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Chapter I. General Introduction 
1. Research context 
Since the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948 until the early 1990s, this Convention 
has been idle.2 The response of the world on it has been absent. Moreover, even in the 1990s, the 
pace in the response on it was very slow. The content of the obligation to prevent genocide was 
largely neglected. This is linked to the fact that the concept of prevention itself is not clarified in 
the Genocide Convention. Not only the meaning of this concept of prevention is not clarified in 
the Genocide Convention, but also there is not much indication on the content of this concept in 
international law in general. The literature has not done much to fill that gap either. In fact, for 
many years, no legal research has been undertaken on the obligation to prevent genocide 
enshrined in the Genocide Convention and on prevention itself. Most academic research on the 
prevention of genocide has been undertaken by historians, philosophers, and social scientists.3  
The latter have rightly shown the necessity to prevent genocide from the perspectives of their 
disciplines, but of course they could not suggest concrete legal measures. Later international law 
research on the prevention of genocide has rather concentrated on the late stages in the process to 
genocide, i.e when acts of genocide are or have been committed, leaving aside the earlier stages 
in the process to genocide. Even at those late stages, such research has suffered from an acute 
lack of concrete measures to put an end to genocide. Moreover, even supposing that measures 
were there to put an end to genocide, the fact that they intervene at late stages of the process to 
genocide makes the aim of prevention not only difficult to be achieved, but also the spirit of 
prevention loses its meaning.  
Another factor that has contributed to the lack of clarity about the prevention of genocide and the 
legal obligation thereof is that for very long, there have been not many legal proceedings related 
to it before competent courts. Except for the 1951 ICJ advisory opinion on the issue of 
reservations,4 it was only until the 2000s that there was the first ICJ decision related to the 
                                                          
2
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260(III)A of the 
United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948, available at< http://www.un.org> (visited 12 July 2009). 
3
 Reference to those researches is made in chapter III of this work. Also noted by Schabas, A. William, Genocide in 
International Law, the Crime of Crimes, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 8. 
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obligation to prevent genocide.5 The Court clarified certain aspects related to the content of the 
obligation to prevent genocide, but given the fact that its power is limited to the case before it, it 
did not (and it could not) solve all the questions surrounding this obligation.6 Also, the relatively 
new concept of the Responsibility to Protect did not solve the questions related to the obligation 
to prevent genocide. Instead, there is a danger that it may absorb the legal obligation to prevent 
genocide. Moreover, as the legal status of  the Responsibility to Protect is more uncertain than 
the legal status of the prevention of genocide  the result may be a weakening of prevention of 
genocide.  
Given these problems, it is not surprising that since the Holocaust a number of other tragic 
situations of genocide have occurred. The tragedies in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur 
are other most horrible instances of genocide that have shocked the conscience of mankind, and 
there is a fear that the list may grow even longer in the future if prevention of genocide is not 
clarified and taken seriously.  
What is paradoxical is that, while for other tragedies it is generally not easy to foresee them 
before they happen and therefore difficult (or even impossible) to prevent them, genocide is 
preceded by factors and clear signs that it may or is about to happen. That would logically 
provide enough opportunities to take measures to prevent those factors from leading to genocide. 
In fact, even when it has not been prevented from happening, it can still be clear to everyone that 
it is happening and can therefore be stopped at its start. Two of the instances of genocide 
(Rwanda and Bosnia) may help to show that paradox. Several years before the genocide in 
Rwanda occurred, there existed factors and signs that a genocidal conflict could potentially break 
out. For instance, the permanent distinction between the ethnic groups introduced during the 
colonisation in the 1930s and the consequent discrimination contributed to the antagonism of the 
Hutu population which had been underprivileged for long time. This contributed to the hatred 
that exploded in 1959 when the killing of thousands of Tutsi by Hutu extremists occurred, 
followed by others in the 1960s and 1970s. The hate ideology and propaganda against the Tutsi 
population continued for many years. It increased in 1990 with the invasion of the Tutsi-led rebel 
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group known as the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). Some weekly newspapers like Kangura 
supported by the government and military figures carried out open hate-propaganda against 
Tutsis. It published in 1990 the infamous ten Hutu commandments in which there were 
instructions to mistreat and discriminate Tutsis.7 This propaganda increased much more in 1993 
by the “Radio-Television Libre de Milles Collines” (RTLM) which began broadcasting shortly 
before the signing ceremony of Arusha Accords between the Rwandan government and the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front.8 
In his report of March 1993, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary 
Executions alerted the international community that genocide against the Tutsi population was 
being prepared.9 The alert was also given four months prior to the real beginning of the 
massacres by the commander of United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), Canadian 
General Romeo Dallaire, when he sent a coded cable to the Peacekeeping Operations department 
of the United Nations Secretariat warning of a plan for the extermination of the Tutsi 
population.10 He mentioned that he suspected that the lists of Tutsis which were being 
established were for their extermination. He revealed that various and several arms had been 
stockpiled in secret locations.11 These arms were the ones which were used to exterminate Tutsi 
four months later.  
On 6 April 1994, the airplane of the Rwandan president was shot and it exploded in the skies 
above Kigali. Within hours of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard, the army, the 
Interahamwe, and the Impuzamugambi mounted roadblocks and killings spread quickly 
throughout the whole county, ordered and commanded by the Government through its army, 
Gendarmerie, militias, and individuals. This was the beginning of the genocide. The Hutu Prime 
Minister Madame Agathe Uwiringiyimana who was known for being moderate was assassinated 
the day after the presidential air crash.12 Ten Belgian soldiers who were in charge of her security 
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were killed by the Rwandan army as well.13 
At that beginning of the killings, the French government decided to fly in a well-equipped armed 
force of paratroopers, Operation Amaryllis with the objective to evacuate French nationals and 
other westerners, and members of President Habyarimana’s family. The evacuation was done by 
French, together with Italian and Belgian soldiers.14  
At that time, the number of the UN peacekeeping force was 2548. General Dallaire made a 
request of reinforcement of UNAMIR to put an end to the genocide that had just started. For 
instance he sought the Security Council to increase the number of UNAMIR troops and to give 
the enforcement power under Chapter VII of the Charter to UNAMIR for it to stop the 
genocide.15  In the meantime, the Belgian contingent (a battalion) in the UNAMIR got a message 
around the 9th of April 1994 ordering it to pull out from Rwanda.16 By that time, ninety soldiers 
of that Belgian battallion commanded by Lieutenant Luc Lemaire were at “Ecole Technique 
Officielle” of Kicukiro in Kigali.17 In this school, there were more than two thousand people 
(from 8 April) who had fled the killings. They sought the protection from the Belgians, which 
they got only until 11 April, when the Belgian battalion pulled out.18 Likewise, in another 
location in Kigali known as the “Centre des Pères Salésiens de Kimihurura”, there were some 
troops of UNAMIR (Belgians) and around 600 people had sought their protection until 11th April 
when they abandoned them and they were killed by Hutu extremists.19 
Ten days after this withdrawal and at the urging of the United States,20 the Security Council 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
pp. 221-262. See also Ruvebana, Etienne, “Victims of the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda”, in Letschert, 
Rianne et al., Victimological Approaches to International Crimes: Africa, Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2011, p. 95.   
13
 Dallaire, Romeo, op.cit, pp. 221-262. 
14
 Heidenrich, G. John, How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and Concerned Citizen, 
Westport, Connecticut London: Praeger, 2001, p.199 
15
 Kenneth, J. Campbell, Genocide and the Global Village, Palgrave, New York, 2001, p. 78. 
16
 Schabas, A. W., Le Genocide Rwandais et la Responabilité de Casques Bleus, Communication presentée lors des 
Ateliers pour la pratique du droit international public et du droit international humanitaire ONU mecanique, Geneve, 
le 23 Avril 1998, p. 3, available at <http://129.194.252.80/catfiles/1215.pdf>   (visited 17 September 2009). See also 
Testimony of Colonel Luc Marchal on 15 May 2007 in the Case Prosecution v. Major Ntuyahaga Bernard, available 
at < http://www.lesoir.be/> (visited 16 September 2009). The Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal was second-in-
command for UNAMIR (1993-1994) until the Belgium contingent pulled out on the 11th April 1994. 
17
 Melvern, Linda,  op.cit, p. 2. 
18
 Idem, pp. 1-3. 
19
 Melvern, Linda,  op.cit, p. 2. 
20





adopted Resolution 912,21 in which it decided to withdraw 90 per cent of the rest of UNAMIR 
troops and the remaining 270 were to be used only for the evacuation of foreigners and to act as 
intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreements.22  
All along those days, General Dallaire kept seeking the UN to ask the US to shut down the radio 
RTLM which was a direct instrument of genocide. However, after a study of the request by the 
Pentagon, it was recommended not to grant that request due inter alia to the high cost ($ 8.500 
an hour for a jamming aircraft over the country) and the legal argument that jamming a national 
radio station would violate the international law principle of sovereignty of states.23 Upon the 
proposal of France, on the 22 June 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 929 in which it 
authorised France to conduct the operation Turquoise for humanitarian objectives.24 However, 
this operation did not put an end to genocide.  
As a result of Rwanda’s lack of will to put in place measures to prevent genocide and the 
absence of concrete actions by other actors to prevent genocide, an estimate of 800,000 lives 
were lost in only one hundred days before it was ended as a result of the military victory of the 
RPF. It is the fastest and most vicious genocide yet recorded in human history.25 Yet, as 
observed later, this genocide could have been prevented if each actor had taken preventive 
measure tailored to each phase.26 It is generally recognized that states and the UN have failed to 
prevent it from happening.27 Indeed, not only a number of measures could have been taken at 
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early phases to prevent it from starting, even at later phases, genocide could have been averted or 
halted.  
The discussion on the second instance of genocide will focus on the late phases. Similarly to 
what happened in Rwanda, the genocide in Srebrenica occurred while the Dutch peacekeepers 
were there. The Dutch troops were in the Balkans as part of the UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) to shield civilians during the bloody wars that pitted Bosnian Serbs against 
Bosnian Croats and Muslims. This peacekeeping force at Srebrenica, which was composed of 
nearly 400 men, was meant to protect the refugees and residents of that Bosnian town, 
designated a safe haven by the UN in 1993. The UN units were stationed in the Safe Areas in 
order to deter an attack.28 But this signified little more than a symbolic presence and they offered 
little or no resistance to the Serb attack.29 UN Undersecretary-General Kofi Annan had already 
written to the then Force Commander Wahlgren on the establishment of the Safe Areas that the 
demilitarisation of Srebrenica only meant that UNPROFOR itself took on a “moral 
responsibility” for the safety of the Safe Area but that he realized that UNPROFOR did not 
possess the military resources to guarantee safety. Annan stated that a small number of 
peacekeepers could not be expected to ward off a large-scale invasion by Bosnian Serbs. 
UNPROFOR would seek cover when fired at, like everyone else. It was up to the warring 
factions to treat Srebrenica as a Safe Area.30 The Rules of Engagement for peacekeeping 
remained in force, unchanged. These rules landed the UN troops in a vulnerable situation 
because they were of a reactive nature and did not allow for offensive operations. The rules were 
not geared to an overt attack on a Safe Area.31 As a result of a lack of will by actors involved in 
the conflict to take preventive actions as well as others outside it, an estimated 8,000 men and 
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boys at Srebrenica were killed in July 1995. 
These two genocides, as well as others, happened while the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and other sources of international law on the prevention of 
genocide were in force. However, the obligation to prevent genocide has been extremely vague 
and almost non-existent in practice.  
2. Research question 
When the ICJ ruled for the first time on the obligation to prevent genocide, it confirmed the 
existence of that obligation where it noted that: “The Contracting Parties have a direct obligation 
to prevent genocide”.32 However, it neither gave the meaning of prevention nor does it provide 
clear mechanisms on what the obligation to prevent genocide entails. Given the nature of 
genocide and the nature of measures to be taken to prevent it, different actors may be necessary 
for that prevention. These may include territorial states,33 non-territorial states,34 and the UN. But 
the Convention did not make such a classification. Furthermore, even where such classification 
of actors might be correct, it is not clear what each actor should do to prevent genocide. 
Also, the rules on the prevention of genocide may clash with some other rules of international 
law. For instance, the Genocide Convention was adopted three years after the adoption of the UN 
Charter which prohibits the UN from interfering in affairs that are within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state.35 Likewise, the same Charter prohibits member states from threatening 
to use or using force in other states.36 A number of UN General Assembly resolutions followed 
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to confirm these rules. 37 This was reiterated by the ICJ in Nicaragua case which confirmed that: 
“The principle forbids all states or groups of states to intervene directly or indirectly in internal 
or external affairs of other states.”38   
In view of the foregoing, the main question of this work is:  
What does the obligation to prevent genocide in international law entail for states and 
for the UN?  
The aim of this question is to investigate what the obligation to prevent genocide may entail for 
its bearers at every level of prevention. This research thus investigates the scope of that 
obligation, its bearers and preventive tools available to them. It examines who among the bearers 
of the obligation to prevent genocide should do what, when, where and how in fulfilling that 
obligation at each phase of the process to genocide. 
In the process to find answers to the main question of this research, a number of sub questions 
will need to be answered. They include the following: 
- What does the concept of prevention mean in different fields and how does its meaning 
in those fields relate to the prevention of genocide in general? 
- What does prevention mean in international law related to genocide and what does the 
obligation to prevent genocide entails for territorial states, non-territorial states and 
the UN? What are the tools available to them in concreto? In other words, what 
possibilities do the existing rules of international law provide for the prevention of 
genocide, what is missing and how should it be improved for the future?  
3. Objective of the research 
Genocide is the crime of crimes which shocks the human conscience. Given the lack of 
clarification of the content of the obligation to prevent genocide or even the doubt on its 
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existence, it is worth investigating the role of international law in attempts to effectively prevent 
this crime. The questions posed in this work arise on the basis of the sad experiences in some 
places in the world including my own state Rwanda. In different places where genocide has 
occurred, there have been factors and phases through which the risk to destroy people on the 
ground of race, ethnicity, religion or nationality could be foreseen and indeed those factors were 
followed by genocide. The field of prevention of genocide in international law has suffered from 
embarrassing insufficiencies of clarity on what the obligation to prevent genocide entails. There 
is actually no existing “accepted canon” of theories in international law on how to prevent 
genocide. This work aims at providing some, and therefore contributing to filling that deep 
vacuum. Indeed, the aim in this work is to contribute to the clarification of the international legal 
regime applicable to the prevention of genocide. It is limited to the obligation of states and the 
UN to prevent genocide and it does not treat questions related to their responsibility in case of 
the breach of that obligation. 
If answers to questions formulated above are provided, this research will contribute to the 
advancement of international law as far as the prevention of genocide is concerned. It will help 
to establish whether and to what extent states and the United Nations have the obligation to 
prevent genocide and how this should work and be improved in concreto. Therefore, this 
investigation aims at contributing to avoid such tragedies in the future. More clearly, this work is 
undertaken for the purpose of promoting the cause of humanity in general and human rights in 
particular. Indeed, genocide is itself not only a violation of human rights but the whole process to 
genocide is full of many human rights violations and therefore its commission involves those 
violations to a large extent. Looking at it from this perspective leads to assuming that clarifying 
the obligation to prevent genocide in the whole process leading to genocide can contribute to 
promoting the cause of humanity and human rights. 
4. Sources of the research 
This research is not limited to specific states as a case study. Though in the investigation I refer 
to some examples of states in which genocide has happened in order to verify the theoretical 
arguments, I do not do this with a particular region or state in mind. Genocide is a global issue 




I start this research with the assumption that there is a real vacuum in research on how the 
prevention of genocide should be carried out in international law. The content of the obligation 
to prevent genocide has been obscure for many years. This research aims at contributing to the 
filling of this gap in international law that has not been addressed properly in the academic 
discourse on the subject. It endeavours to give meaning to prevention and the obligation to 
prevent genocide and to suggest concrete measures. Much of the work consists of the elaboration 
of the meaning and scope of the concept of prevention as well as the means, tools and methods 
that are available to states and the UN to prevent genocide during the whole process to genocide, 
i.e before and during the genocide.   
In doing so, the appropriate method is the analysis of general literature and legal materials. 
Indeed, general literature on the concept of prevention will be used in order to clarify the 
meaning and scope of that concept in general. Academic research in various fields, including 
public health, criminology, economics, environment and sociology, will be used. Moreover, 
since the ordinary meaning of terms is relevant in interpreting international law, using this 
general literature is useful because it will contribute to elucidating the meaning and scope of the 
concept of prevention and the obligation to prevent genocide in international law in the various 
stages in the processes leading to genocide. Legal sources as enshrined in article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice will be analysed in order to show the scope of the 
legal obligation to prevent genocide.39 According to this article, sources of international law are: 
international conventions, international custom, general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations, judicial decisions and legal doctrine.40 Key international conventions used in this work 
include the Genocide Convention and the Charter of the United Nations. They will be 
investigated in order to show the “ratio legis”, the content of the obligation to prevent genocide, 
its structure as well as its limits. Customary international law related to the obligation to prevent 
genocide will also be analysed in order to determine the bearers of the obligation to prevent 
genocide. As subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law, case-law will be also used 
to show how those international legal instruments have been interpreted and applied by courts in 
relation to the obligation to prevent genocide. More specifically, the case of Serbia-Montenegro 
v. Bosnia-Herzegovina will occupy the most important place since the Court ruled on many legal 
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questions about the application of the Genocide Convention. Legal doctrine will be used to 
clarify rules and principles of international law related to the prevention of genocide which have 
not been sufficiently defined in related international conventions.  Other legally relevant sources 
will also be used and analysed. For instance, resolutions of competent organs of the UN related 
to genocide will be analysed to show the extent to which they may have contributed to the 
development of international law in the field of prevention of genocide. Furthermore, such 
resolutions, reports of competent organs of the UN as well as other relevant documents related to 
genocide and its prevention will be used to show and discuss the practice of states and the UN in 
taking measures to prevent genocide. This will help to identify legal, institutional, and practical 
barriers  to the prevention of genocide and to suggest how they could be solved for the future. 
5. Structure of the research 
In searching for legal answers to the questions involved, this work will be divided in nine 
chapters. Chapter I (the present one) is a general introduction which consists of an explanation of 
the context of this research, the research question, the interest of the research and its approach.  
Since an analysis of the content of the obligation to prevent genocide (which is core in this work) 
calls first and foremost for the understanding of the meaning and scope of the concept of 
prevention itself, Chapter II discusses the notion of prevention in different fields. The purpose 
and process of prevention in those fields will be explained. Chapter III discusses prevention of 
genocide in general. It discusses the factors that contribute to leading to genocide as well as the 
phases in the process to genocide. It also discusses how prevention can be applied to those 
factors and phases in the whole process to genocide. 
These chapters are followed by five chapters on the obligation to prevent genocide in 
international law. Indeed, Chapter IV discusses this obligation under both international 
conventions and customary law. It first outlines the origin and process of the drafting of the 
Genocide Convention. It also explains how prevention is understood in international law, the 
meaning and scope of the obligation to prevent genocide, the bearers of the obligation to prevent 
genocide under the Genocide Convention and customary international law, and the temporal 
divisions in the application of the obligation to prevent genocide. Chapter V discusses how to 
apply the rules on the prevention of genocide to territorial states. It examines what that obligation 




that obligation entails to non-territorial states, Chapter VII examines whether and to what extent 
the UN is obligated to prevent genocide. In these chapters, some serious challenges to the 
prevention of genocide are identified. That is why Chapter VIII discusses whether and to what 
extent the (relatively) new concept of the responsibility to protect addresses them and whether 
and to what extent it contributes to the prevention of genocide. 
Finally, recognizing the crucial weight of the prevention of genocide in the whole work, Chapter 
IX concludes by summarizing the work and giving recommendations on mechanisms for future 
and better prevention of genocide and how they should be operationalized.  




Chapter II. The concept of prevention as understood in various fields 
Introduction 
Law as a discipline is not a closed vehicle of ideas and thoughts. It is conceived and written in 
connection with other disciplines. This means that it cannot stand alone and it therefore needs 
other disciplines for not only its formulation and understanding but also its certainty. As simple 
example, law does not have its own language and the rules are formulated in different languages 
which are also used in other disciplines and one needs to know what the terms used mean from 
their ordinary or contextual meaning to understand their scope.  
In this respect, before seeking to understand what prevention of genocide means in international 
law, this chapter explains that concept of prevention from different fields. Indeed, the 
understanding of the meaning of the concept of prevention and actions to be taken as well as the 
time to take them will help to understand what the prevention of genocide might entail and when 
actions are needed and can be taken. Thus, the understanding of this concept from other fields 
will be useful to the thinking or conceptualization of prevention of genocide. In other words, 
drawing from this chapter will help to understand and clarify what the prevention of genocide 
may entail or what it ought to entail. It should be understood however that the aim of this chapter 
is not to develop all fields that use prevention but rather to provide some examples that help to 
understand the meaning and the scope of the concept of prevention in order to see how far these 
theories can shape the methods and techniques useful for the prevention of genocide. This 
chapter will be limited to five different fields which are prevention in public health, prevention 
of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, prevention in criminology, prevention in international 
environmental law and the prevention of torture. The choice of these five fields is mainly 
dictated by the relatively frequent use of prevention and the development of that concept as it 
will be demonstrated in each of them. 
1. Prevention in public health  
It is believed that the concept of prevention was first developed in the field of public health.41 
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This concept is an essential element in public health and since it is strongly developed within this 
area, it is a most relevant area to start with in the investigation on the concept of prevention. This 
will be done in two subsections. First, the meaning of prevention is explored. In the second 
subsection this will be illustrated with some examples. 
1.1. Meaning of prevention in public health 
An English proverb much commonly used in the field of health says: “Prevention is better than 
cure” which means that it is better to stop a bad thing from happening rather than try to deal with 
the problem after it has happened.42 In the field of public health, prevention has been understood 
as the fact of averting the development of a pathological state by putting in place and applying 
measures that limit the progression of disease at any stage of its course”.43 In other words, 
prevention in public health is the action to avoid occurrence or development of a health problem 
and/or its complications.44 The World Health Organization did not go far from this explanation. 
Indeed it defined prevention as a concept entailing measures not only to prevent the occurrence 
of disease, such as immunization or disease vector control or anti-smoking activities, but also its 
progress and the reduction of its consequences once established.45 In other words, disease 
prevention would cover measures not only to prevent the occurrence of disease, such as risk 
factor reduction, but also to arrest its progress and reduce its consequences once established.  
This concept of prevention has historically been divided into three main levels of prevention 
namely: primary, secondary, and tertiary.46 The primary prevention consists of interventions that 
are directed at individuals prior to the onset of any signs of behavioural or medical disorder.47 
                                                          
42
 Sally, Wehmeier et al., Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 7th edition, Oxford University press, 2005, p. 78. 
43
 Clark, Duncan W, MacMahon, Brian., Preventive medicine. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co, 1967, cited by 
Starfield, Barbara, “The Concept of Prevention: A good idea gone astray”? Journal of Epidemiology and Community 
Health, December 2007.  
44
 Bentzen, Niels (ed.), “Wonca International Dictionary For General/Family Practice”, available at 
<http://www.ulb.ac.be/esp/mfsp/quat-en.html> (visited on  06 May 2010). 
45
 World Health Organization, Glossary of terms used in the “Health for all”, Geneva, 1984. 
46
 Tarter, Ralph, “Applying Prevention Theory to the Prevention Practice”, Centre for Education and Drug Abuse 
Research, University of Pittsburgh, available at <http://www.pitt.edu/~cedar/forum/tarter.html> (visited on 06 May 
2010). See also Jaime Correia de Sousa, “Quaternary Prevention”, available at 
<http://www.drmed.org/javne_datoteke/novice/datoteke/603-QuaternarycPreventioncJCScshort.pdf> (visited on  06 
May 2010). 
47
 Tarter, Ralph, “Applying Prevention Theory to the Prevention Practice”, Center for Education and Drug Abuse 
Research, University of Pittsburgh, available at <http://www.pitt.edu/~cedar/forum/tarter.html> (visited on 06 May 
2010). 




The goal of the primary prevention is to protect healthy people from developing a disease or 
experiencing an injury in the first place.48 The World Health Organisation as well as 
Brantingham observed that at the primary level, measures are taken with the aim to abate the 
environmental conditions that cause diseases.49 Indeed, the action taken are those capable of 
avoiding or removing the cause of a health problem (disease) in an individual or a population 
before it arises, including health promotion and specific protection prior to the development of 
disease or injuries.50 These measures may include the mosquito extermination, vaccination, job-
safety engineering, personal hygiene education.51 They may also include education about good 
nutrition, the importance of regular exercise, and the dangers of tobacco, alcohol and drugs, 
education and legislation about proper seatbelt and helmet use, regular exams and screening tests 
to monitor risk factors for illness, immunization against infectious disease, controlling potential 
hazards at home and in the workplace.52 The preventive measures and actions thereof usually 
emanate from the health sector, dealing with individuals and populations identified as exhibiting 
identifiable risk factors, often associated with different risk behaviours.53  
The secondary prevention consists of interventions directed at individuals who demonstrate early 
or prodromal signs of a disorder.54 The interventions at this level seek to arrest or retard existing 
disease and its effects through early detection and appropriate medicine.55 In other words, it 
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identifies groups or individuals who have high risk of disease or who have incipient cases of 
disease and intervenes in their lives with special treatments designed to prevent the risk from 
materializing or the incipient case from growing worse.56 This may include special diets for 
overweight executives and chest x-rays in poor neighbourhoods.57 It may also include telling 
people to take daily, low-dose aspirin to prevent a first or second heart attack or stroke, 
recommending regular exams and screening tests in people with known risk factors for illness, 
providing suitably modified work for injured workers,58 etc. Prevention at this level is the action 
taken to detect a health problem at an early stage in an individual or a population, thereby 
facilitating cure, or reducing or preventing its spreading or its long-term effects (e.g. methods, 
screening, case finding and early diagnosis).59 Interventions at this level consist of measures that 
halt or slow the progression of a disease or its sequelae at any point after its inception,60 i.e to 
detect disease in early (asymptomatic) stages and act accordingly.61 And like for the primary 
level, the preventive measures and actions thereof emanate from the public health sector.62 
Tertiary prevention consists of interventions, more commonly called treatment, that are directed 
at individuals who manifest the disorder.63 Interventions at the tertiary prevention seek to arrest 
or retard existing disease and its effects through appropriate treatment; or to reduce the 
occurrence of relapses and the establishment of chronic conditions through, for example, 
effective rehabilitation.64 The rehabilitation is a treatment designed to facilitate the process of 
recovery from injury, illness, or disease to as normal a condition as possible (it is an integral part 
of convalescence which may include proper food, medication, hygiene and suitable exercise 
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which provides the physical basis for recovery and assisting the patient to compensate for deficits 
that cannot be reversed medically).65  Prevention at the tertiary level is concerned with the 
identifying individuals with advanced cases of disease and intervenes with treatment to prevent 
death or permanent disability and to prevent the reoccurrence of the disease by dealing properly 
with the recovery process. This may include the stomach pumping for poisoning, open-heart 
surgery for defective heart valves and radiation therapy for some forms of cancer.66 So, tertiary 
prevention aims at reversing or arresting the progression of disease,67 and like for the other 
levels, this is done by the public health sector.68 
To some up this subsection, the common and important thing to notice is the different moments 
the prevention is needed and the interventions needed to address the issue. While the first 
moment is before the manifestation of any medical disorder which requires preventive measures 
directed to the whole population, the second one is when there are first signs of the disorder 
which requires a selective prevention targeting individuals who demonstrate the risk of disorder. 
And the third moment is when the disorder is already clearly high which needs an intervention or 
a treatment. What makes this third moment different from the second one is the degree of 
seriousness of disorder and the methods or medicine to be used to fix the problem. As far as 
these levels of prevention and the intervention are concerned, it is worth explaining them through 
some examples in the next subsection.  
1.2. Understanding prevention in public health through examples  
Two examples are worth giving here in order to show how prevention may work in practice in 
the field of public health. While the first concerns the prevention of malaria, the second is about 
the prevention of international spread of disease. 
1.2.1. Prevention of malaria 
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Malaria is a common and life-threatening disease in tropical and subtropical countries.69 It is 
therefore not only a health risk to the populations of these countries, but also to travellers who 
visit those malaria regions. Thus, a need to prevent this health risk to both the populations and 
the travellers in the said countries is clear. Some examples on preventive measures suggested by 
the South African ministry of health are worth summarizing here because of their fitting in the 
scheme explained above. They are: the awareness of malaria risk, avoidance of mosquitoes bite, 
Chemoprophylaxis (taking preventive medicines if you are travelling to or living in a malaria 
region), early detection and effective treatment.70 
From this, it can be noticed that in most countries where malaria is an issue, the first thing to do 
by States in line with the prevention of malaria is to raise the awareness of the population about 
the risk. In this respect for instance, the population needs to be sensitized on the danger of 
inhabiting near marshy areas. Likewise the population is advised to clean the place surrounding 
their houses in order not to allow unnecessary grasses around the house which can serve as a 
reproductive area for mosquitoes.  
Furthermore, in line with avoiding mosquito bite, some measures are necessary. These include 
having mosquito nets and make sure they are regularly insecticide-treated with the capability of 
killing mosquitoes around them. Mosquito nets are used to cover the beds in order to prevent 
mosquito bite while users are sleeping.  The use of repellent cream on exposed skin is also 
important as well as the use of appropriate preventive medicine that keeps the populations and 
travellers able to resist the infection even in case of mosquito bite. 
In all these measures mentioned above and the need to comply with the preventive measures, 
raising the awareness of the population on the danger of the disease is important in order to make 
the prevention possible. The population must be educated on how to use and apply the methods 
and techniques of prevention. But also the state makes sure that not only it has to train enough 
doctors who are capable of treating this disease and deploy them in each hospital but also must 
ensure that there are enough and efficient equipment to diagnose this disease as well as 
appropriate and efficient medication to treat it. These preventive measures are naturally taken 
before the infection/disorder and thus fall in the primary prevention level. 
When none of the above mentioned measures has been taken or despite them the mosquito could 
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still bite someone, then new measures are needed to suppress the disease. For instance when a 
person has the symptoms of malaria (mostly Fever –although common, fever may be absent in 
some cases, Rigors, Headache, Sweating, Fatigue, Myalgia (back and limbs), Abdominal pain, 
Diarrhea, Loss of appetite, Nausea and vomiting71), the person must immediately get early 
detection and medication to avoid getting worse. These preventive measures are taken after the 
infection/disorder and thus fall in the secondary prevention level. When these measures have not 
been able to stop the disorder from getting worse, the hospital must act as quickly as possible to 
first give the medication that stop the fever, but also to provide with strong medication capable 
of suppressing the disease to avoid that the person’s situation (health) leads to death. At this level 
also, measures that deal with the consequences that the disease has caused must be taken in order 
to avoid the relapse into that disease. These measures fall in the tertiary prevention level.  
The non- malaria states also needs to proceed the same way with regard to people who travel 
from and to them. In other words, though the prevention of Malaria is much needed in malaria 
regions, preventive measures to combat it in non-malaria regions are also needed in order to give 
advice to persons who wish to travel to malaria regions and also to intervene in case there are 
persons who may come with that disease from the malaria region (regardless of the nationality). 
1.2.2.  Prevention of international spread of disease   
The WHO Constitution72 confers upon the World Health Assembly the authority to adopt 
regulations “designed to prevent the international spread of disease”.73 Pursuant to this 
Constitution, some International Health Regulations have been adopted and successively 
amended by the WHO Assembly.74 The last amendment of the International Health Regulations 
was adopted in 2005 and entered into force in 2007.75  According to the latter instrument, the 
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purpose and scope of these international health regulations are to prevent, protect against, control 
and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are 
commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic and trade.76 In doing so, states parties to the regulations are 
obligated to take measures as provided in these international health regulations. 
Moreover, in the implementation of these regulations, states are to be guided by the goal of their 
universal application for the protection of all people of the world from the international spread of 
disease.77  The measures to be taken by states parties include the quick development, strength 
and maintenance of the capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events in accordance with 
these regulations.78 In the annex I of those regulations  states are obligated to utilize existing 
national structures and resources to meet their core capacity requirements under these 
regulations, including reporting, notification, verification, response and collaboration activities, 
and their activities concerning designated airports, ports and ground crossings.79 So, states 
parties have the obligation to develop certain minimum core public health capacities.80 These 
capacities include the ones to detect events involving disease or death expected levels for the 
particular time and place in all areas within the territory of the State Party; and to report all 
available essential information immediately to the appropriate level of healthcare. Essential 
information includes: clinical descriptions, laboratory results, sources and type of risk, numbers 
of human cases and deaths, conditions affecting the spread of the disease and the health measures 
employed.81 The capacities also include the one to implement preliminary control measures 
immediately.82  
Furthermore, the state must develop its capacities in public health response which include being 
able to determine rapidly the control measures required to prevent domestic and international 
spread; to provide support through specialized staff, laboratory analysis of samples (domestically 
or through collaborating centres) and logistical assistance (e.g. equipment, supplies and 
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transport).83 Likewise, state party must be able to provide on-site assistance as required to 
supplement local investigations; to provide, by the most efficient means of communication 
available, links with hospitals, clinics, airports, ports, ground crossings, laboratories and other 
key operational areas for the dissemination of information and recommendations received from 
WHO regarding events in the State Party’s own territory and in the territories of other states 
Parties.84 It must also be able to establish, operate and maintain a national public health 
emergency response plan, including the creation of multidisciplinary/multisectoral teams to 
respond to events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern; and to 
provide the foregoing on a 24-hour basis.85 States therefore develop and implement plans of 
action to ensure that these core capacities are present and functioning throughout their 
territories.86 Pursuant to the explanation in the previous sub section, these measures correspond 
to the primary prevention level. 
If, despite all these preventive measures, they did not prevent a public health concern from 
happening, further levels of prevention intervene. Hence, states will comply with the obligation 
to notify the WHO of those events that may constitute a public health emergency of international 
concern according to defined criteria.87 The determination of a “public health emergency of 
international concern” and issuance of corresponding temporary recommendations88 is done by 
the Director-General, after taking into account the views of an Emergency Committee; the 
establishment of national IHR focal points and WHO IHR contact points for urgent 
communications between states parties and WHO.89 In case states concerned do not report to the 
WHO, the regulations have provisions authorizing WHO to take into consideration unofficial 
reports of public health events and to obtain verification from States Parties concerning such 
events.90 If the state does not accept to cooperate with the WHO for the verification of the report 
on events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern, the WHO may, 
when justified by the magnitude of the public health risk, share with other States Parties the 
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information available to it,91 and shall send to all States Parties and, as appropriate, to relevant 
intergovernmental organizations, as soon as possible and by the most efficient means available, 
in confidence, such public health information which it has received, necessary to enable States 
Parties to respond to a public health risk.92 And depending on the level of the magnitude of the 
public health risk, the preventive measures may correspond to either the secondary or tertiary 
level. 
1.3.  Preliminary conclusions 
In summing up this section, what can be noticed from this discussion is that the prevention in 
public health is understood as a continuous one. The temporal division in the three levels: 
primary, secondary and tertiary ones, explains well this concept in public health and its 
continuous character. The prevention of disease is done in a way that tackles its root causes 
(primary level), addresses the early symptoms (secondary level) and treats the sickness and deals 
with its consequences (tertiary level). This means that when preventive measures aiming at the 
eradication of the causes has not been successful, the disease can still be prevented by addressing 
the symptoms from the early stage and later at a critical stage with robust treatment (if not 
successful at early stage) as well as dealing with the consequences (recovery process) in order to 
avoid the relapse into the same disease or related ones. The World Health Organisation provides 
an example of an international institutionalized governance model to deal as effectively as 
possible with prevention at all three levels. 
2. Prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons  
The question to be treated here is how prevention is understood in the prevention of proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and how it is used in practice. It is proceeded in two subsections. The first is 
about the understanding of the concept of prevention through the rules on the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and the second is about the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
in the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
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2.1. Understanding prevention through the rules on non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons 
As the UN was aware that the discovery of atomic energy also included the capacity to produce 
nuclear weapons,93 a creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was initiated 
as one of the mechanisms to regulate and make good use of atomic energy but also to prevent the 
development of nuclear weapons.94 According to its Statute, this agency was created with the 
objectives of seeking to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health 
and prosperity throughout the world and ensuring, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by 
it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any 
military purpose.95  
However, it was clear that the Statute was not by itself adequate to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was adopted in 
1968.96 Both instruments complemented each other in furthering safeguards to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons and to work towards their eventual elimination. 
With regard to the prevention of the diversion of the atomic energy into nuclear weapons, the 
agency has been given the power to put in place an international safeguards system. Article III. 
A. 5  of the Statute and article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty assign to the agency the 
function to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and 
other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or 
at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any 
military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or 
multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a state, to any of that state’s activities in the field of 
atomic energy.97 Likewise, under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, state 
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party undertakes to accept safeguards for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment 
of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear 
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.98  This 
provides the legal basis for the IAEA to conclude agreements with states, and with regional 
inspectorates, for the application of safeguards. These agreements are of three main types: (i) 
comprehensive safeguards agreements, (ii) item-specific safeguards agreements, and (iii) 
voluntary offer agreements.99 
In the comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, states undertake to accept Agency 
safeguards on all sources or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within 
the territory of the state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. With 
this, the Agency’s increased ability to detect such facilities reduces the possibility that they may 
exist undetected.100 
As for item-specific safeguards agreements, the Agency is required to ensure that the nuclear 
material and other specified items are not used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices or in such a way as to further any military purpose.101 And although the NPT does not 
require the five nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, UK, USA) to accept safeguards 
provided for in that Treaty, they have all concluded safeguards agreements under which they 
have voluntarily offered nuclear material and/or facilities from which the Agency may select to 
apply safeguards.102 It appears that the IAEA plays a crucial role in the supervision/monitoring 
of states” compliance with the rules on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and there is a 
need to show it much more concretely. 
2.2. The IAEA role in the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons 
Concretely, in order to fulfil its functions, the agency carries out some activities which include 
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but are not limited to furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and in 
conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies103 and 
establishing control over the use of special fissionable materials received by the Agency, in order 
to ensure that these materials are used only for peaceful purposes.104 It allocates its resources in 
such a manner as to secure efficient utilization and the greatest possible general benefit in all 
areas of the world, bearing in mind the special needs of the under- developed areas of the 
world.105 
Furthermore, the agency is bound by an obligation to submit reports on its activities annually to 
the General Assembly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security Council: if in 
connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the 
competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ 
bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.106  
The UN Security Council has so far dealt with the matter of nuclear weapons and has acted 
accordingly. For instance, after reports of the IAEA, the Security Council has adopted several 
resolutions either condemning some states for the acts of non-compliance with their obligations 
under international law related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or has provided for 
sanctions in this regard and has requested states to take preventive measures.107 One of those 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council in line with the prevention of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is the resolution 1540 of 2004 requesting states not only to take effective 
measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction but also to enforce them.108 
Under this resolution 1540, all states have some primary obligations: to prohibit support to non-
State actors attempting to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use 
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;109 to adopt and enforce 
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effective laws prohibiting the proliferation of such items to non-state actors, and prohibiting 
assisting or financing such proliferation; and to take and enforce effective measures to control 
these items, in order to prevent their proliferation, as well as to control the provision of funds and 
services that contribute to proliferation.110 This resolution requests states to adopt effective 
measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. In doing so, states are 
obligated to develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such 
items in production, use, storage or transport; developing and maintaining appropriate effective 
physical protection measures.111 
2.3. Preliminary conclusions 
What can be understood here is that the concept of prevention in this field has not been very 
much used in all these legal instruments. However, it is not completely absent. Moreover, from 
the procedure and purpose of the rules of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it can be argued 
that the rationale of the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was to 
prevent the development of nuclear weapons. The international safeguards system put in place by 
the IAEA shows the phases through which this prevention is carried out. The primary, secondary 
and tertiary levels explained in the previous section are not used in the field of prevention of 
proliferation of nuclear weapons but the explanation of the procedure shows that this prevention 
is done in different phases as well. The relatively recent development in that field where states 
are requested to adopt effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, including by establishing appropriate controls over related 
materials has even demonstrated much more that the prevention has to be done from the early 
stage but also continues at further steps. Another interesting thing in this regard is the 
establishment of this organisation that supervises the implementation of the rules on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Its role through the procedure explained above is primordial for 
the prevention of development of nuclear weapons.                                                                                                                              
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3. Prevention in criminology 
The question to be treated here is how prevention is understood in the field of criminology. To 
start with, Criminology is a discipline that, among other things, looks at the root causes of crime 
and about its prevention which involves measures that deter the occurrence of crime.112 It is 
about tackling the causes of crimes and work on them.  This section does not go into details 
about causes of crimes. Instead, it focuses on the scheme of prevention applied in criminology 
which is of course done by tackling those causes.113 
A definition of prevention in criminology has been proposed by Brantingham and Faust that it is 
“any activity by an individual or a group, public or private, that precludes the incidence of one or 
more criminal acts”.114 They also referred to the three levels of prevention proposed in the public 
health field which are the primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. Crime prevention was 
hence conceptualized as operating at these three levels: The primary prevention which is directed 
at modification of criminogenic conditions in the physical and social environment at large. In 
other words, the primary crime prevention identifies conditions of the physical and social 
environment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts in order to alter those 
conditions so that crimes are less likely to occur.115 Secondary prevention is directed at early 
identification and intervention in the lives of individuals or groups in criminogenic 
circumstances, and tertiary prevention is directed at prevention of recidivism.116 
For each of the three levels of crime prevention, the authors proposed some prevention modes of 
interventions. Measures to be taken at the primary crime prevention level may include the 
general deterrence through the presence of the police and through education of citizens.117 The 
measures may also include the adoption of laws which define crimes in a clear manner and 
which provide for exemplary sentences for each crime. These laws may also be such that they do 
not allow the opportunity for crimes. Basing on the old saying that “opportunity makes the 
thief”, scholars have defined criminal opportunities as  those arrangements or situations that 
individuals or groups encounter that offer attractive potential for criminal reward, largely 
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because they are accompanied by little apparent risk of detection or penalty.118 Among the 
examples there is the widespread availability of handguns in the United States of America which 
result in a high rate of homicide and aggravated assault.119 From the view of the authors, the fact 
that the homicide rate in the United States is many times higher than in Britain and in other 
European nations it is not because the United States is a more criminal society than others, it is 
rather because there is an opportunity for that.120 Since criminal opportunities play an important 
role in causing crimes (root causes of crimes), it is therefore extremely important to reduce the 
opportunities, for the crime prevention to be successful.121 This would for instance include the 
adoption of a strict legislation on gun control. Likewise, putting in place a legislation that 
requires multiple signatories and independent auditors helps to prevent larger frauds within 
organizations.122 Also, installing lights where needed and locking houses and stores as well as 
not exposing things to avoid tempting thieves, may help to prevent property crimes. It is possible 
to add that addressing the issues such as poverty and unemployment can be a way of reducing a 
root cause of crimes because it is axiomatic that these can be causes of certain crimes. 
Brantingham and Faust added that measures that reduce the opportunities may require citizens to 
take part in household and business security precautions. Schools are required to give general 
education; religious and social agencies provide moral training, family education and general 
social work.123  These measures at the primary level are needed and they may play the biggest 
role in creating the environment that reduces the opportunities and incentives for crimes. This 
may be achieved through clear rules which will have to be enforced by the police or other 
enforcement mechanisms.  
At the secondary level of prevention measures comprise mainly of those undertaken by the 
police, prosecution and courts. At this level the police put in place social service operations such 
as family crisis units and sensitivity training. It also takes measures of patrol and peace-keeping 
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actions as well as intervention and diversion (e.g: drunk detoxification, juvenile supervision).124 
Providing a large police presence in areas known to suffer from property crimes is another 
example of measures at the secondary level.125 As for the courts, they take pre-adjudication 
diversion (provisional measures).126 Furthermore, measures may require private citizens in places 
where there is manifestation of delinquency to undertake some social activities aiming at 
discouraging it,127 such as parenting education programmes that remind children right from 
wrong.128 Schools intervene with specific educational programs129 like cognitive and social skills 
training to teach children to consider the consequences of their behaviour.130 In this respect, 
while giving the example of how to prevent hate crimes, Nick Tilley says that the prevention of 
hate crimes is a longer-term one because it involves the education of young children in schools 
about diversity as well as efforts to tackle behaviour such as bullying which is often directed 
against people who are perceived as “different”.131  
At the tertiary prevention level, the police and the prosecution arrest and prosecute offenders. 
They are put in custody as it is a key means to prevent reoffending.132 The courts adjudicate and 
therefore offenders are incapacitated through sentence.133 And once incapacitated they are 
prevented from continuing to commit crimes. For instance, in hate crimes, not only the offender 
will not be able to continue to commit them himself, but also, he will be prevented from inciting 
others to commit them. Measures at the tertiary level involve private citizens and schools. The 
latter act as correctional volunteers by denouncing the offenders, planners or policy makers put 
in place institutional design aiming at rehabilitating the offenders in order to prevent recidivism. 
Religious and social agencies provide aftercare service.134 
To sum up, the discussion in this section shows that prevention of crimes needs the three levels 
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said in the public health field. The primary level is meant to identify conditions of the physical 
and social environment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts in order to alter 
those conditions so that crimes are less likely to occur. This may include the adoption of laws 
that criminalise certain conduct and provide for punishment in order to dissuade potential 
offenders. The secondary prevention is about the early intervention in the lives of individuals or 
groups in criminogenic circumstances in order to discourage any plan for the crime before it is 
committed. At the tertiary level, the police and the prosecution arrest and prosecute the offenders 
before competent courts which punish them and therefore prevent them from continuing their 
criminal acts. Prevention in criminology focuses on both root causes and procedure through 
which crimes are committed. This means that prevention is understood in criminology as 
continuous as well. It is a process and each level is important for the prevention.  
4. Prevention in international environmental law 
“Prevention should be a preferred policy because compensation in case of harm often cannot 
restore the situation prevailing prior to the event or accident”.135 
The question here is about how prevention is understood in international environmental law. This 
section is divided in two subsections. While the first is about understanding the meaning and 
purpose of prevention and the preventive measures in international environmental law, the 
second confronts prevention with the lack of scientific certainty on the occurrence of the 
environmental damage as well as the lack of certainty on the power to prevent. 
4.1. Understanding the meaning and purpose of prevention and the preventive 
measures in environmental law 
Under this subsection, the meaning and purpose of prevention in environmental law will be 
explained and the preventive measures through some international conventions and case-law 
related to the environment will be given. 
4.1.1. Understanding the meaning and purpose of prevention in environmental law 
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The meaning and purpose of prevention in international environmental law have been considered 
by the ILC as a duty which deals with the phase prior to the situation where significant harm or 
damage might actually occur.136 Indeed as it has also been affirmed in literature, the purpose of 
this principle is to prevent a specific harm such as alteration of the environment, damage to 
people or the environment, the overload of the assimilative capacity of the environment, from 
arising.137 In other words this would mean that prevention consists of taking measures that are 
susceptible of avoiding the occurrence of environmental harm. According to De Sadeleer, 
preventive measures do not depend on the appearance of ecological problems; they anticipate 
damage or, where it has already occurred, try to ensure it does not spread.138 For him, common 
sense dictates timely prevention of environmental damage to the greatest extent possible, 
particularly when it is likely to be irreversible or too insidious or diffuse to be effectively dealt 
with through civil liability or when reparation would be extremely expensive. By requiring the 
adoption of measures intended to prevent such damage from arising, prevention forms a prudent 
complement to the polluter-pays principle, which does not necessarily compel polluters to reduce 
their pollution by requiring them to internalize their costs.139  
This is different from curative measures which, although capable of remediating environmental 
damage, come too late to avert it.140 Philippe Sands shares this view by saying that it is no longer 
primarily a question of repairing damage after it has occurred.141 He thus argues that prevention 
is not only about prohibiting activities that cause or may cause damage to the environment, but 
also requires that actions be taken by states to protect the environment at an earlier stage.142 The 
question about what kind of measures may be taken will be answered next. 
4.1.2. Understanding preventive measures through some international conventions and 
case-law 
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Given the seriousness of the environmental damages that the world has been experiencing in 
recent years, there has been a popular concern at international, regional and local levels about the 
mechanisms to avert the environmental harm before it occurs.  
There are treaties and related instruments that provide for prevention in international 
environmental law such as those related to pollution, toxic waste and the depletion of ozone 
layer. Without purporting to mention all relevant legal instruments in this area, it is worth 
mentioning some examples related to measures aiming at the prevention of environmental harm.  
They include but are not limited to the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Environment, which in its article 1 provides inter alia that states pledge themselves especially to 
take all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste and other 
matter that is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, 
to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.143 Although this 
convention does not expressly define prevention, it suggests what to do to prevent pollution by 
dumping of wastes. Indeed, this convention provides that states take effective measures 
individually, according to their scientific, technical and economic capabilities, and collectively, 
to prevent marine pollution caused by dumping and shall harmonize their policies in this 
regard.144   
In the same respect, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, while emphasizing 
that states have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment,145 obliges states to 
do so by taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment.146 
According to this convention, the measures to be taken shall deal with all sources of pollution of 
the marine environment which include, inter alia, those designed to minimize to the fullest 
possible environmental damage, such as measures dealing with the release of toxic, harmful or 
noxious substances, especially those which are persistent, from land-based sources, from or 
through the atmosphere or by dumping; those measures limiting the pollution from vessels, in 
particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety 
                                                          
143
 Article 1 of the International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other 
Matter, London, Mexico City, Moscow, Washington, 29 December 1972, available at 
<http://www.admiraltylawguide.com> (visited on 20 December 2010). 
144
 Idem, article 2. 
145
 Article 192 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, available 
at <http://www.admiraltylawguide.com> (visited on 20 December 2010). 
146
 Idem, article 194. 




of operations at sea, preventing intentional and unintentional discharges, and regulating the 
design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of vessels.147 
Prevention appears also to be the fundamental concept behind international legal instruments 
regulating the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. 
Prevention was the foundation of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal under which states are bound to take 
preventive measures to minimize the production of hazardous waste.148 
Likewise, art 2 of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer149 provides 
that states shall take appropriate measures to protect the environment against adverse effects 
resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone 
layer. Among those measures, this article puts that states shall adopt appropriate legislative or 
administrative measures and co-operate in harmonizing appropriate policies to control, limit, 
reduce or prevent human activities under their jurisdiction or control should they find that these 
activities have or are likely to have adverse effects resulting from modification or likely 
modification of the ozone layer.150  
While commenting on article 3 of its Draft Articles on prevention of transboundary harm from 
hazardous activities which reads “The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to 
prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof”, the ILC 
explained what should be understood by appropriate measures and it stated that they may include 
“formulating policies designed to prevent significant transboundary harm or to minimize the risk 
thereof and, secondly, implementing those policies”.151 It added that “such policies are first 
expressed in legislation and administrative regulations and then implemented through various 
enforcement mechanisms”.152 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change stresses that states should take 
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measures to prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate their adverse 
effects,153 and it obligates all states parties to it to formulate and implement national or regional 
programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change  and measures to facilitate adequate 
adaptation to climate change. 154 Likewise, the Kyoto protocol to this convention provides for 
concrete measures to be taken by states in order to prevent the climate change with the objective 
to reach the sustainable development.155  
Preventive measures that can be taken by states may include those related to the environmental 
impact assessment which is the process of identifying the future consequences of a current or 
proposed action or project.156 The ICJ noted in the case concerning Pulp Mills that it is “a 
requirement under general international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment 
where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact 
in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource.”157 
International (arbitral) courts have contributed in the clarification of the content and purpose of 
prevention as well as to the confirmation of the existence of the obligation thereof in 
international environmental law and it is worth giving some examples. In the case between the 
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US and Canada, the Arbitral court ruled in 1938 that Canada had an obligation to stop the 
pollution caused by a smelter plant through the adoption of regulatory measures aiming at 
preventing environmental damage.158 Likewise, although it did not use the word prevention per 
se, the ICJ implied it by confirming in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons that “…the existence of the general obligation of states to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other states or of areas 
beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment.”159 More explicitly, the ICJ subsequently observed in the case of Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros project (Hungary v. Slovakia) that “…in the field of environmental protection, 
vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to 
the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type 
of damage.160 
The case-law has also touched the situation where the environmental damage has occurred by 
reiterating  that international law provides for remedies which, to some extent may be a 
preventive measure in that they may not only deter other states from doing the same, but also 
may discourage the authors from continuing or repeating their acts. The PCIJ has confirmed in 
the case Chorzow Factory that in international law, states are responsible for violations of public 
international law and are obligated to compensate the indirectly or directly affected states for the 
damage caused.161 It is indeed a principle of international law that every breach of an 
international obligation creates a duty to make reparation in an adequate form.162 The ICJ later 
noted again that in case a state has caused an injury by a breach of its international obligations, it 
is responsible for the damage and the reparation is therefore the indispensable consequence of a 
failure to apply a convention without the necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.163 
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From this, it is to be said that, since the obligations under international law are owed to states, a 
breach of binding obligations under international environmental law engages the responsibility 
of the state that has breached it. The ILC draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of 
transboundary harm arising from hazardous activities164 have confirmed this in even clearer 
terms. Principle 4 says: “Each State should take all necessary measures to ensure that prompt and 
adequate compensation is available for victims of transboundary damage caused by hazardous 
activities located within its territory or otherwise under its jurisdiction or control.”165 However, 
the difficulty arises in determining the responsibility of state in case of the environmental 
damage especially in how to know the exact time the breach of the obligation to prevent the 
harm occurs as well as the extent of this breach and consequence to the environment. For 
instance in case of pollution that has contributed to global warming, how to know which state 
contributed to it, from when and to which extent? These are however questions that go beyond 
the scope of this sub-section and a deep analysis on them is not done here. Instead, the questions 
that need consideration here are whether the scientific certainty that a given damage will occur as 
well as the certainty that the preventive measures to be taken will fully prevent that damage are 
required before taking preventive measures. 
4.2. Prevention principle  v. the lack of certainty of the occurrence of 
environmental damage and of the power to prevent 
Clearly as I have endeavoured to demonstrate above, prevention principle in international 
environmental law has been treated with much attention on the international scene in order to 
prevent the occurrence of environmental damage. It is worth questioning here whether in doing 
so, the scientific certainty that the damage will occur is required before the preventive measures 
have to be taken.  Another question is whether certainty that preventive measures to be 
undertaken would totally prevent the occurrence of the environmental damage is required.  
For the first question, article 3.3 of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change seems to 
give a negative answer. It states that “where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, 
taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
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effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost…” Also for the prevention of 
the environmental damage in general, the Rio Declaration used almost the same words that 
“…where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation”.166 This declaration confirmed the relevance of the precautionary principle in the 
protection of the environment by states.167 This principle implies that governments are not to 
refrain from taking action against possible damages, even if the causal link between the human 
behaviour and those damages is not 100% clear.168 In other words, it requires controlling an 
activity susceptible of causing environmental damage even where there is no exact scientific 
certainty on causes and on what the consequences could be. It is commonly agreed that it is 
impossible to know, for instance how a certain level of air pollution will result in a particular 
increase in mortality from respiratory disease, when a certain level of water pollution will affect 
a healthy fish population, or whether oil development in an environmentally sensitive area will 
significantly disturb the native wildlife on the long term.169  
The need to take preventive measures even in case of absence of scientific uncertainty on the 
environmental consequences has been also shown by the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP). It asserted that even in the case of doubt as to the effects on the environment, 
preventive and remedial action should be taken.170 This means that preventive or remedial action 
does not have to await the presentation of conclusive scientific evidence of detrimental effects 
for the environment; instead, preventive or remedial action is to be taken if scientific evidence 
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makes it sufficiently plausible that detrimental effects to the marine environment may result.171 
So, according to UNEP, policy makers cannot hide behind the uncertainties inherent in the 
conclusions of scientific research and that they have to take decisions on the basis of 
probabilities and uncertainties.172 Some other conventions on international environmental law 
also confirmed the same.173  
On the question whether certainty that preventive measures to be undertaken would totally 
prevent the occurrence of the environmental damage is required, the answer seems to be also 
negative. The ILC stated that “…the obligation of the state of origin to take preventive or 
minimizing measures is one of due diligence which entails reasonable efforts by a state to inform 
itself of factual and legal components that relate foreseeably to a contemplated procedure and to 
take appropriate measures, in timely fashion, to address them.174 So, according to the ILC, the 
due diligence  is not intended to guarantee that significant harm be totally prevented, if it is not 
possible to do so. In that eventuality, the state of origin is required to exert its best possible 
efforts to minimize the risk.175 States must behave in such a way as to ensure that no damage will 
occur to the environment of other states or other areas, as a result of the activities under their 
jurisdiction and control.176 The state is therefore under the obligation not only to refrain from 
damaging the environment but also under the obligation to take measures that protect it. 
4.3. Preliminary conclusions 
To sum up this section it can be said that the content and purpose of prevention in environmental 
law is the avoidance of environmental damage by putting in place measures that avert it. The 
temporal divisions used in public health and in criminology are not explicitly mentioned in the 
rules and literature on international environmental law. However, the explanations given in 
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different texts as mentioned in this section do not exclude the application of that division in this 
field as well. Indeed, preventive measures in environmental law do not only anticipate damage 
(primary level) but also avert the spread where it has started to occur (secondary level) and deal 
with its consequences where it has already occurred (tertiary level).177 Understood this way, it is 
possible to infer that the temporal division may be applicable in international environmental law 
as well. Several preventive measures have been indicated. Although it was not intended (and it 
was impossible) to give each and every single preventive measure that is susceptible of 
preventing environmental damage/degradation, the examples contribute to the understanding of 
the concept of prevention and the measures needed at different stages. Though one of those 
measures may be to undertake the environmental impact assessment before launching a given 
activity which might have effect on the environment,  it was explained that prevention does not 
require full scientific certainty on the consequences on the environment. In fact, the 
precautionary principle requires that measures be taken to control activities that are susceptible 
of causing environmental damage even where there is no full scientific certainty on possible 
environmental damage. Lastly, the certainty on success in the prevention is not required. States 
need not to be sure that the measures will successfully prevent the environmental damage. All 
they need is to use their reasonable efforts to inform themselves on the potential environmental 
risks and to take appropriate measures, in timely fashion, to address them.178 
5. Prevention of torture 
Torture, being one of the worst violations of human rights, has been nowadays treated with 
attention on both international and regional level in order to eradicate it. Under this section, the 
prevention of torture which has been singled out among other violations of human rights 
especially because of some relationship it has with the prevention of genocide, will be discussed 
in order to clarify its meaning as far as torture is concerned and to see not only the role states 
may play in that prevention but also the obligation of states in this field and the consequences of 
the non-compliance with that obligation by states. This will be done through two subsections. 
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The first examines the prevention of torture at the international level and the second examines it 
at the regional level. In both subsection the aim is to explain the structure of prevention of 
torture. 
5.1. Prevention of torture at the international level 
It was in 1948 that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the first international legal 
instrument outlawing torture was adopted.179 It states in its article 5 that: “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.180 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also provided in its article 7 that “no one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.181 In 
these instruments above, it is apparently clear that the first thing was to outlaw torture and it was 
outlawed indeed.  
Some other instruments were also adopted and, while on their turn they also outlawed torture, 
they also (and particularly) focused on its prevention. These are the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT) of 1984 and its Optional Protocol of 2002.182  However, none of these international 
instruments managed to give a clear definition of the concept of prevention. That is why it has 
been difficult to clearly understand what the concept of prevention exactly means. Nonetheless, 
some provisions in the rules related to torture need to be analysed to see what the meaning of this 
concept of prevention of torture could be.  
For instance, article 2(1) of the CAT states that “each State Party shall take effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its 
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jurisdiction”.183 This article obligates states to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial 
or other measures to prevent acts of torture. Although it is not clearly shown in this article what 
kind of measures have to be taken by states to effectively prevent torture, some provisions in this 
convention do mention some. Among them, article 4 of the CAT obligates states to criminalize 
acts of torture and to provide for appropriate penalties against the torturers in its legislation. 
Also, article 10(1) of the CAT obligates states to ensure that education and information regarding 
the prohibition of torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or 
military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the 
custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or 
imprisonment. 
In 2008, the Committee against Torture, which has been created by the CAT,184 tried to put some 
light on how the prevention of torture under article 2(1) should be understood.185  The 
Committee explained that states parties are obligated to eliminate any legal or other obstacles 
that impede the eradication of torture and to take positive effective measures to ensure that such 
conduct and any recurrences thereof are effectively prevented.186 In trying to recommend 
specific actions for preventing torture, the Committee explained that certain basic guarantees 
include, inter alia, maintaining an official register of detainees, the right of detainees to be 
informed of their rights, the right to promptly get independent legal assistance, independent 
medical assistance and to contact relatives, the need to establish impartial mechanism for  
inspecting and visiting places of detention, and the availability to detainees and persons at risk of 
torture of judicial and other remedies.187 
Likewise, recognizing that the obligation to take preventive measures transcends the items 
enumerated in the CAT, the Committee added that it is important that the general population be 
educated on the history, scope and necessity of the non-derogable prohibition of torture as well 
as that law enforcement personnel receive education on recognizing and preventing torture. Also, 
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in the reporting obligation of states, the Committee suggested that they provide detailed 
information on their implementation of preventive measures.188 
In the same context, while commenting on article 2 of the CAT, Nowak and McArthur gave 
examples on what states have to do in preventing the occurrence of torture.189 According to their 
interpretation, the emphasis of article 2(1) is to put on the positive obligation of States Parties to 
fulfil, which means to enact laws, to provide an effective remedy and procedural guarantees, to 
establish relevant legal institutions and other legislative, administrative, political or judicial 
measures.190 In the opinion of the authors, article 2(1) can be seen as an umbrella clause 
encompassing all the specific obligations to prevent torture as laid down in the CAT such as 
article 3 on the non-refoulement and the obligation of states to make torture a criminal offence, 
article 10 on education and training of law enforcement and other personnel, article 11 on the 
systematic review of interrogations, article 12 on ex officio investigation for torture cases, article 
13 on investigations of allegations by torture victims, article 14 on compensation to victims of 
torture which can constitute a deterrent measure for the future and article 15 on the non-
admissibility of evidence extracted by torture in any proceedings.191   
More concretely, the authors find that the most effective measures to prevent torture is to create 
independent national commissions with the power to carry out unannounced visits to all places of 
detention, to have access to the prison registers and all other relevant documents, to interview all 
detainees in private and to subject them to medical examinations.192 
On this monitoring system to places of detention and in the spirit to make article 2 of the CAT 
about measures aiming at preventing torture more effective, while recalling that efforts to 
eradicate torture should first and foremost be concentrating on prevention, the Optional Protocol 
to the CAT established a preventive system of regular visits to be undertaken by independent 
international and national bodies to places of detention in order to prevent torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 193 With that objective, this Protocol created an 
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opportunity to establish a Subcommittee on prevention of torture (article 2) as well as one or 
several visiting bodies for the prevention of torture at national level (article 3). On the 
international level, this Subcommittee shall have the mandate inter alia to visit the places where 
persons are deprived of their liberty and make recommendations to States Parties concerning the 
protection of persons deprived of their liberty against torture (art 11(a)), advise and assist States 
Parties in the establishment of national preventive mechanisms and in the evaluation of needs 
and means necessary for the strengthening of the capacity to prevent torture (article 11(b)). 
In order to fulfil its mandate, this Subcommittee will be given unrestricted access to all 
information concerning the number of persons deprived of their liberty in places of detention and 
to all information on their treatment and conditions of detention as well as unrestricted access to 
the installations and facilities of the places of detention. The Subcommittee will also have 
opportunity to conduct private interviews with persons deprived of their liberty and therefore the 
liberty to choose the places to visit and the persons it wants to interview (art 14).  
After the visit, the Subcommittee shall communicate its recommendations to the state concerned, 
and if relevant to the national prevention mechanism and may publish the report whenever 
requested by the state concerned (Art 16(1,2)). However, if the state concerned refuses to 
cooperate or to take steps to improve the situation in the light of the recommendations of the 
Subcommittee on Prevention, the Committee against Torture to which the Subcommittee 
presents a public annual report on its activities, may, at the request of the Subcommittee, decide, 
after the state concerned has been given the opportunity to make its views, to make a public 
statement of the matter or publish the report of the Subcommittee (art 16(3,4)). 
As for the national level, this protocol obligates states to establish independent national 
preventive mechanisms for the prevention of torture at the domestic level and to make available 
necessary resources for the functioning of this mechanism as well as giving them access to all 
information and to grant them power to visit persons deprived of their liberty and examine their 
treatment and recommend to the relevant authorities with the aim of improving the treatment and 
conditions of persons deprived of their liberty and to prevent torture from occurring (art 19).  
In addition to this, this protocol also introduced means to implement the recommendations from 
the Subcommittee. A special fund shall be set up to help finance the implementation of the 
recommendations made by the Subcommittee on Prevention (after the visit to a State Party) as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




well as education programmes of the national preventive mechanisms.194 
When torture occurs despite the above mentioned measures, measures aiming at punishing the 
perpetrators and at compensating the victims are taken. Indeed, under articles 4 to 8 states are 
obligated to take measures related to the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of 
torture. It might appear that these articles concern only perpetrators of torture and not the state 
that fails to prevent it. However, the comments on article 2(1) in as far as the scope of state 
obligation and responsibility is concerned suggest that the responsibility of States may be 
incurred when it fails to prevent its public authorities from committing torture. This  Committee 
against Torture has observed that states are obligated to adopt measures to prevent public 
authorities and other persons acting in an official capacity from committing, inciting, 
encouraging, acquiescing to acts of torture and concluded that states parties are in violation of 
the CAT when they fail to fulfil their obligation to prevent torture.195  
Furthermore article 14(1) of the CAT which obligates states parties to it to ensure in their legal 
system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and 
adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible is the basis not 
only for the punishment of the perpetrators but also for the compensation to the victim. Even 
though article 14 of the CAT does not prima facie appear like one of the preventive measures as 
provided for in article 2(1), it has been interpreted as having preventive character. For instance, 
Nowak and McArthur observed that it has a deterrent effect aimed at preventing torture in the 
future because the torturers will not only be punished but also be held accountable to pay full 
compensation for all long-term rehabilitation costs of the torture victims. 196 This view was also 
taken by the Committee against Torture in the case Guridi v. Spain,197 in which the Committee 
against Torture did not only confirm that States have the duty to guarantee compensation for the 
victim of an act of torture, but also that compensation should cover all the damages suffered by 
the victim, which includes, among other measures, restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation 
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of the victim, as well as measures to guarantee the non-repetition of the violations.198 The 
Committee therefore concluded that the absence of appropriate punishment is incompatible with 
the duty to prevent acts of torture.199 This simply means that, in the view of the Committee too, 
the obligation to give appropriate punishment and to provide compensation is one of the 
measures to prevent future torture.  
The prevention of torture has been not only operated at this international level but also at 
regional level. The next subsection will give a short explanation on how this concept is 
conceived and practiced at the regional level. 
5.2. Prevention of torture at the regional level 
The prevention of torture has been paramount at regional level as well. Since there is no 
substantial difference between the model of prevention of torture on international level and the 
prevention of torture in the European and American systems, and since the aim in this subsection 
on the prevention of torture is not to have a comparative analysis between the systems, it will not 
be necessary to go into all details about this. It is instead preferred to give a brief summary on 
how the prevention of torture is understood on the regional level and since the European and 
American systems are relatively much more developed than others, this subsection will be 
limited to them.  
5.2.1. Prevention of torture at the European level 
The European Convention on Human Rights states in article 3 that “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”200 The European Convention for 
the Prevention and Punishment of Torture provides in its article 1 that there shall be established a 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.201  Like for the Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture on international level 
seen above, this committee shall, by means of visits, examine the treatment of persons deprived 
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of their liberty with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the protection of such persons from 
torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.202  
In facilitating the task of this Committee, each party has the obligation to give access to its 
territory and the right to travel without restriction, to give full information to it on all places 
where people are deprived of their liberty and to let it interview any person of their choice 
without restriction (article 8). After the visit, the Committee writes a report containing all 
recommendations it considers necessary and the report is transmitted to the state concerned. If 
the state concerned does not cooperate or if it refuses to improve the situation of persons 
deprived of their liberty in the light of the Committee’s recommendations, the Committee may 
decide to make a public statement on the matter (art 10). Further, the Committee shall every year 
submit to the Committee of Ministers, a general report on its activities which has to be transmitted 
to the Consultative Assembly and to any non-member State of the Council of Europe which is a 
party to the Convention, and made public (art 12). 
This Committee provides a non-judicial preventive mechanism which contributes in strengthening 
the protection of individuals deprived of their liberty from torture. It is in fact a complement to the 
judicial one already created through the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights 
which established the European Court of Human Rights.203 Indeed, having prohibited torture in its 
article 3, and having created the said court with the power to render judgments on any violation of 
human rights provided in that convention, it follows that the Court decides on cases involving 
States Parties to this convention which have breached the prohibition of torture.204   
5.2.2. Prevention of torture at the American level 
The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture states in article 1 that the States 
Parties undertake to prevent and punish torture.205 Accordingly, article 6 provides that States 
Parties shall take effective measures to prevent and punish torture within their jurisdiction and 
ensure that all acts of torture and attempts to commit torture are offenses under their criminal law 
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and shall make such acts punishable by severe penalties that take into account their serious 
nature. 
Among the preventive measures, article 7 asserts that States Parties shall take measures such as 
the training of police officers and other public officials responsible for the custody of persons 
temporarily or definitively deprived of their freedom. Special emphasis shall be put on the 
prohibition of the use of torture in interrogation, detention, or arrest. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has given more examples on measures to prevent 
torture in its explanation of the duty to prevent torture by saying that:  
“The duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, administrative and 
cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any violations 
are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the punishment of 
those responsible and the obligation to indemnify the victims for damages.”206 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has found violations by states of the duty to prevent 
as enshrined in articles 1, 6 and 7 or 8 of the Convention. For instance, in the Tibi case, the Court 
found Ecuador responsible for the violation of the duty to prevent torture as provided in art 1, 6 
and 8 of the Convention on the Prevention of Torture under which states are placed under the 
obligation to take preventive measures.207 After the Court found that Tibi had suffered serious 
injuries while he was detained at the Penitenciaría del Litoral by police officers where he was 
burned and suffocated several times by police officers in the period of custody,208and while 
expressing a requirement of a training campaign for prison, police, and judicial officials, as well 
as for doctors and psychologists on how to prevent torture and document allegations of torture, it  
concluded that Ecuador failed to take such effective measures as may be necessary to prevent 
and punish all acts of torture under its jurisdiction.209 The Court has taken the same approach in 
other similar cases.210  
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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has also contributed to the clarification of the 
prevention of torture. In strengthening the mechanism to prevent torture, this Commission on 
Human Rights adopted in 2008 the principles and best practices on the protection of persons 
deprived of their liberty211 in which, like other instruments seen above, it was affirmed that: 
“…regular visits and inspections of places of deprivation of liberty shall be conducted by 
national and international institutions and organizations, in order to ascertain, at any time 
and under any circumstance, the conditions of deprivation of liberty and the respect of 
human rights”.212 
In all these instruments shown above and explanations thereof, no detailed list of prevention 
measures to be taken in preventing torture is provided. They only give examples and it is 
impossible to give that list as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has said in Vélasquez- 
Rodriguez that:  
“It is not possible to make a detailed list of all such measures, since they vary with the 
law and the conditions of each State Party…”213  
5.3. Preliminary conclusions 
To conclude this section, it can be said that, like the prevention in public health for instance, it is 
possible to distinguish phases of prevention in the prevention of torture. It is clear that at the 
primary level (phase) states are obligated to build up safeguards against torture by adopting 
legislative, administrative and judicial measures aiming at preventing torture. At this level other 
measures may include the training of police and security personnel for example as well as the 
education of the general population on the history, scope and necessity of the non-derogable 
prohibition of torture. They include also the creation of national preventive measures.  
At the secondary level, one might say that states are obligated to implement those safeguards, 
allowing the visits to places of detention by independent international and national prevention 
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bodies. At the tertiary level, it might be said that states are obligated inter alia to punish the 
torturers and to make sure that victims of torture get compensation for the damage suffered. 
Conclusion 
The aim in this chapter was to explain the concept of prevention from different fields and where 
applicable, to see (to some extent) legal obligations pertaining to it. This approach was chosen in 
order to have an understanding on what this concept means in general that can be helpful in 
understanding what it may entail in particular in the field of genocide. In other words, the 
investigation about the meaning of the concept of prevention as well as its methods and 
techniques and obligation of states thereof in different fields has aimed at understanding what the 
concept means and what the actions ought to be taken in order to prevent a harm from occurring.  
To summarize what has been discussed in this chapter, two important elements that form a 
scheme of prevention need to be mentioned here. The first is about the meaning and purpose of 
the concept of prevention and the second is about the preventive measures at different temporal 
divisions. 
With regard to the first element, it is possible to say that the meaning and purpose of prevention 
are the same in all the fields discussed above. The meaning of prevention is to stop something 
bad (harm) from happening, i.e to forestall its occurrence and its purpose is to avoid the 
consequences of that harm. In fact, although sometimes there can be compensation in case of 
harm (which can itself have preventive effect), early prevention is a preferred policy since it 
avoids the occurrence of the harm instead of dealing with its consequences. In most cases, the 
compensation may not even be able to restore the situation prevailing prior to the occurrence of 
the harm. 
Regarding the second element, prevention will naturally involve timely measures aiming at 
avoiding the occurrence of harm. For prevention of anything from happening, there is a need of 
preventive measures to be taken to avoid that the harm starts. However, this does not mean that 
once the harm has started it is no longer possible to prevent it. Some different phases of 
prevention were discussed in this chapter. It is commonly accepted that there are three important 
levels of prevention. These are the primary, the secondary and the tertiary ones. Each level needs 
measures tailored to it. Not all fields discussed above used this categorisation of levels per se, 




prevention for all the discussed fields.  
At the primary level which is a very important phase as it aims at putting in place measures that 
may pre-empt the start of the harm, there is a need to put in place several measures aiming at 
avoiding the occurrence of the harm and this involves tackling the root causes of the harm and 
creating an environment that does not allow any harm from emerging or developing. This also 
means the establishment of conditions that do not create opportunity for the occurrence of the 
harm. It will therefore include the adoption of laws that not only prohibit the harm but also put in 
place mechanisms that ensure the prevention of that harm.  
The preventive measures aiming at avoiding the start of the harm may be unsuccessful but this 
does not mean that the prevention journey ends there. Other measures can still be needed and 
taken to stop the development of the harm. This is the secondary prevention level at which there 
is a need to take measures to deal with the harm after it has started. At this level, depending on 
the nature of the harm in question, measures tailored to the situation are taken in order to prevent 
the risk from materializing or the situation from growing worse. These measures intervene at 
early stage to prevent the spread of the risk.  
If, by any reason whatsoever, these measures have not been successful; there is still a possibility 
for further actions. And this is the tertiary level at which robust measures are needed to put an 
end to the harm. But since this may intervene when the harm has had its consequences on the 
victims, then there are also measures which provide for remedying the situation. These measures 
which may include the reparation are aimed at preventing the reoccurrence of the harm in the 
future.  In other words, the tertiary prevention level also deals with those consequences in order 
not only to repair the damage but also to avoid the reoccurrence of the harm.  
From the discussion in this chapter and without ignoring the supremacy of the primary level, 
given the nature, relevance and essence of prevention, it is worth concluding that prevention is a 
continuous process which involves several actions at different levels.  
Furthermore, some characteristics of the prevention which are arguably common for the five 
fields discussed in this chapter have been given attention. These are about the irrelevance of the 
scientific uncertainty of the risk as well as the irrelevance of the uncertainty on the result of the 
preventive measures as an exemption from taking preventive measures. Measures would still 
have to be put in place and taken even without conclusive evidence that harm would occur. And 
the fact that there cannot be guarantee that measures would still not prevent the occurrence of the 




harm cannot be an excuse because prevention is a due diligence duty which entails reasonable 
efforts to address the situation in order to avert the occurrence of the harm. Another important 
characteristic is that in most cases the creation of international and national preventive 
mechanisms is indispensable to make the prevention effective.  
The question is whether the conclusions from different fields on the concept of prevention are 
applicable to the prevention of genocide as well? The next chapter will address this question in 
examining whether the prevention of genocide is understood in the same way as seen above (as 








Chapter III. The concept of prevention in the field of genocide in 
general 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was concluded from the fields examined that prevention is a 
continuous process that is aimed at avoiding the occurrence of something harmful by tackling the 
causes of the harm prior to it and at each phase of the process to its occurrence and after.  It is 
now time to examine in this chapter whether this understanding is the same for the prevention of 
genocide and if so to show what may be needed to destabilize the process to genocide in order to 
prevent genocide. In fact, it would be a capital mistake to try to discuss the prevention of 
genocide before showing the process through which it passes before it is committed. Taking into 
account the sources and contributions from other disciplines than law, it is essential to determine 
the existence of factors in the process to genocide. In doing so, the theories will be confronted 
with the reality of genocide on the ground, in order to leave the confinement in the abstract and 
understand what can (or is to) be done concretely to prevent genocide. This means that the 
factors as well as phases in the process to genocide will be taken into consideration in attempting 
to show when the prevention of genocide is needed.  
 As generally known, genocide is not something that happens overnight. For genocide to happen 
there is a number of factors that precede and make possible the actual genocide. They create the 
conditions or the opportunity for genocide to occur. Hence, for it to be prevented, one needs first 
to understand the whole process to genocide from the early stage until the end. This is not to say 
however that this chapter will be able to give a linear process identical to all genocides, but with 
some examples, the explanation on common factors and phases of genocide will serve as a good 
basis to understand the phenomenon of its prevention. For this reason, the first section explains 
the factors in the process to genocide. The second section summarises the phases in the process 
to genocide (confronting them to the realities on the ground). The third (and last) section 
discusses prevention of genocide in general and from a temporal perspective before seeing how 





1. Understanding the factors214 in the process to genocide 
Factors are used here as they are defined in their ordinary meaning as elements that contribute to 
a result, i.e ones that actively contribute to an accomplishment, result, or process of 
something.215  Many factors have been discussed in literature on genocide. However, there is no 
consensus on a definitive list of factors that are present in all genocides. The intention here is not 
to identify all the factors that may contribute to genocide. Nor is it to enter in the whole debate 
on all factors that may lead to genocide. The aim is to illustrate with some of the common factors 
in the process that may lead to genocide. It is assumed that for the prevention of genocide to be 
successful, one needs to understand the process to genocide in order to know what to do, at 
which moment and by which means. 
Authors from various disciplines such as psychology and sociology have written that genocide 
occurs in societies with different racial, ethnic, national or religious groups,216 meaning that 
genocide is based on identity. Some other factors that have been identified include the situation 
in which a state has a totalitarian or authoritarian government and where only one group controls 
power (political problems).217 These factors create an environment that is favourable to the 
emergence of other factors that may contribute to a situation that may lead to genocide. These 
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include difficult life conditions due to economic problems, deprivation or inequalities in the 
allocation of resources, discrimination in various forms. Other factors may be impunity for 
violation of human rights which may lead to violent (armed) conflicts that pave the way to 
genocide or cover it. These factors will be discussed in the following categories: differences in 
identity (1.1), difficult life due to economic problems (1.2), deprivation or inequalities in the 
allocation of resources (1.3), political problems (1.4), armed conflicts (1.5) and human rights 
violations in an atmosphere of impunity (1.6).  
1.1. Genocide as an identity-based phenomenon 
In his report of 2009 on the efforts of the UN system to prevent genocide, the Secretary-General 
suggested a framework of analysis in determining risks of genocide in which he noted eight core 
questions organised in accordance with the increasing imminence of genocide.218 One of those 
questions is whether there are national, ethnic, racial or religious groups - a prerequisite for 
genocide to be possible.219 The experience shows that genocides that have happened up to now 
have been committed within multi-racial, multi-ethnic or multi-religious societies. This explains 
why the drafters of the Genocide Convention mentioned the national, ethnic, racial or religious 
groups in the definition of genocide as protected groups.220  
In this regard, and although much emphasis was put on Africa, Ricardo Rene Laremont221  
observes that ethnic and racial differences may be causes of conflict that may lead to genocide. 
Leo Kuper said that “the plural society provides the structural base of genocide, the presence of a 
diversity of racial, ethnic and/or religious groups being structural characteristic of the plural 
society, and genocide a crime committed against these groups”.222 The Holocaust, the Cambodia, 
Rwanda and Bosnia genocides are illustrations of this and there is no controversy on that. 
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On the question whether this mean that the existence of different races, ethnic, religious groups 
in a given society is in itself a cause of genocide, Leo Kuper noted that it should not be 
understood that genocide is inevitable in plural societies, but only that those plural societies offer 
the necessary conditions for domestic genocide.223 It cannot be said that the existence of different 
races or ethnic groups alone is in itself a sufficient factor that may cause genocide. Genocide is 
not possible where there is no difference among the population in a state but this difference itself 
cannot cause genocide if not combined with other factors. In other words, by definition, genocide 
is not possible without different groups but the presence of various groups cannot explain 
genocide. That is why genocide does not happen everywhere (given the fact that there is no state 
which has population composed of one racial group, with no difference in ethnicity, religion).  
1.2. Difficult life conditions due to economic problems 
Ervin Staub has observed that the frustration caused by difficult life conditions leads to 
psychological processes in individual and social processes in groups that even though might not 
lead directly to genocide, can result in turning against and harming members of another group224  
which, combined with other factors, may grow into a genocide. Among the things that may cause 
the difficult life conditions Ervin Staub and Barbara Harff give the example of poverty.225 Smith 
also argues that economic problems may lead to genocide in what he calls material scarcity.226 
According to him, the material scarcity is that of material goods, resources, employment.227 
Among other scholars in the field of economics, Frances Stewart argues that genocide tends to be 
high in low and middle income states.228 She bases this on the fact that perpetrators of genocide 
may use mass killings against a group that stands in their way, in order to acquire wealth.229 And 
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because of the high rate of unemployment among youth, it becomes easy for the perpetrators to 
mobilise the youth to accomplish their objective.230 Harff added that leaders of low income 
countries are more likely to calculate that they can eliminate unwanted groups without 
international repercussions because of their low degree of interdependence with others.231 This 
has been also affirmed by the Genocide Prevention Task Force which noted that mass atrocities 
and genocide almost always occur in the context of violent conflict or in the wake of major 
political instability, and that these factors are most prevalent in impoverished countries where 
ordinary citizens lack economic opportunities.232  
While the economic problems may indeed be a factor that may contribute to leading to genocide, 
they may need other associated problems to play a big role in that.233 In fact, no one has shown 
that genocide is always possible in poor states and impossible in rich ones. Being poor itself does 
not make genocide possible. But it certainly creates a favourable environment to other associated 
problems that may add their contribution to the process to genocide. Those associated problems 
may include the deprivation or inequalities in the allocation of resources. 
1.3.  Deprivation or inequalities in the allocation of scarce resources 
It has been argued in literature that economic scarcity leads to economic inequality between 
individuals and groups.234 Manus I. Midlarsky explains that scarcity and inequality are strongly 
linked in that the greater the scarcity of commodities, the greater the inequality among potential 
recipients,235 hence the greater the contraction of socioeconomic space, the greater the inequality 
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between haves and have-nots.236 When this inequality is based on the differences in racial, 
ethnicity grounds, i.e when some groups are given many more privileges than others or when a 
group is totally excluded (deprived) from the access to the resources, it may create tensions that 
may lead to other problems that may soon or late lead to genocide. That is why, Ervin Staub 
argues that poverty itself is not primarily instigator of violence that might lead to genocide, but 
when some groups of people are rendered poor through deprivation and injustice, it can be more 
important237  and this can contribute to the development of the sentiment of animosity that might 
lead to conflict (armed or not) that can on its turn lead to genocide. In fact, this can be practiced 
up to a level that members of a privileged group may find themselves superior to other groups 
and treat other groups like inferior and the logical consequence from that is that there will be an 
antagonism between the groups. The frustration of the unprivileged groups may cause them to 
react against the privileged group and this may lead to genocidal conflict.238 
At this point it is again clear that when the differences in identity mentioned before have 
implications for example on how some groups access to basic needs, access to services and 
employment etc, the risk of genocide becomes even higher. But again this may not itself lead to 
genocide if not associated with others. And even where there is no scarcity of resources, other 
factors like political scarcity may create inequalities in the distribution of those resources as it 
will be explained below. 
1.4. Political scarcity 
It has been argued in literature that political problems may play a big role in creating an 
environment favourable to genocide. For instance Smith explained political problems in what he 
qualified as political scarcity.239 According to him, this means that there may be sufficient 
resources to meet everyone’s needs, but the allocation of resources favour certain groups and 
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discriminates against other groups.240 So, no matter how wealthy or poor a country might be, 
some groups may be singled out and deprived of resources because of their membership of a 
certain group. Helen Fein and Frances Stewart have argued that authoritarian governments are 
most likely prone to committing genocide compared to democracies which are least likely.241 
Some of the means that authoritarian regimes use is the exclusionary ideology. On this political 
system, Barbara Harff wrote for instance that Elite ideologies are crucial determinants of their 
choices that may lead to genocide.242 She explained that episodes of genocide become more 
likely when the leaders of regimes and revolutionary movements articulate an exclusionary 
ideology, a belief system that identifies some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts 
to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people.243  Other sources have mentioned 
other political motivation for political leaders in given states to encourage divisions among 
national, ethnic, racial or religious groups. The example is where a political party’s access to 
political power and its retention of that power are facilitated and even dependent upon the party 
maintaining a voter constituency through the use of racist policies that divide groups of the 
population from each other.244 But the access to power may come also from any other means like 
revolutionary war; military coups etc.245 In any case what is important here is the power 
dominance of one group over other groups. The source of the risk of genocide may be twofold. 
First, that the dominant group may intend to eliminate other groups in order to have the 
guarantee of continuation of dominance. Second, the underprivileged group may feel 
discriminated and find their way to get to power by any means. In both cases, the most means 
that they tend to use is the war which might be itself another factor susceptible of leading to 
genocide. That is how it went in Bosnia and Rwanda. In Bosnia, it appears that the object of the 
war on at least one side was to kill or expel the majority of a group in order to create an 
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ethnically pure state. In Rwanda, the genocidaires aimed for total transformation of their society 
by killing all the Tutsis which would have guaranteed the Hutu to stay on power all the time.246  
In the discussion below, this link between war and genocide will be explained further. 
1.5. Armed Conflicts 
The presence of underlying conditions of stress due inter alia to deprivation of resources, power 
inequalities or other inequalities and other factors shown above based on ethnic, religious or 
racial differences247 may lead to an armed conflict. Helen Fein gives an interesting explanation 
on the linkage between war and genocide. She wrote that genocide virtually always occurs within 
a context of war, and sometimes triggers war or the renewal of war. 248 She explains this in two 
ways: First, the war releases aggression, allows the perpetrator to mask the crime and to blame 
the victim for the war; indeed, the victim group may be the enemy.249 Second, wars lead to crises 
that destabilize society and may lead to the rise of revolutionary elites with genocidal ideologies 
which seek to reconstruct the society to fit the new order imposed by the state.250 As confirmed 
in subsequent sources, such armed actors may claim to be fighting to defend the population 
group, turn against other population groups or armed forces.251 As the past can tell, the existence 
of such armed actors has served as a motivation and excuse for human rights violations, 
including killings, arbitrary arrest and discrimination, committed against the civilian population 
that the armed actor claims to represent. Also, refugees from genocide may become warriors 
determined to overthrow the government in order to go home again like in the case of 
Rwanda.252 
Indeed, when such wars occur especially in the context where other risk factors mentioned above 
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are present, genocide becomes much likely. Manus I Midlarsky also affirmed this link by giving 
the examples that it was during wars that the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Germany 
during World War II, and Rwanda in 1994 engaged in the most destructive form of identity 
conflict, genocide, respectively against the Armenians, Jews, and Tutsi.253 Bosnia in 1995, 
Cambodia in the 1970s and allegedly Darfur in the 2000s are other examples.  
1.6. Human rights violations in an atmosphere of impunity  
It is generally agreed by many scholars and observers that genocide is always preceded by 
successive human violations which are marked by impunity. Those human rights may be of any 
kind but the rights violated in such contexts are mostly related to the right to equality and to life. 
The consequence of impunity in case of violations of human rights violations is not only that it 
makes it impossible to prevent their continuation but also that when they continue to occur and 
remain unpunished they may grow and lead to a big conflict either armed or not and likely lead 
to genocide especially when they are ethnically, racially, religiously or nationally based. To 
show the link between impunity and conflict that may lead to genocide Otto Trifferer recalled 
Adolf Hitler’s argument to convince his commanding generals in early 1938 to accept his plan, 
to occupy foreign territories like Czechoslovakia in order to gain more space for the development 
of the So-called “Aryan race”.254 Hitler argued against his commanders” objections that “Who 
after all thinks of the Armenians?”255  He was recalling correctly that the world at the time of the 
peace treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) and even when he presented and started to 
execute his plans, was not ready to investigate and prosecute genocide committed by states 
respectively by their organs.256  He referred to the case of acts committed against Armenians 
whose authors had not been punished to convince his generals to accept his plan. In Rwanda, it is 
generally agreed that the culture of impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations based on 
ethnicity that characterised the colonial period and the two regimes that followed has played a 
leading role in the genocide that occurred in 1994. The episodes of unpunished massacres 
committed against the Tutsi ethnic group that happened in 1959, 1963-1964, 1973, 1990-1993 
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did not only pave the way to genocide but also contributed to its magnitude in that it made the 
public participation high because of the then assurance that no prosecution would follow.257  
The role of the elite and leaders in denying the enjoyment of human rights to some groups and in 
the impunity before and during armed conflicts is an important factor that creates opportunity for 
tensions to emerge which may soon or late result into genocide.258 
1.7. Preliminary conclusions 
To sum up this section, let it be said that genocide is only possible where there exist different 
groups (racial, national, religious and ethnical). Since there is no place in the world where a 
population is composed of people who share everything, this factor exists everywhere. But it 
cannot be a cause of genocide alone. It serves as a source from where other factors draw their 
emergence. Those other factors include a situation of difficult life due to economic problems. In 
low or middle income states it becomes easier for the perpetrators to mobilise people on the 
national, ethnic, racial or religious ground, to resort to mass killings in order to acquire wealth. 
But regardless of the economic situation, leaders in some states may resort to the deprivation of 
resources or the injustice/inequalities in the allocation of those resources even where the state is 
wealthy. This usually happens in states in which political scarcity is present. In fact, authoritarian 
governments are most likely prone to committing genocide compared to democracies especially 
when elites/leaders use divisions based on the differences among the population in order to 
dominate other groups and to stay on power. These kinds of regime types often result in armed 
conflicts which may provide an environment favourable to genocide. In all these situations, the 
impunity of human rights violations becomes an incentive for potential genocide perpetrators.  
This atmosphere in which the rule of law is absent becomes a womb in which the development 
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of genocidal germ easily and healthily grows. The lawless environment that permits massacres 
can also lead to genocide because when those massacres are unpunished, it serves as a 
motivation to go on and on.  
Having shown above some of the factors in the process to genocide the idea has not been of 
course to say that there is a uniform formula of the development of all conflicts that lead to 
genocide because each society might have its particularities and the factors may not be identical 
for all conflicts. Likewise, no single factor among those shown above can be cause of genocide 
alone. And also it cannot be concluded that where there are those factors, genocide becomes an 
absolute result. Concluding that way would mean for instance that all poor states will commit 
genocide and that genocide is not possible in rich states (yet Germany was not a poor country but 
the holocaust happened.). It would also mean that wherever there is no democracy, good 
governance and rule of law, genocide is inevitable and wherever there is democracy, good 
governance or rule of law genocide can never happen. However, it is logical to say that if no 
genocide would be likely where the said factors are inexistent then it follows that those factors 
are susceptible of causing genocide. The illustration of drinking alcohol as a cause of accident 
given by Bellamy is relevant to explain this.  He said that “drinking and driving does not make a 
specific car crash inevitable, but it makes it much more likely. As such, it can safely be said that 
alcohol causes car crashes that would not occur otherwise.”259 Likewise, for genocide, there 
might be no single direct factor to cause it but since for it to happen it is preceded by those 
factors, it is correct to say that they may contribute to causing genocide. The factors of genocide 
are complementary in leading to genocide. In consideration of these factors, the next section 
explains the risks of genocide at different phases. 
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2. Understanding the risks of genocide in different phases260 of the 
process to genocide 
Gregory H. Stanton has suggested an analytical model for the process to genocide. He explained 
it through eight stages viz., classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, 
preparation, polarization, extermination and denial.261 This model is the main basis for this 
section. However, basing on the analysis of other sources related to the process to genocide, this 
model will be adjusted to the development and context of this work. Some stages will be fused 
while others will be added to explain the process to genocide much more comprehensively. This 
section shows the risk of genocide in nine phases of the process to genocide. Explaining this 
process in those phases will later help in the determination of the moment (period), means and 
person to prevent genocide at each phase. These are social categorisation (which fuses 
classification and symbolisation of Stanton’s model), discrimination (not in Stanton’s model), 
dehumanisation, propaganda for the elimination (not in Stanton’s model per se), preparation, 
targeted massacres (not in Stanton’s model), elimination (genocide), absence of or late 
intervention to halt genocide(not in Stanton’s model), and the denial and impunity of genocide.  
2.1. Social categorisation 
As observed by Leo Kuper, since genocide is a crime against a collectivity, it logically implies 
an identifiable group as victim.262 Numerous other scholars from genocide studies, sociology and 
social psychology have argued that the social categorisation is a phase that may lead to 
genocide.263 Among them, Gregory Stanton has written that at this phase people are classified 
                                                          
260
 For the purpose of this work, phase and stage means exactly the same and may be used interchangeably.  
261
 Stanton, H. Gregory, “The Eight Stages of Genocide”, 1998, originally presented as briefing paper at the US 
State Department in 1996.  Stanton, H. Gregory is the James Farmer Professor of Human Rights, The University of 
Mary Washington, Fredericksburg, Virginia, President, Genocide Watch, Chairman, The International Campaign to 
End Genocide, Director, The Cambodian Genocide Project, Vice- President, International Association of Genocide 
scholars, available at <http://www.genocidewatch.org> (visited on 24 April 2011). 
262
 Kuper, Leo, Genocide, its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London, 1981, p. 53. 
263
 See for example M. Deutsch, “Justice and Conflict”, in M. Deutsch& P.T Coleman(eds.), The Handbook of 
Conflict Resolution, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2000, pp 41-64, R.D, Crelinsten &A.P. Schmid, The Politics of 
Pain, Torturers and their Masters, Leiden, 1993, P.Glick, “Sacrificial Lambs Dressed in Wolves”Clothing”, in L.S 
Newman &R. Erber(eds), Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust, Oxford University 
press, 2002, pp. 113-142, N. Haslam, “Dehumanisation: An Integrative Review”, Personality and Social Psychology 




into ““us and them” by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality: German and Jew, Hutu and 
Tutsi.264  For instance, in 1933 (during the colonization in Rwanda), the Belgian administration 
organised a census and teams of bureaucrats who measured the people’s height, the length of 
their noses, the shape of their eyes and then everyone was classified either Tutsi, if s/he is tall 
and slim or Hutu if s/he is shorter and broader.265 Identities cards were issued to each individual 
mentioning the ethnicity. It may not be deduced that this census was meant to incite Hutu to 
commit genocide against the Tutsi, but this permanent line put between the groups and the 
implications related to that, contributed to the antagonism between the two groups that later, 
combined with other things, led to genocide. That means that this phase alone would naturally 
not lead to genocide if not given effect by (an) other phase(s), but it may for instance lead to 
discrimination which is among other phases as explained next.  
2.2. Discrimination 
As Ulrich Wagner wrote, the social categorisation which gives the basis for defining groups may 
be followed by devaluation of some groups, intensified by intergroup injustice in the allocation 
of resources as well as the injustice on how the participation in decision making process is 
distributed which increases even much more the devaluative and hostile behaviour between 
groups.266 When there is that ideology on distinction between different groups, the 
underprivileged group will be discriminated in different sectors by the leaders who are 
themselves produced by the society with the same ideology or who come to power through a 
revolution or military coup, after having been victims of a similar treatment in the past or who 
are just bad. For instance, during the colonisation in Rwanda and especially after the census of 
1933, Hutu masses that were considered as inferior were subjected to forced labour and 
discrimination in all walks of life.267  A study by the Jacob Baulstein Institute in cooperation 
with the Office of the Special Adviser on the prevention of genocide elaborated much more on 
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these risks and special circumstances with very much emphasis inter alia on discrimination.268 
Since these practices of discrimination against some targeted groups are either done by state 
leaders or are supported by them, they grow and lead to other phases that may lead to genocide. 
In some cases, the “Us v. Them” grows bigger even to the level of dehumanisation. However, 
though discrimination may precede dehumanization, it may continue with it.  
2.3. Dehumanisation 
Wagner qualifies dehumanisation as an extreme or strong kind of bias in the process of which 
one group and its members are no longer perceived by another as being humans.269  According to 
Stanton, dehumanisation is a denial of the humanity of others and is the step that permits killing 
with impunity.270 In other words, it is a denial of human status, the denial of human individuality 
and significance of the members of the targeted group.271  There is a belief or an ideology that 
says the targeted group is less than human.272 This ideology “dehumanizes” members of that 
group and justifies violence against it.273 Victims are not considered as belonging to the same 
human race as the oppressors.274  Glick also notes that more often, dehumanisation is a collective 
process during which societies make ideologies available that classifies a certain group as 
infrahuman.275 Victims are treated as less than human, given disgusting names. Nazi propaganda 
called Jews "rats" or "vermin"; Rwandan Hutu hate radio referred to Tutsis as "cockroaches." 
The targeted group is often likened to a “disease”, “microbes”, “infections” or a “cancer” in the 
body politic. That is what explains why later when genocide happens; bodies of genocide victims 
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are often mutilated to express this denial of humanity.276  Furthermore, not only are these groups 
perceived as infrahuman, but scholars have found that they are also, in some cases, perceived as 
security threat to the perpetrators (existential threat to them). 277  Both situations produce the 
same result (genocide).  
Dehumanisation is an important phase in the process that leads to genocide because 
ideologically, the genocidal group claims to purify the society as a justification. So the ideology 
grows deeper to convincing one group that another deserves nothing but death and this is an 
ideological legitimation to kill.  As was observed by Leo Kuper, the ideological legitimation is a 
necessary pre-condition for genocide.278  Though it cannot be concluded that where this phase 
has been reached the genocide will definitely happen, where there is dehumanization, genocide 
becomes more likely. But again, it cannot be said that wherever there is dehumanisation there 
must be genocide or that genocide cannot happen without dehumanisation. The availability of the 
dehumanising ideology is important in the process to genocide but may not be enough to cause 
genocide if it is not followed by further actions. As it will be seen next, it might need a campaign 
to spread the ideology out for it to successfully lead to genocide. 
2.4. Propaganda for the elimination of the targeted group(s) 
In fact, for the dehumanisation to have its effect, it needs propaganda to spread out the hate 
ideology done either by leaders themselves or authorised, condoned or supported by them. 
Indeed, this is an important phase in the whole process because it helps the elite members of the 
eliminating group to disseminate the dehumanising ideology and to make other members of that 
group believe in that hatred which is a motivating prior factor to act ruthlessly. The rapid and 
most effective way of spreading out the hate ideology is through hate speeches that are of course 
expressed in words.279 The ICTR has given an explanation on the dangerosity of hate speech,280 
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(which can apply to any hate messages as well):  
“hate speech is a discriminatory form of aggression that destroys the dignity of those in 
the group under attack. It creates a lesser status not only in the eyes of the group members 
themselves but also in the eyes of others who perceive and treat them as less than human. 
The denigration of persons on the basis of their ethnic identity or other group 
membership in and of itself, as well as in its other consequences, can be an irreversible 
harm.” 
The hate speeches and other hate messages are spread out through the media or at rallies (“hate 
media” and “hate messages”),281 or through any other way of communication such as internet, 
social media and telephone calls and text messages.  
I will focus here on the role of the media. This role of the media in spreading out the hate 
messages has been shown in literature. One of the prominent examples of such propaganda is 
about the Nazi anti-Semitic doctrine that was disseminated through Der Stuermer newspaper and 
other publications, as well as in the speeches and public declarations of other Nazi leaders.282 For 
instance, in a September 1938 diatribe in Der Stuermer, editor Julius Streicher described the Jew 
"as a germ and a pest, not a human being, but a parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator 
of diseases who must be destroyed in the interest of mankind".283  
In May 1939 an article by him again was proclaimed in Der Stuermer that: 
“A punitive expedition must come against the Jews in Russia. A punitive expedition 
which will provide the same fate for them that every murderer and criminal must expect: 
Death sentence and execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be 
exterminated root and branch”.284  
He also published: “If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the Jewish blood is 
finally to come to an end, then there is only one way the extermination of that people whose 
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father is the devil.”  No defence could justify these remarks!”285 
Another prominent example is about the famous newspaper Kangura in Rwanda as well as the 
“Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM)”.  In an article entitled Appeal to the 
Conscience of the Hutu in which the Hutu were urged to cease feeling pity to the Tutsi, Kangura 
published in December 1990 in its No. 6 its ten Hutu Commandments.286 These Ten 
Commandments for instance directly portrayed the Tutsi woman as a femme fatale, and the 
message that Tutsi women were seductive agents of the enemy were also conveyed repeatedly by 
RTLM after it was created.287 Other publications by Kangura include an article which stated that, 
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“A Cockroach Cannot Give Birth to a Butterfly”288 meaning that if the Tutsi was enemy, his 
child will be not different and should have no different treatment.  
The link between the hate propaganda and the occurrence of genocide has been shown in case-
law. For instance, in the Media case, the ICTR has rightly recalled the jurisprudence of the 
Streicher case in 1946 by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg which held Julius 
Streicher directly responsible for crimes against humanity because of his speeches and 
publications in the Nazi newspaper Der Stuermer289   albeit they were published before the start 
of the elimination of Jews per se. The ICTR joined the IMTN in the opinion that the speeches 
and publications were understood to be like a poison that infected the minds of the German 
people and conditioned them to follow the lead of the National Socialists in persecuting the 
Jewish people.290 For instance, the statement of the Nazi press that : “in the case of the Jews they 
are not merely a few criminals (as in every other people) but all the Jews rose from criminal 
roots, and in its very nature it is criminal”“291 contributed in infecting the minds of Germans.  
Comparing with the role of the media in the genocide in Rwanda the court put that: “In Rwanda, 
the virulent writings of Kangura and the incendiary broadcasts of RTLM functioned in the same 
way, conditioning the Hutu population and creating a climate of harm, as evidenced in part by 
the extermination and genocide that followed,292 confirming that expressions of ethnic hatred 
constitute the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide.293 However, depending 
on the acts committed and situation, some acts may qualify as persecution.  
It is clear that the hate propaganda by the media is crucial instruments and means through which 
the genocide can easily be prepared and committed. It is an important phase that, if not 
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addressed, it may lead to genocide. However, the newly available other means of communication 
may play also a big role in disseminating the hate messages. In fact, if the media has been 
focused on in literature it is not that it is the only means that may reach a big audience it is 
because it is the one which was much more available before and during the time the genocides 
referred to in this work happened. The social media accessed through internet is nowadays 
accessible to huge number of users and may be available to those who want to disseminate hate 
messages. The most known of available social media include Facebook, Twitter, Weblogs and 
Youtube which are accessible thanks to internet. The Arab Spring may serve as a good example 
of how through the social media, messages can reach a huge number of the population.294  
The hate ideology propagated through media and other means of communication may continue 
up to convincing some groups to turn against the targeted groups. But this may need preparation 
as it will be shown next. 
2.5. Preparation 
This phase is when some acts susceptible of making genocide possible are performed. Stanton 
argued that they include identification,295 i.e, for instance, lists of victims are drawn up, houses 
are marked, maps are made, and individuals are forced to carry ID cards identifying their ethnic 
or religious group.296 In Germany, the identification of Jews, defined by law, was performed by a 
methodical bureaucracy. In Rwanda, despite the fact that identity cards showed each person’s 
ethnicity, lists of Tutsi were drawn up. In his cable to the UN Secretariat four months before the 
genocide in Rwanda (11 January 1994), the commander of United Nations Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR), Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, warned of a plan for the extermination of the 
Tutsi population by indicating inter alia that the lists of Tutsis which were being established 
were for their extermination.297  
However, identification is not the only form of preparation. There can also be a creation of 
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gangs, mobs or militias to be used later in genocide. Stanton has made it a distinct stage (phase) 
that he called organisation but since the acts he mentioned in it constitute preparatory acts as 
well, they may be put under this phase. These militias are trained to have the capacity to execute 
mass murders. For instance, in the period before the genocide in Rwanda, Dallaire reported that 
in twenty minutes the personnel of President Juvenal Habyarimana could kill up to a thousand 
Tutsis.298 These personnel included the army, police and the militias. 
Another form of preparation may be the purchase of arms to be used in the execution of 
genocide. In the Dallaire’s cable to the UN mentioned above, he reported that arms had been 
stockpiled in secret locations including pistols, rifles, a half million machetes and hundreds and 
thousands of hoes, axes, hammers and razor blades.299 Documents prove that the machetes came 
from China, supplied between 1992 and 1994 by a company called Oriental Machinery.300 Some 
arms were distributed many months before April 1994.301 By the time the genocide began, 85 
tons of munitions are thought to have been distributed, one machete being given to every third 
adult Hutu male.302  
Stanton added that in its most extreme form, preparation includes construction of extermination 
camps as in the Nazi-ruled Europe, or conversion of existing buildings -temples and schools – 
into extermination centres in Cambodia.303  In Rwanda also, large holes had been digged to serve 
as mass graves later in genocide. At this level, the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide as 
well as other crimes may already be constituted and other crimes may follow. 
2.6. Targeted massacres 
Literature shows that genocide is almost always preceded by some killings targeting a given 
group either on some individuals belonging to a given group in different places or on a group at 
some specific places.304 For instance, Nzongola- Ntalaja asserted that the 1994 genocide in 
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Rwanda was a logical outcome of an ideology and a politics of exclusion that had generated 
earlier episodes of large scale massacres of the Tutsi beginning in 1959.305 Also, following the 
killings targeting individual as well as groups of Tutsi at different places in Rwanda and at some 
specific places that had happened in and before 1993, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary and Arbitrary Executions warned in March 1993 about acts of genocide against the 
Tutsi.306 Genocide may also be preceded by killings of moderate people because, though not 
belonging to the targeted group, they are targeted because of their likelihood to obstruct the 
extermination of that targeted group.307   This may escalate to a serious level which may lead to 
the extermination of a group as it will be seen below.  
2.7. Elimination (genocide per se) 
This is the phase when the actual genocide is being executed. It is when the intent to destroy the 
targeted group can be seen from what is happening on the ground.308 As Stanton observed, since 
the victims are not considered human anymore (are seen as vermin, rats or cockroaches), at this 
point the purpose becomes to exterminate all the members of the targeted group.309 Being not 
considered as persons explains the way targeted members are killed: often including children, 
their bodies are mutilated, buried in mass graves or burnt like garbage.310  
2.8. Absence of action to halt genocide 
It has been extensively argued in literature that the assurance that no external force would 
obstruct the perpetrators of genocide constitutes one of the incentives to committing genocide. 
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The examples of Rwanda and Bosnia are among the telling ones.311 Numerous scholars and 
observers have argued for instance that had there been action by the international community in 
Rwanda or in Bosnia, genocide would have not occurred or it would have at least been halted at 
its start, thus mitigating the consequences.312 In the case of Rwanda, it is believed that the 
Belgian withdrawal of its troops from Rwanda and the Security Council decision to significantly 
reduce the number of UNAMIR troops gave a green light to the perpetrators of genocide since 
they became assured that no one would obstruct their plan.313   
2.9. Denial of genocide and impunity of its perpetrators 
The aftermath of genocide is a very fragile situation with high risk of a new conflict due to many 
problems caused by the genocide. It is characterized by cessation of hostilities but also with a 
high risk of a new conflict due to large number of refugees and internally displaced 
persons…and a vast security apparatus on one or more sides that threatens to reignite conflict.314 
The risk may be even higher if that genocide is denied and therefore unpunished or not denied 
but unpunished. 
The denial of genocide is not only a destruction of the truth but is also likely to cause its 
repetition.315 The analogy with the example of disease may be helpful to explain the 
consequences of denial on future genocide. When someone is recovering from a disease, there is 
a need of a strong mechanism to fight its consequence instead of hiding that it occurred, to avoid 
the relapse. When such a mechanism is absent, there is a risk of reoccurrence. 
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With regard to the impunity of genocide, it has also been argued in literature that it may lead to 
repeating genocide. For instance John Heidenrich argued that the fact that the perpetrators of past 
genocides in a given society are rewarded by being punished lightly or not at all is an indicator 
that it may be committed again.316 Others added that this growing acceptance of violations of the 
targeted group’s human rights (where there is history of genocide) gives violators and abusers a 
sense that if the perpetrators of the earlier crimes got away with it, they will get away with their 
abuses this time.317 
2.10. Preliminary conclusions 
To summarise this section it must be said that genocide does not happen overnight. For genocide 
to happen there are always risks that can be seen at different phases of the whole process. Indeed, 
the social categorisation is the phase where people are classified into “us and them” by ethnicity, 
race, religion, or nationality. Depending on the circumstances in each situation, this may be 
followed by discrimination in which the “them” get underprivileged status compared to the “Us”. 
This can be followed by a dehumanising ideology in which potential victims of genocide are no 
longer considered as belonging to the same human race as the oppressors. When this is spread 
out, it increases the risk of genocide even much more. When that ideology is successfully spread 
out, it makes it easy for the planners to make preparations for it, a phase which is mostly 
followed by testing through targeted massacres. These massacres may reach a high intensity 
from which the intent to destroy the whole group can be clearly seen. In such a situation, when 
no action is taken to stop it, it makes the perpetrators of genocide be assured that there will not 
be repercussion on them and this is a big incentive in the execution of their plan. No matter how 
the genocide ends, when it is followed by the denial and impunity of the perpetrators, there is a 
risk that it may reoccur.  
It must be said however that this is not a mathematical division of phases, nor is it a formula 
followed in all genocides. There is no linear process to genocide but there is no genocide that can 
just happen. It may happen in different ways, each having its particularities. What is common to 
all genocides is that they are all preceded by long-standing risks that if not eradicated, may 
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amount to genocide. Hence, together with the factors, these phases show how for genocide to 
happen it passes through a process. This gives an idea on what period is important for the 
prevention and what could be done at each phase (once that phase is there). The next section will 
discuss the prevention of genocide in the perspective of factors and phases of the process to 
genocide. 
3. Understanding prevention in the process to genocide 
“We have learned from those experiences that the very step in preventing genocides is to address 
the conditions that permit them to occur”,318 Kofi Annan 
After the explanation above, it is now time to see how this understanding of the process to 
genocide may help to understand prevention of genocide in that process. This section is limited 
to examining prevention in its temporal divisions. It does not therefore examine the types of 
measures needed at each temporal division because this will be done in the next chapters. The 
aim here is to confront the factors and phases in the process to genocide to the need of prevention 
at each level. It is possible to group factors and phases within the three temporal divisions 
discussed in the previous chapter. This will be discussed in subsections 3.1 to 3.3. Subsection 3.4 
will discuss prevention of genocide when there is uncertainty on the occurrence of genocide and 
on the power to prevent. 
3.1. Primary prevention of genocide 
For the purpose of this work, some factors may be grouped at this early level. In the previous 
chapter it has been concluded that the prevention at the primary level is understood as consisting 
of measures aiming at creating an environment that reduces the risk that a given event will occur. 
Some factors such as differences in identity and difficult conditions due to economic problems 
may already be present and the prevention of genocide at this level deals with these existing 
factors of genocide by putting in place measures that do not allow the emergence of the risks 
related to them. One might say for instance that all measures aiming at promoting the economy 
and the equitable sharing of available resources, democracy, and the rule of law and respect of 
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human rights are needed. This view is supported by the Secretary-General of the UN in his report 
of 2009 on the efforts of the UN system to prevent genocide.319 Among the things to consider 
when assessing and addressing the risk of genocide, he suggested to look at structural and 
institutional frameworks in the country - including domestic legislation, an independent judiciary 
and an effective police force - to protect people from genocide.320 He also suggested taking into 
consideration factors such as illiteracy or geographic isolation that make it difficult for a 
vulnerable population group to benefit from a domestic protection capacity and opined that 
addressing these weaknesses through appropriate measures is essential to the prevention of 
genocide.321  
In fact, since genocide is a process, prevention of genocide would mean to tackle it at very early 
stage: creating an environment that does not favour the development of the genocide germ that 
could lead to genocidal conflict. When the primary preventive measures are unsuccessful, then 
the need to take other measures may arise. 
3.2. Secondary prevention of genocide 
Prevention of genocide at this secondary level is necessary in two situations. First in case a state 
has not adopted measures at the primary level and secondly in case the measures adopted before 
did not prevent the risks of genocide from developing. Preventive measures at this level must 
therefore address the risk factors and the phases of genocide before the start of genocide per se.  
This level concerns the period in which there are symptoms of genocidal conflict but before the 
start of the commission of genocide. That is the time the bridge from the normal situation has 
been crossed. For instance it is a period when in a given state, there is a presence of a totalitarian 
ruler and an authoritarian form of government which, as noted by Linda M. Woolf and Michael 
R. Hulsizer322 is “one key characteristic of genocidal states”. The two authors emphasise that “it 
is not coincidental that only non-democratic nations in the twentieth century committed 
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genocide.”323 For instance those kinds of regimes create a climate that allows the deprivation of 
resources that targets a specific group. They also allow discrimination targeting a specific group 
as well as dehumanization of that group. They may give rise to a period in which there is hate 
propaganda against that group, characterized by impunity of the perpetrators of crimes related to 
this. A period in which an armed conflict may occur which is either ethnic, racial, religious 
oriented or can create a favourable environment in which the distinctions between groups get 
worse or as Fein noted can “obscures genocidal killing”“.324 Symptoms and risks that may fall 
within the secondary level include human rights violations such as killings, disappearances, 
torture, rape and sexual violence, abduction, ethnic cleansing, forced population transfer or 
displacement, segregation, isolation or concentration of a group, expropriation, destruction of 
property, destruction of subsistence food supply, denial of water or medical attention and hate 
speech.325 They can also point to specific actions that need to be immediately taken if genocide is 
to be averted.326  In the action plan to prevent genocide launched by the UN Secretary-General in 
2004, he insisted on addressing the causes of conflicts and to pay attention to the gathering signs 
of disaster.327 He mentioned some of what he called roots of genocide: hatred, intolerance, 
racism, tyranny, and the dehumanizing public discourse that denies whole groups of people their 
dignity and their rights.328 At this level there is a need to take preventive actions that are tailored 
to it. 
3.3. Tertiary prevention of genocide 
When the measures at the secondary level fail (or have never been taken) and the actual genocide 
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starts, measures at the tertiary level are needed in order to respond to the final phases of 
genocide, i.e the actual execution of genocide. They will constitute measures aiming at stopping 
the genocide. 
At this level, there is also a need to put in place measures that deal with the aftermath of 
genocide in a way that prevents the reoccurrence of genocide which may also have preventive 
effects elsewhere.  
While the necessity to take preventive measures at this level (and early ones) is clear, it is 
noteworthy that there are some difficulties that may affect the motivation to take preventive 
measures at those levels. The first is related to the lack of certainty that the presence of factors at 
different phases may amount to genocide and the second is the uncertainty on whether the 
preventive measures to be taken can prevent genocide.  
3.4. Prevention v. the lack of certainty of the risk of genocide and of the power to 
prevent 
Two questions need some consideration here. The first is whether certainty that genocide will 
occur is needed before the preventive measures will be taken. The second is whether certainty 
that preventive measures will prevent the occurrence of genocide is needed. 
Regarding the first question, it must be said that the certainty from the existing factors and risks 
at early phases that they will amount to genocide may be difficult to get. Even at advanced 
phases the degree of certainty of occurrence may still not be there. The process to genocide 
cannot be understood as an exact science. That is why it may be argued that the answer to the 
first question may be negative. Before taking preventive measures, one cannot wait until there is 
certainty that genocide will happen. In fact, by the time this is clear, it might be too late to 
prevent it from happening and too difficult to do it without causing other problems. The analogy 
with the prevention of environmental damage which does not require full scientific certainty can 
help to understand the uncertainty of the occurrence of genocide. Like in environmental law, lack 
of certainty should not be a reason not to take preventive measures.329 The fact that there may not 
be a linear process to genocide that is identical everywhere is a big challenge. Another important 
challenge is that there is no institution that assesses the factors and phases in order to determine 
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who takes which measures, when to take them and how and where to implement them.  
On the question whether certainty that preventive measures to be taken would totally prevent the 
occurrence of genocide is needed, the answer is negative as well. As it will be developed further 
in this work, given the nature of prevention and the process to genocide, it would be not logical if 
the preventer  would need to be sure beforehand that the preventive measures to be taken will 
definitely prevent the occurrence of genocide.  
3.5. Preliminary conclusions 
To sum up this section, it must be said that the prevention of genocide needs to take into 
consideration all the factors and phases through the three levels of prevention: primary, 
secondary, and tertiary. These three levels refer to the period before the beginning of a conflict 
that may lead to genocide (primary level), during a conflict that may lead to genocide (secondary 
level), and during and after the actual genocide (tertiary level).  
Thus, to prevent genocide would mean to tackle all those factors which, as shown earlier, give 
chances to the likelihood of genocide. In the previous chapter it was concluded that prevention is 
continuous and therefore needs measures at every level. This conclusion is equally valid for the 
prevention of genocide. In other words, like for the prevention of diseases for instance, for the 
prevention of genocide there is also a need to take preventive measures at all three levels.  
At every level there is a risk that may lead to genocide. So, all factors at each level need to be 
addressed. If prevention is done at only last levels (when the risk of occurrence of genocide is 
high), the risk of failure to avert the occurrence of genocide is high.  This is not to say that at that 
level there is no more need to take actions. Even at an advanced level of risk of genocide, 
prevention is possible and needed. Genocide is never inevitable.330  
Conclusion 
The aim in this chapter was to explain the factors and risks (in phases) in the process to genocide 
and ultimately what the concept of prevention of genocide could mean in that process. 
Six factors discussed in this chapter (differences in identity, difficult life due to economic 
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problems, deprivation or inequalities in the allocation of resources, political problems, armed 
conflicts and human rights violations in the atmosphere of impunity) have been given as 
illustrations and are far from constituting an exhaustive list of factors of genocide. Some of these 
factors may be of course more determinant in contributing to causing genocide than others, but 
each factor is important in its way. Though no single factor among those shown above can 
neither be a cause of genocide alone nor could it be said that wherever there are those factors 
genocide becomes a necessary result, it was argued that no genocide can occur where none of the 
said factors exist. It thus followed that those factors are susceptible of contributing to causing 
genocide. These factors are a womb from which genocidal germ, safely, rapidly (or sometimes 
slowly) and healthily grow.  
In addition to the said factors, it has been argued that for genocide to happen it passes through 
different phases in the process to genocide. Indeed, what is common to all genocides is that they 
are all preceded by risks at various phases that, if not addressed, may lead to genocide.331 For 
instance where the social categorisation exists, there is a risk that the discrimination of some of 
the groups may follow. The situation may grow up to the dehumanisation and the propaganda for 
their elimination. The metaphor used by a witness before the ICTR in describing how the hate 
radio played a role in making the genocide possible in Rwanda applies for the whole process. 
The witness said that the radio had “spread petrol throughout the country little by little, so that 
one day it would be able to set fire to the whole country”.332  In her comment on this, Professor 
Suzan Benesch333 noted that the witness implied that the crime that matters most is spreading the 
petrol, not striking the match. This implies that the phases prior to genocide per se are important 
to make it happen and need to be addressed. Indeed, the petrol was poured and spread in the 
whole country even long before the creation of the hate radio as shown above and the radio came 
to pour more and more. In this climate, the preparation of genocide becomes easier and some 
grave crimes targeting a given group (which may include the incitement to commit genocide) 
may be committed. Since in this climate these crimes are not punished (impunity), it creates 
good incentives to those who want to wipe out the targeted group(s). This is the final phase: 
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elimination (genocide as such). When no action to halt it is taken, it is successfully committed. 
The whole process may be coupled with the denial which continues even after the genocide. Yet, 
denial of genocide is not only deeply offensive to survivors and their descendants as Professor 
Roger W. Smith334 has observed, but also if it is successful, it can be a signal that genocide will 
be committed with impunity.335 Then the lesson that can be drawn from it is: commit genocide 
and deny it.336 Like for some diseases that need a favourable environment for their development, 
genocide also needs a favourable environment in which its germ will grow and expand to reach 
its final phase. It is important to note therefore that factors and phases in the process to genocide 
are very much interconnected in the sense that they create together an environment from which 
genocidal germ reproduces.   
However, the process to genocide through the said phases does not mean that there is a linear 
process. All depends on particularities of each place and situation. It should also be understood 
that in all these phases, the factors do not disappear but continue to exist. For instance, 
discrimination may continue until the last phase. Likewise, dehumanisation and propaganda for 
the extermination may continue until the last phases (extermination and even after it).  
As for the prevention of genocide in the process to genocide, it has been argued that the 
prevention of genocide requires addressing both the factors (favouring environment) and the 
risks in the phases to genocide. That means that prevention of genocide is a continuous process. 
Using the temporal divisions of primary, secondary, and tertiary levels was useful in that process 
because it gave an idea on what periods are important for the prevention and what could be done 
at each level. At the primary level, the prevention of genocide deals with these factors of 
genocide by putting in place measures that do not allow the emergence of all the risks shown in 
the previous two sections. At the secondary level, preventive measures susceptible of eliminating 
those symptoms and risks from the relatively early phases and at every phase of the genocidal 
conflict are put in place in order to avoid that the situation escalates to genocide. At the tertiary 
level, robust measures aiming at stopping the genocide are needed. The measures are taken at 
each level without the certainty that genocide may happen and without certainty that they will 
absolutely prevent genocide from happening. 
                                                          
334
 Smith, W. Roger, “Legislating against Genocide Denial: Criminalizing Denial or Preventing Free Speech”? 









The question is however to know what this process and the levels of prevention of genocide may 
mean to international law. In other words, the question is whether international law takes care of 
the process to genocide by requiring preventing genocide through the different levels as 
discussed in this chapter and what could be the measures at each level. This question will be 








Chapter IV. Prevention of genocide under international law  
 
“Many hope that there will be no more wars, but we dare not to rely on mere hopes for 
protection against genocidal practices by ruthless conquerors”,   Raphael Lemkin337 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explained the path to genocide and concluded that the prevention of 
genocide needs to tackle the different factors and phases that contribute to leading to its 
perpetration. It was argued that every factor and phase of the process is important and needs 
measures tailored to it. In so doing, given the nature of the process to genocide, it was argued 
that prevention must be undertaken at three levels. These are the primary, secondary, and tertiary 
levels. It was questioned if and how the legal framework for the prevention of genocide needs to 
be adjusted to these levels. This requires the examination of the existing laws on the prevention 
of genocide.  Therefore, this chapter primarily seeks to show the origin and definition of 
genocide as well as the process of the adoption of the Genocide Convention in order to 
understand the context in which this convention was adopted which helps in the understanding of 
the spirit of the convention as far as the scope of prevention of genocide is concerned. This is 
important to understand before analysing in deep what the scope of the obligation to prevent 
genocide entails to its bearers in next chapters. Thus, the present chapter explains in its first 
section the historical context in which the Genocide Convention was drafted and explained at its 
initial stage. 
Furthermore, this chapter examines the legal status of the obligation to prevent genocide in order 
to answer the question whether it is a legal obligation on its own or a component of the 
obligation to punish. It also examines who the bearers of the obligation to prevent genocide are 
under both the Genocide Convention and customary international law and discusses the temporal 
scope of the obligation to prevent genocide. Finally, it discusses the ICJ test on knowledge of 
serious risk of genocide. 
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1. Origin and definition of genocide: a prevention perspective 
It is important to show the context in which the laws on genocide came into existence and to see 
what can be learned from this for the prevention of genocide. In doing so, this section will 
examine whether or not the drafting history shows that prevention was understood in the way 
discussed in the previous chapters.  
While describing the Nazi atrocities in Poland in 1940 Winston Churchill, then British Prime 
Minister, asserted in a radio broadcast: “we are in the presence of a crime without name”“.338 
This broadcast was heard by the Jewish Dr Raphael Lemkin and began to think about ways he 
could combine his knowledge in international law with the aim of preventing such atrocities.339 
Four years later he created the word genocide.340  Some years before, Lemkin who had been 
touched by the atrocities against the Armenians, had been working on a draft law aiming at 
preventing and punishing such killings. This is because he believed that if the killings happened 
once, they would happen again and anywhere if the international community would not prevent 
them.”341 With that end, Lemkin started to work on preparing an international draft law that 
would commit governments to stopping the destruction of ethnic, national, racial or religious 
groups, qualifying those killings as barbarity and vandalism.342 He envisaged the creation of two 
new international crimes: the crime of barbarity, consisting in the extermination of social 
collectivities,343 and the crime of vandalism, consisting in destruction of cultural and artistic 
works of these groups.344 Lemkin wanted first and foremost to find names to qualify the crimes 
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which would lead to putting in place a law that would obligate the international community to 
prevent and punish them. Unfortunately, in 1933 he was denied by the Polish Government to go 
to Madrid, where he wanted to present his draft law in the Fifth International Conference for the 
Unification of the Penal Code. That draft law was presented by the Polish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs but was not adopted.345  
At the start of World War II, Poland was invaded by Nazi Germany, and the place in which 
Raphael Lemkin grew up became a killing zone. As a Jew, Raphael Lemkin was forced to flee, 
making his way to Sweden first346 and later to the United States where he became an advisor to 
U.S. War Department.347 The Nazis tried to create a more homogeneous empire in Eastern 
Europe by restructuring the population and carrying out genocidal policies against the Jews.348 
On several occasions in June 1942, Lemkin used this opportunity of working in the War 
Department to meet Wallace, the U.S Vice- President to introduce his proposal to ban the 
destruction of people. Later he wrote, “I looked hopefully for reaction, there was none”.349 
Parallel to this, in the same year, Raphael Lemkin got an idea of writing Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe, a book that would be published in 1944.350  In this book, he would set out his new 
concept of genocide as the mass murder of national, racial and religious groups and proposed to 
prosecute the Nazis after the war for genocide as a crime in international law.351  Even after a 
disappointing meeting with the then US Vice-President, Lemkin whose people were being 
systematically exterminated, did not give up. He continued to insist that there must be a law to 
stop the destruction of Jews and future exterminations. Indeed, he next tried to approach 
Roosevelt, then U.S President. Later Roosevelt wrote to him that he recognized the danger to 
groups, but saw difficulties to adopting such a law at that time. He urged patience, but Lemkin 
was aghast on that and said: 
“Patience is a good word to be used when one expects an appointment, a budgetary 
allocation or the building of road, but when the rope is already around the neck of the 
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victim and strangulation is imminent, isn’t patience an insult to reason and nature?”352 
For him, he believed that a double murder was being committed, one by Nazis and another by 
allies by not publicizing, denouncing and stopping the Hitler’s extermination campaign.353  
At the same time, another Polish Jew and member of Polish National Council in exile in London, 
Szmul Zygielbojm, was also campaigning for ending the extermination of Jews, emphasizing 
that it would be a shame to go on living, to belong to the human race, if steps are not taken to 
halt the worst crime which was being committed by Nazis.354  In his letter to his government, 
before he took an overdose of sleeping pills for his successful suicide, he wrote: 
“The responsibility for murdering the entire Jewish population of Poland falls in the first 
instance on the perpetrators, but indirectly also weights on the whole humanity, the 
people and allied states which so far have made no effort towards a concrete action for 
the purpose of curtailing this crime. By passive observation of this murder of defenceless 
millions and of the maltreatment of children, women, and old men, these countries have 
become the criminals” accomplices… By my death I wish to express my strongest protest 
against the inactivity with which the world is looking on and permitting the extermination 
of Jewish people. I know how life is worth, especially today. But as I was unable to do 
anything during my life, perhaps by my death I shall contribute to destroying the 
indifference of those who are able and should act.”355  
Still, the Nazis and their fascist partners were inflicting on the European continent, atrocities so 
savage, so widespread, and yet so integrated into a monstrous whole that Winston Churchill 
made his remark on the crime without name.356 Ever since Lemkin had heard Churchill’s radio 
address, he had been determined to find a new word to replace “barbarity” and “vandalism” 
which had failed him at the 1933 Fifth Madrid Conference.357  He constructed the word 
genocide, i.e the killing of a people, from the Greek word “genos” (clan, family or people) and 
Latin word “occidio” (total extinction or extermination,358 and he wrote: 
 “The crime of genocide involves a wide range of actions, including not only the deprivation of 
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life and also devices considerably endangering life and health: all these actions are subordinated 
to the criminal intent to destroy or to cripple permanently a human group. The acts are selected 
for destruction only because they belong to these groups…”359  
Lemkin proposed the following definition of genocide: 
“Genocide is …a co-coordinated plan of different actions, aiming at the destruction of 
essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves. The objective of such plan would be disintegration of the political and 
social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic 
existence of national groups and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, 
dignity and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is 
directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed 
against individuals, not in their own capacity but as members of the national group…”360   
So, according to Lemkin, genocide did not necessarily imply the immediate destruction of the 
national or ethnic group, but rather different actions aiming at the essential foundations of the life 
of the group with the aim of annihilating the group as such.361 He wrote in the Axis Rule in 
occupied Europe,  that “the objective of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and 
social destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and even the lives of the 
individuals belonging to such groups.”362  He showed that the Nazis had elaborated before, a 
plan to destroy the targeted groups. He cited Hitler’s statement to Rauschning:  
“(…) We favour the planned control of population movements. But our friends will have 
to excuse us if we subtract the twenty millions elsewhere.  After all, all these centuries of 
whining about the protection of the poor and lowly, it is about time we decided to protect 
the strong against the inferior. It will be one of the chief tasks of German statesmanship 
for all time to prevent, by every means in our power, the further increase of the Slav 
races. Natural instincts bid all living beings not merely conquer their enemies but also 
destroy them. In former days it was the victor’s prerogative to destroy entire tribes, entire 
peoples. By doing this gradually and without bloodshed, we demonstrate our humanity. 
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We should remember, too, that we are merely doing unto others as they would have done 
to us.”363   
In his mind, Lemkin believed that finding a name and a definition of the crime was a first step 
along the way to banning such destruction.364  After having found the name “genocide” and its 
definition and after having observed that the system of minorities protection created following 
the First World War had proved to be inadequate, he proposed that there be a multilateral treaty 
requiring States to provide for the introduction, in constitutions but also in domestic criminal 
codes, of norms protecting national, religious or racial minority groups from oppression and 
genocidal practices.365 Thus, in the suggestion to ban this crime, Lemkin who observed that 
genocide also represents a violation of specific regulations of the Hague Convention such as 
those regarding the protection of property, life and honour,   did not only focus on its prohibition 
by international law but also on its prevention.366 
Following this, during the session of the General Assembly on 30 September 1 October 1946, 
Cuba, India and Panama asked that the question of genocide be put on the agenda, a matter 
which was discussed briefly and then referred to the Sixth Committee where, on 22 November 
1946, the same three States proposed a draft resolution on genocide.367 
The draft resolution approved by the Sixth Committee was adopted on 11 December 1946 by the 
General Assembly, unanimously and without debate, Resolution 96(I) which states inter alia 
that: 
“Genocide is a denial of right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is a 
denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of right of existence 
shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of 
cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to 
moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. Many instances of such 
crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political and other groups have 
been destroyed, entirely or in part. The punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of 
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The General Assembly, therefore 
““Affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world 
condemns, and for the commission of which principals and accomplices – whether 
private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on 
religious, racial, political or any other grounds – are punishable; 
Invites the member states to enact the necessary legislation for the prevention and 
punishment of the crime;  
The General Assembly recommended that “international co-operation be organized between 
States with a view to facilitating speedy prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.”368 
In this resolution also, the General Assembly requested the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) to undertake the necessary studies, with a view to drawing up a draft convention on 
the crime of genocide to be submitted to the next regular session of the General Assembly.369 
On its turn, ECOSOC adopted a resolution on 28 March 1947, asking the Secretary-General of 
the UN to consult all relevant organs and experts in a view to drawing a draft convention on 
genocide, and submit it to the next session of ECOSOC. The Secretary-General turned to the 
Secretariat’s Human Rights Division for preparation of the draft, and the division consulted 
experts in the area such as Raphael Lemkin (among others), inventor of the word “genocide”.370 
Meanwhile, the General Assembly adopted later, on 21 November 1947, resolution 180(II) 
realizing the importance of the problem of combating the international crime of genocide and 
reaffirming its resolution 96(I) of 11 December 1946 on the crime of genocide. It also declared 
that genocide is an international crime entailing national and international responsibility on the 
part of individuals and states.371  
After many drafts were prepared by different appointed committees, commented on by member 
states and revised in different sessions of the General Assembly, a final draft was adopted in the 
third session of the General Assembly on 9 December 1948, one day before the adoption of the 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights.372 All the delegates voted yes for the Genocide 
Convention, none voted no. This marked the first time the United Nations had adopted a human 
rights treaty.373   
Article II of this convention which defines the crime of genocide reads as follow: “In the present 
convention genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such: 
(a) Killing members of group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm  to members of the group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.374 
And article III enumerates acts which shall be punishable:  
(a) Genocide 
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide 
(e) Complicity in genocide.375 
Though as it can be noticed from the context and circumstances in which the convention was 
adopted much emphasis was put on criminalizing genocide and punishing it, the convention also 
provides for the prevention of that crime. Indeed article I of that convention reads: “The 
Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, 
is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish”.  
However, since in the whole process prevention was not very much commented on, there is no 
clear indication that the initiators of the convention meant to include the very early stages of the 
process to genocide as discussed in chapter three. Yet, it cannot be concluded either that the 
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initiators excluded those early stages. For instance Raphael Lemkin repeatedly said that the 
Nazis had planned to eliminate Jews long before the actual elimination started. This is one of 
other indications that show that prevention was to include the whole process to genocide though 
it was not clearly structured that way. Indeed, the idea of the initiators of the Genocide 
Convention was to avoid the occurrence of genocide by preventing it. What lacks though is the 
indication of details about measures to prevent genocide especially at early stages.  
As for further stages of the process to genocide, there is at least much more indication on the 
stage of action in the prevention. For instance the initiators of the convention suggested that the 
genocide be stopped. This has been shown above and it can easily be explained by the fact that 
they were pressed by the then on-going annihilating situation. Given the context, they were 
rather much closer to the last level: to stop it and punish the authors.  Yet, the process to 
genocide does not start at that level, it passes through other levels.  
In summary it can be said that, though the initiators of the Genocide Convention did not structure 
the convention in the three levels of prevention as such as discussed in previous chapters, 
nothing shows that some stages were to be excluded either. What is clear though is the fact that 
they have put more emphasis on the period close to the perpetration of genocide and to the post 
genocide period (punish). This is fairly explained by the fact that at the time this convention was 
finally adopted it was in response to the atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War II 
and the idea was to prevent a similar tragedy from happening again. This idea to avoid that it 
happens again is what was indeed behind the drafting and adoption of the Genocide Convention 
with the obligation to prevent it. This obligation to prevent genocide will be discussed in next 
section in order to show its nature, meaning and scope.   
2. The obligation to prevent genocide: meaning, scope and 
independence vis-à-vis the obligation to punish 
This section will answer three questions: What does prevention mean and what does the 
obligation to prevent genocide entails with regard to the different stages of the process to 
genocide? What is the standing of this obligation vis-à-vis the obligation to punish genocide? 




2.1. Meaning of prevention and the obligation to prevent genocide:  Article I of the 
Genocide Convention 
Article I of the Genocide Convention states that “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, 
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which 
they undertake to prevent and to punish.”376 As it can be seen from this formulation, this article 
does neither define prevention nor does it clarify what the obligation to prevent genocide entails. 
It also does not clarify whether or not the obligation to prevent genocide includes the obligation 
not to commit genocide.  
2.1.1. The meaning of prevention in the Genocide Convention 
From the discussion on the draft of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the 
crime of genocide there is not much indication on the meaning of prevention itself. Instead, 
during those discussions, many states criticized article I not on the issue of the word 
“prevention” but because according to them, it was a repetition of the Resolution 96(I) of the 
General Assembly. The discussions were mainly whether to maintain that article or not.  Some 
states thought that it was important to affirm that genocide was a crime under international law, 
while others saw it as unnecessary and urged its deletion.377  As William Schabas later noticed, 
while the final convention has got much to say about punishment of genocide, there is really 
little to suggest what prevention of genocide really means, because nothing in the debates about 
article I provides the slightest clue about it.378 Legal literature did not help much in clarifying it. 
It is important to have recourse to methods of interpretation in the endeavour to understand what 
article I of the Genocide Convention means with regard to prevention.  Indeed, according to 
article 31 of the Vienna Convention,379 in interpreting a treaty, one must consider the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. In its 
ordinary meaning, “to prevent” means to stop something from happening or coming into 
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existence.380 According to the Oxford dictionary, prevention is the action of stopping something 
bad from happening,381 or making impossible an anticipated or intended act.382 It is an action 
intended to provide against an anticipated danger.383  In the case of genocide the bad thing to be 
prevented from happening is the genocide. This meaning of the concept of prevention is the same 
as what was found in chapter two and three of this work and there is no other suggested meaning 
that would contradict it.  However, even if we accept this ordinary meaning of prevention, the 
problem in article I is still not solved. This is because even if to prevent would mean to avert the 
occurrence of something bad, with the prevention of genocide there is still need to clarify what 
should be done in averting the occurrence of genocide, the exact time to do it and who should do 
so and within which territorial limits. This will be addressed later in this work. It is now 
opportune to examine in general what the obligation to prevent genocide entails.  
2.1.2. The meaning and scope of the obligation to prevent genocide 
There is generally a distinction between two categories of legal obligations. Some may be 
positive and others negative. This distinction will be briefly made here in order to show where 
the obligation to prevent genocide belongs to. The purpose of making the distinction is not linked 
to particular consequences of each. It serves to show the meaning and scope of that obligation. In 
other words, what does the obligation to prevent require from the obligation bearers?  
2.1.2.1. Is the obligation to prevent genocide a positive obligation?  
A positive obligation is an obligation that requires its bearer to take positive acts.384 The main 
characteristic of such an obligation is that it requires the bearer to take the necessary measures 
aiming at fulfilling the obligation concerned. That is what positive obligation means. It requires 
its bearer to do something.385 As the literature and case-law illustrates, such positive acts may 
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include the adoption of laws for the implementation of an international obligation in domestic 
law,386  the duty to provide resources to individuals to prevent the breach  of the obligation 
concerned,387 and the duty to “take appropriate care” in the planning and conduct of an 
operation.388  
The question whether the obligation to prevent genocide belongs to this category of positive 
obligation has been given a limited attention in literature. That explains why that obligation has 
remained unclear for many years. It is only with the first case before the ICJ related to that 
obligation that some clarification has been given.  
Fifty-nine years after the adoption of that convention, the ICJ wrote in the Case Bosnia- 
Herzegovina v. Serbia-Montenegro that:  
“The ordinary meaning of the word “undertake” is to give a formal promise, to bind or 
engage oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to agree, to accept an obligation… It is not 
merely hortatory or purposive. The undertaking is unqualified …and it is not to be read 
merely as an introduction to later express references to legislation, prosecution and 
extradition. Those features support the conclusion that Article I, in particular its 
undertaking to prevent, creates obligations distinct from those which appear in the 
subsequent Articles. That conclusion is also supported by the purely humanitarian and 
civilizing purpose of the Convention”.389 
It added that  
“Article I does impose distinct obligations over and above those imposed by other 
Articles of the Convention. In particular, the Contracting Parties have a direct obligation 
to prevent genocide”.390  
According to the Court, this obligation to prevent genocide obligates states “to adopt and 
implement suitable measures to prevent genocide from being committed.”391 The Court added 
that “the duty to prevent places States under positive obligations, to do their best to ensure that 
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such acts do not occur”.392 In other words, states are under the obligation to prevent the 
commission of genocide by taking appropriate measures. However, the Court did not go far to 
suggest each and every measure that must be taken to prevent genocide. It however made it clear 
that the content of the obligation to prevent genocide is about the appropriate measures that must 
be put in place by states in order to avoid that genocide occurs. This was lacking in literature 
prior to the court’s decision. It is only after this decision of the ICJ that different scholars have 
analysed the scope of the obligation to prevent genocide. In most cases though, the discussion 
has been on either supporting or criticizing the court’s decision without adding much on 
clarifying the scope of the concept itself.393 For instance, Gattini and Gibney recognize the lack 
of the indication on the exact meaning in the existing literature in international law on the scope 
of prevention and notice that the court does not give much explanation of its meaning either.394  
Despite this criticism, the court’s ruling on this question is remarkable in the sense that for the 
first time after the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the obligation to prevent genocide was 
addressed. The court expressly suggests that this obligation is a positive one which requires 
states to take necessary preventive actions. This gives a foundation from which the full content 
of the obligation in concreto can be developed, which is the objective of this work.  However, it 
is important to first discuss the question whether the obligation to prevent genocide also requires 
states not to engage in acts that may lead to genocide themselves. 
2.1.2.2. Is the obligation to prevent genocide a negative obligation?  
A negative obligation is about what its bearer must not do. It is an obligation that prohibits some 
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acts.395  For instance, the bearer of an obligation that prohibits the violation of people’s liberty 
must refrain from depriving people of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily.396 Another example 
is the obligation provided in the Articles on the Responsibility of States for International 
Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) which prohibits states from recognizing as lawful a situation created 
by a serious breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international 
law.397  This obligation also prohibits States from rendering aid or assistance in maintaining such 
a situation.398 
The obligation to prevent genocide has not made it clear whether it requires abstaining from acts 
that may lead to genocide or in acts of genocide. The literature has not addressed either whether 
the obligation to prevent genocide may fall in the category of negative obligation. That may also 
be due to the fact that this category of negative obligations is not common in international law. It 
is worth examining how the ICJ has addressed this and how its ruling could be interpreted with 
regard to the negative obligation to prevent genocide.  
The ICJ wrote that:  
“(…) Under Article I the States parties are bound to prevent such an act, which it 
describes as “a crime under international law”, being committed. The Article does not 
expressis verbis require States to refrain from themselves committing genocide. 
However, in the view of the Court, taking into account the established purpose of the 
Convention, the effect of Article I is to prohibit States from themselves committing 
genocide. Such a prohibition follows, first, from the fact that the Article categorizes 
genocide as “a crime under international law”: by agreeing to such a categorization, the 
States parties must logically be undertaking not to commit the act so described. Secondly, 
it follows from the expressly stated obligation to prevent the commission of acts of 
genocide. That obligation requires the States parties, inter alia, to employ the means at 
their disposal, in circumstances to be described more specifically later in this Judgment, 
to prevent persons or groups not directly under their authority from committing an act of 
genocide or any of the other acts mentioned in Article III. It would be paradoxical if 
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States were thus under an obligation to prevent, so far as within their power, commission 
of genocide by persons over whom they have a certain influence, but were not forbidden 
to commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have such firm 
control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under international law. In 
short, the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the 
commission of genocide”.399 
It added that:  
“Accordingly, having considered the various arguments, the Court affirms that the 
Contracting Parties are bound by the obligation under the Convention not to commit, 
through their organs or persons or groups whose conduct is attributable to them, genocide 
and the other acts enumerated in Article III…”400 
This was even strengthened by what the Court added that:   
“…If a State is held responsible for an act of genocide (because it was committed by a 
person or organ whose conduct is attributable to the State), or for one of the other acts 
referred to in Article III of the Convention (for the same reason), then there is no point in 
asking whether it complied with its obligation of prevention in respect of the same acts, 
because logic dictates that a State cannot have satisfied an obligation to prevent genocide 
in which it actively participated.”401 
The court found that the obligation to refrain from committing genocide was implied in the 
obligation to prevent genocide. This view of the court has been criticized in literature. For 
instance, Professor Paola Gaeta argued that the two obligations belong to different “species”402 : 
the obligation to prevent genocide being clearly an obligation of conduct  and the obligation not 
to commit genocide clearly an obligation of result.403 This makes them independent from each 
other. She agreed that the source of the obligation to prevent genocide is article I of the Genocide 
Convention but rejected the view that the obligation not to commit genocide has the same source 
and therefore argued that the former obligation originates in customary international law.404 She 
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reached the conclusion that the court wrongly inferred that the obligation to prevent genocide 
implies the obligation not to commit it.405 While the principles referred to in this argument might 
be correct the conclusion reached is debatable for two reasons. First, while it is true that the 
obligation not to commit genocide originates in customary law, it is also true that the spirit of the 
Genocide Convention as a whole and of article I is to prohibit genocide from happening. The 
Genocide Convention was drafted with this objective and it sets an obligation to prevent it from 
happening because it is an international crime. Furthermore, as it will be argued later in section 
three of this chapter, the obligation to prevent genocide is a principle underlying the Genocide 
Convention with a status of customary international law. So, the fact that both may be customary 
international rules does not make it impossible to codify them in the Genocide Convention as it 
seems to be the case. The obligation not to commit genocide may have its source in customary 
international law that preceded even the adoption of the Genocide Convention but it is argued 
that this does not mean that it cannot find its place in the Genocide Convention as well. It is not 
impossible for it to be implied in the obligation to prevent genocide.  
Secondly, the argument that the fact that one is an obligation of means and another of result 
makes them independent from each other might be true, but the nature of some obligations may 
make them have two faces: the positive side (to do something) and the negative side (to refrain 
from doing something). To have negative and positive obligations in one provision is not a 
particularity of the Genocide Convention. There are other international conventions that have a 
provision with both negative and positive obligations. For instance, article 2(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that: “Each State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”406  In its general comment of this article, the committee on this 
covenant confirmed that the legal obligation under article 2, paragraph 1, is both negative and 
positive in nature. States Parties must refrain from violation of the rights recognized by the 
Covenant, and any restrictions on any of those rights must be permissible under the relevant 
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provisions of the Covenant (negative obligation).407 Article 2 requires that States Parties adopt 
legislative, judicial, administrative, educative and other appropriate measures in order to fulfil 
their legal obligations (positive obligation).408 
The Court’s view that the obligation not to commit genocide is implied in the obligation to 
prevent genocide makes sense because this obligation to prevent genocide cannot be satisfied by 
its bearer if the latter commit acts of genocide. The court made it clear that the fact that article I 
of the Genocide Convention has made genocide an international crime that Parties are obligated 
to prevent was enough to conclude that it was meant to obligate bearers not to commit it. The 
obligation to prevent genocide includes the obligation not to commit genocide. This is useful and 
helps to argue that obligation to prevent genocide as underlined in article I of the Genocide 
Convention has two faces: a negative one (not to commit genocide) and a positive one (to 
prevent it by taking measures). The question that arises is however whether this negative face of 
that obligation includes refraining from engaging in acts that may lead to the commission of 
genocide. 
This question has neither been addressed by the ICJ nor has it been discussed in literature. 
Yet, it needs some consideration and it will be discussed in line with the discussion above. The 
obligation to prevent genocide requires taking actions that may prevent genocide from 
happening.  Logically, it would be absurd if it were not required to refrain from taking actions 
which would lead to genocide. For instance, if the obligation requires taking action such as 
adopting laws that would give effect to the Genocide Convention, it would be absurd if it would 
not imply to prohibit from adopting laws that would allow its preparation and perpetration.  Such 
laws may be like those that were enacted in Germany against the Jews before their 
extermination.409 Though such laws may be adopted long before genocide happens (if it does), 
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the prohibition from adopting them may flow from the obligation to prevent genocide that 
requires adopting laws that prevents genocide. It is argued that the reasoning of the ICJ that 
obligation to prevent genocide implies also the obligation not to commit genocide may apply to 
the obligation to refrain from performing acts that may lead to it.  
If the Court limited itself to the obligation not to commit genocide it is most probably because it 
is what it was asked, but nothing indicates that this can be construed to limit the scope at that 
level (commission of genocide). In fact if the obligation to prevent genocide did not entail the 
obligation not to act in a way that may lead to genocide or not to commit genocide, this 
obligation would have a very insignificant utility. If the Genocide Convention obligates the 
bearers to take measures to prevent genocide from happening it automatically implies that it 
forbids them from taking measures that makes it happen. By obliging them to prevent genocide it 
consequently forbids them to perform acts that may cause it. This interpretation can be supported 
by what the Committee against Torture has said about the obligation to prevent torture. It 
observed that “States Parties are obligated to adopt effective measures to prevent public 
authorities and other persons acting in an official capacity from directly committing, instigating, 
inciting, encouraging, acquiescing in or otherwise participating or being complicit in acts of 
torture as defined in the Convention”.410 Also, if history has shown that genocide has mostly 
been possible where states (through their authorities) were involved in it, it makes sense to say 
that the obligation to prevent genocide can make sense if it obligates them to prevent their organs 
from taking actions that are susceptible of causing genocide. 
This argument does not solve all the questions related to the obligation to prevent genocide. For 
instance the question whether the obligation to prevent genocide is a legal obligation on its own 
separate to the obligation to punish needs to be answered.  
2.2.  Obligation to prevent genocide as a legal obligation (separate from the 
obligation to punish) 
The question here is whether or not the obligation to prevent genocide has its own legal status 
different from the obligation to punish it. Though there are some relations between the obligation 
to prevent and the obligation to punish, they should not be confused with each other. The 
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obligation to prevent requires that its bearer takes appropriate measures aiming at avoiding the 
occurrence of a breach.411 This is not uniquely provided in the Genocide Convention. It has been 
provided also in other international legal instruments. For instance, as it was noted in Chapter 
two of this work, article 2(1) of the Convention against Torture stipulates that “each State Party 
shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of 
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction”.412Also, article 22(2) of the Vienna Convention on 
diplomatic relations provides that the receiving states shall have the obligation “to take all 
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and 
prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.413 
What is different from other conventions is that for the Genocide Convention the two obligations 
were put in one article and could be confusing as some could think that since the obligation to 
punish would have itself a preventive character, it has absorbed the one to prevent. It has already 
been said above that in the drafting stage there was more discussion on punishing the 
perpetrators of genocide than on prevention and this could have contributed to the idea of 
absorption of the obligation to prevent by the obligation to punish. This was deplored by the ICJ 
where it gave the following explanation which separates the two obligations: 
“…it is not the case that the obligation to prevent has no separate legal existence of its 
own; that it is, as it were, absorbed by the obligation to punish, which is therefore the 
only duty the performance of which may be subject to review by the Court. The 
obligation on each contracting State to prevent genocide is both normative and 
compelling. It is not merged in the duty to punish, nor can it be regarded as simply a 
component of that duty. It has its own scope, which extends beyond the particular case 
envisaged in Article VIII, namely reference to the competent organs of the United 
Nations, for them to take such action as they deem appropriate”.414 
This explanation of the obligation to prevent genocide was needed and it is very important in that 
it confirmed that the obligation to prevent is independent from the one to punish. This is very 
important as some had thought and could continue to think that punishing genocide is a sufficient 
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way to prevent it. The contribution of the court is relevant in this regard since now it can be said 
that there is a legal obligation to prevent genocide which is a separate legal obligation on its own. 
This view has been supported by  scholars. Among them, Orna Ben- Naftali has observed that 
this teleological interpretation and broad reading of article I made it possible to reject the view 
that the main function of the Genocide Convention lies in punishment rather than in 
prevention.415 Schabas has also maintained that the obligation to prevent genocide is a legal one, 
independent from the obligation to punish, subject to the application and sanction by the 
courts.416 This coheres even with the title of the convention itself: “convention on the prevention 
and punishment of the crime of genocide”. This title shows that the Convention was created for 
two things: prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide and not for preventing by 
punishing the crime of genocide. In other words, the Genocide Convention was meant not only 
to punish those who have committed genocide but also to prevent its development through 
different phases. 
However, this is not to say that the two obligations have no link between each other. There is a 
link between the obligation to prevent and the obligation to punish genocide. As already said in 
Chapter two, indeed the punishment of genocide has deterrent effects on future genocide. And 
among the measures to be taken in complying with the obligation to prevent genocide, there is 
the enactment of laws that provides for penalties against potential perpetrators. In this respect, 
the ICJ did recognize that close link between prevention and punishment by saying that “…It is 
also true that one of the most effective ways of preventing criminal acts, in general, is to provide 
penalties for persons committing such acts, and to impose those penalties effectively on those 
who commit the acts one is trying to prevent”.417 
Another close link is that they both pursue the prohibition of genocide. This evident connection 
however does not make the two obligations synonymous nor does it make them confusable 
because even though it was concluded earlier in this work that the obligation to prevent is 
continuous, it should be understood that it aims at putting in place measures that forestall the 
occurrence of the harm whereas the obligation to punish intervenes only when the harm has 
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occurred. That is to say that the obligation to punish plays its role when the obligation to prevent 
has not been complied with but it can have preventive effects on future genocides.418  
It may be concluded that the interpretation of the ICJ in Serbia v. Bosnia permits to clearly see 
the obligation to prevent genocide as an independent substantial legal obligation. However, for 
the purpose of the prevention of genocide it is not sufficient to know that the obligation to 
prevent is a legal one and that it has its legal standing vis-à-vis the obligation to punish (despite 
the link), it is also important to show next, the nature of this obligation as this may be useful to 
knowing the extent to which genocide can or should be prevented. 
2.3. The nature of the obligation to prevent genocide: obligation of means not of 
result? 
Before answering the question whether the obligation to prevent genocide is an obligation of 
means or one of result as well as examining its consequences on the preventability of genocide, it 
is important to first briefly give their distinction. It is thus worth summarizing here the traditional 
distinction between obligations of means and obligations of result. 
2.3.1. The distinction between the obligation of means and the obligation of result 
The obligation of means has been explained by Constantin P Economides as being understood in 
domestic law as that by which the one who owes it promises to use all possible means and to 
demonstrate the diligence necessary to perform the contractual obligation, without however 
committing to performing the obligation or achieving a particular result.419 To this, Dupuy gives 
a classic example of the obligation of a doctor in relation to a patient.420 The former must do 
everything that a reasonable person and competent physician can do in order to look after the 
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patient but he has no obligation, in the strict sense of the term, to heal or cure the patient.421 
Constantin P Economides adds in this case that, even though the doctor assumes the obligation to 
do everything possible to cure his patient, he cannot guarantee the patient’s health.422 This means 
that for a doctor to be said that he has breached his obligation, it must be proven that he did not 
use all appropriate means to perform his obligation and it is always difficult to prove that.423 This 
has also been referred to as l”obligation de s”efforcer i.e the obligation to endeavour or to strive 
to achieve a certain result.424  
It is different from the obligation of result which requires that there be a burden on the person 
who owes such an obligation to attain a precise result.425 The person who undertakes an 
obligation of result commits himself to provide the agreed result and it is easier to find that the 
result is not achieved.426 It is in fact an obligation that imposes the one who owes it to achieve 
the result, i.e to succeed. Dupuy gives an example that if he buys a car, the seller has the 
obligation, after the payment, to provide him with that car.427 
To date, this traditional concept as explained above remains untouched and it is the one 
applicable in international law as well,428 and as the ICJ confirmed.429 Indeed, the ICJ played a 
predominant role in qualifying this obligation as an obligation of means/conduct. It concluded on 
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this in the Serbia v. Bosnia case that: 
“it is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of result, in the 
sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, 
in preventing the commission of genocide: the obligation of States parties is rather to 
employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as 
possible”.430  
The Court’s ruling shows that the obligation to prevent genocide is a positive obligation, i.e the 
obligation to do one’s best to ensure that such acts do not occur431 without promising a specific 
result. The question that arises is whether this distinction by the Court is absolute when applied 
to the obligation to prevent genocide. 
2.3.2. Does the application of the distinction by the ICJ match the reality and nature of the 
obligation to prevent genocide? 
It is clear that in this case, the court followed the traditional distinction and did not expatiate on 
what specific conduct is required to prevent genocide. In other words, the measures to be taken 
by the bearers of the obligation to prevent genocide seem to be left at their appreciation. This 
leads to the question whether this coheres with the aim of the obligation to prevent genocide. In 
other words, it is important to see whether this obligation was justifiably qualified as obligation 
of means or if it should have qualified differently. 
In doing so, it is essential to start with examining whether the  obligation to prevent genocide is 
really comparable with the classic example of the obligation of a doctor vis-à-vis his patient for 
them to be in the same category of obligation. If a medical doctor cannot guarantee the result (to 
heal the patient), it is due to the fact that for instance some diseases have no medicine so far and 
are therefore incurable by definition. Moreover, even for diseases that are curable, the level of 
sickness might have reached a critical stage that whatever means can be used the patient cannot 
be healed. Even for those curable and early detectable diseases, the doctor cannot guarantee the 
result because, though he can prescribe the right medicine and other forms of treatment, some 
diseases may resist medicine or some patients may not take them properly or at all. This 
obligation of a doctor is indeed one of means because it is impossible for the doctor to guarantee 
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the cure. As Dupuy noted in this regard, the obligation of the doctor is a best effort one which 
does not require that the end result be achieved. 432  
In contrast, isn’t it really conceivable to require result in the prevention of genocide? Let me 
examine whether the result can be required and achieved in the following two senses: The first 
sense is related to the prevention at early stages. At this level the bearers are under both the 
positive and negative faces of the obligation to prevent genocide. Since the positive face requires 
to put in place measures to prevent genocide, it may be argued that it is not accurate to consider 
this obligation as an absolute obligation of means because if preventive measures are appropriate 
and are taken on due time, the result may be expectable and achievable. For the negative face of 
the obligation to prevent genocide, though I am yet to discuss in next section the bearers of the 
obligation to prevent genocide, it is important to just say at this level that it would not make 
much sense to consider that a state has an obligation of means/conduct when it comes to 
preventing its organs from committing genocide against its own people on its own territory. For 
instance, it has been shown in literature433 and in case law,434 that it is almost impossible for 
genocide to happen in a state if it is not either prepared and committed or condoned by that state. 
It should therefore be understood that the state has an obligation to achieve the result of 
refraining from engaging in acts that may lead to genocide and from committing it itself. In other 
words, if for the genocide to happen there is generally the role of the state, if the state does not 
play that role the result required by the obligation to prevent will be achieved. This is the result 
required for that State, and in this way, the obligation to prevent genocide can be considered as 
an obligation of result. In fact, if the obligation not to commit genocide can fall within the 
obligation to prevent genocide, then one may say that the obligation to prevent genocide as far as 
this is concerned is an obligation of result.  
The second sense is about the late stages. When the process to genocide has reached a stage 
where it is clear that genocide is imminent or is being committed, the result of stopping it can 
still be achieved and therefore requiring the result in this line is not inconceivable. Of course it 
depends on the measures taken and on who takes them. The previous chapter of this work 
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showed the process to genocide. Even though it concluded that there is no linear process to 
genocide, it nevertheless showed that no genocide can happen in secret or without prior signs. In 
fact, even if it might be a bit difficult to be certain that some signs will necessarily amount to 
genocide, at its final stage (targeted massacre at large-scale) it is clear to everyone that the 
chances of genocide are high. The result of stopping genocide may be possible if each bearer of 
the obligation to prevent genocide does its part well. The example of Libya is eloquent. Even 
though the action by NATO in Libya was not expressly authorized to stop genocide,435 its 
operation prevented a possible large-scale massacre against civilians which was highly likely. If 
the intervention was successful here, there are no reasons to think that it would not  be possible 
for halting genocide as well. This can serve as a good example where the appropriate action 
taken even at a late stage of the process to genocide can achieve a result. It is the same for the 
NATO air strikes in the FRY in 1999.  This action was not authorized by the UN and here it is 
invoked to serve as an example exclusively for the purpose of showing how it is practically 
possible to achieve a result in the prevention of genocide when each member plays its full part. 
Indeed NATO achieved a result of preventing Serbia from possible genocide against the ethnic 
Albanian civilians in Kosovo.436 This would therefore show that to expect and require a result in 
the prevention of genocide is not inconceivable. In my view, the obligation to prevent genocide 
can always achieve a result if each bearer plays its full role and employs means which are 
tailored to the situation. Therefore, making it exclusively an obligation of means is not entirely 
correct. 
Wasn’t the court then too traditional to conclude without nuance that the obligation to prevent 
genocide is purely an obligation of means?  In my view the answer is yes. Moreover, there is a 
danger to conclude exclusively that the obligation to prevent genocide is an obligation of means. 
It makes the chances of preventability of genocide very low. This means that as long as the 
obligation to prevent genocide will be understood and considered as an obligation of 
means/conduct, the success in preventing genocide will hardly be expectable. It weakens that 
obligation in the way that its bearers might not put in place (all) measures to prevent genocide. 
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James Crawford has opined that not all obligations can be classified as either obligation of 
conduct or of result because some of them can be hybrids and the obligations of prevention are 
among them.437 It may be argued that the reality and nature of genocide dictates that the 
obligation to prevent genocide should be understood that way and not as an absolute obligation 
of either way (means or result) because of its nature with regard to measures required and the 
bearers of that obligation. 
2.4. Preliminary conclusions 
Since the Genocide Convention does not give a particular meaning to “prevention”, this section 
argued that it is to be understood in its ordinary meaning as explained in the previous chapters. 
As for the obligation to prevent genocide, it is argued that it obligates its bearers to take positive 
actions to prevent genocide. It is also argued that that obligation implies the obligation to refrain 
from engaging in acts (or activities) that may lead to genocide and from committing genocide. 
Taken that way, this section concluded that it is a legal obligation on its own. It is not absorbed 
by the obligation to punish. The ICJ interpretation on the legal status of this obligation has 
contributed to adding more legal force to it. The section also discussed the nature of that 
obligation and it was noticed that the ICJ and mainstream legal literature so far consider it as an 
obligation of means. However, it has been argued that this classification does not match the 
obligation to prevent genocide and may weaken the prevention of genocide. Therefore, there is a 
need to rethink the qualification of that obligation for the future. For instance, it was argued that 
the obligation to prevent genocide can also be regarded as an obligation of result. 
Having explained the meaning of prevention and the scope and nature of the obligation to 
prevent genocide, it is now possible to examine who are the bearers of the obligation to prevent 
genocide, before discussing when the obligation is due and what its bearers have to do in order to 
comply with it. 
3. The bearers of the obligation to prevent genocide  
This section first examines who is legally bearer of the obligation to prevent genocide under the 
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Genocide Convention (3.1). Article I of the Genocide Convention is central to this discussion but 
also reference will be made to other international legal instruments and other sources of 
international law that are relevant to the discussion on who owes the obligation to prevent 
genocide. In the second place, this section discusses the bearers of the obligation to prevent 
genocide under customary international law (3.2). 
3.1. The bearers of the obligation to prevent genocide under the Genocide 
Convention 
Article I of the Genocide Convention states that “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, 
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which 
they undertake to prevent and to punish”.438 From this provision it might be simple to say that 
States Parties to this Convention are bearers of the obligation to prevent genocide.  However, in 
order to be systematic, it is essential to say a few words on how and why States Parties to the 
Genocide Convention are bearers of the obligation to prevent genocide. To do it in a systematic 
way, it is essential to start with some elementary definitions of those key words as given by some 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which applies to treaties between 
states. 439 Since the Genocide Convention is a treaty, it is better to start with the definition in the 
Vienna Convention of a treaty. According to its article 2(a), “treaty” means an international 
agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether 
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation.440 While the Vienna Convention continues by explaining that contracting state 
means a state which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has 
entered into force;441 it also said that ““party”“ means a state which has consented to be bound 
by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force.442 Moreover, according to the same treaty, the 
consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of 
instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other 
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means if so agreed.443  
Clearly, even though the Vienna Convention did not mention contracting party per se as it is 
phrased in art I of the Genocide Convention, it appears not difficult to understand from what is 
explained in article 2 of that Vienna Convention that a contracting party is a State that has 
consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force. In other words, all states 
that have become parties to the Genocide Convention through whatever means as provided for in 
article 11 of the Vienna Convention, are parties to the Genocide Convention. As of July 02, 
2013, one hundred and forty-two states were parties to the Genocide Convention.444 All these 
states are bound by the obligation to prevent genocide enshrined in the Genocide Convention. 
This is the old customary rule: Pacta sunt servanda as also reiterated in article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention on the law of treaties,445 according to which every treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.446 
At this level, it is safe to say that States Parties to the Genocide Convention have the obligation 
to prevent genocide as provided in article I. In fact, there has been no controversy among 
scholars447 on this and the jurisprudence has constantly confirmed the rule that every party to a 
treaty has to fulfil the treaty obligation.448  
While there are no difficulties in finding that States Parties to the Genocide Convention have the 
obligation to prevent genocide, the question is whether they are the only ones bound by that 
obligation or whether there are other sources of international law which provide for that 
obligation as well.  
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3.2. The obligation to prevent genocide under customary international law and its 
bearers 
Answering the question on who is the bearer of the obligation to prevent genocide goes together 
with answering the question whether or not the obligation to prevent genocide is a customary 
international rule.  
To determine that the obligation to prevent genocide is a customary rule there is a need to show 
its general practice and opinio juris which are evidence of the existence of international 
customary law. Doing so needs to start with examining whether the prohibition of the genocide is 
itself a customary rule.  The first resolution on genocide449 as well as the preamble and article I 
of the Genocide Convention450 give an indication on this question by making it a pre-existing 
international crime. Indeed, in that first resolution on genocide by the General Assembly of the 
UN, the latter affirmed that genocide is an international crime and that it had happened in the 
past where either racial, religious or other groups had been destroyed, entirely or in part.451  Two 
years later, the preamble of the Genocide Convention  refers to the General Assembly resolution 
of 1946 which qualifies genocide as an international crime and it equally recognizes that “at all 
periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity”.452 In addition, article I 
confirmed that genocide is an international crime. This use of the verb “to confirm” indicates that 
the crime of genocide existed before the convention codified it. So, if it existed as an 
international crime before a convention, it means that it was prohibited (as an international 
crime) and there is no other way it could be so if not by customary law. 
In international law, some rules reflect universal values and are owed to the international 
community as a whole. Such rules evidently have the status of customary international law. It is 
thus important to see whether the prohibition of genocide is among them. 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties refers to those rules of great 
importance as peremptory norms of general international law. These norms are accepted and 
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
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derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.453 In determining rules with such character, the ICJ 
has explicitly confirmed for the first time in the DRC v. Rwanda case that the norm prohibiting 
genocide was assuredly a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).454 But the ruling in 
the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ had given an indication on the special nature of the 
prohibition of genocide by observing that it is an erga omnes (towards all) obligation of states.455 
It said that the very nature of some obligations including those deriving from the outlawing of 
genocide are owed to the international community as a whole and therefore are concern of all 
states.456  
The prohibition of genocide has also been regarded in literature as one of the few undoubted 
examples of jus cogens.457 The position of the rules of jus cogens is hierarchically superior 
compared to ordinary rules of international law and they are, as customary international rules, 
binding upon all states.458 Another relevant indication of the status of the prohibition of genocide 
as customary international law is the fact that it has been accepted by many states both by 
becoming parties to the Genocide Convention459 and by voting in the UN General Assembly 
resolutions on the prohibition of genocide.460 General Assembly resolutions are not binding. 
However, as confirmed by the ICJ in Legality of Nuclear weapons advisory opinion,461 they can 
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provide evidence in the determination of the existence of binding rules and their acceptance by 
states. Also, the fact that the prohibition of genocide has been included in different historically 
important legal instruments like the ICTY462, ICTR,463ICC464 statutes does undoubtedly confirm 
that it is customary international law.465 
Given all that is said above, it is safe to conclude that the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory 
norm under customary international law and all states are bound by that rule. The remaining 
question is however whether this legal status also extends to the prevention of genocide.  
Schabas has argued that “it is uncontroversial to maintain that the duty to prevent genocide is one 
of customary law, applicable even to states that have not signed or ratified the 1948 Genocide 
Convention”.466  This argument strongly supports the ICJ advisory Opinion on the reservations to 
the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. In this advisory 
opinion the court affirmed that “the principles underlying the Convention are recognised by 
civilised nations as binding on states even without any conventional obligation... The 
Contracting States do not have any individual advantages or disadvantages nor interests of their 
own, but merely a common interest”.467 In 1996, in its judgment of preliminary objections in the 
case Serbia v. Bosnia, the ICJ confirmed that “… the rights and obligations enshrined by the 
Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes”.468  
There is evidence that shows indeed that the prevention of genocide is a principle underlying the 
prohibition of genocide. The Genocide Convention (which codified the customary rules on the 
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prohibition of genocide) includes prevention in its title.469 Its preamble says that “genocide is a 
crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and 
condemned by the civilized world”, that “has inflicted great losses on humanity”, and that “in 
order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required”.470 
The title and preamble are not binding, but their content can help to understand that  the spirit 
and the objective of the convention is to ban genocide. 471  The substantial part of that convention 
expressly confirms that genocide is a crime under international law472 which they undertake to 
prevent and to punish”.473  The prohibition is made possible by the prevention (and punishment). 
That is what makes the link between the prohibition of genocide and its prevention.  One is 
necessary to achieve the other.  Prevention is needed to achieve the aim of the prohibition. Logic 
dictates that to liberate the mankind from this international crime (the odious scourge), genocide 
must be prevented from happening. This is supported by the ICJ position the case Bosnia v. 
Serbia that prevention is stated as a principle in Article I of the Genocide Convention.474 The ICJ 
had even done so before in the earlier proceedings concerning this case. Indeed, after it 
concluded that rights and obligations enshrined in the Genocide Convention are erga omnes,475 it 
linked that to the obligation to prevent as one of its principles by saying that “the obligation each 
State thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the 
Convention”.476 The two obligations are not limited by territory because of their character as 
erga omnes obligations owed to the international community as a whole.  Since the aim of the 
prohibition of genocide in international customary law is the non-occurrence of genocide and the 
prohibition of genocide requires prevention, the ruling of the ICJ that the prevention of genocide 
is a principle underlying its prohibition makes sense. This allows the conclusion that the 
obligation to prevent genocide is also customary law that binds all states, including the non-
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parties to the Genocide Convention.477  
3.3. Preliminary conclusions 
This section has shown the legal basis for the obligation of states to prevent genocide. It showed 
the bearers of that obligation under the Genocide Convention and under customary international 
law. While the Genocide Convention is the legal basis for the  states parties to the Genocide 
Convention,  non-parties to that Convention are bearers of that obligation under customary 
international law. The question whether this conclusion may apply to actors other than states has 
not been treated in this section because it requires a consideration that is beyond the scope of this 
section. It will be treated later in this work. However, identifying the bearers of that obligation is 
one thing, but knowing when this obligation is due is another. 
4. The temporal scope of the obligation to prevent genocide 
The question here is whether under the Genocide Convention (and international law in general), 
the bearer of this legal obligation to prevent genocide takes into consideration the process 
discussed in Chapter three in complying with it. In other words, it will be examined what the 
process to genocide means to international law in as far as the obligation to prevent genocide is 
concerned. It is therefore paramount to examine how the temporal issue has been treated in 
international law and what can come out from that before discussing in next chapters what each 
bearer of the obligation does concretely.  
Since the Genocide Convention is at the centre of the discussion on the prevention of genocide, it 
is worth examining how it deals with this temporal issue. Article I suggests little as to when to 
prevent genocide. However, article III supplements it by listing specific acts that are punishable 
which, to some extent can give an indication on when prevention would be needed. Those are 
genocide itself, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.478 The case-law of 
international tribunals that have dealt with genocide cases seem to give the same indication but 
without much clarification.479 
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Although it appears not impossible to deduce from what is provided for in article III that the 
Genocide Convention does not ignore the existence of a plan and preparation for any genocide to 
occur, the steps through which genocide passes before it is committed which need to be 
addressed in preventing its occurrence are not unambiguously shown.  Indeed, conspiracy to 
commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and complicity in genocide 
give some indications on the time to prevent genocide, but this concerns a rather at late stage in 
the process to genocide. Article III is not enough to indicate fully when activities for the 
prevention of genocide have to be undertaken, since there are a lot of factors to be addressed in 
phases long before incitement or conspiracy.  
Can the drafting history help to answer this question? During the drafting process, the 
representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Ad Hoc Committee created by 
the ECOSOC480, supported the inclusion of preparatory acts in article III (which was IV in the 
draft) as punishable acts and suggested that the notion of preparatory acts should be not left 
unpunished. He stated that they should be defined as: 
a) studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of genocide; 
b) setting up of installations, manufacturing, obtaining, possessing or supplying of 
articles or substances with the knowledge that they are intended for genocide; 
c) issuing instructions or orders and distributing tasks with a view to committing 
genocide.481 
This suggestion, which to some extent would give some indications on the time to prevent 
genocide in early stages of the process to genocide was rejected because the majority of the 
members of the Ad Hoc Committee voted against it, stressing the difficulty defining or 
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enumerating preparatory acts.482 Rejecting this proposal however does not mean that prevention 
should not include preparatory acts. What was rejected was criminalizing them. So like article 
III, the travaux préparatoires do not help much to clarify the exact time the obligation is owed.  
Two other provisions in the Genocide Convention may indicate more when the obligation to 
prevent genocide is owed.  These are article V and VIII. Indeed, by stating that “the Contracting 
Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary 
legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to 
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
article III”, article V may be understood as indicating that states can do so to avoid that there be 
signs of genocide which might logically be at the primary level. Furthermore, article VIII states 
that “Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take 
such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the 
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III”. 
As it will be detailed later, this may indicate three periods: the period before the start of signs of 
genocide, when signs are present,  and the period when genocide has started. Placing this within 
the three levels, prevention might fall within the primary and secondary levels and suppression in 
the tertiary level. 
In all the said articles though, even if there are some indications on the time to prevent genocide, 
there is a lack of clear obligation on states to take action to tackle the factors shown in Chapter 
three of this work. The Genocide Convention is focused on the period close to the genocide itself 
as was discussed above. In other words, the Convention does not indicate all the stages/phases in 
the process to genocide and therefore lacks clarity on when to take preventive action.  
Schabas noticed that academic research on the Genocide Convention is dominated by historians 
and philosophers.483 This explains why the temporal scope has received little attention. The few 
legal scholars who treated the issue have tended to focus on the shortcomings484 of the 
Convention in general without suggesting much about the scope of the provisions on the 
prevention of genocide as far as the time to prevent genocide is concerned. 
Also, the treatment by the ICJ of this issue suffers from ambiguity of the Genocide Convention 
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as far as the temporal issue is concerned. In its endeavours to explain when the obligation to 
prevent genocide commences within the meaning of Article I of the Convention, the ICJ started 
by asserting that: 
“It is at the time when commission of the prohibited act (genocide or any of the other acts 
listed in Article III of the Convention) begins that the breach of an obligation of 
prevention occurs. In this respect, the Court refers to a general rule of the law of State 
responsibility, stated by the ILC in Article 14, paragraph 3, of its Articles on State 
Responsibility: The breach of an international obligation requiring a State to prevent a 
given event occurs when the event occurs and extends over the entire period during 
which the event continues and remains not in conformity with that obligation”.485 
However, the Court did not limit itself to this statement which, if not explained in context may 
lead to insufficiency when it comes to applying it to a particular obligation like the prevention of 
genocide. Thus, the Court took into consideration the nature of the prevention and added that:  
“This obviously does not mean that the obligation to prevent genocide only comes into 
being when perpetration of genocide commences; that would be absurd, since the whole 
point of the obligation is to prevent, or attempt to prevent, the occurrence of the act. In 
fact, a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant 
that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk 
that genocide will be committed. From that moment onwards, if the State has available to 
it means likely to have a deterrent effect on those suspected of preparing genocide, or 
reasonably suspected of harbouring specific intent (dolus specialis), it is under a duty to 
make such use of these means as the circumstances permit”.486 
The effort of the Court in this regard to try to give an indication on the time the genocide is to be 
prevented is laudable. However, question on the exact stage/time the prevention is to be 
undertaken is not accurately answered. Yes, the Court recognizes that the prevention of genocide 
does not commence when genocide commences itself. However, not only the Court avoided to 
give details on phases and what states have to do at each phase of the process to genocide, but it 
also used a criterion that does not help much in solving the question of when prevention is 
needed and is supposed to commence. According to the Court, “a state’s obligation to prevent 
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and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally 
have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed”.487  
The court apparently had in mind the period close to the commencement of genocide when clear 
signs of the risk of genocide are there.  However, the Court does not give any clue on what 
constitutes a serious risk and this shows the emphasis of the late stage where it is already clear 
that genocide may be committed. While there may be many reasons for the Court to have put 
much emphasis in this case on the final stages of the process to genocide, it also recognized that 
the obligation to prevent genocide is not temporally limited. Saying that the obligation to prevent 
genocide does not commence at the time genocide starts, but from the time state learns or should 
have learned about the serious risk of genocide makes it an open norm because as it was seen in 
Chapter three, there are risks in every stage and factor which, if not addressed, might lead, soon 
or late, to genocide. The questions that this does not solve include what the criterion of the 
knowledge of the (serious) risk and the lack of certainty that genocide may happen means. 
5. Prevention and knowledge of serious risk of genocide and the lack of 
certainty of its occurrence 
5.1. Prevention and knowledge of the serious risk of genocide 
The Bosnia v Serbia case was the first case concerning genocide in which the ICJ decided on the 
merits,488 in relation to the obligation to prevent genocide. In its decision, the ICJ came up with 
the criterion of the knowledge of serious risk of genocide in determining the responsibility of the 
responsible state. What does this criterion mean with regard to the obligation to prevent 
genocide? 
The Court noted that: 
“In fact, a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the 
instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a 
serious risk that genocide will be committed. From that moment onwards, if the State has 
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available to it means likely to have a deterrent effect on those suspected of preparing 
genocide, or reasonably suspected of harbouring specific intent (dolus specialis), it is 
under a duty to make such use of these means as the circumstances permit”.489 
The ICJ stressed the fact that the risk of genocide in Srebrenica was known to the authorities of 
Serbia, including Milosevic, in determining the responsibility of Serbia for the breach of the 
obligation to prevent genocide. One of the indications given by the ICJ with regard to Serbia is 
that Serbia was “fully aware of the climate of deep-seated hatred which reigned between the 
Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims in the Srebrenica region”.490 Although this explanation of the 
Court relates to the period close to the occurrence of genocide, it cannot be inferred that the 
obligation to prevent genocide only arises at that advanced phase of the process to genocide. The 
place to discuss this in detail is not here; it will be discussed in next chapters in which the 
obligation to prevent genocide will be analysed at each level of prevention. At this moment, it 
suffices to maintain that the obligation to prevent genocide is not limited to the time it starts, but 
is owed from the time there is a risk that it may happen. This risk can be at any phase of the 
process as it has been shown earlier and will be clarified further in next chapter.  
Although it may not be difficult to understand the concept of knowledge of awareness as it 
simply means to have information on or be acquainted with something,491 the assessment of the 
risk and the seriousness thereof may not be easy. In 1993 the ICJ had already indicated that the 
obligation to prevent genocide imposed Serbia to take all measures to prevent the commission of 
genocide in the future.492 This was several months before the genocide was committed in 
Srebrenica. But at that time, and even before, there were indications that genocide was likely or 
was even being committed (Bosnia indicated some acts committed from 1992).493 The ICJ 
however did not (and maybe was even unable to) clearly show what constitutes a serious risk of 
genocide. This is not an easy task and even if it had determined it in that very case, it may differ 
in other cases. As already demonstrated earlier, genocide may occur in a context of war, which to 
some extent may make it relatively easy to assess the risk depending on the nature of that war). 
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However, it may also occur in peace time and the determination of the risk may be more difficult 
in such situation. This leads to the question whether knowledge of serious risk of genocide would 
mean to be certain that genocide will occur if not prevented.  
5.2. Obligation to prevent genocide v. the lack of certainty that genocide will happen 
The ICJ explained that a State may be found to have violated its obligation to prevent genocide 
even though it had no certainty, at the time when it should have acted, but failed to do so, that 
genocide was about to be committed or was under way; for it to incur responsibility on this basis 
it is enough that the State was aware, or should normally have been aware, of the serious danger 
that acts of genocide would be committed.494 The ICJ noted: 
“In view of their undeniable influence and of the information, voicing serious concern, in their 
possession, the Yugoslav federal authorities should, in the view of the Court, have made the best 
efforts within their power to try and prevent the tragic events then taking shape, whose scale, 
though it could not have been foreseen with certainty, might at least have been surmised. The 
FRY leadership, and President Milosevic´ above all, were fully aware of the climate of deep-
seated hatred which reigned between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims in the Srebrenica region. 
As the Court has noted in paragraph 423 above, it has not been shown that the decision to 
eliminate physically the whole of the adult male population of the Muslim community of 
Srebrenica was brought to the attention of the Belgrade authorities. Nevertheless, given all the 
international concern about what looked likely to happen at Srebrenica, given Milosevic´’s own 
observations to Mladic´, which made it clear that the dangers were known and that these dangers 
seemed to be of an order that could suggest intent to commit genocide, unless brought under 
control, it must have been clear that there was a serious risk of genocide in Srebrenica. Yet the 
Respondent has not shown that it took any initiative to prevent what happened, or any action on 
its part to avert the atrocities which were committed.”495 
In the context of this judgment, the knowledge (or awareness) of the risk of genocide should not 
be confused with the certainty that genocide will occur. In other words, for the obligation to 
prevent genocide to be owed there is no requirement that the state must have the certainty that 
genocide will occur. That would be absurd and contrary to the purpose of prevention. Though the 
ruling of the court on this issue focused on the period close to the occurrence of genocide, 
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nothing shows that the intention was to limit the application of this obligation to that stage. The 
court’s ruling does not exclude the extension of serious risk to early stages because every stage 
matters for the prevention of genocide. The court was dealing with one case and had to decide in 
consideration of the facts in that specific case. It should be recognised however that, in practice 
there might be many difficulties in determining the exact time a state knows or should know 
about a risk of genocide and on the determination of its seriousness, at each phase of the process 
that may lead to genocide.496  
5.3. Preliminary conclusions 
This section concludes that the court gave some indications of what it meant by the knowledge of 
the serious risks of genocide but it did not clarify whether and how it would apply to early stages 
of the process to genocide. However, given the seriousness of risks of genocide even at early 
stages, there is nothing that indicates that the court intended to exclude them. Therefore, this 
section concludes that the obligation to prevent genocide is not temporally limited and is owed in 
the three levels discussed in Chapter two and three because if genocide is not prevented at any 
stage, the risk that genocide may happen becomes serious. Likewise, it does not require certainty 
that genocide will occur before preventive measures are taken. However this needs a discussion 
in concreto in order to see how this legal obligation is or ought to be exercised by its bearers 
within the three levels of prevention. The next chapters will discuss what the bearers of the 
obligation have to do in order to comply with the obligation to prevent genocide at the primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels. 
Conclusion  
This chapter started by explaining the origin and adoption of the Genocide Convention before 
discussing the nature and bearers of the obligation to prevent genocide that it imposes. This 
approach was chosen because to understand prevention and the obligation to prevent genocide, it 
is paramount to have recourse to the circumstances under which this convention was adopted, as 
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well as how it was understood by its initiators. This provides a basis for the discussion on what 
the Convention entails to its bearers. The explanation of the genesis and drafting process of this 
convention revealed that the Convention was initiated from the experience of the Armenian 
genocide and more directly from the Second World War during which the Holocaust occurred. 
These circumstances not only were determinant in creating that convention but also influenced 
its content, for instance by putting much emphasis on the last stages of genocide. There is no 
evidence however that the prevention of genocide at early stages was excluded.  
On the prevention of genocide as such, this chapter discussed what the prevention means and 
what the obligation pertaining to it entails. Since the drafters did not give any specific meaning 
to this word, prevention is to be understood from its ordinary meaning which is to put in place 
measures to avoid the occurrence of something harmful, in this case genocide. The obligation to 
prevent genocide consists of adopting measures that make genocide unlikely and complying with 
them. The obligation to prevent genocide contained in article I of the Genocide Convention 
(which reflects customary international law) provides an umbrella obligation that refers to any 
other rules and measures that are susceptible of having effect to the prevention of genocide.497  
Furthermore, it was shown that many consider the obligation to prevent genocide to be an 
obligation of means and not of result, but it was argued that this makes this obligation weak. 
Therefore this obligation should not be understood exclusively as an obligation of means. For 
instance, it was argued that this obligation has two faces: positive and negative. The second face 
of negative obligation (obligation not to engage in activities that may lead to genocide and not to 
commit genocide) is absolutely an obligation of result.  
With regard to the bearers of the obligation to prevent genocide, prima facie, they are the states 
parties to the Genocide Convention. It was shown that the obligation to prevent genocide is 
inextricably linked to the prohibition of genocide and therefore a customary rule and therewith 
binding also non-parties to this convention as members of the international community as a 
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Finally, on the questions related to the temporal scope of the obligation to prevent genocide, it 
was concluded that the obligation is not temporally limited. And this coheres well with what was 
concluded in previous chapters that prevention is a continuous process. Likewise, the ICJ 
criterion on knowledge of serious risk of genocide does not limit the obligation to prevent 
genocide because the risk may be serious even at early stage of the process to genocide. It was 
also noted that this knowledge does not mean the certainty that genocide will happen.  
It cannot be claimed that this chapter has completely answered all questions surrounding the 
obligation to prevent genocide. Discussing these issues seems to be rather a long way. The 
chapter nevertheless served as a strong foundation from which other chapters will be built in 
clarifying what this obligation entails in concreto. Hence, it is important to see in next chapter(s) 
and within different divisions of period, what international law requires and permits in 
preventing genocide and under what conditions and with which means the obligation to prevent 
genocide arises. In other words, it is now good time to see in concreto what the convention and 
other legal sources of international law provide on how the legal obligation to prevent genocide 
is implemented by its bearers. That is to see what each bearer is legally owed, at which moment 
and with which means, and within which territorial boundaries.  




Chap V. The obligation of territorial states to prevent genocide under 
international law 
Introduction 
This chapter aims at discussing the obligation to prevent genocide by territorial states in a 
concrete way: by looking at what they are required to do in preventing genocide on their 
territory. For the purpose of this work, a territorial state means any state as known in 
international law with powers and privileges recognized in international law within the 
boundaries of its borders. This chapter proceeds in four sections. It starts with briefly examining 
the territorial scope of the obligation to prevent genocide as far as territorial states are concerned 
(section one). This will be followed by an analysis on what international law requires to 
territorial states to do in order to comply with their obligation to prevent genocide. This is done 
at three levels: primary (section two), secondary (section three) and tertiary (section four). Some 
challenges on prevention common to the three levels will be identified and suggestions to 
overcome them will be given (section 5). This is a longer-term and more comprehensive 
approach to prevent genocide and it is argued that it is only when prevention is done through 
these levels that the chances of its effectiveness become high. 
1. Territorial scope of the obligation to prevent genocide 
What is the legal basis for territorial states to prevent genocide on their territory? This is the 
question that will be briefly treated in this section. 
Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that “unless a different 
intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party 
in respect of its entire territory”.498 Thus, from what is provided in article I of the Genocide 
Convention, each state has the primary obligation to prevent genocide from being committed to 
the population on its territory. This has been reiterated in literature.   For instance, Sammaruga 
has written that the prevention of deadly conflicts (genocide being one of the worst of them) and 
other forms of man-made catastrophes are indeed first the responsibility of sovereign states and 
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the communities and institutions within them.499  This means, as was also observed by Arbour, 
that States have a responsibility under existing international law vis-à-vis the people on their 
territory to prevent genocide.500 Recalling article I of the Genocide Convention, Schabas notes 
that this article established the duty of states to prevent genocide and to punish the perpetrators501 
and in this, the logic of things would be that they primarily do that on their territory. 
In the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, although the word responsibility was used 
instead of obligation (the nuance will be discussed later), the primary responsibility of states on 
their own territories was more or less unambiguously explained. In this document, states agreed 
in paragraph 138 502 that:  
“Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it”. 
There is no reason to go further in this discussion since there is no controversy on this issue. It is 
safe to conclude that territorial states have the obligation to prevent genocide on their entire 
territory. However, the content of this obligation as to what states are obligated to do on their 
territory to prevent genocide needs to be examined in order to show the measures that should be 
taken at primary, secondary and tertiary levels. 
2. Primary prevention of genocide by territorial states. 
It was argued in chapter four that the obligation to prevent genocide does not commence when 
genocide begins as this would be absurd. It is owed long before genocide starts. This means that 
states are obligated to take measures which aim at preventing genocide at the primary level, i.e 
before there are signs of risk of genocide in order to create an environment that does not give 
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chance to the risk of genocide to emerge. According to the meaning and aim of prevention, this 
level is very important as shown in previous chapters. It is important because if prevention is 
done at this level, genocide is not only prevented from being committed but also from even being 
started or attempted. This is because this level covers the period before any manifestation of 
problems that may lead to genocide. The question is about what a state should do on its own 
territory at this level to comply with the obligation to prevent genocide. Does international law 
regime concretize this obligation of territorial states at the primary level? Does the Genocide 
Convention give any indications on that? What about other sources of international law? Who 
checks whether territorial states prevent genocide at this level? In other words, what are the legal 
measures envisaged by international law to prevent genocide on this level by territorial states?  
This section groups the measures in two categories: The first is about the necessary legislation 
that give the effect to the Genocide Convention. The second is about measures other than 
legislation with the same effect.  
2.1. Necessary legislation to give effect to the Genocide Convention 
2.1.1. Legal basis and meaning 
Article I of the Genocide Convention obligates each Contracting Party to prevent genocide but 
does not suggest how. Article V complements article I by suggesting legislative action: “The 
Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the 
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, 
to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated 
in article III”.503 To understand what this article means at the primary level of prevention of 
genocide it is important to explain some of the words it uses. First, this article uses words like “in 
accordance with their respective constitutions”. Apparently, this might incline the Genocide 
Convention to the constitution of states and not the other way round.  In other words, it might 
seem to mean that in adopting legislation to give effect to the Genocide Convention, states adopt 
only those measures that are consistent with their constitution. In his commentary on this article, 
Robinson argued that this only concerned the procedure to enact laws and not their substantive 
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nature.504 To support his argument, he referred to the French text that: “s’engagent à prendre, 
conformément à leurs constitutions respectives” which, contrary to the English text sounds much 
more of procedural nature than the substantive one.505  Indeed, it would have been strange to say 
that states adopt measures that are in conformity with their internal constitution. The subsequent 
codification of laws of treaties in international law confirms Robinson’s argument. According to 
the VCLT, when a state has established its consent to be bound by a treaty,506  that treaty in force 
is binding upon it507  and it cannot therefore invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.508 Given this, it is safe to join Robinson’s 
argument that it was about the procedure of enactment of legislation and not the substantive 
nature of the legislation in question. 
Secondly, like article I of the Genocide Convention, this article also uses the verb “to 
undertake”509 which, as already explained, means “to give a formal promise, to bind or engage 
oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to agree, to accept an obligation.”510  So, it is safe to argue 
on this that it has created a legal obligation upon contracting parties to enact necessary 
legislation that gives effect to the Genocide Convention.  
Thirdly, this article uses the concept of necessary legislation511 and it is worth examining what it 
means to the obligation to prevent genocide at the primary level. Obviously, this provision does 
not specify which legislation is necessary to give effect to the Genocide Convention except 
where it says that states undertake to provide in their legislation, effective penalties for persons 
guilty of genocide. But this is just an example among other unspecified possible provisions. The 
travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention do not instruct much on this because it seems 
that the prevention component was not explored enough. The ICJ also does not add much. It only 
says that states take appropriate measures in complying with their obligation to prevent genocide. 
However,  from its ordinary meaning the concept of necessary legislation512 does not limit states 
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from enacting any legislation other than those related to penalties as long as they can give effect 
to the Genocide Convention. In this line, to give effect to the genocide convention means to 
make the prevention of genocide possible. This leads to a further question about what kind of 
legislation can give effect to the Genocide Convention. 
2.1.2. Content of necessary legislation to give effect to the Genocide Convention  
What legislation can be necessary to give effect to the Genocide Convention? This question 
might seem easy but at the same time it is complicated. Easy because one might say that article 
V opened a possibility for territorial states to enact any legislation that is susceptible of 
preventing genocide. However, it is also complicated because article V did not indicate what 
kind of legislation is necessary in the prevention of genocide. That is what will be examined 
here. 
The key word here is the adjective “necessary”. The Convention does not define this word and 
nowhere in the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, there is any indication that 
drafters wanted to give any special meaning to this word. Hence, this word is to be understood in 
its ordinary meaning. The American Heritage English Dictionary defines necessary in different 
ways: it may mean absolutely essential therefore a synonym of indispensable or as needed to 
achieve a certain result or effect; requisite. 513 Though not really different to the latter 
explanation, Black’s Law Dictionary514 gives a more detailed definition. It first says that this 
word is to be considered in the connection in which it is used as it is a word susceptible of 
various meanings.515 Indeed, according to this dictionary, this word may import absolute 
physical necessity or inevitability or it may import that which is only convenient, useful, 
appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive to the end sought.516  
In my understanding it is not indispensable to engage in a debate on knowing whether the 
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the Genocide Convention falls within the 
first meaning: absolutely essential, indispensable or the second one: useful, suitable, proper or 
conducive to the end sought. The reason is simple. Given the object and purpose of the Genocide 
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Convention which is to avoid the occurrence of genocide, both meanings are valid because they 
may serve that purpose. An additional reason may be that the indispensability or usefulness of 
the legislation to give effect to the Genocide Convention may not only depend on the content of 
that legislation vis-à-vis the Genocide Convention but also and especially on how it is applied. In 
other words, it might be hard to say that a given legislation is indispensable or useful to give 
effect to the provisions of the Genocide Convention.  For the obligation to prevent genocide 
which requires taking all appropriate measures, the word “necessary” cannot be understood to 
have one or the other meaning (exclusively). If some legislation might be indispensable, some 
others may be useful in the sense that they may contribute to the prevention of genocide and they 
still mean “necessary”.  
This leads me to an argument that necessary legislation is any kind of legislation that addresses 
all the factors and phases in the process to genocide as discussed in chapter three. For instance 
legislation that does not allow totalitarianism, discrimination, inequality among groups, 
dehumanisation, impunity, extermination etc. It is also a legislation that creates an environment 
that does not allow economic hardship to happen. At this stage, the legislation addresses all those 
factors that, if not avoided at this level, might create a favourable environment for the outbreak 
of conflict that may in turn lead to genocide.  Ban Ki-Moon rightly put that “conflicts often break 
out in countries where governments are weak or rule in a way that is blatantly unfair to some 
groups”517 The best way to prevent this is to promote “good governance” -- to advocate for 
healthy and balanced economic development; respect for the human rights of all, including those 
of minority groups; and for political arrangements in which all groups are fairly represented.”518 
If that is correct, “necessary legislation” deals with all those areas. 519 
It is worth pointing out other provisions in other international legal instruments that address the 
same factors in the primary phase. Recently, the Jacob Blaustein Institute made a compilation of 
them which is very much instructive.520 For instance, with regard to the factors of genocide 
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(poverty, absence of rule of law, totalitarianism…), the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights requires states to create conditions whereby everyone may enjoy his 
economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights.521 Article 2(1) of this 
convention states that “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”.522 These laws shall for instance 
include those recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, and will 
obligate states to take, individually and through international co-operation, including specific 
programmes which are needed inter alia “to improve methods of production, conservation and 
distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating 
knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such 
a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources”.523 
With regard to the phases of deprivation and discrimination in the process to genocide, article 
2(2) of the ICESCR stipulates that “the States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without 
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.524 
As for discrimination per se, among other things, article 21 of the International Convention on 
the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (ICERD) obligates states parties to it, to 
“prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means including legislation, as required by 
circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organisation”.525   
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For the phases of dehumanisation and propaganda to incite people to commit genocide it is 
important to say that article V of the Genocide Convention explicitly referred to article III by 
saying that  states undertake to “…provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or 
any of the other acts enumerated in article III”.  This article III lists the direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide among acts punishable under this convention.  
Also, article 4 of the ICERD stipulates that: “States Parties condemn all propaganda and all 
organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons 
of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and 
discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to 
eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the 
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set 
forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:  
“(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial 
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or 
incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic 
origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing 
thereof;  
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other 
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize 
participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;  
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote 
or incite racial discrimination.”526 
There are also some examples of domestic laws that have specific provisions in their legislations. 
For instance, article 137c, paragraph 1 of the Dutch Criminal Code stipulates:  
“He who publicly, verbally or in writing or image, deliberately expresses himself about a 
group of people based on their race, their religion or belief, their hetero- or homosexual 
nature or their physical, mental or intellectual disabilities, shall be liable to a prison 
sentence of a maximum of one year or  pecuniary fine of the third category”.527 
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Similarly, Article 137d, paragraph 1of the same Criminal Code states that:  
“He who publicly, orally, in writing or graphically, incites hatred against or 
discrimination of people or violence against an individual or belongings of people 
because of their race, their religion or their belief, their gender, their heterosexual or 
homosexual orientation or their physical, psychological or mental disability, shall be 
liable to punishment with a maximum of one year or a pecuniary fine of the third 
category.”528 Finally, article 137 (e) penalizes the making public of a statement that is 
discriminatory for a group of people or incites to hatred, discrimination or violence.529 
It is not possible here nor is it very important to mention all the provisions from various 
international legal instruments that are complementary to the Genocide Convention in the sense 
that they give indication on the kind of the legislation that, by their nature, may also give effect 
to the Genocide Convention. Nor is it necessary to mention all states that have such laws.  It is 
more important to answer the question whether these other international instruments and those 
domestic laws thereof have any legal link to the Genocide Convention. In other words, would not 
complying with them mean also not complying with the obligation to prevent genocide under the 
Genocide Convention? 
The Genocide Convention has not included such a specific provision but it is impossible to 
prevent genocide without having recourse to adopting measures that are also required by those 
other conventions. Indeed, if article I of the Genocide Convention obligates states to prevent 
genocide and article V obligates states to take necessary legislation that can give effect to the 
Genocide Convention, the fact that the necessary legislation might be falling within other 
instruments should not be a problem. Instead, it should be understood as an added value to the 
prevention of genocide. And since genocide is a crime of crimes which is at the apex of the 
pyramid530 of all violations of human rights, it makes sense to construe from that that this level is 
reached after many other violations have occurred. Genocide is the umbrella of many other 
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human rights violations because the process that leads to it involves the violation of many other 
human rights. This means that it is the final level of violation of human rights and it is reached as 
a consequence of violation of others. It can therefore be argued that if territorial states adopt laws 
that conform to those conventions, they are at the same time respecting their undertakings in the 
respective conventions but also by the nature of the obligation to prevent genocide, they are 
complying with their obligation to prevent genocide by adopting necessary legislation that is 
susceptible of giving effect to the Genocide Convention. And if adopting such legislation related 
to discrimination and other things as shown above fits in the necessary legislation to give effect 
to the Genocide Convention, it does not require that states be at the same time parties to those 
other international instruments. They are directly required to adopt such legislation in complying 
with their obligation under the Genocide Convention. Whether or not the breach of their 
obligations under those conventions would engage the responsibility of states under the 
Genocide Convention is another question that cannot be answered here.  
However, since article V did not indicate what kind of legislation is necessary in the prevention 
of genocide, states have been given a wide margin of appreciation in how to apply this at this 
level.  Given the uncertainties surrounding this level (primary) and unfamiliarity states have in it, 
the prevention at this level is very likely to be disregarded by states. This is a problem on 
prevention of genocide at this level because there is a lack of a legal framework on what are the 
necessary laws to be adopted to prevent genocide at the primary level. Also, the fact that there is 
no monitoring body to provide guidelines and to assess whether states apply what is required at 
this level makes it even more unlikely that every territorial state will adopt necessary laws. While 
the legislation is necessary to prevent genocide at the primary level, the next question becomes 
whether it is the only measure needed at that level. 
2.2. Is only legislation envisaged at the primary level in order to prevent genocide? 
The question here is whether legislation is the only measure that can be taken at this primary 
level. In other words, do the measures required by international law only consist of enacting 
legislation in stricto sensu? Looking back to the example of the prevention of torture, the answer 
to this question might be in the negative. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
explained in a case of torture that the duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, 
political, administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights and 




ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts.531 Similarly, prevention of 
genocide needs also different measures that are not only legislation, in order to ensure that 
genocide does not happen. Article I of the Genocide Convention does not give any limitation. It 
was concluded above that this article did not limit the legislation as long as it is necessary to give 
effect to the Genocide Convention. There are no reasons the arguments used to reach that 
conclusion would not apply to other measures as well. The analysis of this article I has proven 
that despite the focus of the convention on legislation, it did also provide for measures other than 
the legislation. The European court of human rights has given a ruling that can support this 
argument in a case where the applicant (Oyal), a new-born baby had been infected with HIV 
Aids virus during blood transfusions in a state hospital in Turkey.532  The applicant claimed that 
state authorities had failed in their positive obligation to protect the right to life.533 In explaining 
the positive obligation of states with regard to the right to life (article 2 paragraph 1 of the 
European convention of human rights) the court said that it “requires states to make regulations 
compelling hospitals, whether public or private, to adopt measures for the protection of their 
patients,”534and it found that Turkey had failed to do so.535  
What should other measures to prevent genocide at this level include? Measures to prevent 
genocide at this level may for instance include educational measures through schools and media 
coverage. These may maintain or have changes in behaviour and therefore have effect on the 
prevention of genocide. As suggested by Linda M.Woolf and Michael R. Hulsizer, “education is 
a primary element involved in creating a culture of peace”.536 Measures could also concern the 
promotion and maintenance of good diplomatic relations with other states to prevent conflicts 
with other states that can turn in long run into genocide against its people. As  the Inter-
American Court of human rights observed again that “it is not possible to make a detailed list of 
all measures”,537 to prevent torture, it is equally impossible to make a detailed list of measures to 
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prevent genocide because “they vary with the law and the conditions of each State Party”.538 
However, though these different measures can have a place in article I of the Genocide 
Convention, the fact that they have not been explicitly mentioned in the Genocide Convention 
can make it easy for states not willing to take them to ignore them. In other conventions on 
prevention, it is sometimes preferred to have a specific provision that mentions other measures to 
be taken. For instance, art 2 of the Convention Against Torture stipulates that States parties 
“shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of 
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction”.539  Likewise article 7 of the ICERD puts that: 
“States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of 
teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to 
racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations 
and racial or ethnical groups, as well as to propagating the purposes and principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and this Convention.”540  
Such specific provisions are missing in the Genocide Convention and it is a problem on this 
primary level because not only there is no monitoring body to follow-up the implementation of 
the Genocide Convention at this level but also a specific provision would have made it much 
more clear what measures can be taken at this level. In this regard, article 9(1) of the ICERD can 
serve as a good example that can be envisaged to solve the two problems. It says: “States Parties 
undertake to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for consideration by the 
Committee, a report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have 
adopted and which give effect to the provisions of this Convention: (a) within one year after the 
entry into force of the Convention for the State concerned; and  
(b) thereafter every two years and whenever the Committee so requests. The Committee may 
request further information from the States Parties…”541  





 Article 2 of the CAT. 
540
 Art 7 of the ICERD. 
541
 See article 9 (1) of the ICERD. See also its articles 10 and 11 which concern the procedure and functioning of the 
committee. 




2.3. Preliminary conclusions 
It can be argued that though not much is said on this in the Genocide Convention, preventing 
genocide at the primary level is part of the Genocide Convention. It can therefore be concluded 
that the obligation to prevent genocide is owed from the primary level. States are obligated to put 
in place measures that are relevant for the prevention of genocide. Those measures include 
enacting legislation as well as other measures that are necessary for that purpose. What is 
necessary for that purpose is a legislation and other measures that prevent those factors shown in 
chapter three from developing into the following phases. Prevention means to take measures that 
aim at avoiding the occurrence of genocide and as states have the obligation to prevent genocide 
by adopting measures that makes it not happen, it follows that this obligation is owed from the 
moment the necessity to take measures arises. This coheres with the meaning of prevention and 
the spirit of the Genocide Convention which is to avoid the occurrence of genocide. The problem 
is however that the flaws in the Genocide Convention can be in the interest of states unwilling to 
take measures to prevent genocide.  
If for whatever reasons no measures have been taken at this level,542 or if, despite the measures 
in place, there are signs that a genocidal conflict between groups (racial, ethnic, national or 
religious) is developing; further preventive measures are needed at the next level (secondary).  
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3. Secondary prevention of genocide by territorial states 
The question here concerns measures that territorial states should take to prevent genocide once 
the primary level has not successfully prevented the occurrence of a situation that may lead to 
genocide. This section first discusses the preventive measures at the national level, and then 
preventive measures which may have an international character. 
3.1. Preventive measures exercised at a national level 
What judicial measures exercised at the national level should territorial states take to prevent 
genocide at this level?  What other measures may be available to territorial states that are capable 
of contributing to the prevention of genocide at this level?  
3.1.1. Judicial measures to prevent genocide 
The most effective ways to prevent criminal acts, in general, is not only “to provide penalties for 
persons committing such acts”,543 but also “to impose those penalties effectively on those who 
commit the acts one is trying to prevent.”544 Judicial measures at the secondary level would thus 
involve imposing penalties on those who violate the laws that contribute to the prevention of 
genocide. These laws concern all the factors that have been discussed earlier. They may include 
laws prohibiting discrimination, dehumanisation, incitement to commit genocide, and murder or 
all other crimes that target a specific group targeting a group protected by the Genocide 
Convention. Since it is impossible to discuss all the crimes that can be punished at this level in 
order to prevent genocide, I will consider and discuss some that I consider most relevant for the 
prevention of genocide. These are the incitement to hatred against a specific group of people or 
to discrimination of a specific group, persecution as act of crimes against humanity and the 
incitement to commit genocide. These will be discussed here as examples of judicial measures 
that can have a preventive effect on the crime of genocide. 
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3.1.1.1. Prevention through the punishment of incitement to hatred or to discrimination  
The aim here is not to study all the aspects of this crime but rather to show how punishing it can 
have effect on the prevention of genocide. It is nonetheless important to give its definition.  Far 
from being the only state that punishes hate crimes,545 scholars have argued that Germany is one 
of the states that can serve as a good example in criminalizing this crime.546 For this reason and 
as an example of how this crime is understood, I give here its definition from what is known as 
Volksverhetzung547 as a concept which bans incitement of hatred against a minority of the 
population in the German criminal code. Its article 130(2)548 reads as follows: “Whoever:  
1. with respect to writings (Section 11 subsection (3)), which incite hatred against 
segments of the population or a national, racial or religious group, or one characterized 
by its folk customs, which call for violent or arbitrary measures against them, or which 
assault the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning or defaming 
segments of the population or a previously indicated group:  
a) disseminates them;  
b) publicly displays, posts, presents, or otherwise makes them accessible;  
c) offers, gives or makes accessible to a person under eighteen years; or  
(d) produces, obtains, supplies, stocks, offers, announces, commends, undertakes to 
import or export them, in order to use them or copies obtained from them within the 
meaning of numbers a through c or facilitate such use by another; or  
2. disseminates a presentation of the content indicated in number 1 by radio, shall be 
punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine. 
It is under this law that Ernst Zündel was sentenced to an imprisonment of five years for having 
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denied the fate of Jews which was interpreted by the court as an incitement to hatred.549 
Likewise, pursuant to the French press law of 1881 which criminalizes the incitement to racial 
discrimination, hatred on the basis of ethnic, national, religious origins550 etc, some 
condemnations have occurred. For instance in 2008, the actress Brigitte Bardot was convicted on 
charges of inciting racial hatred for her criticism concerning the ritual slaughter of sheep during a 
Muslim feast. Bardot was ordered to pay €15,000, the fifth time she was fined for inciting racial 
hatred against Muslims since 1997.551 The French politician Jean Marie Le Pen has also been 
condemned for the incitement to hatred against Muslims.552  
The Netherlands attempted to punish Geert Wilders for incitement to hatred against the Muslims, 
non-western immigrants and Moroccans and discrimination of Muslims. However, the 
Amsterdam District Court acquitted him for lack of proof of the inflammatory nature of his 
statements.553  
The punishment of this crime is not an easy task especially because of the big challenge it faces. 
This is the invocation of the “right to freedom of expression” by those who incite for hatred 
basing on article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides 
for that right which include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in printing, in the form of art, or through 
any other media of his choice”. However, the same article adds that this right may be limited in 
certain circumstances. For instance, article 20(2) of the International Covenant stipulates that 
states must prohibit "any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes 
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incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.” This article was referred to by the ICTR in 
explaining the relationship between the freedom of speech and freedom from discrimination. It 
said that “The Chamber notes that freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination are 
not incompatible principles of law. Hate speech is not protected speech under international law. 
In fact, governments have an obligation under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights to prohibit any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence”.554 It also referred to article 4 the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination which requires “the prohibition of propaganda 
activities that promote and incite racial discrimination.”555 
It can therefore be argued that the punishment of persons guilty of the incitement to hatred or to 
discrimination against a group does not violate the right to freedom of expression and is 
consistent with the prevention of genocide under the Genocide Convention. This covenant is 
very much connected with the Genocide Convention with regard to the prevention. Moreover, 
there is nothing wrong when human rights treaties can complement each other in the pursuit of 
the protection of those rights. In this line, Diane F. Orentlicher rightly mentioned that “it is 
perfectly appropriate and even desirable to interpret one human rights treaty in light of others”556 
because “this approach promotes coherence in human rights treaty law and helps ensure that 
states are not subject to conflicting obligations under different human rights treaties.”557  
The question that needs a consideration here is however what the punishment in all the cases 
mentioned above, and other related cases not mentioned may mean to the prevention of genocide 
especially when the crime is committed in time of peace. In fact, all these punishments and 
attempt to punish were not done in the name of prevention of genocide as such nor did the 
convicted persons necessarily intend to commit genocide. However, since as already explained 
earlier, these acts may contribute to the building-up of the ideology of genocide that might cause 
genocide soon or late, punishing those acts may be one of the means to give effect to the 
Genocide Convention. In fact, by the nature of these very crimes as precursor to genocide, 
punishing them contributes to preventing genocide because it may stop them from continuing 
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and dissuade others from inciting for hatred. After all, if it is true that there  cannot be genocide 
if there is no hatred of the perpetrator against the victim group, punishing a person who sows that 
seed of hatred is a way to preventing that genocide from happening even when this falls short of 
incitement to genocide per se. This reasoning is supported by the ruling of the supreme court of 
Canada in Mugesera case558 where it explained the rationale of the Canadian provision that 
punishes incitement to hatred.559 It noted that “the intention of Parliament was to prevent the risk 
of serious harm and not merely to target actual harm caused. The risk of hatred caused by hate 
propaganda is very real. This is the harm that justifies prosecuting individuals under this section 
of the Criminal Code”.560 From this discussion it is argued that punishing incitement to hatred or 
discrimination is required at the national level. Whether a state can be held internationally 
responsible for the breach of the obligation to prevent genocide when it has failed to punish 
perpetrators of this crime is another question not covered by the present work. But what then if 
the incitement is made during tensions or war? This leads to the next example of persecution as 
act of crimes against humanity. 
3.1.1.2 Prevention through punishing incitement to hatred that takes form of persecution as a crime against 
humanity  
In some circumstances such as the time of high tension or war, the incitement to hatred may take 
the form of persecution. The question here is whether and how its punishment can have a 
preventive effect. Persecution is known in international law as one of enumerated acts of the 
crimes against humanity.561 For the first time, in the Streicher case before the Military 
International Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946, it has been recognized that persecution is a crime 
against humanity.562 Streicher was found guilty of persecution as a crime against humanity 
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because of his anti-Semitic writings that significantly predated the extermination of Jews in the 
1940s.563 Pursuant to customary international law as codified to date, like for any of the 
enumerated acts constituting the crime against humanity, persecution becomes crimes against 
humanity if it is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population or any identifiable group.564 
Moreover, there are also some required elements for persecution itself. The jurisprudence of the 
ICTY and ICTR has clarified the elements of persecution by determining that it requires a 
“blatant denial of a fundamental right reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts 
enumerated as crimes against humanity under the Statute.565 As an example, in the Nahimana 
case, the ICTR noted that “hate speech targeting a population on the basis of ethnicity, or other 
discriminatory grounds, reaches this level of gravity and constitutes persecution under article 3 
of its Statute”. The Supreme Court of Canada also noted that “a speech such as Mr. Mugesera’s, 
which actively encouraged ethnic hatred, murder and extermination and which created in its 
audience a sense of imminent threat and the need to act violently against an ethnic minority and 
against political opponents, bears the hallmarks of a gross or blatant act of discrimination”.566 It 
concluded therefore that the criminal act required for persecution was met.567  
History and jurisprudence shows that there is even a close link between persecution and 
genocide. In fact, when the perpetrators of the extermination of Jews were punished, “genocide” 
as a word was still under construction; but what happened to Jews meets the definition of 
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genocide and it is indeed to be qualified as genocide. This was preceded by (and committed 
together with) persecution. It is the same for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as mentioned 
earlier. The jurisprudence above shows that persecution targeting a group protected by the 
Genocide Convention is one of the clearest signs that genocide may follow. It may therefore be 
argued that since where genocide has occurred it has been preceded by persecution, punishing 
this latter crime at the domestic level may prevent genocide from happening. It may not only 
stop the perpetrators from continuing but may also discourage others from doing the same. The 
difficulty with this argument is however that this jurisprudence is a post genocide one and there 
is no way to show instances where punishing prosecution before genocide happened has 
prevented genocide from happening. On the other hand though, it is possible to argue that the 
fact that persecution has not been punished made genocide possible. If a state punishes 
perpetrators who are under its control, this may prevent them from continuing the persecution. 
However, this assumes that state has control over the perpetrators. If this is not the case, it 
becomes a serious challenge. Another serious challenge is where a state is itself the persecutor or 
where persecution is coupled with other clear calls to commit genocide. These challenges will be 
addressed in the next chapter of this work. 
3.1.1.3. Prevention through punishing incitement to commit genocide 
Another crime is the incitement to commit genocide.  There is no jurisprudence on the national 
level with regard to the punishment of this crime before genocide is completed. This may be due 
to two possible reasons. First, the Genocide Convention did not provide the definition of this 
crime nor did the doctrine provide enough guidance for its definition that could serve in the 
process to incorporate it in national laws. Even states which have incorporated the Genocide 
Convention in their domestic laws have not defined the incitement to commit genocide.568 Others 
omitted even to include it in their implementary legislation.569 Had they defined it, it could have 
probably served as light for the rest. This lack of clarity on its scope contributed for instance to 
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the opacity on the question whether or not the incitement to commit genocide could be punished 
even when it does not produce the intended effect. The second possible reason may be that while 
many states might have considered themselves as not pressured by any danger of genocide and 
have been reluctant to adopt laws domesticating the Genocide Convention, others have been 
reluctant to do so because their leaders were themselves involved in acts that could lead to 
genocide.  
The problem of lack of definition remained even after the creation of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia570 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.571 
Both article 4, 3(c) of the ICTY Statute572 and 2, 3(c) of the ICTR Statute573 made the crime of 
public and direct incitement to commit genocide punishable without defining it and without 
indicating whether it could be punished even before genocide is committed or completed.  Since 
the definition and scope of this crime is essential for its punishment and therefore for the 
prevention of genocide, and since it is the argument of the author of this work that this crime 
plays a key role in the whole process to genocide, it is paramount to briefly discuss its definition 
and scope here before discussing whether it can be punished even where it has not reached the 
intended result. 
The ICTR has had to confront the difficulty of lack of definition of this crime and was compelled 
to give an indication on its definition, scope and on the question whether it can be punished when 
genocide is not completed. For the definition, after having viewed how both the common law 
and civil law systems574  define incitement, the ICTR provided in the Akayesu case a definition 
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of that crime. It said: “ it can be noted in the final analysis that whatever the legal system, direct 
and public incitement must be defined for the purposes of interpreting article 2(3)(c), as directly 
provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, whether through speeches, shouting or threats 
uttered in public places or at public gatherings, or through the sale or dissemination, offer for 
sale or display of written material or printed matter in public places or at public gatherings, or 
through the public display of placards or posters, or through any other means of audio-visual 
communication.”575  
From the formulation of this crime and its definition, to be punishable, the incitement must be 
public576 and direct.577 To explain the first element(public), the ICTR cited the International Law 
Commission that has characterized “public” incitement as “a call for criminal action to a number 
of individuals in a public place or to members of the general public at large by such means as the 
mass media, for example, radio or television”.578 For instance, the court found that the speeches 
of Akayesu, made on 19 April when he “joined a crowd of over 100 people which had gathered 
around the body of a young member of the Interahamwe in Gishyeshye”579 and “seized the 
opportunity to address the people”580 were made in public and in a public place.581 Likewise, in 
the Nahimana case, the ICTR Chamber found it as incitement made in public, “the broadcast of 4 
June 1994, by Kantano Habimana, as illustrative of the incitement engaged in by RTLM”.582 
This broadcast was calling for the extermination of the inkotanyi (then meaning Tutsi by 
euphemism). 583 Also in Mugesera case, the Supreme Court of Canada found that his message 
was delivered in a public place at a public meeting584 where he spoke to about 1,000 people at a 
meeting of the MRND, at Kabaya in Gisenyi prefecture.585 The Canadian Law defines "public 
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place" as one to which the public has access by right or invitation, express or implied.”586 
The court also explained the second element (direct) of the incitement by saying that  direct 
incitement “implies that the incitement assume a direct form and specifically provoke another to 
engage in a criminal act, and that more than mere vague or indirect suggestion goes to constitute 
direct incitement”.587 An example of this is about the infamous speech of Leon Mugesera in 
November 1992 in which he wondered this: “Why do they not arrest these parents who have sent 
away their children and why do they not exterminate them? Why do they not arrest the people 
taking them away and why do they not exterminate all of them? Are we really waiting till they 
come to exterminate us?”588 Likewise, a local court in Rwanda found that the broadcast of 
Valerie Bemeriki on RTLM that “do not kill those cockroaches with a bullet - cut them to pieces 
with a machete” as a direct incitement.589 But in some cases the inciters might be careful and use 
indirect language. The ICTR was mindful of this. It said that depending on a specific culture, 
“incitement may be direct, and nonetheless implicit……”590 For instance in the call addressed to 
the population to unite in order to eliminate what he termed the sole enemy: the accomplices of 
the Inkotanyi,591 it has been established that Akayesu then clearly urged them to kill the Tutsi.592 
The ICTR also found as a direct incitement in the Nahimana case, the fact of “calling on listeners 
to exterminate the Inkotanyi, who would be known by height and physical appearance. 
Habimana told his followers, “Just look at his small nose and then break it”.593 Another example 
is about the same infamous speech of Leon Mugesera in which he said: “…So don”t you know 
how to listen or read? I am telling you that your home is in Ethiopia, that we will send you by the 
Nyabarongo so you can get there quickly”.594 Given the context of that speech and the fact that 
this river (Nyabarongo) is not navigable, the Canadian Supreme Court deduced that he meant to 
throw dead bodies in it.  
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Apart from the two elements of incitement to commit genocide present in the formulation itself 
the court added another one. This is the intent to commit genocide. The ICTR noted that “the 
person who incites must also have the specific intent to commit genocide.”595 In support of this 
ICTR argument, the Supreme Court of Canada explained what can help to assess this guilty mind 
by saying that “a speech that is given in the context of a genocidal environment will have a 
heightened impact, and for this reason the environment in which a statement is made can be an 
indicator of the speaker’s intent”.596  
With this status of the crime of incitement to commit genocide, it can be said that its punishment 
is possible, required at the national level as well, the question being however whether this is 
possible when it has not produced effect i.e before genocide is committed or is completed. 
This question has been somehow addressed by the ICTR. Indeed, in the Akayesu case the ICTR 
said that “the fact that such acts are in themselves particularly dangerous because of the high risk 
they carry for society, even if they fail to produce results, warrants that they be punished as an 
exceptional measure. The Chamber holds that genocide clearly falls within the category of 
crimes so serious that direct and public incitement to commit such a crime must be punished as 
such, even where such incitement failed to produce the result expected by the perpetrator”.597 
The same court confirmed it in the Nahimana case by saying that the causal relationship between 
the incitement and genocide itself is “not requisite to a finding of incitement. It is the potential of 
the communication to cause genocide that makes it incitement.”598 It concluded that “with regard 
to causation, the Chamber recalls that incitement is a crime regardless of whether it has the effect 
it intends to have.”599 
In all this however, the court has used the words “fail to produce the result expected” or 
“regardless of whether it has the effect it intends to have”. It clearly answers the question of 
whether it can be punished when a specific incitement has not produced the specific result it 
intended but it raises the question whether this means or implies also “before it produces the 
intended result”, i.e before genocide is committed.  The ICTR has said that the incitement to 
commit genocide is among “inchoate offences which are punishable by virtue of the criminal act 
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alone, irrespective of the result thereof, which may or may not have been achieved”.600 In both 
Akayesu and Nahimana cases it confirmed that this nature as inchoate crime does not require a 
result.601  It even went far to say that the fact that the drafters of the Genocide Convention did not 
mention explicitly that the incitement to commit genocide can be punished even where it was not 
successful does not mean that the intent was not to punish unsuccessful acts of incitement.602 If 
this is true, there is no legal reason why it would not be possible to punish it even before it 
produces the effect it intends as well, i.e before genocide happens. If it is a separate crime and 
not a mode of participation as it is already shown, it means that as far as it is consummated it 
should be legally punishable even before genocide occurs or never occurs. I fully join the 
argument of the Supreme Court of Canada that “because of its inchoate nature, incitement is 
punishable by virtue of the criminal act alone irrespective of the result”,603 and this is possible 
even when no genocide is committed yet or ever. 
This argument serves to answer another question on whether punishing this crime before 
genocide is committed can have a preventive effect.  The answer is affirmative because, as 
inchoate crime is described as a ““step toward the commission of another crime”,604 if you 
punish the perpetrator of that crime before he commits the other crime he intends to achieve, you 
will prevent him from reaching that final step.605 
This argument coheres perfectly with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention as far 
as the prevention of genocide is concerned. Indeed, as already mentioned earlier, article I of the 
Genocide Convention is one of the sources that created the obligation to prevent genocide. Its 
article III made the public and direct incitement to commit genocide a crime. Articles V and VI 
obligated states to provide penalties and to apply them. So, if it is a crime that occurs before the 
genocide and it can lead to it and states have the obligation to prevent genocide from happening, 
punishing the incitement before it causes genocide is to prevent genocide from happening. There 
is no reason not to interpret it in this way and the fact that the ICTR did not explicitly give that 
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detail is probably because it was simply dealing with post genocide cases. There is no theoretical 
or practical reason or use to not consider an unsuccessful incitement as an incitement before 
genocide occurs. After all, nothing in the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention 
indicates that the incitement to commit genocide can only be punished when and after genocide 
has occurred. This would be contrary to its object and purpose. Also, the fact that the ICTR did 
not make causation a requisite for that crime to exist does not mean that it implied that it is 
regarded as a crime with no causation relationship with genocide. The court has explicitly shown 
it in Akayesu case for instance that “the direct and public incitement to commit genocide as 
engaged in by Akayesu was indeed successful and did lead to the destruction of a great number 
of Tutsi in the commune of Taba”. Moreover, the fact that it later added in the Nahimana et al. 
case that “it is the potential of the communication to cause genocide that makes it incitement”606 
shows that the ICTR was also of the view that it is punished because it can cause genocide.607 
Article 318 of the Criminal Code of Canada is a good example to show that reasoning to punish 
the crime before the intended final crime is committed is preventing the commission of that 
crime. This article formulates the crime as "advocating genocide" and defines it as: “supporting 
or arguing for the killing of members of an "identifiable group" — persons distinguished by their 
colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or sexual orientation. The intention or motivation would be 
the destruction of members of the targeted group. Any person who promotes genocide is guilty 
of an indictable offence, and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.”608 The 
language used in this provision shows even more that the idea is to punish it at the moment the 
perpetrator commits it to prevent the intended destruction from happening. 
From this prevention perspective, it is concluded that territorial states (through their courts) are 
legally required to punish perpetrators of the incitement to commit genocide under their control 
and this from the very  moment it is consummated in order to prevent the intended result from 
being achieved. However, like for the other crimes discussed above, the problem is when the 
state is not willing to do that because its apparatus is the perpetrator itself or when it has no 
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control over the perpetrators. This will be discussed later. Before that, since the judicial measures 
may need to be supplemented by other measures, it is important to first see what those other 
measures may be at the secondary level.  
3.1.2. Other measures 
It was said earlier that at the primary level states are required to adopt and apply measures that 
give effect to the Genocide Convention. Those measures may be of political, administrative, 
educational, cultural, socio- economic, security or other nature.  If a state has not adopted them 
before, it can still adopt and apply them at the secondary level. It will be argued here that 
territorial states are required to enforce measures adopted at the primary level. In principle one 
could argue that all acceptable means should be used to ensure that these measures are enforced, 
the question being how they can be enforced. 
It is impossible to discuss each and every measure of these kinds and how they should be 
enforced. Only some examples regarding the political, educational, socio-economic, and security 
will be discussed here. Moreover, even for these chosen ones, they will be discussed as 
illustrative and certainly without being comprehensive.  
Political measures taken at the primary level or at the secondary level which may concern 
fostering democracy need to be enforced through the institutions of the state. It is generally 
agreed that measures that are based on fair mutual accommodation between different 
communities, good understanding of others and working out compromises foster democracy 
(implying that where there is true democracy no genocide is possible).609 The political system 
should be made in a way that each political organ is capable to exercise its power independently. 
For instance, in accordance with the constitution of the state, the parliament should be able to 
hold the President and any other member of the executive accountable in case of failure to 
enforce or abide with measures that are susceptible of preventing genocide. This does not require 
only a constitutional framework that guarantees a checks and balance mechanism but also a 
political culture of accountability.  
Another example is about the educational measures. It has been noted in literature that the habits 
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of understanding others and working out compromises may be learned at school.610 Indeed from 
basic school to the education of political leaders, if curricula are designed to facilitate 
constructive social engagement and peaceful coexistence611 among different groups, this can 
arguably give effect to the prevention of genocide. So, at the secondary level, state organs check 
if this educational measure is being implemented through the ministry of education. If it is not, 
there must be administrative and or political sanctions against the concerned authorities, imposed 
by competent state organs. For instance, the parliament should be capable of holding a minister 
of education accountable for failing to adopt an education system that promotes the culture of 
tolerance among different groups.  
For socio-economic measures, they may include the welfare of the population and the equitable 
enjoyment and sharing of resources among groups. They need to be implemented by the 
ministries concerned and in case they do not, the parliament should be able to hold the minister 
accountable for that. For instance, if a specific group is marginalised, is denied social rights and 
is deprived of resources for instance, the institutions concerned should be held accountable for 
that. Furthermore, investment measures as a key to socio-economic development612 need to be 
enforced in order to ensure that the problem of economy scarcity is addressed. In his report, the 
UN Secretary-General recognized that “eradication of poverty and addressing, in particular, 
inequality, justice and human security issues in developing countries would greatly contribute to 
conflict prevention in the long term.”613 In case of failure, the accountability could be engaged as 
well. 
Another category of measures is about security. If for some reasons the genocidal conflict has 
grown to reach a civil war for example, the state should still put in place measures that prevent 
the escalation to genocide. These should include but not be limited to the negotiation and to 
refrain from training militias that could be used later to commit genocide. Also, article VIII of 
the Genocide Convention gives a possibility to a state to call upon the competent organs of the 
United Nations to take appropriate measures in accordance with the UN Charter in order to 
prevent genocide. This article did not specify which measures are appropriate but it is worth 
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saying in line with what has been discussed above that these measures may be necessary for 
example in case of a civil war in which either a rebel movement has a genocidal agenda or the 
conflict itself can create a favourable environment for a potential genocide. In both situations, a 
state may call upon the UN to take measures such as imposing arms embargo on the leaders of 
the movement or any other measure against them. The measures to prevent genocide by the UN 
will not be discussed in depth here but later in a separate chapter on the UN.  
It is argued that at the secondary level, territorial states are required to enforce those various 
measures exercised on its territory that may have preventive effect on genocide. The question on 
what measures territorial states should take at the secondary level to prevent genocide that may 
involve actors not under their jurisdiction and/or control need to be addressed. 
3.2. Preventive measures with international character  
The question to be addressed here concerns what a territorial state should do for instance to 
address a problem related to incitement to commit genocide from outside either done by heads of 
other states, individuals outside its jurisdiction or inside but not under its control or when another 
state supports a rebel group that attacks it with a potential risk of genocide.  
3.2.1. Prevention by punishing the incitement to commit genocide committed outside its territory 
What measures should a territorial state take that aim at punishing officials of other states as well 
as individuals not under its control who commit the crime of incitement to commit genocide 
against its people? Scholars and other commentators have suggested that territorial states should 
take action against individuals through its courts and the ICC or before the ICJ against the state 
from which this crime is being committed for the violation of the Genocide Convention.614 These 
possibilities are discussed here from a prevention perspective. There could be other measures 
such as diplomatic, political, economic, cultural, but they are not discussed here. 
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3.2.1.1. Preventive measures through municipal courts 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s call for the destruction of the state of Israel when he was president of 
Iran has been cited in literature as an example of situation in which a territorial state should take 
judicial measures through its courts.615 Among his statements on several occasions, Ahmadinejad 
said in October 2005 that Israel should be “wiped-off the map”.616 He stated later again that the 
“Zionist regime . . . cannot survive,” and “cannot continue its existence.”617 During the Israel-
Hezbollah military conflict, he stated that the “real cure for the [Lebanon] conflict is elimination 
of the Zionist regime.”618 He later told the French newspaper Le Monde that “these false people, 
these fabricated people (the Israeli people) cannot continue to exist”.619 
Some scholars have subsequently qualified these calls as flagrant crime of public and direct 
incitement to commit genocide and also as a violation of the Genocide Convention.620 Others 
have however argued that Ahmadinejad’s words have been mistranslated and or misquoted and 
did not mean to incite people to commit genocide against the people of Israel but rather the 
regime change in Jerusalem.621  However, whether Ahmadinejad has said and meant to wipe off 
Israel or whether what he said has been mistranslated is not the point of discussion here. Instead 
of examining the merit of Ahmadinejad’s statements, the point is rather to see what the legal 
possibilities available for a territorial state to prevent statements from officials or individuals in 
other states that indeed call for the destruction of its people. The legal means to put an end to 
such calls once they are there are central to this discussion. Among them, there may be a 
possibility to indict them in order to have them on trial. 
After the adoption of the Genocide Convention, some states parties to it have adopted laws that 
                                                          
615
 Gregory, S. Gordon, op.cit, 892. 
616
 Nazila, Fathi, Wipe Israel “off the map”, The New York Times, October 27, 2005, available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26iht-iran.html> (visited on 20 February 2012). 
617






 See International Association of Genocide Scholars, Resolutions Condemning Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s 
Statements Calling for the Destruction of Israel and Denying the Historical Reality of the Holocaust: and Calling for 
Prevention of Iranian Development of Nuclear Weapons, available at <http://genocidescholars.wsg.net/about-
us/iags-resolutions-statements/> (visited on 21 February 2012). See also, Pax American Institute, Iran’s Violation of 
International Law: Defiance of Conventions, Treaties, Statutes, Resolutions and Safeguards Agreement 1948-2011, 
A special Report, Vol. NSS IL No. 3, 2011, p. 14, available at <http://www.paxamerica.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/SPECIAL-REPORT-Irans-Violations-of-International-Law-03-2011.pdf> (visited on 21 
February 2012). 
621
 Shiraz, Dossa, “The Explanation We Never Heard”, Literary Review of Canada”, Vol. 15, No. 5, 2007, pp. 4-5. 




make genocide punishable as well as other crimes related to it including the incitement to 
commit genocide. For instance, Israel adopted in 1950 a law No 57/10/50 on the prevention and 
punishment of the crime of genocide,622 which treats a person guilty of incitement to commit 
genocide in its article 3 like a person guilty of genocide itself and punishes him the same way.623 
Article 5, gives to Israeli courts the universal jurisdiction in case of genocide and related crimes.  
It stipulates that “A person who has committed outside Israel an act which is an offence under 
this Law may be prosecuted and punished in Israel as if he had committed the act in Israel.”624 
Like article IV of the Genocide Convention itself which obligates states to punish persons 
committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals,625 this Israeli law gives 
Israel courts the competence  to punish any person regardless of his position. Under article 4 of 
the said Israeli law, any person guilty of an offence under this Law (which includes incitement to 
commit genocide) may be punished whether he is a legally responsible ruler, a member of a 
legislative body, a public official or a private individual. Reading this article with article 3 of the 
same law which allows Israel to try people who have committed offences under the law on the 
prevention and punishment of genocide as if he has committed it in Israel without mentioning 
any exception, it appears that this could include any person, including a head of state of another 
state.  
In this line, though Gregory S. Gordon does not explicitly refer to these laws, he argued that in 
the example of Ahmadinejad, Israel also could base on a “passive personality” principle and the 
“protective principle” because Israelis are victims of his statement and because his statement was 
coupled with the development of nuclear weapons to be used against the same people.626 
However, though this argument may cohere well with Israeli law mentioned above and may 
constitute a good means to prevent genocide, from international law perspective it is 
unconvincing. In fact, the ICJ ruling in the Arrest Warrant case is an example of how the above 
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argument has some serious challenges. This ruling reaffirmed that heads of states, heads of 
governments and ministers for foreign affairs as officials enjoy full personal immunity from 
jurisdiction in other states.627 The Court thus found that the issuance of the arrest warrant of Mr. 
Yerodia “infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by 
him under international law”628 as an incumbent minister for foreign affairs of the Congo. 
It follows from this ruling that Israel or any other state in the same situation would not legally 
exercise this right to issue an international arrest warrant against an incumbent head of state that 
has incited people to commit genocide against its people.629  
Nevertheless, as the court has indicated in this case, not all state officials are concerned with this 
full personal immunity from jurisdiction in other states.630  It may be therefore deduced from the 
said court’s ruling that a territorial state may have jurisdiction to try other foreign state officials 
with the exception of those who enjoy the full personal immunity for international crimes. In 
exercising this, it can therefore issue an international arrest warrant against a state official of 
another state for incitement to commit genocide.  If that is correct, there is no point to ask 
whether that territorial state against which the crime of incitement to commit genocide is 
committed would have jurisdiction to prosecute individuals who commit it from foreign states 
and who live there,631 or from inside the state but not under its control. This is because, if it can 
do so for state officials of foreign states there is no legal reason to suggest otherwise for 
individual foreign citizens as well as its nationals who commit the same crime. 
However, with regard to what this procedure means to prevention, two difficulties might be most 
challenging.  The first is that there is a category of state officials who enjoy full immunity from 
jurisdiction in other states and therefore cannot be indicted by them. In that case, they might 
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continue the incitement. The second is that even for those who do not enjoy the full immunity, 
the enforceability of arrest warrants against them may be problematic and as long as the indicted 
persons are not arrested, they may continue the incitement. For instance, if the inciters against 
Israel are in Iran and Israel issues arrest warrant against them, they might never be arrested 
unless they happen to be in another state that is willing to arrest them. Yet they might be careful 
before they travel unless they are sure they will not be arrested. Like the other challenge shown 
above on the fact that a state cannot indict persons that enjoy the personal full immunity, this 
challenge weakens this possibility and though it cannot be said that it means nothing to the 
prevention of genocide, it is not that promising for the prevention of genocide.  
However, with regard to these challenges related to the situation where the incitement is 
committed by one of those enjoying the personal full immunity, the court did not say that 
international law closes all the possibilities to prosecute a head of state or other concerned with 
the case in other states. Among the possibilities that the court listed, and in line with the 
prevention of genocide, it is important to mention the one that says that those enjoying the full 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction in other states can be subject to criminal proceedings before 
international criminal courts,632 and this may presumably concern individuals outside a 
territorial-state’s control as well. 
3.2.1.2. The possibility for a territorial state to seek preventive measures through the ICC 
As it is noted in the preamble of the Rome Statute, to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators 
of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes was among the 
justifications of the creation of the ICC.633 This expression of the preventive intent of the 
founders of the ICC seems to be accepted in literature.634  
Under article 5 of the ICC Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction with respect to the crime of genocide 
(among other crimes). Article 6 defines genocide in the same way as the Genocide Convention 
did. Article 25, 3(e) states inter alia that “a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:…in respect of the 
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crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide.”635 Article 25, 3(e) 
has been linked to article 5 by expressly saying that: “In accordance with this Statute, a person 
shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court if that person: 
(e): In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit 
genocide”.636  
In this way, article 6 and 25, 3(e) of the ICC Statute (read together with article 5) may be a legal 
basis under which the ICC may treat the public and direct incitement as separate crime and not 
just a mode of participation of genocide.637 The case-law on this crime and literature support 
this.638 
The procedure to refer the cases to the ICC is provided for in article 13, 14 and 15 of the ICC 
Statute. The referral is done either by a state party to the ICC Statute, the Security Council or is 
initiated proprio motu by the ICC prosecutor.639  If a state is not party to the ICC, it could, under 
article VIII of the Genocide Convention call upon the Security Council to take appropriate 
measures which, in this case could be to refer the situation to the ICC in accordance with article 
13 of the ICC statute.640 These provisions provide a clear legal basis for a territorial state to seek 
preventive measures through the ICC against officials of other states who enjoy the immunity 
from jurisdiction as well as other individuals outside its control. However, the fact that there is 
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no effective mechanism to arrest the indicted persons may undermine the chances of 
preventability of this measure.641 But since there is no single measure that is capable of 
preventing genocide alone, it can be argued that it can play its role no matter how little it may be.   
3.2.1.3. The possibility for a territorial state to seek preventive measures through the ICJ 
Articles VIII and IX of the Genocide Convention provide a legal basis for a state victim of an on-
going incitement to commit genocide (or other international crimes that may lead to genocide) to 
bring a case before the ICJ against another state from which this crime is being committed for 
the violation of that Convention.642 To contribute to the prevention of genocide, the Court may 
order the state concerned to stop its people from committing that crime and may order it to take 
any other measures to prevent the commission of genocide.643 The court may also hold the state 
concerned responsible for the violation of the obligation to prevent genocide. Theoretically, it is 
possible to say that the ICJ may take measures that may contribute to the prevention of genocide. 
However, in practice it may be unlikely that this possibility offers a big contribution to the 
prevention of genocide due to various reasons. For instance, in some cases, the ICJ may lack 
jurisdiction.644 Furthermore, even where the ICJ may have jurisdiction over a given case and 
would order the responsible state to prevent or stop the incitement to commit genocide, there is 
no clear mechanism to enforce that.645 The Serbia case is a good example. In fact, despite the ICJ 
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provisional measures that ordered Serbia to prevent the commission of genocide and the 
subsequent confirmation that Serbia should take them immediately, the measures were not taken 
and the genocide followed. 
3.2.2. What if the inciting state is developing weapons of mass destruction which could be used 
to commit genocide against the people of a territorial state? 
If a state is developing weapons of mass destruction and there are reasons to think that they 
might be used to exterminate people in a territorial state,646 the latter may take some actions in 
accordance with the Charter of the UN and the Genocide Convention.   
The Charter provides for an indication on what a state in that situation can legally do. It sets a 
principle in its article 2(3) that: “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”.647 
At this level a state could use the diplomatic means to settle the issue. Article 33 of the Charter 
suggests how to do it. It says that a state may “seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice.”648 These peaceful means may not be successful. In that 
case the same Charter in its article 37 of the Charter requires states, once they have exhausted the 
peaceful means, to refer the dispute to the Security Council.649  That possibility is also offered in 
article VIII of the Genocide Convention. Under this article, the territorial state may refer such a 
situation to any competent organ of the UN for it to take appropriate actions to prevent genocide 
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and any other acts punishable under the Genocide Convention.650 There is no practice on where 
this possibility has been used to prevent an inciting state to stop from developing weapons of 
mass destruction. However, considering the practice of the Security Council on these weapons in 
general,651 it is possible to say that it is well positioned to take actions that may include a 
situation where a state might be developing those weapons to use them to commit genocide or to 
prevent their spread to non-state actors,652 (to prevent that they use them to commit genocide, 
among other things). 
3.3. Preliminary conclusions 
At this level, it is safe to conclude that territorial states are under the obligation to prevent 
genocide at the secondary level. In doing so, the means discussed above are appropriate since by 
the nature of the discussed crimes and other signs as precursors to genocide as well as the nature 
of the crime of genocide, using the suggested means can prevent genocide from happening. The 
means are not without challenges though. The latter include the lack of international and national 
monitoring system to follow-up the implementation of this obligation at this level. When these 
challenges make the prevention unsuccessful then other measures are needed at the tertiary level.  
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4. Tertiary prevention of genocide by territorial states  
This level is the final one: after the onset of genocide, i.e when genocide has started. The 
question is to know what a state is required to do in order to stop it from continuing. This may 
depend on who is committing it. In fact, genocide might be being committed by a territorial 
state’s own organs, a rebel group or a part of the population against another or by another state 
supporting a movement against the people of that state or by that other state against the whole 
nation of the territorial state. This section discusses these situations in order to see what the legal 
preventive means available to may be. Though the tertiary level may also deal with the aftermath 
of genocide in order to prevent genocide from reoccurring, this component will not be treated 
here. In fact, given its predictable complexity in that it would deal with various questions on the 
responsibility of the bearers of the obligation to the continuous process of the prevention of 
genocide, it will not be part of this work.653 
4.1. Who within the state is committing genocide? 
It has been argued in the previous chapter that the obligation to prevent genocide implies the 
obligation not to perform acts that may lead to genocide and the obligation not to commit 
genocide. The previous section addressed the obligation not to perform acts that may lead to 
genocide. The aim at this level is to investigate what a territorial state can do when the measures 
taken at the secondary level have been unsuccessful (or have not been taken at all) and acts of 
genocide by state officials, by a rebel group or a part of its population have started.  
4.1.1. When genocide is being committed by the territorial state’s organs 
History has proved that genocide has been possible where states have organised and perpetrated 
it.654  In that case, one might think that it would be useless to discuss what territorial states are 
required to do to stop it when it is the perpetrator itself. However, it has not been concluded that 
genocide is only possible where the whole state apparatus is involved in it. In case state organs 
acts with genocidal intent without the order or authorisation of state leaders, the territorial state 
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should prosecute individuals involved. Article VI of the Genocide Convention obligates states to 
punish persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III of the 
same convention.655 There is no requirement that genocide be completed for its perpetrators to be 
punished. As long as it can be established that acts of genocide have been commenced, the 
territorial state should legally punish its perpetrators and those who attempted to commit it. It is 
not impossible to imagine a situation where such acts may occur. For instance a state military 
commander in a given region where there is war (or not) may order his troops to exterminate a 
given group (without the order or authorization from his hierarchical superiors). To imagine this 
is not arbitrary. For instance, on 9 December 1947 (during the 1945-1949 Indonesia’s fight for 
independence), the Dutch soldiers who were looking for weapons and resistance leader Lukas 
Kustario known for ambushing Dutch bases,656 massacred men and boys in the West Java village 
of Rawagede.657 When these villagers said they didn”t know where he was, nearly all the men 
were rounded up and taken to the fields where they were massacred.658 Official papers estimate 
the number of men killed at Rawagede at 150, but other reports say around 431 men and boys.659 
There is no evidence that Major Alfons Wijnen who was the commander in charge during that 
massacre received an order from the Dutch government to do it. The fact that he was not 
prosecuted for that and that he was instead later promoted to colonel and got the royal honour 
does not suffice to say that he had acted upon the order of his government. The point here is not 
to say that the massacre in Rawagede was a genocide (which it was not), but to show how it is 
possible that commanders can act ruthlessly without necessarily being authorized or ordered by 
the leaders of their state. It should not be impossible to think that it might be possible also for 
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any troop with the intent to commit genocide.660 
Punishing commanders and other soldiers involved may have a direct preventive effect since it 
might stop them from continuing to perform their acts.  
4.1.2. When genocide is being committed by a rebel group (not under the control of the territorial 
state) 
Another genocidal situation may emanate from a rebel group that may have the intention to 
commit genocide. History shows that some rebel groups, such as the Lord Resistance Army in 
Uganda, have inflicted huge sufferings to the population and there is no reason to think that a 
rebel group would not commit genocide as well. The Genocide Convention did not go in all the 
details on the means to be employed by states in order to stop (suppress) genocide in such a 
situation. But the interpretation of article I of the Genocide Convention which obligates states to 
prevent genocide permits to say that states are required to protect their populations from 
genocide by employing all legitimate means to put an end to genocide being committed by rebel 
groups. The measures may include negotiations with the rebel group(s) in order to end hostilities. 
In case the negotiations are impossible, the state concerned may use force to stop the genocide. It 
may also refer the situation to the ICC which may indict the perpetrators.661 If, for whatever 
reasons a state is incapable of putting an end to such acts, the territorial state may seek military 
assistance from other states.662  It may also call upon competent organs of the UN to take actions 
against the rebels. When a territorial state does not do this, it is not complying with its obligation 
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to prevent genocide. 
4.1.3. When genocide is being committed by a part of the population of the territorial state 
In a situation where a part of a population is committing genocide against another group, the 
state is required to stop it. The situation where a given part of the population may resolve to kill 
another is not impossible to imagine. For instance, the UN commission of inquiry on Burundi 
has concluded that “acts of genocide against the Tutsi minority were committed in Burundi in 
October 1993.”663 This was following the assassination of the Hutu President of Burundi in 1993. 
According to that commission of inquiry, this assassination “was planned beforehand as an 
integral part of the coup that overthrew him, and that the planning and execution of the coup was 
carried out by officers highly placed in the line of command of the Burundian Army”.664 The 
Burundian Army was then mainly composed of the Tutsi. 
It is a state’s obligation to prevent a population in this situation from committing genocide 
against another part of the population. The measures to be taken may include arresting and 
punishing the instigators and perpetrators and using force where appropriate. This genocide may 
be being committed by a very big part of the population that a state may be incapable to stop it 
from continuing. In such a case, that territorial state should either seek assistance from other 
states or call upon the competent organs of the UN to take action.665  Also, like for measures 
against the rebels, the territorial state should refer such a situation to the ICC.  
4.2. When genocide is being committed by another state or rebel groups from another 
state 
The Genocide Convention did not give details on what a state should do to stop genocide being 
committed to its population by another state or by an organization from and supported by another 
state. Yet, this is not a situation that is unlikely.  For instance, there have been claims that 
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Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda were all involved in mass killings in the jungles of eastern Congo 
some of which could, as noted in the mapping report,666 “be classified as crimes of genocide” if 
“they were proven before a competent court.” 667   
To know what measures a state concerned may take, it is important to make a distinction of 
circumstances in which this genocide may happen. First, it is possible that a state may invade 
another with the intention to commit genocide against the people of that state as such or against 
an identified group in that state (racial, ethnic, religious). Secondly, genocide may be committed 
by armed bands or groups operating from another state. The point here is not to discuss all the 
notions on these circumstances, but to see what the legal means available to the state victim are, 
for it to stop that genocide. 
4.2.1. When a territorial state is victim of aggression by another state with the intention to 
commit genocide 
A state may attack a territorial state using its regular armed forces or sending other armed bands 
or groups.668 In either situation, the legal basis for action is basically the Charter of the UN and 
the Genocide Convention. Since this is a violation of one of the fundamental principles of the 
UN which prohibits the use of force against another state,669 the first means to say here is article 
51 of the UN Charter which recognizes to every state the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against it until the Security Council takes 
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action.670 So, the territorial state attacked is required to defend itself in order to protect its 
population from genocide. And as said in article 51, this right may be exercised individually or 
collectively.671 However, depending on the military power of the aggressor, it might be difficult 
for the state victim to defend itself effectively (even through collective self-defence). In such a 
case, the Security Council action may be sought for.672  
Other measures may include seeking measures through the ICC which may indict individuals 
involved for the crime of genocide.673 If the territorial state is not party to the ICC or if the 
aggressing state is not party to it, the territorial state can refer the case to the Security Council 
which, under article 13(b)674 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, can refer it to the ICC.675 One of 
the big challenges here is that the aggressing state may not make its plan to commit genocide 
clear when it has started the war against the territorial state. For such a hidden agenda, one may 
think that punishing aggression from the very beginning could be an alternative to prevent that 
state from committing genocide. Indeed, since the prosecution would concern persons in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of the 
aggressing State,676 if it is done at the beginning, it could presumably have preventive effect on 
genocide. However, the fact that this possibility is yet to be available,677 is one of many 
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challenges on the prevention of genocide through the ICC.678 
4.2.2. When genocide is being committed by armed bands or groups operating from another state 
The problem may arise when the acts by these bands can hardly be attributable to the state from 
which they operate because the involvement of that state can be done either in a calculated way 
or the state is just passive. 
For the first situation, the involvement may not constitute of sending the armed bands against 
another but by supplying logistical means, providing financial support to an organization that has 
already the intention to commit genocide in the territorial state. Obviously, the territorial state 
has the right to self-defence on its territory. The problem arises when it comes to using such a 
right to follow these bands outside its territory in order to dismantle them. The ICJ has said in 
Nicaragua case that some acts, though constitute a clear breach of international law (the principle 
of the non-use of force and an intervention in the internal affairs of a State) do not give rise to an 
entitlement to self-defence that involves the use of force.679 It clearly said that “while the concept 
of an armed attack includes the dispatch by one State of armed bands into the territory of another 
State, the supply of arms and other support to such bands cannot be equated with armed 
attack.”680 
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The court added that such conduct (supply of arms) “is of lesser gravity than an armed attack”.681 
However, it is doubtful whether this interpretation could apply in case these arms are supplied by 
a state to the armed bands or groups operating from its territory in order to be used to commit 
genocide in a given territorial state. In fact, if the armed band is neither sent by that state nor is it 
acting on its behalf but operates from that state and gets arms from it and uses them to commit 
genocide in the territorial state, it can be argued that this could either be interpreted as an implicit 
sending or as a substantial involvement of that state. This could presumably justify the use of 
force as self-defence. The Security Council resolution 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001682 
which recognized the right of self-defence in the context of the September 11 terrorist attack on 
the United States may serve as a support to this argument. Though the acts committed are 
different from genocide, the rest is similar and the response that international law may give in 
this regard may not be different. 
Things may get more complicated however when the state that supplies funds and arms is 
different from the one that serves as support base of the organization. For instance it has been 
alleged that Hezbollah (and Hamas) get arms and financial support from Iran and Syria.683 Even 
where it may be assumed that Hezbollah attacks to Israel aim at committing genocide against the 
Jews and that it gets arms and other support from the two states, it is difficult to use the same 
argument to say that Israel could exercise its right of self-defence against Syria and Iran if 
Hezbollah is not operating from their territory. However, Israel could alternatively take 
countermeasures684 against those states. But it might be difficult for it to find one that will stop 
those states from continuing if the intention is absolutely to commit genocide. Another 
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alternative may be the referral of the situation to the Security Council (which itself is not very 
promising). The referral of the case to the ICJ could be an option. However, not only this might 
take long before a decision is made (thus difficult to have a prompt preventive effect), but also 
the court’s decision might still need the enforcement of the Security Council at the end (if the 
state concerned does not comply with that decision).685 Given the nature of the peril, this gives 
very little chance of prompt preventability of genocide. 
The second situation is when there is a passive involvement of a state. This is when for whatever 
reasons; a band is operating from the territory of a given state but without any supply of arms or 
any kind of logistical or financial support from that state. This may happen in two ways. First, a 
state may, without necessarily taking active part in what the band is doing, be unwilling to 
prevent it from doing it from its territory. Secondly, the state may be aware of what the armed 
band is doing from its territory and may not be acquiescing to that, but is unable to prevent it 
from using its territory as a support base to commit genocide in another state. The question being 
what the territorial state can do to stop the commission of genocide by this armed band in both 
situations. In other words, what solution does international law provide to the problem where the 
people of a territorial state may be facing such a peril from a band operating from another state? 
Prima facie, it could be said from what the ICJ has said in the Nicaragua case that both situations 
could not justify measures involving the use of force against the band in another state. That is 
why numerous scholars and states have argued for example that Israel violated international law 
in pursuing Hezbollah in Lebanon.686 Likewise Rwanda was criticised the same way when it 
used force in DRC to fight the former Rwandan soldiers and interahamwe militia most of whom 
were involved in the 1994 genocide and who were carrying out armed attacks from DRC 
allegedly aiming at committing genocide against the Tutsi ethnic group in Rwanda. 
Though the claim by both Israel and Rwanda in attacking those bands in Lebanon (2006) and 
DRC (1996) respectively were not explicitly to stop genocide, they were both considering 
themselves as legally dismantling the organisations because of the peril they represented. For 
instance one of the reasons invoked later by Mr Kagame (then Vice-President) was to destroy the 
ex-Rwandan forces (FAR) and militias in Zaire”687 (now DRC) and this because they had been 
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using Zaire as a support base to attack and selectively kill people belonging to the Tutsi ethnic 
group in Rwanda. This use of force was heavily criticized not necessarily for the illegality of use 
of force but mainly for the alleged international crimes during the operations.688 Not much has 
been debated on whether the justification to suppress acts of genocide could be used as a legal 
ground for the operations. This is probably because no clear claim was made to justify the 
operations within the ambit of the Genocide Convention and other international sources on the 
prevention of genocide. This makes it difficult to make an argument that the attacks on a 
genocidal band/rebel group in another state can be justified within the combination of article 51 
of the Charter and article I of the Genocide Convention. The case DRC v. Rwanda which 
included the violation of the rule on the prohibition of use of force did not reach the merit stage. 
Had it reached it, it could have probably compelled the ICJ to give an interpretation on that and 
this could have presumably advanced this area. The ICJ did give its position in the case DRC v. 
Uganda that Uganda (which was ally with Rwanda in that war) had violated international law 
with regards to the rules on the prohibition of use of force despite its argument that it was 
preventing rebels from attacking Uganda using Congolese territory.689 However, since Uganda 
did not have such a heavy claim (genocide), this cannot serve to draw a conclusion that the use 
of force in such a case is absolutely outside the Charter of the UN, read together with the 
Genocide Convention. 
If it was true that the bands were committing genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, the latter 
could have probably argued that it was preventing its people from it by stopping the bands from 
continuing those acts. Whether this could have been convincing enough is not sure. The 
“approximate application” principle may presumably be useful in this situation. In the 
Gabcikovo Nagymaros Dams case, Slovakia invoked a principle that it described as the 
“approximate application”,690 in justifying countermeasures against Hungary after the latter had 
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violated the treaty between them. It was referring to what had been expressed by Judge Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht in the 1950s as follows: 
"it is a sound principle of law that whenever a legal instrument of continuing validity 
cannot be applied literally owing to the conduct of one of the parties, it must, without 
allowing that party to take advantage of its own conduct, be applied in a way 
approximating most closely to its primary object. To do that is to interpret and to give 
effect to the instrument - not to change it.691  
Though one would say that this principle would be an option to be relied on while acting to 
dismantle genocidal bands in applying the Charter of the UN and the Genocide Convention; its 
legality is not guaranteed. The Court also avoided giving an opinion on it in the said case. It did 
neither acknowledge that this principle existed nor did it say that it did not.692 Yet, it could be a 
good path to be explored and exploited in the future.693 Since not much has been done so far to 
clarify this area, these uncertainties of  international law may constitute at the same time an 
obstacle to the prevention of genocide and a danger in general because it may make some 
territorial states, in order to defend themselves against a threat of future genocide from other 
states (or rebels supported by them), take the law into their own hands by taking action against 
other states as a preventive measure which, though this may prevent an imminent genocide 
against its population,  it may cause other deaths in the concerned state(s) and may not remove 
the danger of genocide in future.  
It is possible to say that to date international law is still unclear on how genocide can be 
prevented in the situations discussed above. The mainstream among international lawyers is that 
using force is only accepted where it is clear that a band is sent or is acting on behalf of a state to 
attack another. Whether this applies to a situation where the attack aims at committing genocide 
is not yet clearly explored. Yet, given the seriousness of the peril, self-defence should be justified 
even in case of passive involvement or inability to prevent the band from using its territory to 
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commit genocide in a territorial state. In such a case however, there should be a need of putting 
in place some railings in order to avoid that there be abuse.  
4.3. Preliminary conclusions 
Whatever the challenges, it is possible to argue that international law does not only obligate 
territorial states to prevent genocide before it starts but also to continue after the onset of it in 
order to suppress the on-going acts of genocide regardless of where they emanate from. This is 
done through the legal means discussed in this section even though not all are promising because 
of the uncertainties or ineffectiveness of some rules of international law. Here again, the 
challenge of the lack of monitoring mechanism is serious at this level because there may be 
uncertainties on whether or not what is going on constitutes acts of genocide. International and 
national monitoring mechanisms would be useful to authoritatively determine this and put a 
pressure on the territorial state concerned to comply with its obligation to prevent genocide. 
5. Some challenges common to the prevention at the three levels and how 
they should be overcome  
All these categories of measures face some common big challenges. First, for the measures to be 
enforced, territorial state’s institutions need to be independent from each other in order for 
example to impose sanctions against another where applicable. The legislation may have 
provided for that independence but if a territorial state turns out to be characterised by 
authoritarianism, this independence might be altered at this level. In that case, the measures 
might be of little significance. The way this can be overcome may depend on how the second 
challenge may be dealt with.  
The second challenge is that there is no coordination of preventive measures in these categories. 
For instance there is no monitoring body that could establish a link between these measures and 
the prevention of genocide. It has been noticed earlier in this work that the Genocide Convention 
did not expressly obligate states to create national mechanisms for the prevention of genocide. It 
was argued however that nothing would preclude states from creating one in complying with the 
obligation to prevent genocide because it may be essential for the prevention. In other words, 
creating that national mechanism (a national independent body) is consistent with the Genocide 




help in the follow-up of how the prevention of genocide is being implemented. However, since 
this is not expressly provided for in the Genocide Convention, its likelihood has low chances 
because not every state (if any) would necessarily interpret article I of the Genocide Convention 
in this way. The fact that it is not provided may be in fact a good excuse for many unwilling 
states.  
The third challenge is that, even if a state would create this national mechanism, it is not clear 
where it would report on the international level. The Genocide Convention did not create any 
international body to which a national mechanism would report a situation of failure to enforce 
preventive measures by states.  Yet, some other conventions on prevention that are already 
explained in chapter two of this work can serve as a good example for the Genocide Convention 
as well. Indeed, one of the good examples may be about the development of the laws on the 
prevention of torture.  In fact, the Convention Against Torture not only obligated states to 
prevent it694 but its additional (optional) protocol came to supplement it by obligating states to 
set up independent national preventive mechanism to undertake regular visits to places where 
people are deprived of their liberty, in order to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.695 Likewise, a monitoring mechanism has been provided for 
on the European696 and American697 levels. Though it does not create a national preventive 
mechanism as such but it has a system of regular visits that is a good preventive way to deter the 
occurrence of torture.  
It may be argued that following the example of torture at the international level with regard to 
national and international mechanisms, these mechanisms would help to resolve the uncertainties 
and other obstacles surrounding the prevention of genocide at this level. These mechanisms 
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would even develop guidelines on preventive measures in all fields.  The guidelines are essential 
to assess if a state is breaching its obligation under the Genocide Convention at each level and 
this is useful because states would then improve how they comply with their obligation to 
prevent genocide.  
Conclusion  
This chapter which aimed at investigating what the obligation to prevent genocide entails to 
territorial states argued that this obligation of states under existing international law first and 
foremost meant to obligate states to prevent genocide from being committed to their own 
population, i.e the people on their territory.  
With regard to the question on what this obligation entails to territorial states in concreto, it was 
argued that the effective way to prevent genocide by territorial states is to do it through three 
levels: primary, secondary and tertiary and that this coheres well with the Genocide Convention 
and international law in general. This is because prevention of genocide means to tackle all the 
factors and phases that are susceptible of leading to it. Measures at the primary level include 
enacting legislation as well as other measures that are necessary for the prevention of genocide 
such as administrative, political, educational, cultural, economic measures as well as any other 
measures that can be relevant for the prevention of genocide. This may include the establishment 
of relevant legal institutions and mechanisms with a mandate to monitor the implementation of 
the Genocide Convention through those different measures.  
At the secondary level, it was argued that measures include imposing penalties to people who 
commit some crimes like the incitement to hatred against a specific group of people or to 
discrimination of a specific group, persecution as act of crimes against humanity and the 
incitement to commit genocide. Punishing perpetrators of these crimes before genocide happens 
is complying with the obligation to prevent genocide and may indeed have a preventive effect. 
When territorial states have no control over the perpetrators of the said crimes it was shown how 
international law provides for means to punish them when the crime committed is an 
international one. And though the existing means have proven to be not very much promising 
because of the challenging system under which they are used, it was shown that their existence is 
already good sign from which they can be improved upon for the future. It was also shown that 




At the tertiary level, it was argued that the obligation to prevent genocide obligates territorial 
states to halt acts of genocide after its onset. This is because this obligation is continuous. It does 
not cease when the acts have commenced. States are obligated to put an end to those acts 
regardless of where they emanate from. 
It was demonstrated however that the fact that so far no institutions have been put in place to 
monitor the implementation of the obligation to prevent genocide by territorial states at all levels 
is a challenge to the effective prevention of genocide. Moreover, though it would be consistent 
with article I of the Genocide Convention for a state to create a national preventive mechanism to 
monitor this, it is not very much likely to happen. Unless the Genocide Convention is amended 
or an additional protocol is adopted to include a provision that creates both international and 
national monitoring mechanisms to follow-up the implementation of this obligation and to 
develop guidelines related to the measures to be taken, the prevention of genocide at all levels 
might continue to be difficult in the future.  
Furthermore, except where the threat of genocide comes from other parties than the territorial 
state itself, all these preventive measures discussed in this chapter would only make sense when 
the territorial state is in good faith, i.e when it does not plan or commit genocide itself. In fact, a 
state cannot be a killer and preventer at the same time. This raises the question to know how 
genocide can be prevented in a territorial state when this state is doing nothing to prevent the 
factors and risks of genocide in different phases from developing themselves, where there are 
signs that a given situation may lead to genocide, or that the state itself has a genocidal plan 
against its own population. As already mentioned above, the experience shows that most 
genocide are possible where territorial states are either perpetrators themselves, unwilling or 
unable to prevent it.698 Since it has been concluded that the prevention of genocide concern all 
states, it will be examined in concreto how other states can prevent genocide outside their 
territories. The extent to which international law requires and permit non-territorial states to 
prevent genocide will be examined. In fact, since the spirit in that convention seems to have been 
doing it through international cooperation,699 it is opportune to question or examine if it was 
meant by the Genocide Convention that States have the obligation not only to prevent genocide 
within their own territories but also beyond the limits of their territories (in other states) in order 
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Chap VI. Prevention of genocide by non-territorial states700 under 
international law  
Introduction 
This chapter will address the question what the obligation to prevent genocide means to non-
territorial states. Are they obligated to prevent genocide in territorial states? If so, from what 
moment are they entitled and/or required to do so? What is the impact of the geographic distance 
on prevention and what measures can the non-territorial states legally take?  
This chapter first discusses the territorial scope of the obligation to prevent genocide (section 
one) and the capacity of non-territorial states to prevent genocide outside their territories (section 
two).  Regardless of the conclusions in these sections, the three other sections will examine what 
international law permits and/or requires to non-territorial states to prevent genocide at the 
primary level (section 3), the secondary level (section 4) and at the tertiary level (section 5). The 
influence as one of the available means of non-territorial states to prevent genocide at all levels is 
also discussed (section 6). The final section (7) discusses the issue of coordination of the 
prevention of genocide at all levels. Except for section one and seven, for other sections the 
discussion will include an examination of the capacity of those non-territorial states to prevent 
genocide outside their territories. 
1. The territorial scope of the obligation to prevent genocide  
This section first confronts the obligation to prevent genocide with the principle of state 
sovereignty. It also discusses the ICJ ruling on the territorial scope of the obligation to prevent 
genocide. In both subsections, the aim is to answer the question whether state sovereignty may 
(not) constitute a barrier to the prevention of genocide by non-territorial states. 
1.1. Confronting the obligation to prevent genocide with state sovereignty 
Sovereignty is considered as one of the central pillars of international law.701 Numerous scholars 
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have written about its origin and scope. Apparently, there is no disagreement on the fact that the 
present foundations of international law with regard to sovereignty were shaped by agreements 
concluded by European states as part of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.702 After almost 30 
years of war, the supremacy of the sovereign authority of the state was established within a 
system of independent and equal units, as a way of establishing peace and order in Europe.703  
After the Second World War, the principle was introduced in the UN Charter. According to 
article 2 (1) of that Charter, the world organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all member states. In a subsequent ruling of the ICJ in Nicaragua case, this principle 
of State sovereignty was reaffirmed as being a principle under, not only the Charter of the UN 
but also customary international law which creates the duty of every State to respect the 
territorial sovereignty of other States.704  
State sovereignty denotes the competence, independence, and legal equality of states.705 It is 
normally used to encompass all matters in which each state is permitted by international law to 
decide and act without intrusions from other sovereign states which include the choice of 
political, economic, social, and cultural systems and the formulation of foreign policy.706 A 
sovereign state is empowered in international law to exercise exclusive and total jurisdiction 
within its territorial borders. Other states have the corresponding duty not to intervene in the 
internal affairs of a sovereign state.707 Sovereignty is a legal attribute of a territorially bounded 
political community enjoying full membership in the international system.708 This principle holds 
that states are not subject to the authority of any higher institution or principle and that the state 
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itself is the ultimate source of political authority within its territory.709  
On the other hand however, the same Charter which recognises this principle of state sovereignty 
also has among the goals of the UN, the promotion and encouragement of the respect of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. In that line, some subsequent conventions on human rights 
have created obligations whose nature may dictate either the reinterpretation of the concept of 
sovereignty for their application in some circumstances or may simply limit their application in 
case of the absolute sovereignty. One of those conventions is the Genocide Convention which 
creates the obligation to prevent genocide which, as it will be shown infra, is not limited by 
territory in its application. Then the question becomes how the prevention of genocide by non-
territorial states is possible if the principle of sovereignty excludes the interference of states in 
others’ internal affairs. It is now important to see how this obligation to prevent genocide has 
been confronted with this concept of sovereignty and in so doing it will be examined how this 
has been perceived from the early stage of the drafting process of the Genocide Convention and 
after its adoption.  
During the Lemkin’s struggle to draft a law and convince great powers to accept it so as to 
prevent and punish the crime of genocide, there have been some suggestions by scholars on the 
state sovereignty, some of them arguing that sovereignty should not be defined in the way to 
permit slaughter.710 Lemkin argued that the destruction of a people cannot be considered as a 
matter of internal affairs. He wrote: 
“It seems inconsistent with our concept of civilization that selling drugs to an individual 
is a matter of worldly concern, while gassing millions of human beings might be a 
problem of internal affairs”.711  
He said again that “the treaty on genocide would enshrine a new reality: states would no longer 
have the legal right to be left alone. Interference in a genocidal state’s internal affairs …was not 
only authorized but required by the convention”.712 Apparently, Lemkin predicted that 
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prevention of genocide could not easily be done without the involvement of states in other 
states” affairs. On the critique by the Soviet Union that no interference to sovereignty should be 
allowed, René Cassin responded: “The right of interference is here, it is here” he noted, “Why? 
Because we do not want a repetition of what happened in 1933, when Germany began to 
massacre its own nationals and everybody….bowed, saying “Thou art sovereign and master in 
thine own house”.713 Genocide can never be the exclusive internal concern of any country”, 
“wherever it occurs, it must concern the entire civilized world”.714 Clearly, these two eminent 
personalities known as fathers of the Genocide Convention and the UDHR respectively had the 
view that no state can invoke the principle of state sovereignty on issues related to genocide. 
Others have later argued on this issue. In the mid-1950s, Professor Hersh Lauterpacht said: 
“…Acts of commission or omission in respect of genocide are no longer, in any interpretation of 
the charter, considered to be a matter exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the state 
concerned”.715 
In the 1990s and especially during and after the two major genocidal conflicts since the 
Holocaust, the principle of state sovereignty has been even much more discussed. Proponents of 
the argument that states” obligation to prevent genocide extends outside their territories have 
contended that the principle of state sovereignty cannot be used by a state which plans to commit 
genocide or is committing it. For instance, during the conflict in the Balkans, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali then UN Secretary-General wrote in the Agenda for Peace that “respect for its fundamental 
sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress”.716 He continued that 
“the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never 
matched by reality.”717  
In 1996, Francis Deng et al. argued in their book on sovereignty that “a government that allows 
its citizens to suffering a vacuum of responsibility for moral leadership cannot claim sovereignty 
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in an effort to keep the outside world from stepping in to offer protection and assistance.”718 The 
authors added that sovereignty is not “merely the right to be undisturbed from without, but the 
responsibility to perform the tasks expected of an effective government,” and that the “right to 
inviolability should be regarded as lost…in response to its own inactivity or incapacity and to the 
unassuaged needs of its own people.”719  
Arguing in the same direction as these authors, W. Michael Reisman (referred to by the said 
authors) has made an interesting requalification of the principle of state sovereignty.720 He sees 
sovereignty as “popular sovereignty” and not “state sovereignty”.721 In explaining what it means, 
he argued that in modern international law, the sovereignty of people is what counts and not the 
metaphysical abstraction called the state. In the context of the international intervention in Haiti 
in 1991, he explained further  the popular sovereignty in question where he wondered that “if the 
purpose of coercion is to reinstate a de jure government elected in a free and fair election after it 
was ousted by a renegade military, whose sovereignty is being violated?, the military’s?722 
Hauke Brunkhorst has distinguished popular and state sovereignty and argued that popular 
sovereignty logically precedes state sovereignty.723 Georg Cavallar thinks that this idea of 
popular sovereignty was also in Kant’s mind where he was of the view that a state cannot be seen 
as a possession because “it is a society of people, which no one other than itself can command it 
or dispose of.”724 However, if it is true that Kant seemed to also accept the popular sovereignty, 
his explanation does not favour the interference in state’s matters. Cavallar refers to Kant’s three 
exceptional cases in which interference is justified: (1) in case of an actively inflicted injury 
(namely the first aggression), (2) in case of military preparations (giving rise to a right of 
anticipatory attack), and finally (3) by the potentia tremenda, or the alarming increase of a 
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neighbour’s power.725 Here it can be noticed that he appears to stick to the absolute state 
sovereignty as well by opposing any interference by other states in a state’s own business.726 He 
justifies this by specifying that states must not injure the moral personality of others.727 Cavallar 
explains that Kant’s notion of “moral” is understood as the opposite of physical and not of the 
immoral.728 Being a moral person, a state enjoys the autonomy attached to that status. Hegel’s 
view on this is similar to Kant’s, because he also considered a state as a moral being, capable of 
being autonomous (among other things).729 According to Cavallar, Kant’s argument is that since 
the international right should be based on the principle of equality, the latter is violated if one 
state claims the rights of interference that are denied to others.730 However, in the exceptions he 
gives, Kant bases his argument on the injury as being the only element that triggers any 
interference by injured states.731 His position was that internal affairs of one state do not violate 
the rights of neighbouring states,732 therefore give no right of interference in other states” 
internal affairs. 
Let me now confront two things in Kant’s justification to the prevention of genocide. First, he 
uses the argument that states cannot interfere in another state’s internal affairs because a state is a 
moral person that he equates with a natural or physical person since both enjoy a legal 
personality. Yet, he does not say how to deal with the situation where that moral person may 
want to eliminate natural persons of a given group. In fact, he does not show why he accepts only 
three exceptions. Also, this analogy (moral person and natural person) might weaken his 
argument more than it might strengthen it because when a natural person prepares himself to 
commit or is committing a crime, he might be prevented from completing it if the process of the 
commission of that crime gets to be known and is punished if he has completed it. Thus, his/her 
legal status does not protect him/her from being prevented from continuing or from being 
punished. So why then a moral person (state) with the legal personality as well, would not be 
prevented or punished when it does the same? This then weakens any reliance on the mere fact 
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that sovereignty of state is solely based on the status as a moral person regardless of its conduct. 
Secondly, the notion of injury as explained in Kant’s theory does not exclude any possibility to 
interfere in another state to prevent genocide at least more obviously by neighbouring states 
because genocide may cause serious injury to other states. For instance, as noted by Bruce 
Cronin, “genocide not only grossly abuses the victims; but it also tends to produce massive 
refugee flows, spawn cross-border guerrilla movements, and create tensions with neighbouring 
states.”733 The example of the consequences of the genocide in Rwanda to its neighbouring 
countries, especially to the Democratic Republic of Congo is telling. So, contrary to Kant’s 
position referred to by Cavallar, my view is that other states are injured not only in the three 
cases he gave. 
It can therefore be said that not only Kant’s arguments are not convincing if they are to be used 
to exclude interference in case of genocide, but also his reasoning did not support the idea behind 
the sovereignty as a “popular” one and not as a “state” one even if he seemed to prefer it. In the 
current status of international law, this reasoning might not find its place when it comes to 
genocide because as it was demonstrated earlier, genocide is a concern of all states and therefore 
all states are injured even when a state is committing genocide against its own people within its 
boundaries. Indeed it has been argued in literature that the prohibition of genocide is so 
fundamental that “the international community of States as a whole” is said to have recognized it 
as “peremptory” norms (jus cogens), subject neither to persistent objection nor to “derogation” 
(i.e., justification or excuse for non-performance).734  
However, while this argument might be valid (at least clearly) where a territorial state is already 
committing genocide it is doubtful whether it would necessarily be valid during the earlier 
phases of the process to genocide.  Georg Cavallar seems not to solve this problem when he 
argues that there is a primacy of the popular sovereignty because it is the united will of the 
people that matters and suggests that the interference is permissible even when it violates state 
sovereignty.735 This argument puts the will of the people above the sovereignty of the abstract 
state (“state” sovereignty). But the problem with it is not only that it does not solve the problem 
on whether the popular sovereignty would permit interference even at early phases of the process 
to genocide, but also it does not suggest any way to measure that an interference of other states 
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would be necessarily the will of the people concerned. Indeed, if for instance a state convinces 
the majority of its population to eliminate a minority group of its population, it is hard to argue 
that interference would be the will of the people of that country, unless the will would be that of 
people of other states (which would not necessarily be within the meaning of his argument).   
The solution to that may however be that genocide is a concern of all as noted above. Moreover, 
the argument that sovereignty should be taken as responsibility seems to be an intermediary and 
good argument in this regard and it supports the “popular sovereignty” while not requiring the 
condition of the will of the people of the state concerned. Amitai Etzioni noted that “sovereignty 
as responsibility means that the individual states are entitled to full sovereignty so long as they 
abide by the norms established by the international community.”736  
Apparently, it can be noticed that there is an overwhelming claim that State sovereignty is not a 
barrier to the prevention of genocide by non-territorial states. The analogous argument that “just 
as there is no absolute freedom for individual, there cannot be absolute sovereignty for the 
state,”737 is relevant. However, before reaching a final conclusion on the questions above it is 
first essential to see what has been the interpretation of the ICJ on this matter.   
1.2. The ICJ and the territorial scope of the obligation to prevent genocide  
As said earlier in this work, the wording of article I of the Genocide Convention shows that the 
Contracting Parties (states) have a direct obligation to prevent genocide.  Furthermore, it has 
been concluded earlier that the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm from which no 
derogation is permitted, and entails also an erga omnes (towards all) obligation of states.738 By 
their very nature, some obligations including those deriving from the outlawing of genocide are 
owed to the international community as a whole and therefore are concern of all states739 
(including non-parties to the Genocide Convention).  The question whether this character makes 
it obligatory to all states to prevent genocide outside their territories is already posed above. It is 
worth examining the ICJ interpretation of the obligation to prevent genocide to see whether it is 
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in line with the claim above that the obligation to prevent genocide dictates states to act beyond 
the limits of their territories and that therefore the principle of state sovereignty is not a barrier to 
that.  
The ICJ affirmed in its advisory opinion on the reservation to the Genocide Convention that the 
bases of this convention are “the moral and humanitarian principles”.740 The court reached this 
conclusion after having considered the origin of the Genocide Convention itself and the spirit 
with which it was adopted. It said:  
“The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to 
condemn and punish genocide as “a crime under international law” involving a denial of 
the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of 
mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and 
to the spirit and aims of the United Nations (Resolution 96 (I) of the General Assembly, 
December 11th 1946).  The first consequence arising from this conception is that the 
principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized 
nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation.  A second 
consequence is the universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the 
co-operation required “in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge”…741 
Furthermore, the court said that its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of 
certain human groups and on the other, to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of 
morality.742  It said: 
“In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they 
merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high 
purposes which are the raison d”être of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of 
this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the 
maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. The high ideals 
which inspired the Convention provide, by virtue of the common will of the parties, the 
foundation and measure of all its provisions.”743 
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More explicitly, on the question whether a state has the obligation to prevent genocide beyond its 
territory, the ICJ did mention in the Bosnia Genocide case that the obligation to prevent genocide 
is not limited by territory.744 It said: 
“The substantive obligations arising from Articles I and III are not on their face limited 
by territory. They apply to a State wherever it may be acting or may be able to act in 
ways appropriate to meeting the obligations in question.”745   
Does this really mean that states are obligated to prevent genocide everywhere? For instance 
does Norway have the obligation to prevent genocide in Madagascar and vice versa? Does Papua 
New Guinea have the obligation to prevent genocide in Guatemala, Chili in Sri Lanka, New 
Zealand in Tunisia, Lesotho in Syria and vice versa? Marko Milanovic argued in favour of the 
majority approach that can be understood to mean that “every state in the world has the duty to 
prevent any act of genocide, no matter where it might occur.”746 He argued that this approach 
came to support states’ tendency to read article I of the Genocide Convention broadly, i.e as not 
limiting the obligation to prevent genocide to territory.747 In support of his argument he referred 
to the example of what has been qualified as “matter of historical record” that “the US 
government was reluctant at the time to name the then on-going atrocities in Rwanda as genocide 
because that would have implied its obligation to prevent it.748  
In his separate opinion in the Serbia v Bosnia case Judge Tomka agrees also that “under Article I 
of the Genocide Convention the State does have an obligation to prevent genocide outside its 
territory” but only “to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction outside its territory, or exercises 
control over certain persons in their activities abroad”.749 He opposed the reasoning of the  
majority of judges that found the respondent state responsible for the breach of the obligation to 
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prevent genocide in Srebrenica because the respondent did neither exercise jurisdiction750 of 
Srebrenica nor was it established that it exercised control751 over the perpetrators who conducted 
these killings in that area.752 In other words, for Tomka, the elements of exercise of jurisdiction 
and exercise of control are essential for a state to be bound by the obligation to prevent genocide 
outside its territory. Marko Milanovic criticized Tomka’s approach for having neither “support in 
the text of the treaty nor is it based on some more general legal principle, nor, for that matter, can 
the states parties” intent to that effect be inferred from the preparatory work to the 
convention.”753  
Although the ICJ did not support Tomka’s criteria, it did suggest others. In fact, the court made it 
clear that the obligation under article one of the Genocide Convention “is not limited by 
territory” and that it applies to a “state wherever it may be acting or may be able to act”. This 
wording suggests that non-territorial states have the obligation to prevent genocide, wherever it 
might happen,754 within the confines of its ability and influence.755 In preventing genocide, states 
are not limited by their borders and this is not a violation of the principle of sovereignty because 
nowhere has this principle been understood as justifying acts of genocide. This teleological 
interpretation of article I of the Genocide Convention by the court is convincing and consistent 
with the logic and spirit behind the prohibition of genocide. The court authoritatively supported 
arguments against the interpretation by many states leaders that sovereignty protects them from 
any interference from outside.756 Reisman rightly observed that “those who yearn for “the good 
old days” and continue to trumpet terms like “sovereignty” without relating them to the human 
rights conditions within the states under discussion do more than commit an anachronism”.757 
There is thus a possibility for a state to fulfil this obligation anywhere as long as it has the means 
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to do so and as long as the actions are within what is permitted by international law.758 The 
capacity of non-territorial states to prevent genocide in other states will be discussed next. 
2. Capacity of non-territorial states to prevent genocide outside their 
territories 
The ICJ noted some parameters that may be taken into consideration in the assessment of the 
capacity of states to prevent genocide outside their territories.”759 It wrote:  
“this capacity itself depends, among other things, on the geographical distance of the 
State concerned from the scene of the events, and on the strength of the political links, as 
well as links of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the main actors in 
the events”.760 
It added that:   
“The State’s capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear 
that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a 
State’s capacity to influence may vary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis 
the situations and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide”.761  
There are four criteria from this ruling of the court to assess if a state has the capacity or means 
to prevent genocide outside its territory. The first criterion is the geographical distance of the 
state concerned from the scene of the events.762  The second is the strength of the political links 
between the state concerned and the persons likely to commit genocide.763 The third criterion 
concerns the links of all other kinds between the authorities of that State and the main actors in 
the events.764 The Court added as fourth criterion that the State’s capacity must also be assessed 
by legal criteria.765  
With regard to the first criterion, the court did not indicate how distance should be used to assess 
the capacity. One of the problems of this criterion is that it might be understood that those states 
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that are near the scene of the events have greater capacity to effectively prevent genocide. For 
instance, it may lead to the understanding that Serbia had the obligation to prevent genocide in 
Bosnia because it was geographically closer to it. This understanding may therefore exclude the 
possibility that other states geographically far from Bosnia would be bound by this obligation. 
Likewise, it may be understood that states like Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and DRC were 
obligated to prevent genocide in Rwanda whereas other states like the US, UK, France etc, that 
are geographically far from the scene of the events are exonerated from that obligation. Yet, the 
capacity to prevent may be absent even for a state close to the scene of events and may exist 
between a state concerned and the actors of genocide in a place very far from the scene of the 
events. For instance, France might have been in the position to effectively influence the 
government of Rwanda before and during the genocide of 1994. Yet it is thousands of miles 
away from Rwanda. This may have not been the same with some states neighbouring Rwanda. 
So, the geographic distance may indeed be important but not necessarily the most determinant. 
Thus, that criterion may be relevant, but it needs to be supplemented by other criteria. 
The second criterion on the strength of the political links needs also some considerations. The 
Court simply mentioned this criterion without any indication on the degree of that strength. The 
subsequent literature has not (yet) been able to indicate how strong the political links need to be 
for a state to exercise the obligation to prevent genocide. It is generally agreed for instance that 
France had the capacity to prevent genocide in Rwanda before the genocide and during it 
because of the then strength of the political links between it and Rwanda.766 However, there is no 
clear indication whether this would suffice to meet the court’s threshold of “strength of the 
political links”. Also, for other states whose influence was less than of France, it is not clear 
whether the court’s threshold would exclude or include them. Furthermore, the court itself made 
it difficult and confusing where it states in the same paragraph that the state concerned needs not 
have the power to prevent genocide, but to use its efforts to prevent genocide no matter what 
may be the result. Since according to the court, efforts of only one state may be insufficient to 
produce the result of averting the commission of genocide,767 it found that there was a need of 
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combined efforts of several states, each complying with its obligation to prevent, in order to 
achieve the result (avert the genocide).768 It may thus be arguably questionable whether it was 
necessary to use the qualification “strong” if combined efforts by several states were envisaged, 
because even the links that are not strong may still play a role when combined with others. In 
that way, where political links exist, not only is it difficult to quantify it, but also the obligation 
should not be limited to only strong political links.  
The third criterion is much more encompassing since it concerns the “links of all other kinds 
between the authorities of that State and the main actors in the events”. The court did not 
elaborate, and the literature avoided to say much either, limiting itself to criticizing the 
vagueness of all these criteria in general.769 Yet, it is basically accepted that the links could be 
more than political; they may include others such as those of military, diplomatic, cultural, 
economic nature.  
The fourth criterion that the capacity must also be assessed by legal criteria”770 is also to a large 
extent unclear; in particular as the court added that “since it is clear that every state may only act 
within the limits permitted by international law”.771 It has been assumed that the court’s intent 
was to stress the “limits” imposed by international law on the actions of states.772 The Court 
deliberately avoided to go further because it would have perhaps compelled it to rule on means 
that could for instance have, as Gattini has noted, included the question on “the admissibility of a 
humanitarian intervention without UN mandate to prevent an incumbent genocide”,773 as a 
means to prevent genocide.774 Obviously as Gattini has noted, the Court was not willing to 
elaborate upon this matter in the context of the present judgment”.775  
The test to measure the capacity of non-territorial states to prevent genocide outside their 
territories is complicated. In fact, not only there is a question of what kind of capacity or ability 
is needed for a non-territorial state to prevent genocide outside its borders and how far it can go 
(geographical distance) in order to prevent genocide outside its borders, but also the question of 
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what actions are permitted by international law for a state to prevent genocide outside its borders. 
It will be suggested below that depending on the phase of the process to genocide, the criteria to 
determine what non-territorial states should or may do to prevent genocide elsewhere may be 
different. The next sections will attempt to translate these criteria into  concrete measures for the 
prevention of genocide at each level. 
3. Primary prevention of genocide by non-territorial states: What 
actions are permitted and required in international law, with what 
means and to which distance?  
It was argued in the previous section that the obligation to prevent genocide by non-territorial 
states is not limited by territory as long as they have the capacity to do so. The criteria to 
measure that capacity include the geographic distance and political links. This section will 
examine the preventive measures at the primary level. Indeed, since neither article I of the 
Genocide Convention nor the ruling of the ICJ showed specific measures to be taken by non-
territorial states at the primary level in order to comply with their obligation to prevent genocide 
outside their territories, it is worth discussing this in order to indicate what those preventive 
measures are or could be. Legal scholars who have written after the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention or after the ruling of the court have hardly addressed this issue. 
There is a need to analyse some provisions of the Genocide Convention which indicate some 
preventive measures which, to some extent, can be interpreted to imply the prevention of 
genocide outside a state’s territory. For instance, article V states that “The Contracting Parties 
undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to 
give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective 
penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.” Not 
much has been commented on this article to specify what kind of legislation is necessary to give 
effect to the prevention of genocide, nor does this article make a distinction between measures 
that can be taken by territorial states and those to be taken by non-territorial states. This section 
discusses what legislation should be adopted by non-territorial states that can have effect on the 
prevention of genocide in other states (3.1). Since other measures than legislation can be possible 




3.1. Necessary legislation that may have effect on the prevention of genocide in other 
states 
Necessary legislation was understood in chapter V as that which addresses all factors that, if not 
avoided at this level might create a favourable environment for the outbreak of conflict that may 
on its turn, lead to genocide. The legislation may concern various factors but it is impossible to 
discuss each of them here. I will limit myself to some examples which include legislation that 
penalises behaviours that may lead to genocide and genocide itself and provides effective 
penalties for persons guilty of them (3.1.1). It also includes legislation that creates a regime that 
enables the prosecution and punishment of those crimes committed anywhere (3.1.2). 
3.1.1. Legislation that penalises behaviours that may lead to genocide and genocide itself 
It was argued before that legislation that penalises behaviour such as the incitement to hatred or 
to discrimination, persecution as a crime against humanity, incitement to commit genocide etc, is 
necessary to give effect to the provisions of the Genocide Convention.776 This legislation may 
aim at punishing such behaviour in order to cover three situations. The first is where they may be 
committed from a non-territorial state by either its nationals or other nationals but against a given 
territorial state. Secondly, they may also be committed from territorial state by its nationals or 
other nationals aiming at that territorial state and they are living in that territorial state. Thirdly, 
they may be committed from the territorial state against it and by its nationals or by other 
nationals who later go to live in a non-territorial state. Given the fact that penalising them may 
have effect on the prevention of genocide as already argued earlier, it could be said that non-
territorial states would be obligated to adopt such legislation especially also because they are not 
limited by territory in taking preventive measures. The problem is that criminalising them may 
be irrelevant if there is no legislation that creates a mechanism to apprehend them and punish 
them. This will be discussed below. 
3.1.2. Legislation that creates a mechanism to prosecute and punish genocide related crimes 
committed outside the prosecuting state 
While there may not be much difficulty to provide for a mechanism that enables non-territorial 
states to punish individuals who commit those crimes in their territories but against other states, 
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there is a problem with legislation that may give states the jurisdiction to prosecute and punish 
those who have committed those crimes in other states. According to article VI of the Genocide 
Convention “persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III 
shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, 
or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting 
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”777 This article appears to limit the jurisdiction 
to try genocide perpetrators to states in which genocide has been committed as well as to an 
international tribunal. If that were the case it would be a problem because then the state in which 
the genocide has been committed would be the only one to have jurisdiction on those responsible 
of it even when the state is the perpetrator itself.  
To be able to assess whether this is correct, the development on this in international law needs to 
be examined. One year after the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the four Geneva 
conventions were adopted. Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 of these conventions (respectively) 
provided inter alia the obligation to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal 
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches, the 
obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed such grave breaches and to bring 
them before their own courts regardless of their nationality.778 However, “grave breaches to 
which the preceding articles relate shall be those involving any of the following acts, if 
committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or 
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”779 Genocide is not listed as one of 
these grave breaches under which states would base their competence to adopt legislation that 
grant them the universal jurisdiction to prosecute and punish the suspects of these grave breaches 
regardless of their nationality. However, subsequent developments in international law suggest 
an expansion of the jurisdictional bases for prosecuting genocide to include the universality 
principle as evidenced in literature and case-law.780 The principle of universal jurisdiction is in 
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fact classically defined as “a legal principle allowing or requiring a state to bring criminal 
proceedings in respect of certain crimes irrespective of the location of the crime and the 
nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”781 The rationale behind it is broader: “it is based on 
the notion that certain crimes are so harmful to international interests that states are entitled and 
even obligated to bring proceedings against the perpetrator, regardless of the location of the 
crime and the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”782 Those crimes are so grave that they 
harm the entire international community. 783 The principle allows states to punish international 
crimes committed by anybody, anywhere in the world.784 Lemkin already referred to it even 
before the adoption of the Genocide Convention (but after the first UN General Assembly 
resolution on genocide).785 He noted that “the offenders are punishable in a given country even if 
the crime is committed abroad,” affirming that “this principle is the symbol and practical 
application of the higher doctrine of moral and legal solidarity in protecting the basic values of 
our civilization.”786   
It has been argued in literature that “the re-conceptualization of the basis for national jurisdiction 
over criminal violations of the customary laws of war had a knock-on effect for genocide and 
crimes against humanity.” 787 Hence, “despite the merely territorial jurisdiction mandated by 
Article VI of the Genocide Convention only a year before the grave breaches regime was 
established, genocide and crimes against humanity also came widely to be characterized as 
punishable on the basis of universal jurisdiction, by mere virtue of the fact that they were 
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recognized as crimes under customary international law.”788 The case-law on this has also 
provided considerable evidence. For instance, in the case Adolf Eichman, the District court of 
Jerusalem noted that:  
In the light of the repeated affirmation by the United Nations in the 1946 Assembly 
resolution and in the 1948 Convention, and in the light of the Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice, there is no doubt that genocide has been recognized as a 
crime under international law in the full legal meaning of this term, ex tunc; that is to say: 
The crimes of genocide committed against the Jewish People and other peoples were 
crimes under international law. It follows, therefore, in the light of the acknowledged 
principles of international law, that the jurisdiction to try such crimes is universal.789  
That Court added that despite the fact that the Genocide Convention had not expressly provided 
for the principle of universal jurisdiction, nothing in this convention could lead it to deduce any 
rule against the principle of universality of jurisdiction with respect to the crime in question.790 
As that court noted, the universality of jurisdiction is not based on Israel law on genocide or on 
the interpretation of Article 6 of the Genocide Convention, but “derives from the basic nature of 
the crime of genocide as a crime of utmost gravity under international law.”791 The Court based 
its argument on the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention. It noted that “had Article 6 
meant to provide that those accused of genocide shall be tried only by “a competent court of the 
country in whose territory the crime was committed” (or by an “international court” which has 
not been constituted), then that article would have foiled the very object of the Convention “to 
prevent genocide and inflict punishment therefor”.792 
Recent developments have added force to the Eichmann precedent regarding the prosecution of 
genocide under the universality principle.793 Though the two ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals (ICTY, ICTR) did not have universal jurisdiction themselves, judges from both 
tribunals have indicated evidence of the existence of universal jurisdiction for genocide. The 
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notable examples are the Tadić  and Ntuyahaga cases. While in the former, the ICTY asserted 
that “universal jurisdiction [is] nowadays acknowledged in the case of international crimes,”794 
in the latter, the ICTR held that universal jurisdiction exists for the prosecution of genocide.795 
More recent practice of States has also shown that, due to the gravity of the core crimes of 
international law (genocide being considered by many as the gravest), international law allows 
states to prosecute suspects of international crimes. Based on their laws that give them such a 
competence, some states have prosecuted and punished Rwandans who have committed 
genocide and related international crimes in Rwanda and fled to their territories.796 The place to 
discuss the implementation of the obligation to prosecute on the basis of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction is not here. It should be said however that, even for some other states 
where it has been impossible to prosecute Rwandan fugitives on their territories for genocide, it 
was mainly because of the lack of legislation that punishes genocide not because of lack of 
jurisdiction to prosecute foreign persons who have committed crimes abroad. For instance, 
Fulgence Niyonteze arrested in 1996 in Switzerland could only stand for trial for murder, 
incitement to murder and serious violations of the laws of war and not for genocide because this 
crime was introduced in the Swiss Penal code later in December 2000.797 Likewise, in the UK, 
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genocide and related crimes were not punishable under the municipal law at the time the 
genocide in Rwanda was committed.798   
In sum, this development may lead to a claim that there is a customary international law that 
allows non-territorial states to have jurisdiction in respect of certain crimes irrespective of the 
location of their commission.  And I find no contradiction of this international customary rule 
with article VI of the Genocide Convention because the latter did not mean to be exhaustive. 
Therefore, if states are permitted to provide for universal jurisdiction as a necessary legislation 
for the prevention of genocide it can be argued that it should be understood that non-territorial 
states are obligated to provide for that in complying with their obligation to prevent genocide. 
The question that this conclusion may raise is whether enacting legislation that penalises acts that 
may not constitute international crimes is also permitted and required in international law if they 
may have effect on the prevention of genocide in other states. The answer to this question can be 
deduced from the whole line of arguments above. Indeed, states should penalise anything they 
deem necessary for the prevention of genocide beyond their boundaries. However, for 
behaviours that may not constitute international crimes, it is safe to say that it is not (yet) clear 
whether non-territorial states are required to provide for the universal jurisdiction on them.799  
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The capacity (means and the distance) are not an issue because there is no special means a state 
needs for it to enact legislation related to genocide. It is done the same way as for legislation on 
other things.  And if it does enact a law that criminalises genocide and related crimes and that 
law gives the competence to courts to punish all suspects regardless of where they have 
committed genocide and related crimes (and regardless their nationality), there is no point to 
examine the distance to which these laws may apply. The obligation is to provide for the said 
legislation that can have effect on any state regardless of the geographical distance.  
Finally, it should be warned that though the enactment of the legislation that may give effect to 
the prevention of genocide is necessary, the exact portion of preventive effect cannot be 
measured. And, given the complexity of the process to genocide, none can say that the legislation 
itself is the only measure to be taken by non-territorial states in order to prevent genocide beyond 
their territorial boundaries. Other possible preventive measures may be necessary. 
3.2. Other measures 
The question that needs consideration here is whether, in addition to the legislative measures, 
non-territorial states are permitted and required (obligated) to take other measures in relation to 
the prevention of genocide outside their territories.  
In answering this question, it is essential to first indicate what kind of other measures it is 
referred to here. Other measures may be for instance political, social-economic, cultural, 
educational as well as those related to security. While political measures may be any kind of 
measure that aims at fostering democracy in other states, socio-economic measures may be any 
kind of measures that aim at promoting the welfare of the population and the equitable 
enjoyment and sharing of resources among groups in other states. Educational measures may 
concern those related to eradicating illiteracy and to promoting the tolerance of differences and 
the peaceful coexistence among different groups. They may consist of teaching children from 
their early age about lines that they may not cross in the way they treat each other. 
It is not possible nor is it even necessary to enumerate each and every measure falling in these 
categories. What is more important for the purpose of this work is rather the legal regime under 








which states are permitted and required to take those measures. Two situations need to be 
distinguished. The first situation is where measures can be taken by non-territorial state intended 
to have effect on other states without necessarily having to engage in action within the territory 
of these other states. The second is where these measures need actions in other states.  
The measures in the first situation may be for instance the formulation of a foreign policy that 
aims at countering forces that may cause tension among groups in other states that may lead to 
genocidal conflicts. This means that the policy may demand the leaders of the non-territorial 
state to refrain from being involved in activities that would fuel any tension between groups in 
other states. Each state is free (permitted) to adopt its own policy in that regard. Does this also 
mean that each state is required (obligated) to formulate policies in order to comply with the 
rules on the prevention of genocide? There is no explicit rule requiring doing so. However, if we 
accept the ICJ ruling which interpreted the obligation to prevent genocide as requiring states to 
put in place all means available to them in order to prevent genocide, it can be argued that 
adopting a foreign policy that counters the emergence of tension between groups (ethnic, 
religious…) in other states is required. The weakness of this argument may be however the 
vagueness of foreign policy measures that would be required. It is not clear how such policy may 
look like because it may depend on the circumstances and the relations between the non-
territorial state and the territorial state concerned.800  As for the capacity and distance, they do 
not pose problem because there is no special means needed to comply with this obligation. Once 
such a foreign policy is put in place the distance does not matter because it may have effect to 
any state (at a close or far distance). 
The second situation is where the nature of the preventive measures in other states may require 
performing actions there. As already mentioned, at the primary level these measures may support 
reform at the political (e.g: fostering democracy in other states), educational (eradicating 
illiteracy and formulate a curricula that are favourable to the mutual respect between groups and 
that promote the acceptance of diversity from the young age), socio-economic (welfare of the 
population and the increase of the economic capacity of the state and the equitable sharing of 
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resources among the population), security (cooperation in the capacity building in the security 
sector: the military and the police) level. The question here is not whether states are permitted to 
cooperate with others in the mentioned areas (and others not mentioned), but rather whether in 
complying with the obligation to prevent genocide they are required to do so if this can have 
effect on the prevention of genocide in other states.  
It has been already said that the obligation to prevent genocide entails to take any measures that 
can have effect to the avoidance of genocide. This was perfectly so for the prevention of 
genocide by territorial states on their own territories. Indeed, since the rights said “derive from 
the inherent dignity of the human person”,801  states inherently owe to their populations measures 
(political, socio- economic, educational…) in order to protect and ensure their welfare.802 In 
doing so, it may need and may seek help from other states.803 However, it is not clear how the 
obligation to prevent genocide would entail the obligation to provide assistance to the state in 
need in whatever field.  This conflict may make that obligation inapplicable.  
It is nonetheless relevant to say that non-territorial states are permitted to cooperate with 
territorial states with the intention to prevent genocide by employing those means (assist others) 
but this is not the same as being required to do so. Being permitted however is not useless for the 
prevention of genocide because territorial states which are committed (willing) to preventing 
genocide should seek assistance to other states to prevent genocide. Even supposing that this 
obligation would be there, it would hardly be assessable (and achievable) because of the 
indeterminacy of the capacity of states to help and to which distance.   
3.3. Preliminary Conclusions 
To conclude this section, it is argued that prevention of genocide at this level by non-territorial 
states is very essential since it may contribute to the creation or maintenance of a stable/peaceful 
environment that gives no chance of development of factors and phases that may lead to 
genocide. States are both permitted and required (obligated) to take preventive measures at that 
level. Measures constitute the legislation which may include penalising behaviours that may lead 
to genocide and genocide itself. Also, the legislation should create a mechanism that enables 
them to apprehend the perpetrators.  
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With regard to other measures that may be required by the obligation to prevent genocide, this 
section argues that non-territorial states are obligated to adopt policies that counter their leaders 
from engaging in activities that might fuel hatred among groups in other states. Also, states are 
permitted to take actions in assisting other states to build a stable environment that does not 
favour the development of the process to genocide. However, the conflict between the obligation 
to prevent genocide and the lack of obligation to provide aid to other states makes it hard to 
argue that at this primary level, states are obligated to provide assistance to others in discharging 
with the obligation to prevent genocide.  
When prevention at this level is successful, it makes further actions at a next level unnecessary. 
When it is not, there is need of other measures at further level.  
4. Secondary prevention of genocide by non-territorial states: What 
actions are permitted in international law with what means and to which 
distance?  
This section examines what is permitted to and required of states in preventing genocide in other 
states at the secondary level i.e “when situational factors predictive of genocide or other forms of 
mass violence are present.”804 It is a period in which for example there is a totalitarian regime in 
a certain state that violates human rights of its population and especially discriminates a given 
group (religious, ethnic, racial…). At this level certain crimes mostly targeting an identifiable 
group may have been committed and remained unpunished because the regime is the perpetrator 
itself or is condoning them or is unable to punish the perpetrators due to whatever reasons. It will 
thus be examined what non-territorial states are permitted and required to do in order to comply 
with their obligation to prevent that the situation escalates to genocide in the territorial state 
concerned.  In doing so, the judicial measures (4.1), as well as various other measures (4.2) will 
be discussed. 
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4.1. Judicial measures for the prevention of genocide by non-territorial states  
The measures that will be discussed here are those related to the application of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction by non-territorial states on crimes that may lead to genocide and those 
related to the referral of situations to the ICC by non-territorial states. 
4.1.1. Application of the principle of universal jurisdiction in the prevention of genocide 
Some examples of behaviour that may lead to genocide have been given and discussed in the 
previous chapter. In the previous section it was argued that states are permitted and required to 
penalise such behaviour and to provide for the exercise of jurisdiction regardless of the 
nationality of the suspects. This is expressed in the universal jurisdiction principle. This 
concerned the primary level. Problems arise when it comes to the enforcement of those laws at 
the secondary level by non-territorial states.  
In application of the universal jurisdiction principle at the secondary level, states shall be under 
the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be 
committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, 
before its own courts or extradite such persons.805  It is an encompassing measure that may allow 
states to prevent genocide outside their territories by punishing perpetrators of international 
crimes that are susceptible of leading to genocide. Such crimes that need to be punished at this 
level may include the incitement to commit genocide, hate speech which may qualify as one of 
the acts of crimes against humanity (persecution) or conspiracy to commit genocide.806 Whether 
punishing these crimes is necessary for the prevention of genocide is no longer a question 
because it is already answered in the affirmative in the previous chapter.807 The question is 
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however whether how it works in reality may contribute to the prevention of genocide at the 
secondary level.  
As seen earlier, the principle of universal jurisdiction is limited to international crimes. This 
means that other crimes that may lead to genocide such as the incitement to hatred or to 
discrimination are not covered by the universal jurisdiction and therefore hardly punishable by 
non-territorial states at the secondary level.808 
Furthermore, as shown earlier, not all states have put the principle of universal jurisdiction in 
their legislation (yet, not all states have a legal system that makes international law automatically 
applicable at the domestic law). This makes it impossible for some states to punish international 
crimes at the secondary level. 
The reality shows that there is no uniform way to apply this principle. There is a wide discretion 
in how states exercise this principle. In fact, even for those states which have put this principle in 
their legislation, some of them have limited its scope and this has negative impact on the effect 
of the principle on the prevention of genocide at the secondary level. For instance, France limits 
its exercise of jurisdiction to crimes committed abroad to the situation where those crimes have 
been committed by or against French nationals,809 on some international crimes,810 and on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
prevention may involve making certain acts punishable which do not themselves constitute genocide, for example, 
certain material acts preparatory to genocide, an agreement or a conspiracy with a view to committing genocide, or 
systematic propaganda inciting to hatred and thus likely to lead to genocide”. It follows that the idea was not limited 
to making such an act punishable but also to punish it when it is committed even (and especially) before genocide 
occurs in order for it to serve its prevention purpose. For more about the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide 
and the incitement to commit genocide see also Ohlin, Jens David, “Attempt, Conspiracy, and Incitement to Commit 
Genocide”, Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 24. 2009, pp. 174-339. 
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situation when crimes committed fall within the jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR.811 
Likewise, under the Dutch International Criminal act of 2003, universal jurisdiction over some 
international crimes applies to anyone who commits those crimes only if he is present in the 
Netherlands or the crimes are committed against or by a Dutch national.812 These crimes include 
public and direct incitement to commit genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide.813 This 
seems to link the prosecution to certain interests of the non-territorial state concerned.814 One of 
the consequences of this is that states may only exercise jurisdiction during a post-genocide 
period and not before genocide is committed.815 And though this can still have some preventive 
effects, it is for preventing the reoccurrence of genocide. Since the prohibition of genocide 
                                                          
811
 Law No. 96-432 of 22 May 1996 adapting French legislation to the provisions of United Nations Security 
Council resolution 955 establishing an International Criminal Tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for acts of 
genocide or other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in 1994 in Rwanda and, for 
Rwandan citizens, in neighbouring States, available at <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais> (visited on 17 
June 2012). 
812
 See Section 2.1 of the Act of 19 June 2003 containing rules concerning serious violations of international 
humanitarian law (International Crimes Act), available at <http://www.universaljurisdiction.org/national-
laws/netherlands> (visited on 17 June 2012). But even for those who may be found in the Netherlands there has 
been limitation that International Crimes Act of 2003 did not solve. This Act gave Dutch courts the universal 
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide committed outside the NL but only over acts constituting genocide 
committed after that legislation was passed in 2003. The case of Joseph Mpambara who was suspected for having 
committed genocide in Rwanda (among other crimes) is a good illustration for this. The District court in the Hague 
found that it had no jurisdiction in that matter because as it noted,  it appeared “from the foregoing that in the period 
of the facts described in the summons, there were no legal provisions applicable - nor in the Penal Code, nor in the 
Act Implementing the Genocide Convention, nor in the Act on criminal law in time of war, nor in any other Act or 
regulation - which provided for jurisdiction with respect to genocide committed by a non-Dutch national abroad, if 
this fact was not committed against or with regard to a Dutch national or a Dutch legal person or if any Dutch 
interest was not impaired or could be impaired”( see para. 26 of its judgment of July 2007).  The Appeal Court in the 
Hague (December 2007) as well as the Supreme Court (October 2008) respectively confirmed this. See the 
judgments of the three courts available at <http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad/Supreme-
court/Summaries-of-some-important-rulings-of-the-Supreme-Court/Pages/Summary-judgment-on-jurisdiction-in-
genocide-case-Rwanda.aspx> (visited on 17 June 2012).  It must be precised that he was later charged of war crimes 
and torture but only convicted of torture and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment by the District court in the 
Hague (2009). The Court of Appeal did not confirm that ruling and sentenced him to life in prison in July 2011. See 
<http://www.rechtspraak.nl> (visited on 17 June 2012). 
813
 See section 3.1& 2 of the Act of 19 June 2003 containing rules concerning serious violations of international 
humanitarian law (International Crimes Act), available at <http://www.universaljurisdiction.org/national-
laws/netherlands> (visited on 117 June 2012). 
814
 Carnero, Rojo Enrique, “National Legislation Providing for the Prosecution and Punishment of International 
Crimes in Spain”, Journal of International Criminal Justice,   Vol. 9, No. 3, 2011, pp. 699-728. 
815
 For instance Yvonne Basebya was prosecuted in the Netherlands for Incitement to commit genocide 18 years 
after genocide happened. She was found guilty of that crime on 01 March 2013. See the English Summary of the 
case available at <www.Rechtspraak.nl> (visited on 6th June 2013). 




(which include those related international crimes) is a concern of all states,816 regardless of the 
nationality of the perpetrator and victim, to limit the scope of the principle to the state interests is 
not convincing and may make the prevention of genocide ineffective.  
Even those states that have not limited the scope of this principle, the chances of success are 
limited because there is no enforcement mechanism to arrest the suspects. The states that have 
more or less unlimited universal jurisdiction include Germany. Under its Code of Crimes against 
International Law (CCAIL), Germany punishes international crimes817 even when they have 
been committed abroad and bear no relation to Germany.818 Likewise, Rwanda819 and Israel820 
punish the incitement to commit genocide committed abroad regardless of the nationality of the 
perpetrator and of the victim. But there is no practice on how they have applied this principle on 
these crimes before genocide happens. Spain821 and Belgium822 have had unlimited universal 
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jurisdiction (the so-called “absolute universal jurisdiction”) in their laws and have used it in a 
number of cases but not always successfully when the perpetrators were not on their 
territories.823 Indeed, it might be easy to put this principle in the legislation and not difficult to 
know about the crimes being committed in other states that may lead to genocide and to issue an 
international arrest warrant, but to materialise it without the cooperation of the state concerned is 
almost impossible without violating other rules of international law. The example of the 
abduction of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina in April 1960 by Israeli secret agents (Mossad) is 
telling. Though Eichmann was accused of very serious crimes of international law, the action by 
Israel was condemned by the Security Council of the UN (among others) as affecting the 
sovereignty of the Argentine Republic.824 Indeed, if there is no other mechanism to enforce such 
an arrest warrant, the only way to apprehend the suspects would be the one used by Israel which, 
as the Security Council affirmed, is likely to “endanger international peace and security”.825 The 
rest would be to wait until the indicted person would travel to another state that is willing to 
arrest him/her826 or to wait until the person will voluntarily surrender to the court (which is very 
unlikely and not promising for the prevention of genocide).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
was repealed by another of 5 August 2003 with all its modifications and a title Ibis was introduced in the criminal 
Code. Now the exercise of jurisdiction of crimes committed abroad is limited to 3 situations: when the perpetrator is 
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 For instance, Germany enforced the French arrest warrant against Rose Kabuye (then Rwandan high ranking 




The application of the principle of universal jurisdiction by non-territorial states on the 
prevention of genocide is limited by the customary rule which grants absolute immunity to heads 
of states or governments and ministers for foreign affairs who are charged with those crimes that 
may lead to genocide.827 The decision of the Assembly of the African Union which called upon 
all concerned African States to “respect the immunity of state officials when applying the 
principle of Universal jurisdiction”“828 is a clear example on the limitation. Yet, if these are 
among the top leaders, when they are not arrested, they may continue to commit those crimes 
and most likely be obstacle to the arrest of other officials and individuals who are under their 
control.  
Unless these challenges surrounding the application of this principle are addressed, the role of 
that principle in the prevention of genocide at the secondary level will remain not very 
significant. One of the suggestions to overcome most of those challenges might be an adoption of 
a global convention to harmonize the application of universal jurisdiction. Such a convention can 
play a big role in putting in place guidelines that would ease its application without “creating an 
atmosphere of insecurity and distrust incompatible with the preservation of peace”,829 and 
without allowing the process to genocide to grow further. It would for instance adopt the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
state official) and extradited her to France. See Brus, M.M.T.A, “No Functional Immunity of State Official for 
International Crimes: A Principled Choice With Pragmatic Restriction”, T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, November 2011, p. 
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arrest for his alleged participation in grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions in Israeli-occupied Gaza, where he 
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after he was informed of the existence of the warrant. He returned to Israel before the Metropolitan Police could 
execute the warrant. See Human Rights Watch, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe, the State of the Art, Report,   
Volume 18, No 5(D), June 2006, p. 4, available at <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0606web.pdf> 
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universal jurisdiction in absentia approach which allows states to prosecute irrespective of any 
factors,830 but with safeguards on how it must be applied. The suggestion of the African Union of 
the “need for an international regulatory body with the competence to review and or handle 
complaints or appeals arising out of the abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction”831 may 
be relevant in that regard. More doctrinal considerations are needed in the development of this 
principle for a better future use in the prevention of genocide. 
In the meantime, other alternatives for non-territorial states may be explored and exploited by 
non-territorial states.  
4.1.2. Preventing genocide through the referral of a situation to the ICC and through the 
execution of its arrest warrants  
When the challenges mentioned above render impossible or complicated the possibility for non-
territorial states to prosecute perpetrators of crimes that may lead to genocide in other states, the 
remaining possibility would be to refer the situation to the ICC (directly if they are parties to it or 
through the SC if they are not).832 The discussion here will examine whether that possibility is 
available and how the arrest warrants of the ICC may be enforced by non-territorial states.   
4.1.2.1. Preventing through the referral of situations to the ICC 
The legal basis for states in general to refer to the ICC a situation in which international crimes 
that may lead to genocide have been committed has been discussed in the previous chapter.833 
However, when it comes to the referral of a situation in a territorial state by non-territorial states, 
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things become rather complicated. Article 12(2) of the ICC Statute provides for the jurisdiction 
of the court in the situations where the crimes have been committed on the territory of the state 
party or by a national of a state party.834  Article 13 lists three situations in which the court may 
exercise jurisdiction: when a situation has been referred to it by a state party in which the crimes 
in question have been committed, by the Security Council and the situation where the Prosecutor 
has initiated investigation proprio motu. Read literally together, these articles may be understood 
as excluding the possibility of a referral to the ICC by a non-territorial state unless those crimes 
have been committed by its nationals. The practice on this has been literal. Uganda, Central 
African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali referred the situations to the ICC 
because of the territorial and nationality links.835  In other examples of Sudan, Kenya, Ivory 
Coast and Libya, the referral was either done by the Security Council,836 or the investigations 
were started proprio motu.837 In all these situations, no other states had attempted to refer them to 
the ICC. However, since in both  stances, territorial states or the Security Council were willing to 
refer the situations to the ICC; it is not fully clear that the reason why non-territorial states did 
not refer a situation to the ICC was because they were banned by the ICC Statute (article 12(2) 
and 13) to do so. This leaves the question unresolved with regard to situations in which the 
territorial state is unwilling, or unable to prosecute and is unwilling to refer the situation to the 
ICC and for whatever reason the Security Council cannot refer it to the ICC. Yet, there are 
practical obstacles for non-territorial states to apprehend the suspects. Of course the possibility of 
non-territorial states (either party to the ICC or not) to refer the situation to the SC under articles 
I and VIII of the Genocide Convention is available to them but it does not solve the problem 
where the Security Council is itself unwilling to refer it to the ICC. The Rome Statute of the ICC 
has not foreseen this and there is a need to provide for alternative in the near future. 
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4.1.2.2. Preventing through the execution of the ICC arrest warrants 
Where situations have been referred to the ICC and the latter has issued arrest warrants against 
the suspects, the question becomes what the possibilities are available to non-territorial states for 
the execution of those warrants in order to comply with their obligation to prevent genocide. In 
principle, under article 86 and 87 of the Rome Statute of the ICC which require state parties to 
cooperate with it, article 1 of the Genocide Convention on the obligation to prevent genocide and 
the customary rule thereof, all states should play a role in the execution of those warrants. 
However, there are challenges that may limit that. I will focus here on one that I consider most 
serious. This concerns the situation when the indicted person enjoys full immunity. In fact, on 
the one hand article IV of the Genocide Convention and 27 of the Rome Statute of the ICC make 
the official capacity of the suspect irrelevant, but on the other hand customary international law 
says that Heads of States, Heads of Governments, Ministers for foreign affairs enjoy absolute 
immunity from jurisdiction in other states,838 and article 98 (1) of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
requires states not to proceed with requests and surrender  in case this would require it to breach 
its international obligation in respect to the immunity of a person of a third state…839  It is 
beyond the scope of this subparagraph to give an in-depth analysis on this contradiction. Only a 
few words with regard to the impact this contradiction may have to the prevention of genocide 
may suffice. If a non-territorial state executes arrest warrants against those persons in accordance 
with the  mentioned provisions above, it might be at the same time violating the customary rule 
which grants full immunity and sometimes article 98(1) of the ICC.840 Scholars do not agree on 
the issue of immunity in the execution of the arrest warrants against sitting Heads of States. For 
instance, Paola Gaeta argues that the immunity of sitting Heads of states for instance may 
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continue to apply in some circumstances.841 Akande argues that it may not.842 Cherif M 
Bassiouni argues that legal obligations which arise from the international crimes that rise to the 
level of jus cogens (which constitute obligation erga omnes) are inderogable.843 He maintains 
that such an obligation includes “… the non-applicability of any immunities up to and including 
Heads of States.”844  The arguments in favour of the possibility to execute the warrants 
unlimitedly sound consistent with the purpose of the rules on the prohibition of those 
international crimes which includes punishing those who commit them and is in line with the 
obligation to prevent genocide as well.  That is why it may be argued that the rule on the absolute 
immunity should not apply in the execution of arrest warrants against persons indicted by the 
ICC because it would be contrary to the jus cogens concept that does not allow any derogation 
such as immunities or statute of limitations. Furthermore, if there is an obligation to prevent 
genocide that binds all states, and persons indicted of international crimes are concerned with 
article IV of the Genocide Convention and 27 of the Rome Statute of the ICC that waive the 
immunity in case of those crimes, it should follow that non-territorial states should be under the 
obligation to arrest the indicted persons regardless of their status. The scope of these articles 
should not be limited to the exclusion of immunities but also should comprise the prohibition of 
immunities in the execution of the arrest warrants for the crimes concerned.845 If the contrary 
argument is the one to prevail, it makes those arrest warrants of the ICC meaningless because the 
ICC does not have its own police to execute them and there exists no other way these people 
could ever be arrested. The result is that in such cases, the suspects may continue their acts. 
                                                          
841
 See  Gaeta, Paola, “Official Capacity and Immunities” in Cassese, Antonio et al.(eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A commentary, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 975-1001. The recent 
development in the African Union also shows how African States rejects the possibility to put on trial a sitting Head 
of state. See AU Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court  of 12 October 2013, 
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(Oct.2013), available at 
<http://summits.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Ext%20Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20&%20Decl%20_E_0.pdf> 
(visited on 28 October 2013).  
842
 Akande, Dapo, “The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir’s 
Immunities”, 2009, Journal of International Criminal Justice,  pp. 333-352. See also Akande, Dapo, “The Genocide 
Convention and the Arrest Warrants Issued by the ICC”, EJIL:Talk, 2011. 
843
  Bassiouni, M. Cherif, “International Crimes: "Jus Cogens" and "Obligation Erga Omnes", Law and 




 See also Wirth, Steffen, “Immunities, Related Problems, And Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute”, Criminal Law 




4.2. Other preventive measures 
It was said on the prevention of genocide at the primary level that other measures may include 
political, economic, diplomatic, security and any other measures that can be deemed necessary 
for the prevention of genocide. The question here is whether states are permitted and required to 
take these categories of measures in order to prevent genocide at the secondary level.  Not each 
and every measure that can be taken and that can prevent genocide will be discussed here. With 
some few examples of these measures, the idea is to show what international law permits and 
requires non-territorial states for the prevention of genocide outside their borders.  
Let me start with the negative obligation to prevent genocide which requires states not to engage 
in activities that may fuel tension that may lead to genocide. For instance, if a state is clearly led 
by a dictator who uses discrimination against a group protected by the Genocide Convention as 
one of the weapons to hang on to power, other states should refrain from engaging themselves, 
either politically, economically, militarily (they should especially refrain themselves from 
supplying arms to that state), etc. The reason is that the more the regime loses external support, 
the more it is isolated and the more it runs out of means that could even make the genocide 
happen. The history shows how the external support can further the capacity of a state to commit 
genocide. This has been overwhelmingly confirmed in literature. For instance, the French 
parliamentary report has been explicit in stating that in 1992, France increased sensibly the 
supply of weapons in Rwanda. Yet, as the report noted, it was a year in which massive massacres 
against the Tutsi in Bugesera had taken place, the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic 
(CDR) had been created, the training of militia was taking place and a network zero “réseau 
zéro” specialized for the hunting of Tutsis and moderate Hutus was in place.846 This report 
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criticized the French officers and diplomats for having ended up “holding conversations, 
discussions, with a criminal government.”847 It has also been observed elsewhere that even in 
1993, after it was clear that the Rwandan regime had systematically committed several massacres 
against the Tutsi ethnic group in Kibilira, Bigogwe, Bugesera..., “French soldiers were deployed, 
manning checkpoints and scrutinizing identity cards far from where any French citizens were 
known to be living”.848 Yet, the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary arbitrary 
executions Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye had reported that the attacks against the Tutsi ethnic group 
that had taken place by then constituted acts of genocide under article II(a) and (b) and article III 
of the Genocide Convention.849 These are only a few illustrative examples of activities that states 
should refrain from performing at the secondary level.    
However, when a non-territorial state has already a link with a territorial state which, at a given 
point, presents risks of genocide, that non-territorial state has the obligation to perform positive 
actions necessary to prevent genocide in the state concerned. Arguably, even non-territorial 
states which do not have the possibility to exercise influence on a territorial state concerned can 
take other measures against it which may include economic sanctions against the leaders of that 
state, the severance of diplomatic relations, to name and shame the leaders of that state and 
therefore to isolate them from any international forum, arms embargo etc. But again, this is also 
difficult to assess and implement.  
Other measures may include what is provided for in article VIII of the Genocide Convention 
under which  any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to 
take such actions under the UN Charter as they consider appropriate for the prevention and 
suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in art III”“.850 Non-territorial 
states may for instance request the UN to take measures that address means of communication 
used by the territorial states to spread out the hate ideology or the incitement to commit 
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genocide.851 Those means may be radio, television, and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Weblogs and YouTube (accessible through internet). What the UN can do to prevent genocide 
will be discussed in a separate chapter. At this level, it suffices to say that since calling upon the 
organs of the UN would be one of the available means to comply with their obligation to prevent 
genocide, it can be argued that states would be legally obligated to call upon those organs of the 
UN to take appropriate measures for the prevention and suppression of genocide whenever the 
role of the UN is necessary. It can be said that a non-territorial state would therefore be 
breaching the obligation to prevent genocide if it gets the information on the risk or commission 
of genocide by/in a territorial state and refrains from calling upon competent organs of the UN to 
take action where necessary.  
4.3. Preliminary conclusions 
To sum up, it may be said that preventing genocide by non-territorial states at the secondary 
level is permitted and required within the limits imposed by international law as shown in this 
section. The application of the principle of universal jurisdiction by non-territorial states to 
suspects of international crimes that may lead to genocide in the way suggested in this section 
can have a significant contribution to the prevention of genocide. Likewise, the execution of the 
ICC arrest warrants by non-territorial states without distinction based on the official status of the 
suspects may have a contribution to the prevention of genocide. Other measures that non-
territorial states may take at this level which include requesting the UN to take actions that may 
address means of communication used to incite hatred and to commit genocide may have a 
contribution to the prevention of genocide. The instances discussed are not exhaustive. And 
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though there is much indeterminacy of the laws on the prevention of genocide which may have 
effect on the preventability of genocide at this level, if prevention of genocide is understood in 
the way it has been explained above and is implemented as it has been suggested, genocide can 
be significantly prevented at this level.  
5. Tertiary prevention of genocide by non-territorial states: What actions 
are permitted in international law with what means and to which 
distance?  
Prevention of genocide at the tertiary level requires robust actions to stop an on-going genocide. 
This section will focus on actions which involve the use of force in order to halt genocide. Does 
the obligation to prevent genocide give this right and obligation to non-territorial states? This 
section first gives a brief discussion on the scope of the rules on the prohibition of use of force in 
the context of the prevention of genocide (5.1). Secondly, it discusses whether that use of force 
could take the form of humanitarian intervention as it stands today (5.2).  In the third place, it 
discusses whether the commission of genocide could be a stand-alone legal ground for the use of 
force to stop it (5.3). This is followed by a discussion on whether necessity could be a 
circumstance to preclude the wrongfulness of the use of force in case of genocide (5.4). Lastly, a 
summary of conditions that should guide the use of force to put an end to genocide will be given 
(5.5). 
5.1. The prohibition of use of force in the context of genocide 
“When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual 
human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.”852  
 “The state is widely understood to be the servant of its people, and not vice versa…Nothing in the Charter 
of the United Nations precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders.”853 Kofi Annan 
 
The prohibition of use of force is a principle recognised in international law which obligates 
states to refrain from using force in other states except in case of self-defence and authorisation 
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of the Security Council.  If this prohibition is absolute, it would mean that there is no way non-
territorial states would use force to put an end to genocide when not acting in self-defence and 
when the Security Council is unable to authorise them to do so. This subsection examines 
whether this prohibition is absolute. If the prohibition is not absolute, it will be examined 
whether the use of force to end genocide may be among the exceptions.  
5.1.1. Mainstream views on the prohibition of use of force 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states: “All members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”854  
Subsequent resolutions of the UN confirmed this prohibition and any other form of intervention 
in other states’ internal affairs.855 This was confirmed by the ICJ in Nicaragua case.856 Numerous 
scholars have interpreted the rules on the principle of the prohibition of use of force and the 
practice thereof as absolute and not susceptible of any derogation.857  Their view is that the use 
of force not in case of self-defence and not authorised by the Security Council of the UN is 
outlawed in absolute terms by the Charter of the UN and that it has become a customary 
international law.858 For instance, Ian Brownlie and Karl Zemanek have maintained that article 
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2(4) did not allow other exceptions than an enforcement action authorized by the Security 
Council and self-defence.859 Likewise Hersch Lauterpacht has equated territorial integrity with 
territorial inviolability,860 which would mean to be an absolute ban of use of force. Bruno Simma 
has argued the same.861 He wrote that the terms “territorial integrity” and “political 
independence” are not intended to restrict the scope of the prohibition of the use of force and 
maintained that “integrity” has to be read as “inviolability.”862 This view that the prohibition of 
use of force outside the two exceptions is absolute is what is generally accepted in international 
law.863 However, some have understood it otherwise and for the purpose of this work, it is worth 
having a consideration on that. 
5.1.2. Views in favour of an extensive interpretation of article 2(4) 
Other scholars argue in favour of the broad interpretation of article 2(4) on the prohibition of use 
of force.864 This broad interpretation is that article 2(4) prohibits only intervention directed 
against territorial integrity or political independence as well as the intervention which is 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.865  
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5.1.2.1. The use of force not directed at the territorial integrity of a state 
On the first element which concerns the territorial integrity of a state,866 it has been argued in 
literature that “article 2(4) does not forbid “the use of force” simpliciter, it forbids it only when 
directed “against the territorial integrity….,”867 i.e when it results in territorial conquest.868 The 
rationale was mainly to prevent “territorial aggrandizement and secessionist movements”,869 
which would cause alteration of states” boundaries and would therefore make the national unity 
or territorial integrity of a state impossible.870 In explaining this concept through its historical 
background, Anthony D’Amato argues for example that when it was included in the Treaty of 
Paris of 30 March 1856, the parties to it had in mind the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and 
the treaty aimed at preventing the permanent loss of portion of one’s territory.871 In addition to 
this, the fear that the arbitrary establishment of borders would be at the origin of wars of 
annexation of territories given to other states might have contributed to the evolution of this 
concept.  This fear contributed to determining this concept because as D’Amato   has written, it 
prevents some powerful states from waging wars against weak states for search for economic 
gains and the search for strategic gains, among others.872 D’Amato’s argument rejects the word 
“inviolability” used by the proponents of the absolute ban of use of force because he believes 
that the drafters of the Charter would have used that word had they wanted to mean it.873 He 
agrees however that territorial inviolability would have indeed meant the absolute prohibition of 
use of force but he maintains that in the absence of such a word, some actions would not be 
forbidden by article 2(4).874 
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5.1.2.2. The use of force not directed against the political independence of other states 
Political independence refers to the autonomy in the affairs of the state with respect to its 
institutions, freedom of political decisions, policy making, and in matters pertaining to its 
domestic and foreign affairs.875 Independence is defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary as a state 
or condition of being free from dependence, subjection or control,876 and the political 
independence as “the attribute of a nation or state which is entirely autonomous and not subject 
to the government, control, or dictation of any external power.877  
Those in favour of a broad interpretation of article 2(4) posit that this article does not prohibit the 
use of force when it does not undermine the political independence of a state.878 The ICJ 
explanation in Nicaragua case is relied on to support their argument: 
“A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each 
state is permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is 
the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of 
foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to 
such choices which must remain free ones.879 
5.1.2.3. The use of force not in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations 
Needless to recall, the use of force directed against the two elements discussed above are 
inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. For the use of force which is not inconsistent with the 
purpose of the UN, a reference has been made to the Charter to explain that article 2(4) does not 
prohibit the use of force in the absoluteness. The purposes of the UN include achieving the 
international co-operation in solving problems of humanitarian character and in promoting 
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human rights.880 The preamble of the UN Charter states that the people of the United Nations are 
determined “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime 
has brought untold sorrow of mankind, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person….”881 When those human rights enshrined in the Charter 
are “instead violated; delinquent government forfeit the protection afforded by article 2(4)”.882 In 
brief, the argument is that using force to save the lives of people has not been prohibited by 
article 2(4) of the Charter (because it is consistent with the purposes of the UN: promoting 
respect for human rights).883 Among other possible exceptions,884 the arguments of those who 
oppose the absoluteness of the prohibition revive the principle of humanitarian intervention.885  
The question is however whether such a rule has even legally existed and in the affirmative 
whether it could apply to the situation of genocide.   
5.2. Humanitarian intervention and the use of force to put an end to genocide 
Is the principle of humanitarian intervention recognized in international law to the extent that 
using force to put an end to genocide may be justified under it? A definition and background will 
be first given. Secondly, the arguments in favour of this doctrine will be summarised. Thirdly, 
the arguments of the opponents of this doctrine will be given. Then some observations on the 
two sides will be given in the context of the prevention of genocide. 
5.2.1. Background and definition of humanitarian intervention 
Humanitarian intervention is an old concept. The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius has written in the 
seventeenth century that, “where a tyrant “should inflict upon his subjects such a treatment as no 
one is warranted in inflicting” other states may exercise a right of humanitarian intervention.”886 
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Ian Brownlie has written that, historically, there have been two models of humanitarian 
intervention.887 The first one is the one that has been admitted by the majority of publicists of the 
end of the nineteenth century that the right of humanitarian intervention (l”intervention 
d”humanité) existed.888 It concerned a state which had abused its sovereignty by brutal and 
excessively cruel treatment of those within its power, whether nationals or not.889 According to 
Ian Brownlie, this model did not survive the post-1919 era. 890 The second model is connected 
with the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 whose humanitarian motives were undermined 
by various political agendas by the intervening states.891 I will not engage in the details of these 
models. Instead, without ignoring that there have been various definitions of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention in literature,892 for the purpose of this work I will refer to the one 
given by Wil D.Verwey, generally accepted by legal scholars.893 He defined humanitarian 
intervention as being a “coercive action taken by states, at their initiative, and involving the use 
of armed force, for the purpose of preventing or putting a halt to serious and wide-scale 
violations of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to life, inside the territory of 
another state".894 This doctrine has always created a tension among scholars and commentators, 
some finding it legally justified and others finding it illegal. 
5.2.2. Arguments of the proponents of humanitarian intervention in general 
Proponents of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention argue that it is legally justifiable on the 
ground of the protection of the greatest fundamental right which is the right to life and more 
significantly, the right to life for a people. They argue that the customary law on humanitarian 
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intervention existed before the UN Charter. Examples of pre-Charter interventions often used by 
the proponents of this doctrine are the ones by France, England, and Russia in Greece in 1827-
30, France in Syria in 1860-61, Russia in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1877-78, United 
States in Cuba in 1898 and Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia in Macedonia in 1903-13.895  They argue 
that this doctrine survived the UN Charter because the latter did not outlaw it.896  Some even go 
further to add that not only the Charter permits it but that it could also be understood to require 
it.897 Hence, they argue that the UN Charter did neither terminate nor did even weaken the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention.898 To affirm this, they rely on some examples of post-
Charter humanitarian interventions.899 Without being exhaustive, here are some of those 
instances given in literature. One of them is the Indian use of force in Bangladesh (1971) to help 
people to secure their independence from Pakistan and end repression. Other examples are the 
Tanzanian use of force against the Ugandan brutal President Idi Amin and end the repression, the 
Vietnam invasion in Cambodia (1978) which led to the overthrow of Pol Pot.900 Also, after the 
1991 Iraq/Kuwait conflict, the USA, France and the UK launched a military intervention in Iraq 
to protect the Kurds and Shi’ites who, at the end of the Iraq/Kuwait conflict, were turned on by 
the government of Iraq.901 Another example is the NATO airstrikes in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999, undertaken also without the Security Council authorisation. This 
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intervention occurred after an attempt to authorise it failed due to Russian veto.902 NATO leaders 
spoke of genocide by the central government of FRY903 and that this forcible intervention aimed 
at preventing Yugoslavia from committing genocide against the ethnic Albanian civilians in 
Kosovo.904 When the FRY instituted proceedings against the ten NATO states for the violation 
of article 2(4), only Belgium invoked clearly the right of humanitarian intervention in the joint 
hearings on the requests for provisional measures. It said:  
“The Kingdom of Belgium takes the view that this is an armed humanitarian intervention, 
compatible with article 2(4) of the Charter, which covers only intervention against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of a state.”905  
Belgium cited the examples of India’s intervention in Pakistan, Tanzania in Uganda, Vietnam in 
Cambodia, the West African states first in Liberia and later in Sierra Leone.906 It is unfortunate 
that this case did not reach the merits stage. As Gattini also observed, it would have been a 
convenient context for the court to examine this argument of Belgium”,907 which could have 
probably contributed to the clarification of questions pertaining to this doctrine. 
Another forcible intervention mostly neglected in literature when it comes to examples of 
humanitarian intervention is the Rwandan use of force in former Zaire (now the Democratic 
Republic of Congo) in 1996. Yet, as Rwanda claimed later, among other reasons, its intervention 
aimed at saving the Congolese Tutsi minority people (Banyamulenge) of South Kivu against 
whom the declaration of war had been made by the Zairean authorities.908 The Zairean officials 
were at that time speaking openly of the Banyamulenge as “snakes”, and local radio stations and 
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newspapers” propaganda against them sounded more and more like the 1994 Hutu Power media 
of Rwanda. This was following the massacre of the Tutsi communities of Mokoto in North Kivu 
in May 1996.909 Mr Kagame (then Rwanda Vice-President) later revealed that the intervention 
aimed at handling three things: “first to save the Banyamulenge and not let them die, empower 
them to fight, and even fight for them; then secondly to dismantle the camps, return the refugees 
to Rwanda, and destroy the ex- Rwandan forces (FAR) and militias; and third, to change the 
situation in Zaire.”910 The claim by Mr Kagame has indeed an element of humanitarian 
intervention i.e to save Banyamulenge from being exterminated, among other things. The DRC 
later instituted proceedings against Rwanda for the violation of article 2(4) (among other things) 
but again, the case never reached the merits stage. It would have been interesting to see what 
would have been the ruling of the ICJ on a possible argument by Rwanda that its intervention to 
save the Banyamulenge was not in violation of article 2(4) of the Charter. In most of these 
examples, it has been argued that in addition to the fact that the examples of use of force were 
not authorized by the Security Council, they were not condemned by it (during and after), which 
the proponents find as indication of legality of the actions. However, other arguments are 
radically opposed to the claim that humanitarian intervention is accepted in international law as it 
will be shown below. 
5.2.3. Arguments of the opponents of humanitarian intervention in general 
Roberto O. Keohane gives an interesting illustration to explain how humanitarian intervention 
has been opposed by scholars. He noted that: 
“saying “humanitarian intervention” in a room full of philosophers, legal scholars, and 
political scientists is a bit like crying “fire” in a crowded theatre: it can create a clear and 
present danger to everyone within earshot.911  
Indeed, this doctrine has been subject of rejection mainly because of the danger it may allow or 
cause. A summary of numerous scholars’ propositions on which a legal case against the 
humanitarian intervention rest is worthy of note here.  
The first is that one cannot draw from the pre-Charter practice in assessing the legality of 
humanitarian intervention since there is no clear evidence that such customary rule has existed 
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before the UN Charter.912 As they contend, had such a right existed, it would have been invoked 
and exercised during the massacres of Armenians in the 1914-19, the forced starvation of 4 
million Ukrainians by Soviets in 1930s, the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Chinese by the 
Japanese in 1931-45 and the extermination of 6 million Jews by the Nazis in 1939-45.913 They 
argue that not only the examples of pre-Charter humanitarian interventions were insufficient to 
establish a customary right of humanitarian intervention,914  but even if that had been the case, 
the Charter has ushered in a new era.915 They therefore argue that humanitarian intervention is 
contrary to article 2(4) of the UN Charter.916  
The second is that since 1945 even where intervening states have used force to protect human 
rights, they have been very much reluctant to invoke humanitarian intervention.917 It has been 
referred to the well-known examples of Tanzania in Uganda, Vietnam in Cambodia, India in 
Bangladesh, US, UK and France in Iraq, NATO in Kosovo, in which intervening states have 
invoked legal grounds other than humanitarian intervention to justify their actions.918 They 
therefore opine that partisans of humanitarian intervention cannot rely on customary 
international law because the practice and the opinio juris are lacking.919  
The third is that states have consistently rejected humanitarian intervention. Brownlie cited the 
example of the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 by NATO.920 The hostile response to the NATO 
intervention in Yugoslavia has been referred to in affirming that the doctrine has been 
rejected.921  
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It has been observed that among the reasons of rejection of humanitarian intervention there is the 
fact that it is an inherently vague doctrine in that it has been given by its protagonists in various 
forms.922 Indeed, some of its protagonists have restricted the doctrine to free a nation oppressed 
by another; others to put an end to crimes and slaughter; others to end tyranny, others to end 
extreme cruelty, others to end religious persecution and others to the case of feeble government 
or misrule leading to anarchy.923 The opponents of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention find 
this too vague with the risk to open the floodgate of interventions for other motives. 
Some other scholars have noticed however that weaker states oppose the recourse to 
humanitarian intervention even for extreme cases like genocide because they want to protect 
themselves from the conquest by powerful states.924 In other words, they avoid abuse by those 
powerful states. And for strong states, they oppose any intervention mainly because it would put 
them in a position to intervene to stop genocide even where they believe it is not in their 
interests.925 But this interest is vital for either strong or weak states because as Payam Akhavan 
has put it “states will be unwilling to expend blood and treasure where their vital national 
interests are not directly implicated.”926 This explains why some of the authors even prefer that 
there be no development of a customary rule of humanitarian intervention in the future because 
of the danger it constitutes.927 They recognize however that it is intolerable to see grave 
violations of human rights within a state and to see other states being banned by public 
international law from intervening.928 This is found as being a split between law and morality.929  
I will not engage in the determination of who is right among these opposite views. Each side’s 
views have their merits and the debate is not closed. However, I must note that the views of the 
opponents of this doctrine are considered by many as gaining the ground. That is why this 
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doctrine cannot give an answer to the question whether it may provide a legal basis for the 
prevention of genocide when genocide is being committed. The problem of the intolerable 
suffering which is genocide in this work remains unsolved if the arguments of the opponents of 
humanitarian intervention are the one to prevail as it is the case in practice.930 Despite the 
dominance of the arguments of the opponents of this doctrine, the debate on humanitarian 
intervention might never end if things remain unchanged either way. This means that unless this 
doctrine is expressly prohibited in the Charter or is expressly authorized by it, the debate on this 
doctrine will remain. If it happens to be expressly prohibited, it should precise the scope of that 
prohibition. And if it happens to be allowed, it should of course make it clear what kind of 
circumstances would trigger it. In any case, the debate would perhaps end. Since this is not yet 
the case, the debate may take another orientation in the search for the solution to the unresolved 
issue. Instead of relying on humanitarian intervention in its broader sense, it will be examined 
below whether the commission of genocide as such, which is a violation of a peremptory norm, 
would legally trigger the use of force to end it. In fact, as said above, one of the reasons this 
doctrine has been so much opposed is that it has been vague in its scope to the extent that it could 
be easily abused in many ways including using force to any kind of human rights violation. 
5.3. Can the commission of genocide be an independent ground to trigger the use of 
force to comply with the obligation to prevent genocide by non-territorial states? 
No definitive answer followed from the discussion about the humanitarian intervention. 
Recourse to other sources may be necessary. In the present case, recourse to the rules on the 
prohibition of genocide will be made in order to examine whether the nature of those rules could 
dictate the use of force to put an end to genocide without having to borrow other concepts.  
It has been concluded earlier that the prohibition of genocide and the obligation to prevent 
genocide is both conventional (Genocide Convention) and customary.931 The rules on the 
prohibition of genocide are today regarded as jus cogens norms.932 The question whether this 
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nature would mean to obligate non-territorial states to use force to put an end to genocide needs 
consideration from the drafting process of the Genocide Convention until today. The use of force 
to put an end to genocide has been invoked during the drafting process of the Genocide 
Convention. For instance, Raphael Lemkin wrote in 1947 that “by declaring genocide a crime 
under international law and by making it a problem of international concern, the right of 
intervention on behalf of minorities slated for destruction has been established.”933 The Genocide 
Convention adopted later provides in article I that genocide is an international crime that states 
undertake to prevent.934 Under the obligation to prevent genocide, states have a direct obligation 
to prevent genocide which requires states to employ all means reasonably available to them to 
prevent genocide,935 wherever they may be acting or able to act.936 However, there exists no clear 
indication that the use of force to put an end to genocide is allowed and required. Instead, it 
includes an express provision on the possibility for states to call upon the competent organs of 
the UN to take appropriate actions to prevent genocide,937 which could be understood as the only 
forum through which the use of force could be sought. After the entry into force of the Genocide 
Convention, the ICJ gave an interesting opinion with regard to the object and purpose of that 
convention which is relevant for the present discussion. It noted: 
“The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing 
purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this dual character 
to a greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of 
certain human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary 
principles of morality.”938 
The ICJ has confirmed in the DRC v. Rwanda case that the prohibition of genocide constitutes a 
norm of jus cogens.939 Schabas has suggested that arguably as a result of the treaty-based 
obligation to prevent genocide in article I of the Genocide Convention and the customary norm 
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that it reflects, the use of force is permitted even without Security Council authorization.940 
Building upon the assertion that the prohibition of genocide is a norm of jus cogens, Schabas 
added that the duty to prevent genocide as enshrined in international law is a peremptory norm, 
thus, it trumps any incompatible obligation, even one dictated by the Charter of the United 
Nations.941 The argument of M. Cherif Bassiouni that “the implications of jus cogens are those of 
duty and not of optional rights,”942 supports this argument. The prohibition of genocide is not 
only a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted but also an erga omnes (towards 
all) obligation of states.943 Also, article 40944 and 41945 of the ILC draft articles on state 
responsibility for international wrongful acts strongly support this argument because, even 
though they do not suggest how serious breaches by a state of an obligation arising under a 
peremptory norm should be ended by other states, they confirm that these serious breaches must 
indeed be ended by other states. Genocide being the gravest breache of international law, in case 
it is being committed, if force is the only way to end it, a claim is that it should be ended under 
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that basis.  This is what might have inspired the African Union (AU) to adopt article 4 (h) of the 
Constitutive Act. In this article, the African Union explicitly recognised the Union’s right to 
intervene in a Member State “in respect of grave circumstances namely: war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity.”946  The AU did not elaborate on that, but the fact that it recognises 
in the same article that it functions in accordance with the principle of prohibition of use of 
force,947 may be construed as indicating that the AU Member States consider that they do not 
violate that principle in case they use force to end those grave crimes. This provision has not 
been condemned by the UN. Had it been contrary to the UN Charter, the UN would have been 
entitled to ask for its amendment. 
A further interesting analysis on the heinous nature of the crime of genocide and the obligation to 
end it has been made by Heinze. He argued that the rules on the prohibition of genocide show the 
special status  that the crime of genocide has in international law in comparison to certain other 
modes of human suffering that international law proscribes but still tolerates (e.g., violations of 
certain political rights). 948 He continued that genocide is a form of human suffering considered 
intolerable, a form that maintains a fundamentally different legal status with regard to its 
rectification than do other violations.949 He made an interesting analogy with the standards of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction in showing the normative legal framework of the use of force 
to end genocide. Recalling the primary rationale for universal jurisdiction which is that some 
crimes are so heinous and so universally abhorred that a state is entitled to undertake legal 
proceedings against the perpetrators, regardless of where the crime took place or of the 
nationality of the victims or perpetrators, he opines that law of universal jurisdiction is an 
appropriate normative legal framework in which the use of force to end genocide can be 
grounded. He referred to other scholars who have argued on this that  if punishment can be 
justified for certain serious human rights crimes, even if such punishment severely encroaches 
upon the traditional boundaries of sovereign prerogative, “then so can intervention be justified to 
stop such a crime that is about to occur or is already in progress.” 950 As he observed, it is not 
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this principle of universal jurisdiction that renders using force to end genocide legal but it shows 
the definite normative similarity between these two concepts in that both are only rightly 
employed under the worst cases of human suffering.951  
Considering all that is said above, some arguments may be given. Jus cogens norms cannot be 
derogated from because they are hierarchically higher than “ordinary” norms.952 Therefore, the 
procedural requirement (authorisation by the SC) should not be understood to take away the 
obligation to put an end to genocide which is the most serious breach of international law. 
Moreover, it is possible that both rules be read in a harmonious way to serve the purpose for 
which they have been established. Since the prohibition of genocide is a jus cogens norm, it 
follows for instance that states members of the SC (who are themselves under the obligation to 
put an end to genocide) should not veto a decision on the authorisation of use of force when 
genocide is taking place in a given place. In fact, this veto could be interpreted as contrary to 
peremptory norm on the prohibition of genocide. The same is the failure to take action for any 
other reason whatsoever. For instance, during the conflict in the Balkan, it has been argued that 
the Security Council’s failure to take enforcement action and to lift the arms embargo against the 
government of Bosnia was a violation of the Genocide Convention by the members of the 
Security Council which were also parties to the Genocide Convention.953 It would have been a 
good opportunity for the court to contribute to this, had Bosnia filed the case against the United 
Kingdom for violating the Genocide Convention through its activities in the Security Council as 
it had argued.954 Schabas believes that the court’s ruling in the Bosnia v. Serbia case suggests 
that Bosnian argument against the UK had chance of success because of some similarities with 
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the former.955 This could have concerned other members of the SC as well. When the Security 
Council of the UN fails to take decision on ending genocide, it violates the peremptory norm of 
international law. It would be absurd to comply with a conduct contrary to the law in refraining 
from ending that genocide. 
The proponents of the absoluteness of article 2(4) of the UN Charter may find this argument not 
valid but then they may be challenged to find a way of ending this serious breach of international 
law in the state of necessity when no other ways are available.  
5.4. Necessity: a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the use of force in case 
of genocide? 
Hard as it may be for many to instinctively accept, if there is one thing as bad as using military force 
when we should not, it is not using force when we should”.956 
When genocide is being committed and for whatever reasons, no competent organ of the UN can 
take action to end it, then genocide becomes unstoppable if no state may use force to stop it. This 
is because it is very difficult to imagine that it will stop by itself or just from the initiative of the 
one who commits it. The genocidaires need to be coerced to stop their acts. The question is 
whether the use of force out of necessity to save people from genocide would be wrongful. In 
other words, can necessity provide a valid argument that is recognised in international law? 
The ILC confirmed in its articles on the responsibility of states for international wrongful acts 
the existence of the doctrine of necessity in international law which precludes the wrongfulness 
of an act. Even though it admitted that some writers have opposed this doctrine,957  it noted that 
the balance of that doctrine has nonetheless continued to favour the existence of the plea of 
necessity.958 As the ILC explained, this doctrine of necessity denotes “those exceptional cases 
where the only way a State can safeguard an essential interest threatened by a grave and 
imminent peril is, for the time being, not to perform some other international obligation of lesser 
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weight or urgency”.959 That means that it arises where there is an irreconciliable conflict between 
an essential interest on the one hand and an obligation of the State invoking necessity on the 
other.960 Necessity has been invoked in some cases, and this may indicate that it exists in 
international law. For instance Belgium invoked it against FRY and defined it as the cause which 
justifies the violation of a binding rule in order to safeguard, in face of grave and imminent peril, 
values which are higher than those protected by the rule which has been breached.961 The ILC 
relied on a number of other examples and case-law which support its conclusion that such 
doctrine exists in international law. 962 The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case is among those 
examples. In this case, the ICJ noted that “the state of necessity is a ground recognized by 
customary international law for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an 
international obligation.963 There are conditions that need to be fulfilled as reiterated in article 25 
of the ILC draft articles on states responsibility. The first condition set out in paragraph 1(a) is 
that necessity can be invoked to safeguard an essential interest from a grave and imminent peril, 
the second one set out in paragraph 1(b) is that the conduct in question must not seriously impair 
an essential interest of the other State or States concerned, or of the international community as a 
whole.964 The question is whether these conditions would be met in case of genocide. The ILC 
explicitly noted that article 25 does not cover the use of force not sanctioned by chapters VII and 
VIII.965 It did not give reasons for that. The only explanation it gave is that article 25 does not 
cover conduct regulated by the primary obligation.966 Yet, the primary obligation has not clearly 
regulated it. There are reasons to think that these conditions can be met in case of genocide. It is 
essential to confront these conditions with the case of genocide.  
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The first condition is that necessity can be invoked to safeguard an essential interest from a grave 
and imminent peril. Genocide is the gravest crime of international law committed against 
mankind; an odious scourge as the preamble of the Genocide Convention described it.967 In the 
case between Belgium and the FRY, Belgium noted that even assuming that (for the sake of 
argument) the rule on the prohibition of use of force had been breached (which it found not), it 
invoked the higher values which it attempted to safeguard which included rights of jus cogens 
and the collective security of an entire region.968As for the grave and imminent peril it contended 
that it attempted to safeguard these higher interest from the humanitarian catastrophe recorded in 
the resolutions of the Security Council.969  There cannot be a greater interest than the right not to 
be genocided. And there cannot be a bigger peril than genocide. The gravity of peril in a 
situation of genocide has been overwhelmingly shown in literature as demonstrated elsewhere in 
this work and there is no reason to expatiate on that here.  
Instead, I will now turn to the second condition which is that the conduct in question must not 
seriously impair an essential interest of the other State or States concerned, or of the international 
community as a whole. The interest protected by the Charter’s ban to use force was not meant to 
condone the commission of genocide. That would be contrary to the principles and purposes of 
the very Charter. The “link theory” identified in literature supports this assertion.970 According to 
this theory, the “Charter’s absolute ban on force should be observed by member states only if, or 
to the extent that the UN peace-keeping and restoring machinery actually works; i.e to the extent 
that the UN effectively maintains or restores international peace and security.”“971 It has been 
observed that member states were prepared at the San Francisco Conference to accept an 
absolute ban of unilateral use of force on condition and presupposing that the UN would 
effectively safeguard international peace and security which include the prevention and 
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elimination of a situation in which human rights violations have become intolerable.972 If that 
high and common interest is not safeguarded by the UN, it would be unconvincing to sacrifice 
lives of thousands and millions of human beings and invoke the interest to abide with a rule on 
the authorisation from a dead or stuck organ. What is that interest when for instance the Security 
Council’s failure to authorise the use of force to stop genocide is  due to the veto of China or 
Russia (which are themselves frequently accused of being violators of human rights) for no valid 
reason? What is the interest when such failure is due to the fact that any of the permanent 
members of the SC has been against initiation of a resolution to authorise the use of force to end 
genocide from the very beginning like the US in regard to Rwanda and there is no other way to 
stop that genocide?  
In other words, it is the interest of all states (the one in which genocide is being committed and 
others). It can therefore be plausibly argued that the conditions for necessity in case of the 
commission of genocide can be met and the ILC” omission to include it is regrettable but does 
not preclude its application. In fact, given the nature of the state of necessity, the ILC did not 
(and is even unable) to determine beforehand a list of all situations in which necessity may be 
invoked.  My argument is that since non-territorial states” use of force to end genocide as the 
only available way to save the people under the peril of genocide does neither impair the interest 
of the state in which genocide is being committed nor does it impair the interest of the 
international community as a whole, necessity could be validly invoked to preclude the 
wrongfulness of the use of force in that situation.  
5.5. Threshold needed for the use of force to end genocide under any of the discussed 
forms  
It is important to suggest some threshold conditions that should be taken into consideration for 
the use of force to end genocide to be in harmony with other rules of international law. Some 
threshold conditions have already been suggested in literature, 973 and I will supplement (while 
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being inspired by) them with the following six more threshold conditions: (1) genocide must be 
taking place; (2) the state to use force must do it with the sole aim to end genocide; (3) the state 
must have first pushed the UN to take action, (4) the state must have the capacity to end it, (5) 
the state must be able to respect the laws of war; (6) the state should not be accused of the same 
acts on its territory. 
The first threshold condition is that genocide must be taking place in a given place. The problem 
is that, given the fact that the state or group committing acts of genocide may probably rarely 
make a declaration admitting to be committing genocide, it might be difficult for the state to use 
force to determine beyond doubt that what is going on is genocide. Moreover, states might 
always hide behind the uncertainty on whether genocide is occurring as a pretext not to act. This 
is what happened in Rwanda when the US for instance persistently and radically avoided to use 
the “g” word.974 As long as there is no such a body to authoritatively determine that genocide is 
taking place, this problem will remain.  
The second threshold condition is that the state to use force must have the only aim to save the 
population victim of the on-going genocide and must withdraw the troops after the mission is 
accomplished. In other words, it must be for purely putting an end to genocide. In my view 
however, being pure does not mean that state to use force may completely have no other 
incentives. Even where other incentives may exist, the use of force may still be pure as far as 
putting an end to genocide is concerned if the major or primary reason is to save the lives of the 
people against whom genocide is being committed. Of course those other incentives must not be 
contrary to article 2(4) of the Charter. That means that the intervener’s incentives must not be to 
conquer the territory of the state concerned, to affect its political independence or any other 
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incentive inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. The purity of the use of force to end 
genocide should not be measured by only taking into account other hidden incentives but mainly 
by examining whether the purpose expected from that use of force is achieved, i.e: saving the 
lives of people under the threat of genocide. To suggest this is being realistic because it would be 
too utopian to believe that states would be willing to use force in other states for the sole purpose 
to save the people in those states with whom they have no link whatsoever. This is not to say that 
it is impossible but it may be extremely rare because as Rodley, Verwey and Frank have 
observed, states have showed very little interest in intervening where the humanitarian concern 
was the only incentive, yet they have intervened where other incentives were present.975 It is not 
impossible to imagine the use of force with other incentives but that do not undermine article 
2(4) of the Charter. For instance if a state intervenes in its neighbouring state which is 
committing genocide, it might do that with another strong incentive to prevent that the genocidal 
crisis causes refugee flows to its territory as well as the insecurity to it that may arise from that 
crisis from the state concerned. Another example may be that of states anywhere or particularly 
in Africa, where, due to the arbitrary establishment of borders, some neighbouring states may 
have the same ethnic groups because they originated from one of them. In such cases, if a 
territorial state that has those ethnic groups which originated from a non-territorial state decides 
to eliminate them, and the state of origin uses force to save them, the latter might be highly 
motivated by the link with the ethnic group concerned. The determination of this pure purpose 
may also be assessed from actions on the ground. In the Nicaragua case, though it may not be 
said that the court recognised the right to use force for strict humanitarian objective, it provided 
some indication on examples of where states may use this argument as a pretext. It said that: “the 
protection of human rights, a strict humanitarian objective, cannot be compatible with the mining 
of spots, the destruction of oil installations, or the training, arming and equipping of the 
contras”.976 
The third threshold condition would be that the state to use force to end genocide should first try 
to push for the UN action (through the competent organs of the UN). Since that state may be 
ready to intervene, it may push the SC to authorise it or to authorise any other action within a 
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short time. Article VIII977 of the Genocide Convention can also be a good basis for this.  The 
difficulty attached to this is that it may take too long for the competent organs to take action or to 
the state that wishes to use force to know that the action will never be taken. And while waiting 
for this, people to be saved might be perishing, which may make the result that the state to use 
force aims at achieving be insignificant. It is difficult to set a period within which the state 
should wait for. It is probably better to say that the state to intervene assesses the situation by 
considering the chance of success of the UN decision to authorise an action. But the period must 
be short for the use of force to serve its purpose.  It would be absurd to wait long if for example 
there are all signs that show that there are no chances that a decision by the UN would be ever 
reached. 
The fourth threshold condition is that the state to use force in order to end genocide should have 
the capacity or the potential to successfully stop the genocide. The problem becomes how to 
measure this capacity. Is the capacity measured by taking into account the geographic distance 
between the state to use force and the state concerned? Or is it by taking into account the military 
power of the state to use force?  My argument is that each of the two factors is important for the 
chance of success. If a neighbouring state has the military capacity to stop genocide it might be 
much easier than other states geographically far from the scene of genocide. The examples of 
Tanzania in Uganda, Vietnam in Cambodia, India in Bangladesh and West African states in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone are telling. But where there is military capacity, the geographic distance 
is not a barrier. The example of the intervention of the US, UK and France in Iraq to save the 
Kurds and Shiites is one of many others that demonstrate this.  Though it may be difficult to 
assess each and every state’s military capacity, it is axiomatic that some states are more powerful 
than others. For instance, the five permanent members of the Security Council are even better 
placed because of their military superiority in the world. And the use of force undertaken by one 
of them may achieve the result (provided that it is not directed against one of the permanent 
members of the SC which may have more or less the same capacity).  
The fifth condition is that the state to use force should be able to respect the laws of war. One of 
them is that it should not be likely to use weapons of mass destruction. The reason is simple; the 
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state which uses force to end genocide should not cause as much deaths as the genocidaires want 
to. And since these weapons are susceptible of causing as much deaths to the potential victims of 
genocide as to other innocent people and future generations, the idea of saving people is lost 
because that state destroys than it saves. 
The sixth threshold condition, I suggest, is that the state to use force to end genocide should not 
be accused of the same acts on its own territory against its own population. And the reason is 
simple; if that state can commit genocide itself, it would hardly be expected to be motivated by a 
genuine objective to stop others from doing the same as it is doing. 
5.6. Preliminary conclusions 
To comply with the obligation to prevent genocide at the tertiary level, non-territorial states are 
obligated to take all necessary measures. When the situation requires the use of force as the only 
necessary means to end genocide, this section has shown that there may be barriers due to how 
article 2(4) has been interpreted as providing for the absolute prohibition of the use of force. This 
interpretation has had (and still has) effects on the situations of genocide because it is the one 
that has prevailed in practice over another which finds that article 2(4) is not a bar to the use of 
force for humanitarian purposes since it is not directed against the territorial integrity and 
political independence of another state or is not any other manner inconsistent with the purposes 
of the UN.  
However, this section argues that the prohibition of use of force should not be understood as 
banning the use of force in a state where genocide is being committed because the prohibition of 
genocide is a jus cogens norm. A norm of such a character should make void any other norm and 
conduct contrary to it. The Charter’s requirement on the authorisation of a competent organ of 
the UN was not meant to (and cannot) condone the commission of genocide. It should not be a 
bar to the fulfilment of such an imperative obligation to end genocide. The argument is that the 
use of force to save people from genocide should be legally justifiable when genocide as a 
serious breach of international law is being committed. Using force to end genocide should be 
understood as abiding with the obligation to end serious breach of international law which is, as 
shown before, a part of the obligation to prevent genocide. International lawyers who argue 
otherwise without providing for alternative on how to end genocide should accept to be released 




and arid rigidity of interpretation of laws.  
Where such an interpretation would not be convincing enough, non-territorial states should use 
force to end genocide and invoke necessity which is a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness 
of the use of force because the interest to save populations from genocide is superior to the mere 
requirement of the UN authorization. In fact, if states were banned to use force in order to stop 
an on-going genocide where the UN has failed to do it, the rules on the prevention of genocide 
and the aim of the UN would be rendered meaningless, at least clearly at the tertiary level.  
In arguing this way, I do not purport to end or resolve the whole debate on the use of force.  For 
the purpose of this work, modesty demands to say that my arguments are based on interpreting 
the norms involved in good faith in light with the object and purpose of the norms on the 
prohibition of genocide and the Charter itself.  
The measures suggested at the tertiary level (as at other levels in previous sections) are assumed 
to be susceptible of preventing genocide but they may need to be accompanied by the use of 
influence as a preventive means available to non-territorial states at all levels. This is an 
interesting notion which deserves some consideration in a separate section below. 
6. The use of influence as means to prevent genocide at all levels  
The aim for this section is to clarify the notion of influence as a means available to non-territorial 
states for the prevention of genocide. It is proceeded in three subsections. The first defines this 
notion. The second explains how to use it and the third discusses how to assess the capacity to 
influence. 
6.1. Definition of influence 
The ICJ used the notion of influence as one of the means available to non-territorial states for the 
prevention of genocide in other states but did not define that notion. This notion has also been 
used by the Security Council in more or less similar way but also without defining it.978 Since no 
special meaning was given to it, it will be used here in its ordinary meaning. The Black’s law 
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dictionary defines influence as a power exerted over others.979 That dictionary explains that to 
influence is to affect, modify or act upon by physical, mental or moral power, especially in some 
gentle, subtle and gradual way.980 The Oxford dictionary also defines influence in more or less 
the same way. According to that dictionary, influence is an action exerted, imperceptibly or by 
indirect means, by one person or thing on another so as to cause changes in conduct, 
development, conditions, etc.981 It is the capacity to have an effect on the character, 
development, or behaviour of someone or something, or the effect itself.982  This power to 
influence may derive from ability, wealth, position etc. 
Applying this meaning to the influence in the prevention of genocide, it is possible to say that the 
influence in the prevention of genocide is the power exerted by non-territorial states to a 
territorial state concerned or any other person likely to commit, or already committing genocide, 
to discharge its obligation to prevent genocide and refrain from acting in a way that may lead to 
genocide. This influence may derive from the ability or position of non-territorial states to take 
physical actions that may compel the states to change their plan/conduct. This may fall within 
what has been discussed in the previous sections. But the influential power may also derive from 
the wealth of non-territorial states as well as other political links between them and the states 
concerned. This needs attention below.  
6.2. The use of influence to prevent genocide 
There is no doubt; the use of influence with regard to the prevention of genocide is a novelty of 
the ICJ. It has not much support in literature. It is nonetheless essential to discuss its (potential) 
use in more or less concrete way.  
Some states may depend on outside support to be able to function. That means that they may be 
under the full infusion of some non-territorial states that support them financially, militarily, 
logistically, or any other way. This is the same for non-state actors which may depend on outside 
support. Most of the time, those non-territorial states which support them in many areas have the 
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capacity to influence them. They can do it in a good or bad way. Risks of genocide may be there 
even before the support. But states which support may help to take away the risks if they use the 
influence in a good way. On the other hand, if the supporters are passive or are active in 
influencing negatively, the influence can even make things worse by speeding up the genocide 
and by giving to states the ability to make it possible. 
Hence, if the use of influence is a means to prevent genocide, non-territorial states need to use it 
in a good way, i.e, in a way that helps them to comply with their obligation to prevent genocide. 
This would logically imply to refrain from influencing them in a bad way (negative obligation). 
Moreover, there would be both the positive obligation to influence in a way that contributes to 
the prevention of genocide and a negative obligation not to influence states or other actors in a 
way that may help to violate the obligation to prevent genocide. For instance, the support 
(assistance) in other states should be accompanied with the obligation to ensure that the influence 
pertaining to that support is used in a way that does not make genocide possible. This can fit 
perfectly well at the primary level of prevention.  Indeed, it may be assumed that if the influence 
is used in a good way, it may contribute to preventing the risks of genocide from developing.  
Moreover, this influence can also work at further levels: secondary and tertiary. Concerning the 
influence that may be used at the secondary level, it has been extensively written how France had 
tremendous influence over the Rwandan government before the genocide started.983 The 
influence derived from the support in various areas such as financial, military etc. It has been 
overwhelmingly affirmed that had France wished, it could have used its influence over Rwanda 
during the conflict, to prevent what later happened.984 Among those writings, the French 
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parliamentary commission on the French mission in Rwanda has noted that given the flagrant 
lack of progress toward democratisation, the French government should have asked itself on the 
coherence of its politics vis-à-vis Rwanda and that it should have convinced President 
Habyarimana to democratise the regime that was committing repeated human rights violations, 
while ensuring to him the indefectible military and diplomatic support.985 On its turn, the 
International Panel of Eminent Personalities noted that “since the Habyarimana government 
remained a favourite recipient of foreign aid, and since no one demanded an end to the escalating 
incitement against the Tutsi,”986 nothing would preclude Hutu radicals from believing that “they 
could get away with just about anything.”987 This Panel irresistibly concluded that “…until the 
genocide began, the French government was the closest foreign ally of a Rwandan government 
that was guilty of massive human rights abuses. Likewise, it has been observed that Serbian 
government “was in a position to exert enormous amount of influence over the Bosnian Serb 
forces.”988 And as the court affirmed it, Serbia should have used its influence over them to 
prevent genocide in Bosnia.989 
At the tertiary level, influence can still be needed. The International Panel of Eminent 
Personalities noted with regard to France’s capacity to influence the government of Rwanda to 
stop committing genocide that, as a matter of deliberate policy, it failed to use its undoubted 
influence to end such behaviour”.990  
The two examples (France-Rwanda and Serbia-Bosnia) show the undeniable capacity to 
influence the action of the person likely to commit genocide or already committing it. The 
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question is whether the capacity to influence can only exist when it is axiomatic as it was in these 
two examples. This leads me to the examination of how the existence of influence can be 
assessed. 
6.3. Assessing the capacity to influence 
If it can be inferred from the ICJ interpretation that non-territorial states have the obligation to 
use influence as a means to prevent genocide at each level, how can it be assessed? As already 
seen before, the ICJ noted that in assessing this capacity, one needs to consider some parameters 
which may include the geographical distance, the political links.  The uncertainties surrounding 
these parameters have been shown before, and they apply also here. For instance, though the 
geographical distance may indeed be useful to establish links between the non-territorial state 
and the state or other actors concerned, the reality on the ground shows that states far from the 
scene of events may be even much more influential than those which are nearer. This means that 
the position of a state may be more determinant. Furthermore, with regard to the political link, it 
is clear from the ICJ interpretation that where this link between a non-territorial state and the 
territorial state or other actor concerned exists, the obligation to prevent genocide requires it to 
use the influence in preventing genocide.  
The understanding of this ruling may face some problems. Firstly, there is no indication on how 
the influence can be measured. Indeed, given the intangibility of influence, it is very difficult to 
set standards on assessing the influence. Secondly, this ruling might be understood to be limited 
to only where there is an established link between the non-territorial state and the territorial state 
or any other person concerned. And one might ask why this would also not be possible to other 
states that, though no existing link with the territorial state or any other person concerned, have 
the means to influence it by either establishing a relation with it solely for the prevention of 
genocide or using any other means to influence that state. In fact, when the ICJ ruled that Serbia 
had enormous influence over the Bosnian Serbs forces because of the link it had with them; it 
must be argued that it did not mean that no other states could have had influence on them. This 
has been also shown in literature that, though indeed Serbia had influence over the Bosnia Serbs 
forces, there were many other states that could have had influence but did not use it over the 
Bosnian Serb forces.991  It may be highly difficult to assess how a state can be able to influence 
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another when there are no existing ties between them but it may not just simply be said that no 
influence is possible in such a situation because the position of the state to influence may suffice 
for the state or the other persons to be influenced to count on the benefit from that state in the 
future. 
Thirdly, the ruling of the court may be understood to mean only the use of influence over the 
state and any person likely to commit genocide or already committing it. This would exclude the 
possibility of the use of influence not over the person likely to commit or already committing 
genocide but to the one likely to contribute to preventing it from happening and preventing its 
continuation after it has started. For instance, a non-territorial state like the UK may not have 
been in a position to influence Bosnian Serb forces but over Serbia instead. Why wouldn”t it use 
it to convince Serbia to prevent genocide in Bosnia (by influencing the Bosnian Serb forces in 
that way). Likewise, supposing that a non-territorial state like the US did not have influence over 
the government of Rwanda before and during the genocide in Rwanda, it should have used the 
influence it had over the UN to prevent what happened. In fact, if the rule is to employ all 
necessary means to ensure that genocide does not happen, and the influence can be necessary to 
make genocide not happen, then it can be argued that using it wherever it is necessary to prevent 
genocide would play a bigger preventive role than how the ICJ has limitatively explained it. 
6.4. Preliminary conclusions 
Despite these challenges, it must be said that this novel idea of the ICJ is laudable and it may 
have a contribution to the prevention of genocide. This influence does not take away other 
measures shown in previous sections that non-territorial states may take to prevent genocide. It 
may be used together with them where necessary but also without them as the circumstances 
dictate. Using influence to prevent genocide at all levels may be a good means to prevent 
genocide. However, the indeterminacies surrounding that notion as explained above as well as 
the lack of practice in that area show the need to do more in its further development for it to be a 
more promising means of prevention of genocide. That further development is the best route for 
a better prevention of genocide through the use of influence. The ICJ and the ILC could be better 
placed to do that. The next question is about how this means to prevent as well as other means 
available to non-territorial states as discussed before are coordinated.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           




7. Coordination at all three levels of prevention in discharging the 
obligation of non-territorial states to prevent genocide992  
As discussed in the previous sections, the obligation to prevent genocide is a collective one.993 
The ICJ indicated in the Bosnia v. Serbia judgment that the result of preventing genocide could 
have been achieved if several states had combined efforts, each complying with its obligation to 
prevent.994 These efforts can be made individually, but could also take the form of cooperation 
by several states. Yet nowhere it was shown how the preventive measures to be taken by 
different actors (taken individually or collectively) can be coordinated. The question becomes 
then about how this obligation of all states, owed to all states, can be discharged in a coordinated 
way, in order to know who does what, when, how and where precisely. 
Mark Toufayan has observed that the idea of a duty, and not merely a right, of not directly 
affected states to enforce compliance by a state with its obligations relating to genocide, 
overestimates the capacity of states in general to identify signs of imminent genocide and to 
employ measures to prevent human rights abuses.995 He continued that such a duty may lead to 
anarchy if no institutional mechanisms are established or no existing structures are used to 
control the execution by all states of their duty to prevent.996 Indeed, whether a preventive 
measure can be taken individually by a state or through cooperation, international law does not 
provide clear mechanism on how this should be coordinated. Coordination would resolve many 
problems involved in the prevention of genocide. For instance, it would help to know who has 
the capacity to take preventive measures in some specific situations. It would also help to avoid 
some duplication in taking some measures. In fact, if a state has already taken some measures, it 
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might be better in some circumstances that other states take different measures. Another example 
is that this coordination would help to identify where international cooperation is needed and the 
form it can take. In fact, international cooperation in the prevention of genocide which takes its 
roots from the preamble of the Genocide Convention,997 has not been clarified by that very 
convention as to how it is to be done concretely. In the preamble of that convention, it is 
explicitly noted that “in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-
operation is required.”998  The ILC confirmed this requirement to cooperate to bring serious 
breaches of international law to an end,999  but did not indicate the form of cooperation either. 
Article 41 of ILC draft articles on state responsibility also considers this co-operation essential. It 
states that “States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach 
within the meaning of article 40”.1000 The latter article concerns serious breach by a State of an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.1001 It (the ILC) justified 
this lack of indication by invoking the diversity of the circumstances which could be 
involved.1002  There is nonetheless some indication where the ILC noted that both institutional 
and non-institutional kinds of cooperation can be envisaged provided that the means used are 
lawful.1003  
Later, the ICJ also recognised that the combined efforts of several States, each complying with 
its obligation to prevent, might achieve the result averting the commission of genocide which the 
efforts of only one State were insufficient to produce.1004 It thus reaffirmed the necessity of 
cooperation in discharging the obligation to prevent genocide. However, it did not show how this 
can be coordinated.  
The point here is not to determine the details on the different kinds of cooperation. Instead, it is 
to show this gap in international law. This compels me to suggest a creation of an institution on 
the prevention of genocide that would coordinate these responsibilities. Such an institution 
would supervise and control the implementation of the obligation to prevent genocide by states 
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(including the territorial states). It would also contribute to the clarification of some other means 
of prevention such as the use of influence as shown above. Moreover, the fact that the obligation 
to prevent genocide is owed to everybody, without any hierarchical coordination between the 
bearers, it may easily be breached by everybody. And this is a big challenge which weakens the 
prevention of genocide because if each state takes action (or should take it) in its way without 
any coordination, it is even difficult to know who breached what, when, how and where. Hence, 
though the rules on coordination are not the only needed for the prevention of genocide, they are 
indispensable for the prevention of genocide by states for the prevention to be possible (and of 
course effective). It can be therefore argued that there is a need of amendment of the Genocide 
Convention or an adoption of an additional protocol to it which would include a creation of an 
organisation for the implementation of the Genocide Convention and the customary law it 
reflects. That organisation could monitor the implementation of the obligation to prevent 
genocide and could coordinate the works of all actors involved in the prevention. This institution 
could be called the Organisation for the Prevention of Genocide (OPG). It should have the 
independence from states, the capacity and authority to investigate from early stages and to 
recommend appropriate measures to be taken at different levels. But a creation of such an 
institution may not be enough alone. It would also involve the creation of a fund for the 
prevention of genocide (FPG) that should be managed by the OPG and should take care of all 
issues related to the prevention of genocide. Without saying that this can guarantee the non-
commission of genocide, it can certainly create a more favourable legal framework in the 
prevention of genocide.  
If that is not done, the promise to prevent genocide by non-territorial states will remain shaky or 
“blank cheques” as it has appeared in different cases. It should be recalled that during the process 
to adopt the Genocide Convention, the Netherlands deemed it “important to carefully consider 
which stipulation could be accepted by a large number of states”.1005  This was because, as it 
continued, it “would regret if, in order to obtain a speedy result, a document were created which 
could not really enter into force”.1006 Apparently this suggestion has prevailed in the drafting of 
the Genocide Convention in that some relevant provisions like one related to the coordination 
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were not included. If that might have been a strategy needed by then to have somewhere to start 
from, it can validly be said that now after 65 years of the existence of that Convention, it would 
equally be regrettable if that Convention created using empty words (in order to be accepted by a 
large number of states) which practically resulted in empty outcome would remain unchanged. 
In the meanwhile, the ILC and the ICJ (when the opportunity arises) may contribute to 
developing this area further in order to alleviate the acute gap on coordination in the prevention 
of genocide. Other researches are also needed to contribute to the clarification of that issue. 
Conclusion 
This chapter investigated whether international law permits and requires non-territorial states to 
prevent genocide outside their territories and where the answer was affirmative it investigated 
how it should be done in concreto. Doing this required first to confront this obligation to prevent 
genocide with the principle of the state sovereignty recognised in international law, in order to 
see whether the latter is not a barrier to the prevention of genocide by non-territorial states. It has 
been argued that since the popular sovereignty is at the centre and even the purpose of the state 
sovereignty, it counts more than the borders. States have the primary responsibility to protect 
their populations from genocide. Therefore, the opinion that sovereignty is not “merely the right 
to be undisturbed from without, but the responsibility to perform the tasks expected of an 
effective government,”1007 is persuasive. This reasoning rejected the argument that “the 
preservation and stability of governments are the main values in international relations.”1008 The 
right to inviolability should be regarded as lost by a state…” in response to its own inactivity or 
incapacity and to the unassuaged needs of its own people.”1009 The argument that the surest 
means by which a state may avoid outside intervention is to recognize and itself ensure respect 
for fundamental rights and liberties in the territories under its jurisdiction,1010 is valid. The 
absolute sovereignty is to be rejected with regard to genocide because it would mean to limit 
states from preventing genocide outside their boundaries and therefore permit states to commit 
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unchecked/unstoppable genocide. This would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
rules on the prohibition of genocide which is to avoid the occurrence of genocide. However, 
since the actions by non-territorial states may not be unlimited, this chapter had also to examine 
what is legally required to states at each level (primary, secondary and tertiary). 
At the primary level, it was argued that two categories of measures are necessary for the 
prevention of genocide by non-territorial states. These are the necessary legislation as well as 
other measures. For the necessary legislation, in addition to the legislation that prevent genocide 
on their own territories, non-territorial states also have the obligation to put in place legislation 
that can have effect on the prevention of genocide outside their territories as well. For instance, 
in addition to penalising the incitement to commit genocide, states should have laws that would 
enable them to prosecute and punish those who have committed it in their own states. Universal 
jurisdiction is necessary to give effect to such crimes wherever they may be committed. It was 
shown how the obligation to provide for the universal jurisdiction for genocide takes its source in 
customary international law. This applies to genocide and related crimes committed outside a 
state’s boundaries and can have effect on the prevention of genocide because it dissuades 
potential offenders. No contradiction of this international customary rule with article VI of the 
Genocide Convention exists because the latter is not considered to be exhaustive as the 
subsequent practice has proven it. The second category of measures which concern measures 
other than legislative include political, social-economic, cultural, educational, security, etc. It 
was understood that they may take the form of negative or positive obligation. For the form of 
negative obligation, states are required to refrain from taking part in activities that can create 
tension between groups in other states (that may lead, soon or late, to genocide). As for the form 
of positive obligation, it was argued that states are permitted to take actions in assisting other 
states to build a stable environment that does not favour the development of the process to 
genocide.  
At the secondary level of prevention it was also focused on two categories of measures. The first 
category was about implementing the laws on the punishment of some crimes that may lead to 
genocide which means more specifically to apply the principle of universal jurisdiction. Despite 
the challenges in the process, it was argued that states are not only permitted but also have the 
obligation to search and bring to justice people who commit crimes such as the incitement to 
commit genocide, the conspiracy to commit genocide and hate speech that falls in the acts of 




crimes against humanity. It was argued that punishing these crimes on time (before genocide 
happens) can have preventive effect and that was the idea to put them in the Genocide 
Convention. The other category is about other measures. It was argued that non-territorial states 
have the obligation not to be involved in the activities that may fuel tension among groups in 
other states and that they have the obligation to take various positive actions in the prevention of 
genocide.  
At the tertiary level, robust actions which may involve the use of force are needed to end 
genocide. It was examined whether this could be done under the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention but it was found that the state of debate on this doctrine does not provide a definite 
answer on that. However, it has been noticed that the arguments of the opponents of this doctrine 
are seemingly the ones that prevail today. One of the reasons advanced by them is that 
humanitarian intervention as defined today may give room to abuses because states could then 
invoke any human rights to forcibly intervene in other states. A recourse to the commission of 
genocide as a possible ground to justify and require the use of force has been made. It was 
argued that a progressive interpretation of the rules on the prohibition of genocide could have a 
room for the use of force to end genocide because of the peremptory nature of its prohibition. 
Where this argument would be not convincing enough, it was argued that the principle of 
necessity may preclude the wrongfulness of use of force in case non-territorial states do it in 
order to save people under the peril of genocide when this is the only available way these people 
can be saved.  
Furthermore, the novel notion of influence as means to prevent genocide at all levels was 
discussed. It was argued that it is indeed a new (or at least newly expressed) means of prevention 
which can be used at different levels of prevention. The challenges it may face have also been 
identified. Among them there is a lack of means to assess it. Also there is no one to assess it. 
That is why in the last section on the coordination in discharging the obligation to prevent 
genocide it has been suggested that there is a need to create an international institution for the 
prevention of genocide. This institution would not only assess the influence but would coordinate 
how this obligation ought to be discharged in general. This is not to ignore the role that the UN 









Chapter VII. The United Nations and the obligation to prevent 
genocide under international law 
“There can be no more important issue and no more binding obligation than the prevention of 
genocide”, 
Indeed, this may be considered one of the original purposes of the United Nations. The “Untold 
Sorrow” which the scourge of war had brought to mankind, at the time when the organization 
was established, included genocide on a horrific scale. The words “Never again” were on 
everyone’s lips,” Kofi Annan.1011 
Introduction 
The three previous chapters mainly discussed the obligation to prevent genocide in international 
law with a specific focus on what states are obligated to do in preventing genocide. Because of 
the nature of this obligation and the actions needed at different levels of prevention as well as the 
challenges involved, the need to see the role of the United Nations in the prevention of genocide 
became pressing at several occasions. This is also because the UN has been mentioned in the 
Genocide Convention. Indeed, while article I of the Genocide Convention provides for the 
obligation vis-à-vis contracting parties to prevent and punish genocide, article VIII provides for 
recourse to the UN for preventive actions. This article states that “Any Contracting Party may 
call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the 
United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III”.1012 
An analysis of the language used in these two articles read in the context of the Genocide 
Convention as a whole as well as other related sources of international law is very essential in 
order to know whether the United Nations has an obligation to prevent genocide and in the 
affirmative to know the actions it should take in complying with that obligation. Other questions 
linked to this need to be answered as well. The first is whether the obligation to prevent genocide 
by the UN (if any) is subjected to prior information by contracting states about the risk, 
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imminence or occurrence of genocide. The second is related to the territorial scope of that 
obligation (if any). The third is related to the organs of the UN which are competent to take 
action to prevent genocide at each level and the actions they may and should take.  
To find answers to these questions, this chapter is divided in 3 sections. The first section will 
treat the question whether the UN has the obligation to prevent genocide. While the second 
section will discuss the territorial scope of the obligation to prevent genocide by the UN, the 
third will investigate what organs of the UN are competent to take preventive measures and what 
kinds of measures they can and should take to prevent genocide at each level of prevention. 
1. The obligation of the United Nations to prevent genocide 
This section will first look at the drafting history of art VIII of the Genocide Convention in order 
to understand what that history could mean to the obligation to prevent genocide. This will be 
done while also examining how this article has been interpreted later in literature (1.1). Other 
possible legal sources will be examined in order to investigate what could be the basis of the UN 
obligation to prevent genocide (1.2). The conclusion will be drawn that the UN has the 
obligation to prevent genocide under general international law, enhanced by the purposes and 
general competence of the UN under the Charter. It will also be examined whether the obligation 
to prevent genocide by the UN comes into existence only when it is called upon by states (1.3). 
1.1. Drafting history of article VIII and how it was interpreted later 
To show what article VIII of the Genocide Convention means to the prevention of genocide by 
the UN, it is worth going back to its drafting history. That history shows different views of 
delegates of states. Some of those delegates have urged the deletion of this article whereas others 
have supported it. For instance, the United States, the United Kingdom and Belgium did not 
support this proposal and suggested that article VIII be dropped because its concerns were 
already dealt with in the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.1013 For them, what is permitted under 
the Charter should not be permitted in different terms in a convention.1014  In contrast, the Soviet 
Union’s delegate argued that any act of genocide is a threat to the international peace and 
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security and as such should be dealt with under chapters VI and VII of the Charter;1015 the 
obligation to bring a case of genocide to the attention of the Security Council would ensure that 
States did not evade their obligations.1016 
After a long debate, in which the article was deleted and reintroduced,1017 article VIII was finally 
voted for.1018 For some, although this article was unnecessary because the powers it conferred to 
the Security Council were already conferred to it by the Charter, it was essential to have this 
provision in the Genocide Convention so that the convention could not be understood to imply 
recourse only to the ICJ.1019  
After this article was adopted, comments, critics and support have continued. For instance, 
Nehemiah Robinson criticized the article for being insignificant and observed that its “low 
value” was shown by the fact that it was originally deleted.1020  Likewise, Benjamin Whitaker 
wrote that article VIII adds nothing new to the convention.1021 Their views were that this article 
added nothing to what was already provided for by the Charter. 
Others have been in favour of this article. Among them, Hans-Henrich Jeckeck argued that 
article VIII which allows for recourse to the organs of the UN, presents an obstacle to any state 
that might invoke article 2(7) of the Charter to claim that genocide is within its domestic 
jurisdiction.1022 Similarly, Nicodeme Ruhashyankiko, Special Rapporteur on human rights adds 
that: 
“Article VIII of the convention, while adding nothing to the Charter, is of some 
importance in that it states explicitly the right of States to call upon the United Nations 
with a view to preventing and suppressing genocide and the responsibility of the 
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competent organs of the United Nations in the matter. Furthermore….it is the only article 
in the convention …which deals with the prevention of genocide, referring to the 
possibility of preventive action by the United Nations called upon by Parties to the 
Convention…such action by the UN organs is action of a particularly humanitarian 
nature, the need and justification for which should not be underestimated. It would be 
desirable for the organs of the UN, in pursuance of article VIII of the Convention, to 
exercise their powers in this field actively”.1023 
This longstanding difference of opinions on the value of article VIII results in doubt on whether 
the Genocide Convention provides for a stand-alone legal basis for action by the UN to prevent 
genocide.  
1.2. The legal basis for the UN obligation to prevent genocide 
This subsection discusses the legal basis for the UN obligation to prevent genocide by examining 
whether the Genocide Convention could be a stand-alone legal basis for that obligation or 
whether the legal basis for that obligation has to be found in general international law (1.2.1). 
The purposes and general competence of the UN will also be discussed in order to see what role 
they play in the determination of the legal basis for the UN obligation to prevent genocide 
(1.2.2).  
1.2.1. Does the UN obligation to prevent genocide derive from the Genocide Convention as a 
stand-alone legal basis or from general international law? 
The UN is not party to the Genocide Convention. Because of that, it could be understood not to 
be bound by the obligation created by it.1024 However, it has been argued that the duty imposed 
to all states under article I of the Genocide Convention and customary law extends to the UN as 
the organisation of the existing inter-state society.1025 The ICJ has confirmed that the rights and 
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obligations enshrined in the Genocide Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes1026 and 
it can be argued that the UN has become the regime for the enforcement of obligations erga 
omnes.1027  The UN is considered by some as a mechanism of enforcement without which the 
prohibition of genocide would be a dead letter and would continuously be breached.1028 Like 
other conventions of humanitarian character, the Genocide Convention must be deemed capable 
of creating not only rights but also obligations both for third states and international 
organisations.1029 As already noted earlier in this work, it has been confirmed by the ICJ in its 
advisory opinion on reservation to the Genocide Convention that the principles underlying the 
convention are recognised by civilised nations as binding on States even without any 
conventional obligation because contracting States do not have any individual advantages or 
disadvantages nor interests of their own, but merely a common interest.1030  
Furthermore, on the basis of the peremptory character of the rules enshrined in the Genocide 
Convention, they apply mutatis mutandis to intergovernmental organisations.1031 That is why 
arguments have been made that actions of the UN in relation to genocide should be seen as 
ensuring compliance with the obligations to prevent genocide that are imposed to the UN.1032  
However, like with regard to third states to the Genocide Convention, it cannot be said that it is 
the Genocide Convention that technically binds the UN to prevent genocide but the customary 
rules it contains. Giorgio Gaja has argued that when the UN does nothing to prevent genocide, it 
infringes its obligation to prevent genocide under general international law.1033 He referred to the 
ICJ ruling that a state in a position to influence “effectively the action of persons likely to 
commit, or already committing genocide”1034 would have to “take all measures to prevent 
genocide which were within its powers”.1035 He concluded that this would reasonably apply to an 
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international organisation in relation to general international law.1036 Similarly, Olivier De 
Schutter has argued that human rights are qualified as “general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations”1037 and concluded that “international organisations, as subject of international 
law, must comply with general public international law in the exercise of their activities...”1038 
Also, though not writing specifically about genocide, André de Hoogh has argued that “…the 
United Nations is also bound by the rules of universal customary law.”1039  The International 
Court of Justice has confirmed that general international law is a source of an international 
obligation that binds international organisations. It said in its opinion on the interpretation of the 
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt that:  
“International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by 
any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their 
constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties.”1040  
However, having the obligation is one thing and having the competence to act is another as it 
will be explained next. 
1.2.2. The UN obligation to prevent genocide reinforced, enhanced, confirmed and enabled by 
the purposes and general competence of the United Nations enshrined in the Charter 
The Charter of the UN was referred to in article VIII of the Genocide Convention as an 
instrument which could serve as a basis for taking appropriate actions to comply with the 
obligation to prevent genocide which exists under general international law. That is why it is said 
that that article did therefore not give extra powers to the UN. The reference to the Charter by 
article VIII of the Genocide Convention may be seen as evidence that a general rule to prevent 
genocide exists and that the Charter is an instrument that can materialise it.1041 If that were not 
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the case, it may arguably be said that there would have been no reason to refer to the Charter. 
Article VIII and the obligation of the UN to prevent genocide fit well within the purposes of the 
UN.1042 Indeed, the Charter contains human rights provisions which support the argument that 
the prevention of genocide by the UN though not explicitly mentioned in the Charter can be 
implied from them to reinforce the binding obligation to prevent genocide. Among them, article 
1(3) states that the Organization is mandated "to achieve international cooperation in ... 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms ..."1043 
Similarly, as required by article 55 of the Charter, "the United Nations shall promote: ... (c) 
universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all...".1044 
Furthermore, among other things, in the preamble of the Charter,  the people of the United 
Nations engaged themselves to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person… and to establish conditions under 
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained…”1045 Not only sometimes genocide happens in a context of 
wars but even where it may happen in peace time, it may cause as much sorrow to mankind as 
war may do. This may make it be among those odious scourges the United Nations are 
determined to save the succeeding generations from suffering.  
The provisions of the Charter mentioned above are obligations that emanate from the purposes of 
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the UN which include saving people from suffering from grave human rights violations. On this 
same question whether human rights obligations are contained in the Charter, referring to mainly 
its preamble as well as articles 55 and 56, Ian Brownlie has argued that they do and that they 
create legal obligation under the UN Charter.1046 The ICJ also seems to have given an affirmative 
answer to that question as well. In the advisory opinion in the Namibia case, the ICJ observed 
that: “…to enforce distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on 
grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of 
fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the 
Charter.”1047 The ICJ noted the same in the case concerning the US Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Teheran that “…to wrongfully deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject 
them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”1048 Some scholars have drawn from these 
instances to argue that the court has accepted that the human rights provisions of the Charter 
contain binding obligations and that they may be interpreted in light of subsequent human rights 
instruments adopted by the United Nations.1049  
Arguably, in practice the UN has not considered itself as having no obligation to prevent 
genocide. For instance, Boutros Boutros-Ghali who was the UN Secretary-General during the 
Rwandan genocide challenged the Security Council, saying it was afraid to use the word 
“genocide” in presidential statements and resolutions because this would have required it to 
prevent the crime being committed.1050 His successor Kofi Annan went to Rwanda in 1998 to 
acknowledge that the international community and the UN failed Rwanda at the time of evil.1051 
In his action plan of 2004, Kofi Annan again noted that “neither the United Nations Secretariat, 
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nor the Security Council…. paid enough attention to the gathering signs of disaster. Still less did 
we take timely action.”1052 Likewise, the UN independent inquiry on the actions of the UN in the 
1994 Rwanda genocide concluded that the UN failed in its obligation to prevent that 
genocide.1053 Also, in his 2009 report on the situation in the North Kivu, the Special Adviser on 
the prevention of genocide wrote that his office “acts on the premise that the responsibility of 
preventing genocide and related atrocities lies with the United Nations system as a whole, 
including the Security Council and the Secretariat.”1054 Several other reports and writings have 
reached the same conclusion.1055 Also, in the November 2012 report of the Secretary-General’s 
Internal Review Panel on the United Nations in Sri Lanka, it was concluded that the “UN system 
failed to meet its responsibilities to protect civilians.”1056  More particularly, the report pointed 
the finger to the failure of the Secretariat, the members of the Security Council and the Human 
Rights Council. Though this report is not about the prevention of genocide as such and had no 
mandate to establish if genocide was committed in Sri Lanka, the statement of the Secretary-
General does confirm that the UN has an obligation towards humanity to protect it “from harm” 
in which the protection of people from genocide finds its place. He said: “Our obligation to all 
humanity is to overcome our setbacks, learn from our mistakes, strengthen our responses, and act 
meaningfully and effectively for the future.  These principles and objectives drove me to 
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establish the Panel and they will guide us as we take forward its outcomes.”1057 These principles 
that he referred to were also mentioned in the report in which it was concluded that “events in Sri 
Lanka mark a grave failure of the UN to adequately respond to early warnings and to the 
evolving situation during the final stages of the conflict and its aftermath, to the detriment of 
hundreds of thousands of civilians and in contradiction with the principles and responsibilities of 
the United Nations.”1058 In the same circumstances, the report would notice the same failure of 
the UN if genocide was committed in Sri Lanka. 
Moreover, it may be said that without the obligation of the UN to prevent genocide, that 
obligation would have little meaning: although states are primarily obligated to prevent 
genocide, in many cases they may not easily prevent it without either the authorization or the 
involvement of the UN. At this level, it may be said that the obligation to prevent genocide is 
imposed to the UN by general international law because the principles underlying the prohibition 
of genocide in international law are customary rules and that it is enhanced and confirmed by the 
purposes and general competence of the UN as enshrined in the Charter of the UN.  In fact, given 
the horrors that preceded the creation of the UN, it would have been a fundamental mistake to 
create an organization which would have the responsibility to prevent wars without having the 
same responsibility to prevent genocide. And even where it could not be established that that was 
the intention of the framers of the Charter, I would join Tesón who has argued that “international 
treaties, especially the UN Charter, should be interpreted in accordance with present purposes 
and expectations in the international community.”1059 I argue that preventing genocide falls 
squarely within the goals of the UN. If a contrary interpretation were the one to prevail, then 
there would be an extremely urgent necessity to reconsider the Charter to make it clear that the 
prevention of genocide independently falls within the purposes of the UN and that the UN is 
consequently bound by it. Further precisions will be given in a section on the competent organs 
of the UN and the actions they can take to prevent genocide and the temporal scope thereof. 
Before that, there is a need to first answer the question whether the UN is relieved of its 
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obligation to prevent genocide if states do not call it upon to take actions thereof. 
1.3. Is the obligation of the UN to prevent genocide triggered only if called upon by 
states? 
During the discussion on the drafting of article VIII of the Genocide Convention, the language of 
that article as far as calling upon the UN is concerned was not clarified. However, there have 
been some discussions on who should have the obligation to report the genocide being 
committed to the competent organs of the UN. Indeed, Raphael Lemkin and V. Pella Vespasian 
who were consulted by the Secretariat as experts suggested that it should be a duty of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, because the governments might hesitate to do it 
themselves.1060 Yet, others said that this suggestion would be a violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations because it did not attribute that power to the Secretary-General.1061  
The initial draft of article VIII by the Secretariat contained a paragraph which provided that 
parties “shall do everything in their power to give full effect to the intervention of the United 
Nations”. At the urge of the Netherlands this was eliminated because as the Netherlands 
observed, this had a little real meaning.1062 Robinson later criticised this deletion because he 
found the deleted paragraph clearer than the new one and he observed that there is a lack of 
clearness on the obligation of states to call upon the competent organs of the UN to take action in 
case of genocide.1063 In my view, however, I find the Dutch position tenable because this 
paragraph would still add nothing to the language used that states may call upon the competent 
organs of the UN to take action. This paragraph was rather a further step to be taken after the UN 
has decided to intervene and not at the level of calling it upon. So, if the first paragraph asked 
states to call upon competent organs of the UN, there is no reason to say in another paragraph 
that states will do everything to give effect to the intervention of the UN because this follows 
from article 25 of the Charter for example. Not considering that initial draft makes sense. 
However, the language used in the final article is not less vague. It does not indicate whether  the 
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action of the UN is conditioned to a prior call by states parties. As was also noticed by Robinson, 
what is clear here is that this article grants to the contracting parties to the convention, the right 
to call upon the organs of the competent organs of the United Nations to take action,1064 but does 
not say anything on whether or not the action of the UN is conditioned to a prior call of 
contracting parties. This right has indeed been used with express reference to article VIII of the 
Genocide Convention by the US Secretary of State Colin Powell while initiating in the Security 
Council, the creation of a commission on Darfur.1065 He said that he was acting pursuant to that 
article and the commission was launched following this initiative.1066 But in no way he indicated 
that the UN could only do that upon the call by the United States as contracting state to the 
Genocide Convention. 
There is no basis for a claim that a prior request to the UN by states is required before the UN 
can act. If the UN has the obligation to prevent genocide it rather follows that it should act 
proprio motu rather than making itself dependent on information from whomever.   
1.4. Preliminary conclusions 
In this section, it is concluded that since the rules on the prohibition of genocide are of universal 
customary law, they create the obligation to prevent genocide not only for states but also for the 
UN as an international organisation. This obligation of the UN is reinforced, enhanced, 
confirmed and enabled by the purposes and general competence of the United Nations enshrined 
in the Charter. It is not article VIII of the Genocide Convention (which refers to the UN) that 
confers to the UN the power to prevent genocide.1067 Yet, that fact does not make that article 
irrelevant as some writers have argued.  Article VIII does not create new powers of (organs of) 
the UN as such, but it refers to the instrument that gives the powers to the UN which may include 
the prevention of genocide. There was no need to reproduce all the provisions that are relevant to 
the prevention of genocide in the Genocide Convention and the reference to the Charter was 
considered sufficient in this regard. In complying with that obligation, the UN does not have to 
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first be called upon by states. This would be contrary to the UN being established as organisation 
to implement common objectives. Furthermore, the Charter provides the procedures/competence 
for its functioning and operation and it does not require prior information by states before it can 
act. The actions of the UN will be discussed further in other sections of this chapter related to the 
competence of the organs of the UN to take action in the prevention of genocide. Before that, the 
territorial scope of the UN obligation to prevent genocide will be first examined in next section. 
2. The territorial scope of the obligation to prevent genocide by the UN 
It will be examined here whether or not the actions of the competent organs of the UN may be 
limited to the signatories of the Genocide Convention and parties to the Charter of the UN or 
whether under the obligation to prevent genocide, the competent organs of the United Nations 
are allowed to take action in the territory of a State which is party to the Convention or to the 
Charter or to both.  
In the first draft of the Genocide Convention that was prepared by the Secretary-General, 
paragraph one of the text related to article VIII of the Convention read as follows: 
“Irrespective of any provisions in the foregoing articles, should the crimes as defined in 
this Convention be committed in any part of the world, or should there be serious reasons 
for suspecting that such crimes have been committed, the High Contracting Parties may 
call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take measures for the 
suppression or prevention of such crimes…” 
This formulation suggested that the competent organs of the UN take actions to prevent genocide 
in any part of the world, but this paragraph was amended later and there is no clear indication on 
the reasons that pushed the drafters to remove the “in any part of the world” formulation. This 
problem on whether the UN organs were allowed to take measures in non-parties of the 
Genocide Convention remained and it was raised in further discussions of the ad hoc 
Committee.1068 To solve it, as was later noted, it was said that the solution to the problem must 
be looked for in the provisions of the Charter which gave the General Assembly and the Security 
Council competence in respect of matters affecting international peace and security and human 
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rights to which there could be no territorial limits.1069As was noted by Robinson, these provisions 
include article 2(6) which provides that “the organization shall ensure that states which are not 
members of the UN act in accordance with the principles of the Charter so far as may be 
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.1070 Article 10 also did not 
place any limitation to the General Assembly on the discussions and recommendations. This 
article gives the General Assembly the possibility to discuss matters related to violations of 
human rights which may include situations of genocide. Similarly, chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII 
of the Charter do not place any limitation to the Security Council in dealing with matters related 
to the maintenance of international peace and security.1071  Also, according to article 99 of the 
Charter of the UN, the Secretary-General of the UN, without any territorial limitation, may bring 
to the attention of the Security Council, any matter which may threaten the international peace 
and security.1072 
From this, Ruhashyankiko deduced that it follows that an organ of the United Nations would 
have the right to take action to prevent genocide even in the case of states members or non-
members of the UN which were not parties to the Genocide Convention. However, as this 
commentator noted, such action would not mean that the convention was binding on States 
which were not parties to it, but would simply be an application of the general powers of United 
Nations organs in the specific case of genocide,1073 and there is apparently no conflict between 
the two instruments on this. This view by the mentioned commentators seems to be plausible and 
there is no controversy among writers on this.  
It can therefore be safe to say that the Charter of the UN which was referred to by article VIII of 
the Genocide Convention provides for a mechanism through which genocide can be prevented 
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anywhere by competent organs of the United Nations. This alternative may serves as a solution 
on the difficulties related to the hesitation that states parties to the UN and/or to the Genocide 
Convention, may have on the prevention of genocide in states non-parties to the Genocide 
Convention. However, as will be shown in the next section, some conditions might have to be 
fulfilled before the competent organs can take action. 
3. The competence of organs of the United Nations to prevent genocide 
and when and how they can act 
Article VIII of the Genocide Convention does not specify which UN organ is competent. There 
are six principal organs of the UN: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic 
and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the 
Secretariat.1074 The question here is which of these organs are competent to take actions to 
prevent genocide and which actions they may take. It is therefore opportune to examine organ by 
organ to show the competence of each (if any) in the matter. However, since there is no practical 
use to discuss an organ which is no longer operational, the Trusteeship Council will not be 
discussed. Each subsection will correspond to each of the five organs. 
3.1.  The Security Council 
3.1.1. Does the Security Council have the competence to prevent genocide? 
Article VIII of the Genocide Convention referred to competent organs of the United Nations 
which can take actions in accordance with or in reference to the Charter of the United Nations. 
As already argued earlier, it is not this article which creates the competence of the UN. It 
presupposes that the UN is competent to prevent genocide.  To be competent means to have due 
legal authority to deal with a particular matter.1075 The Security Council’s competence to prevent 
genocide can be based on articles 1(3), 55, and 24 among others. Articles 1(3) mandates the 
Organization “to achieve international cooperation in ... promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms...”1076 Article 55 states that "the United Nations shall 
promote: ... (c) universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
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for all ...”.1077 Article 24 of the Charter confers the Security Council the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security.1078 More precisely, the powers of the 
Security Council to take actions that may be useful in preventing genocide fall under chapters VI 
and VII of the Charter. Under chapter VI which is related to pacific settlement of disputes, the 
Security Council shall, when necessary call upon parties to a dispute, to settle it through pacific 
means (negotiation, mediation, conciliation etc) in order to avoid that the conflict reaches a stage 
that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.1079 
These powers of the Security Council to act in preventing genocide have been indeed affirmed in 
literature that human rights concerns have been brought within the jurisdiction of the Security 
Council under article 24, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter.1080 However, it must be precised that 
these powers referred to here belong to the general competences of the Security Council. This 
means that all the questions that may be raised from them are not solved here. In fact, article 2(7) 
of the Charter of the UN may limit the competence of the Security Council.1081 It states that 
“nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”.1082 However, 
knowing whether and to what extent this article may limit the Security Council in the action to 
prevent genocide is possible through a discussion on when and how the Security Council may 
act.  
3.1.2. When and how can the Security Council act to prevent genocide? 
3.1.2.1. Prevention at the primary level  
The Charter of the UN subjects the powers of the Security Council to take action to a preliminary 
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condition: a dispute must endanger or breach international peace and security.1083 Yet, at this 
level, there is no sign of risk of genocide per se and generally no dispute. At the first glance, it 
may appear that the Security Council lacks the power to take action at this primary level because 
the condition of the threat to international peace and security is not met. In other words, for the 
Security Council to take action in case of human rights violation, it is generally assumed that the 
latter must have reached such a level of severity that they threaten international peace and 
security.1084 That is also what article 2(7) may imply. This assertion might not be necessarily true 
if one gives a close reading to the Charter. The Charter has been interpreted in literature that it 
reflects the view that the respect for human rights is a necessary precondition for the preservation 
of international peace and security.1085 If that is true, it would make it possible for the Security 
Council to take action not only in cases where international peace and security is actually 
threatened or breached, but also in early phases of the process leading to such a situation. This 
may include for instance the setting up of a group of experts to investigate in a given state to see 
whether there are factors that might soon or late lead to genocide. The General Assembly 
declaration on fact-finding missions supports this view. Under this declaration, “fact-finding 
missions may be undertaken by the Security Council,… in the context of their respective 
responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the 
Charter.”1086 If gathering information before a genocidal conflict starts may make the Security 
Council exercise effectively its functions in relation to the maintenance of international peace 
and security and may be significant to the prevention of genocide, it may be argued that the 
Security Council may presumably not be acting ultra vires in doing so.  
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Though it was not about the prevention of genocide, Security Council resolution 13731087 may 
serve as a support for the argument above. This resolution was adopted in the aftermath of the 11 
September terrorist attacks which did constitute a threat to international peace and security, but 
the resolution went further to decide that all states shall take various  measures to prevent and 
suppress acts of terrorism. After reaffirming that terrorism is a threat to international peace and 
security and that it is contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,1088 the 
Security Council demanded all states in this resolution, to adopt measures that include enacting 
legislation that criminalizes terrorist acts as serious criminal offences and punishes conducts that 
may lead to or facilitate terrorism.1089  It called upon all states to become parties as soon as 
possible, to relevant conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the international 
convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism of 9 December 1999.1090 It even 
created a committee to monitor the implementation of that resolution and all states were called 
on to report on actions they had taken to that end no later than 90 days from the day this 
resolution was adopted.1091  
If we apply the theory of the three levels of prevention to terrorism, it becomes clear that this 
resolution which concerned all states included those states in which there were no signs of 
terrorism and for them it refers to prevention at the primary level. This could apply to genocide 
as well, as genocide is contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN and qualifies as a threat 
or breach of international peace and security. It would follow that for instance a Security Council 
resolution demanding states to enact legislation that creates an environment that does not allow 
the emergence of a genocidal conflict even before there is a dispute is in conformity with the 
Charter.  If the Security Council can adopt such a resolution for terrorism under the authority of 
chapter VII of the UN (which makes it binding) which demands all states (including those where 
no acts of terrorism have occurred) to adopt measures to put legislation that prevents it, my 
argument is that in regard of genocide, the same legal ground could be used by the Security 
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Council to demand states to put in place legislation that prevents genocide from the primary level 
without violating article 2(7). And if the Security Council has needed a triggering event like the 
September 11 attacks to adopt such a resolution (because it needed to determine a threat to 
international peace), there are a plenty of such triggering occasions for genocide as well.1092 If 
the SC can take such measures that demand states to enact legislation that gives effect to the 
Genocide Convention (like those against totalitarianism, discrimination, inequality among 
groups, dehumanisation, extermination…), it could do the same to demand them to take any 
other measures that it deems necessary for the prevention of genocide. This is because the duty 
to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that 
promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any violations are considered and treated 
as illegal acts.1093 The Charter itself has given a clear justification for a long-term approach to 
prevent conflict in its article 55 which expressly recognizes that solutions to international 
economic, social, health and related problems; international, cultural and educational 
cooperation; and universal respect for human rights are all essential for the creation of conditions 
of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among 
nations.1094 Genocide being a potential result (or end result) of those conflicts needs to be 
prevented through that approach as well. It can therefore be concluded that the Security Council 
could take action that can prevent genocide at the primary level.  
However, given the unfamiliarity with this level of prevention today, the absence of will among 
the members of the Security Council as well as the absence of a mechanism to check its actions 
at this level,  the prevention at this level by the Security Council is likely to be disregarded by it. 
The fact that it is believed that the action by the Security Council must rest on the international 
peace and security and not on protecting human beings as such is itself a challenge to the 
prevention of genocide in general and at the primary level in particular. While the idea of the 
Security Council to base its decisions on the likelihood of a situation to threaten international 
peace and security is not bad, it is doubtful whether this idea would serve the purposes of the UN 
if it were to be interpreted as not putting the human beings at the centre of the objectives it aims 
at achieving. It is argued that this international peace and security should be interpreted as 
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aiming inter alia at protecting human beings (as the victim of endangered international peace and 
security).1095 If the opposite tendency and threshold are the ones to prevail, there is a risk that 
they will undermine the prevention of genocide, at least certainly at the primary level. In fact, if 
the human right to life is not put expressly at the centre of the aim that the maintenance of the 
peace and security wants to achieve, it would make not only the prevention of genocide by the 
Security Council at this level ineffective (if not impossible), but also the idea behind the Charter 
of the United Nations questionable. The prevention of genocide should not be dependent on 
another value because as it has also been argued, “article 1 of the Charter includes both purposes: 
maintaining peace and promoting human rights” 1096 (in which the prevention of genocide falls). 
Unless laws are made clearer on that, there is a risk that this mist will remain with all the 
consequences.  
3.1.2.2. Prevention at the secondary level  
The question here is whether the Security Council can take action to prevent a potential genocide 
and what it can do at this level. As it is impossible to mention and/or discuss all signs of 
genocide, it is also impossible to mention all possible measures that the Security Council can 
take. Only some illustrative signs and measures thereof will be discussed with the assumption 
that if the Security Council can do something in situations discussed below, it can also do it in 
regard of other situations. The secondary level has been explained in previous chapters. It is 
nonetheless worth recalling that at this level, there are concrete signs that may lead to a 
genocidal conflict and that the preventive measures aim at eliminating them in order to avoid that 
the situation escalates to genocide. Among those signs, there is internal conflict within groups in 
a given state that is likely to generate in genocide, discrimination against a given group, targeted 
killings, dehumanisation or even the incitement to commit genocide. The basis for the Security 
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Council to take actions to address these signs can be mainly found in chapters VI and VII of the 
Charter of the UN. 
3.1.2.2.1. Measures under article VI of the Charter of the UN 
In situations of disputes whose continuance may be likely to lead to genocide, some preventive 
measures may be available for the Security Council to avert that. Among them, the SC can call 
upon parties to the dispute to settle their disputes by peaceful means.1097 Those means may 
include negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements but may also be any other peaceful means of the choice of the 
parties.1098 While the Security Council can itself investigate the matter,1099 it may also 
recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment or recommend terms of 
settlement.1100 The Security Council has a big range for action because not only the provisions of 
the Charter under which it can act are relevant for prevention, but also because they do not limit 
it to only them. This may contribute to the prevention of possible genocide(s) if the Security 
Council acts in a timely fashion and adapts its actions to the nature of the conflict.   
The fact that the list of possible measures is not exhaustive has made it possible for the Security 
Council to take actions relating to the creation of peacekeeping operations. The Charter did not 
expressis verbis make reference to peacekeeping operations when it comes to taking measures in 
situation of armed conflict. However, the Security Council has found implied powers from it to 
establish them.1101 These peacekeeping operations may not be specifically created to prevent 
genocide, but they could have that effect because of the nature of the mission. It is essential to 
briefly explain what peacekeeping is and what it aims at, in order to examine whether the 
peacekeeping operations may be a tool to prevent genocide.   
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Peacekeeping is a tool available to the United Nations to help countries torn by conflict to create 
conditions for lasting peace.1102 Depending on the nature of the conflict, a peacekeeping 
operation may aim at preventing the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across 
borders; stabilizing conflict situations after a ceasefire in order to create an environment for the 
parties to reach a lasting peace agreement; assisting in implementing comprehensive peace 
agreements; and leading states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on 
democratic principles, good governance and economic development.1103 
Given this nature and aims of the peacekeeping operations, it is possible to say that they have the 
potential to prevent genocide by preventing the escalation of a conflict likely to lead to genocide. 
One may even say that, depending on how these operations are planned and executed, they may 
be well placed to prevent genocide. For instance, the Security Council established the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) by its resolution 743 as an interim arrangement to 
create the conditions of peace and security for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the 
Yugoslav crisis.1104 Though UNPROFOR was not successful in preventing genocide in 
Srebrenica, it has been acknowledged by many authors that this mission (whose name was later 
changed by the Security Council but only with regard to the troops to be deployed in Macedonia 
to become the United Nations preventive deployment: UNPREDEP),1105 was successful in 
preventing what could have escalated in an ethnic violence and possible genocide in 
Macedonia.1106 During the conflict in Rwanda, the Security Council adopted resolution 872 that 
created the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to contribute to the 
implementation of the Arusha peace agreement signed between the government of the Republic 
of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (the two parties then in conflict).1107 Among other 
                                                          
1102
 See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml(visited on 12 October 2012). 
1103
 See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml (visited on 12 October 2012). 
1104
 See Security Council Resolution 743 of  21 February 1992, available at <www.un.org>  (visited on 19 
September 2011). 
1105
 Security Council resolution 983 of 31 March 1995. 
1106
  Those authors are referred to in Akhavan, Payam, “Preventing Genocide: Measuring Success by What Does Not 
Happen”, in Criminal Law Forum (2011) 22:1–33, pp. 24-25. 
1107
 See Resolution 872 adopted by the Security Council of 5 October 1993, available at <www.un.org>  (visited on 
18 October 2012). This was following the Security Council resolution 812 of March 12, 1993 on the possibility to 
send troops in Rwanda in which it had asked the Secretary-General to examine the establishment of an international 
force in Rwanda which would be “entrusted inter alia with the protection of, and humanitarian assistance to, the 
civilian population.” The power of the UN to create a peacekeeping force had been also recognized in the Expenses 
case in which the ICJ said that such action is within the powers of the Organization and within the functions of the 




things, this resolution gave to UNAMIR, the mandate to “contribute to the security of the city of 
Kigali.”“1108 Needless to say, this implied the protection of the population under the threat of 
genocide and doing that could have been preventing genocide.1109 If the presence of the 
UNAMIR did not prevent the conflict from escalating to genocide it was not due to the legal 
impossibility to prevent that but mainly to the weakness in how UNAMIR was created and the 
means it was given.1110 That is why it has been subsequently suggested that such causes be 
addressed in the future. Indeed, if the peacekeeping operations are created on time, given a clear 
and proper mandate with sufficient means, they may clearly be good alternative to some 
challenges indicated in previous chapters. The challenges include the situation where territorial 
states are unable to prevent the escalation of a conflict that may lead to genocide and non-
territorial states are not permitted to deploy troops to prevent that escalation without the 
authorisation of the UN.1111 
3.1.2.2.2. Measures under chapter VII 
The Security Council may take coercive measures that may enforce peace, and depending on the 
nature of the conflict, this may prevent a potential genocide. The legal basis for this is chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations states 
that “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be 
taken in accordance with article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”1112  The question here is whether at the secondary level, acts that may lead to genocide 
may constitute threat to the peace. On that question, even if there is little indication on whether 
or not in 1948 (the time the Genocide Convention was adopted) genocide was considered to be a 
threat to the international peace and security, subsequent practice of the Security Council has 
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shown that now it is. For instance, although it did not mention “genocide” as such in its 
Resolution 688 of 1991, the Security Council did condemn acts that could lead to it. In this 
resolution, deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved, the Security 
Council condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, 
including in Kurdish-populated areas, the consequences of which threatened international peace 
and security in the region.1113 In the justification of the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council noted in its resolution 8271114 
that it “would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace”. In other words, the ICTY 
was predicated on a hypothesis of deterrence,1115 i.e to prevent that the situation continues to 
constitute a threat to the peace. In its resolution 12911116 the Security Council was for the first 
time even specific on genocide by calling on “all the parties to the conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo… to respect the convention on the prevention and punishment of the 
crime of genocide”.1117  
As it has been argued in literature, the concept of threat to the peace has acquired a wide 
meaning in the practice of the Security Council so that its current meaning certainly includes 
gross violations of human rights.1118 This wide discretion can be seen in the instance where the 
Security Council determined that the Beirut attack of 14 May 2005 in which the former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others were killed constituted a threat to international peace 
and security and created a special tribunal to try the suspects.1119 In situations where the 
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violations may include acts that may lead to genocide it becomes even more compelling. I also 
support the argument that acts that may lead to genocide may constitute a threat to the peace. 
Therefore, depending on the gravity of the situation, a situation at the secondary level may 
qualify as a threat to the peace. This is for instance a situation in which the plan to commit 
genocide can be surmised and the incitement to commit it is broadcasted on radios and 
televisions. It can also be a situation in which there are targeted killings (religious, national, 
ethnic or racial group). This requires immediate action by the Security Council. Of course the 
level of gravity of a situation to qualify as a threat to the peace belongs to the Security Council. 
On this power of the Security Council, it has been for instance affirmed by the ICTR that “article 
39 of the Charter of the United Nations gives a discretionary power to the Security Council in 
assessing the existence of a threat to the peace”.1120 Likewise, the Special Court for Lebanon 
observed that the Charter does not “define or spell out the prerequisites of what precisely 
constitutes peace, security or the threat to the peace”, and that it “appears to be a deliberate 
choice in order to ensure that the Security Council enjoys a great measure of freedom and 
flexibility when carrying out its responsibility to maintain international peace and security.”1121 
This discretion may be useful in that the Security Council may take any action in accordance 
with the Charter of the UN that it deems necessary to prevent the situation from escalating to 
genocide. 
Those measures of the Security Council may for example address the issue of radios, televisions 
and social media which incite to hatred or to commit genocide.1122 For instance, the Security 
Council could have taken action to authorise the UNAMIR to shut down the RTLM during the 
period it was clear that its messages were inciting to hatred and to commit genocide. Depending 
on the means to be used, this could have been authorised under article 41 or 42 of the Charter. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Lebanon, available at <http://www.un.org>  (visited on 15 November 2012) 
1120
 ICTR, Prosecutorv. Karemera, Case No.ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the Defence Motion, Pursuant to Rule 72 
of Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 25 April 2001, available at <http://www.unictr.org> (visited on 15 November 
2012). 
1121
 STL, Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash , Mustaf a Amine Badreddine, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, Assad Hassan 
Sabra, Case No. STL-II-01IPT/AC/AR90.1, Decision On The Defence Appeals Against The Trial Chamber’s 
“Decision On The Defence Challenges To The Jurisdiction And Legality Of The Tribunal”, 24 October 2012, 
available at <http://www.stltsl.org> (visited on 15 November 2012) 
1122
 Measures under article 41 of the UN Charter, may concern those not involving the use of armed force which 
may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and 




General Dallaire, the UNAMIR commander for example has asserted that "many lives would 
have been saved" if he had been provided with proper jamming equipment.”1123 Likewise, the 
Security Council could have demanded the Republic of Rwanda as well as other states to punish 
perpetrators of the crimes of incitement to discrimination or to commit genocide.   
Moreover, now that the ICC has been established, other measures  of the Security Council at this 
level may be to refer cases of crimes like the conspiracy to commit genocide and the incitement 
to commit genocide to the ICC before genocide starts.1124  For instance, the threat to refer the 
case of incitement to commit genocide to the ICC is said to have been successful in preventing 
genocide in Côte d’Ivoire.1125 Indeed, when the national radio and television broadcasted hate 
propaganda against foreigners in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004, the Security Council adopted the 
resolution 1572 in which it demanded “the government of Côte d’Ivoire to stop the radio and 
television broadcasting inciting hatred, intolerance and violence.”1126 Combined with other 
pressure, this contributed to making the hate broadcast stop later on.1127  
The Security Council may take other measures which may for instance be directed against non-
state actors/groups. Depending on the nature of the groups in question, the Security Council 
action may prevent a possible genocide. It has adopted measures on sanctions against rebel 
groups imposing to them an arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze, and even the use of force 
against them1128 in order to protect civilians. This can be a means to prevent genocide. The 
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operation Artemis in Ituri may serve as a good example for the prevention of genocide where 
acts of rebel groups may lead to genocide. When the UN mission in the Congo faced massacres 
in the eastern town of Ituri in May 2003, France took the lead in an intervention by organizing a 
three months “Operation Artemis” whose objectives were inter alia to secure the town of Bunia 
and ensure the protection of displaced persons in the refugee camps in Bunia, waiting for the 
deployment of a UN peacekeeping force at the place.1129 This was pursuant to the Security 
Council Resolution 1484 of May 2003 which authorised an interim multinational emergency 
force.1130 As Gareth Evans remarks, the Operation Artemis force (supported logistically by other 
EU countries) almost certainly prevented genocide in Ituri.1131 Though in the practice of the 
Security Council the prevention of genocide has not been mentioned in its resolutions, the 
measures taken against some rebel groups have significantly played a role in weakening them 
and presumably prevented possible genocide especially in the Eastern DRC. The hesitation to 
explicitly invoke the prevention of genocide in its resolutions may probably be due to the heavy 
weight of the word “genocide”. Yet, there is no legal reason that would prevent it from adopting 
a resolution that expressly mentions the prevention of genocide at the secondary level. 
In sum, it can be said that the Charter of the UN provides for a legal basis for the Security 
Council to play a crucial role in the prevention of genocide at the secondary level. The challenge 
may however be the absence of a mechanism to monitor, coordinate or check its actions at this 
level and this may make the prevention at this level by the Security Council be disregarded by it. 
If the situation is too grave and requires further actions, then preventive actions at the tertiary 
level may be needed. 
3.1.2.3. Prevention at the tertiary level 
When genocide is being committed, chapter VII of the Charter gives a possibility to the Security 
Council to take further actions. Under article 41 of the Charter, such actions may include to refer 
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to the ICC a situation in which individual suspects are committing genocide.1132 For instance, the 
Security Council has referred to the ICC, the situation in Darfur1133 and this was followed by the 
indictment of some individuals including President Omar Al Bashir.  
If the Security Council considers that the measures under article 41 would be inadequate or have 
proved to be inadequate, article 42 of the Charter provides for the competence to take forceful 
actions.1134 In other words, under this article, the Security Council may authorise the use of force 
to end genocide. Another means available to the Security Council is that, under chapter VIII of 
the Charter of the UN, it can utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement 
action under its authority.1135  
However, for all these ranges of competence of the Security Council, the pace to take them in 
order to end genocide has been slow mainly due to shortcomings in the implementation 
mechanism, the lack of will of its members, combined with the absence of mechanism to 
monitor, coordinate or check the action of the Security Council. For instance, with regard to the 
competence to refer a situation of genocide to the ICC, the Security Council referral of the 
situation in Sudan to the ICC made it only binding to Sudan and parties to the conflict which 
were demanded to cooperate fully with the ICC.1136 In theory, the fact that the SC did not make it 
binding to other states to execute the arrest warrant should not be a problem for the states parties 
to the Rome statute of the ICC as already seen earlier. However, in reality it can be said that the 
Security Council explicit reference to states parties to the ICC as well would have made it more 
compelling and therefore arguably increased the chances of implementability. As for states not 
parties to the ICC, the Security Council did not demand them to cooperate with the ICC. It only 
urged them to do so therewith recognising that they had no such an obligation. This reduces the 
chances of implementability of the arrest warrant against those individuals because states non-
parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC are not concerned by the resolution even though as it has 
been argued earlier in this work, there are other grounds under which they could base their right 
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and obligation to arrest them. I argue that the same grounds should apply to the Security Council  
as well when it takes action on the prevention of genocide and nothing would legally prevent it 
from demanding other states to implement its resolution because its powers derive from the 
Charter and not solely from the Rome Statute of the ICC. It would be absurd if the Security 
Council were entitled to refer a situation of a state non-member of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
and be denied the possibility to demand another non-member to implement its resolution related 
to the referral concerned. It has been argued before that the UN can act upon genocidal situations 
involving states members of the United Nations but not parties to the Genocide Convention, 
states parties to the Genocide Convention but not members of the United Nations or those neither 
parties to the Genocide Convention nor members of the United Nations if the conditions imposed 
by the Charter of the United Nations are met. The same reasons should apply here to the Security 
Council as one of its competent organs. It can indeed act outside the United Nations membership 
under some conditions.1137 This argument is supported by the practice of the Security Council 
with regard to the measures on terrorism. Indeed, after the terrorist attacks on the US embassies 
in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 and 1999 respectively, the Security Council adopted a 
number of resolutions that obligated all states (including the non-members of the UN) to take 
measures against the Taliban and all individuals involved from any place of the world in order to 
prevent acts of terrorism from reoccurring.1138 Since these resolutions bound all states, 
Switzerland adopted a number of preventive measures to implement the SC resolutions and this 
from the 2nd of October 2000, two years before it became member of the United Nations.1139 So, 
if the Security Council could legally do it with regard to measures on prevention of terrorism, 
there is no reason it could not be the same with regard to measures on the prevention of genocide 
as well. 
With regard to problems related to the Security Council measures on the use of force to put an 
end to genocide, the Security Council has been reluctant to take them in clear situations of 
genocide. Even where it has adopted resolutions related to such measures, they have not been 
followed by clear actions to end genocide. For instance, when genocide started in Rwanda in 
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April 1994, the Security Council missed a clear opportunity to take action to halt it. It instead 
adopted resolution 912 which reduced to 90 % the number of the UNAMIR troops.1140 When 
later in May and June it finally adopted resolutions 9181141 and 9251142 to expand UNAMIR’s 
mandate1143 as well as to extend it1144 and increase the troops up to 5.500,1145 the states logistical 
support capability sought by the Security Council for rapid deployment of the expanded 
UNAMIR was not provided for many weeks. On the urge of France, the Security Council later 
adopted resolution 929 of 22 June 1994 authorizing France’s humanitarian intervention in 
Rwanda.1146 The  specific word “genocide” was not mentioned in this resolution, but what was 
mentioned in the preamble of this resolution to some extent was a part of its definition and it was 
indeed genocide as the Security Council had already acknowledged in the resolution 925 adopted 
on 8 June 1994 that genocide was taking place.1147 In this resolution 929 the Security Council 
said that it was deeply concerned by the continuation of systematic and widespread killings of 
the civilian population in Rwanda, recognizing also that the situation in Rwanda was a unique 
case which demanded an urgent response by the international community. Under chapter VII, the 
Security Council authorized the State cooperating with the Secretary-General to use all necessary 
means to achieve the humanitarian objectives:1148  which were “to contribute to the security and 
protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda” and “to provide 
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security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operation”.1149 
Though resolution 929 did authorize France to use all necessary means, it did not say that those 
means were to be used to put an end to genocide. Hence, none of these initiatives was successful 
in halting genocide until the military victory of the RPF in July 1994.   
This was due to many reasons as was once acknowledged by Kofi Annan. He said that UN 
missions can achieve their objectives only when:  the Security Council creates them with 
concrete objectives, the General Assembly allocates necessary resources, states provide 
sufficient number of well-trained and equipped troops and do it on time.1150 He immediately 
added that all these elements are fundamental, but that most lies in the will of the Security 
Council without which such missions have the most chances to fail.1151  
The Security Council has also failed to use the available means provided for by chapter VIII of 
the Charter in order to prevent genocide. This is linked to another challenge related to the 
Security Council measures to put an end to genocide which is the veto power vested in the five 
permanent members of the SC. This power may hinder the prevention of genocide in that if it is 
exercised unlimitedly and it gives room to states which lack the will to take decisions in such 
situations, to refuse to do so by threatening to use the veto or by using it to block resolutions that 
aim at putting an end to genocide. One of the many examples of this is the Security Council 
attempt to authorise NATO to use force in the former Yugoslavia which failed due to Russian 
veto.1152 This made the Security Council fail (and therefore miss the opportunity) to utilize 
NATO for the Kosovo situation.  Unless this veto is amended in order to exclude its exercise in 
case of genocide, the chances that the Security Council may successfully prevent genocide at this 
level may be limited. 
Another serious challenge is that even where the Security Council may reach a decision to halt 
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genocide, the fact that it has no military force at its disposal that can be immediately deployed to 
put an end to an on-going genocide makes it a very big challenge to the prevention of genocide. 
It is argued that if a stand-by military force would exist to intervene immediately when the 
Security Council has decided so, the prevention of genocide at the tertiary level would be much 
more achievable. 
Let it be concluded that the Security Council’s primary responsibility is the maintenance of 
international peace and security in which measures aiming at preventing genocide at the tertiary 
level perfectly fit. It is a competent organ to take appropriate actions to prevent genocide at this 
level. If it has not been able to prevent genocide in many instances it has not been due to the lack 
of competence but to the identified challenges.  Unless the latter are addressed, the Security 
Council may not be expected to do more than it has done so far to make the prevention of 
genocide at the tertiary level possible and effective in the future. 
3.2. The General Assembly 
3.2.1. Does the General Assembly have the competence to prevent genocide? 
Article VIII of the Genocide Convention uses the plural form when referring to the “competent 
organs” of the UN.  During the debate on the drafting of article VIII, the General Assembly was 
referred to as competent organ to take preventive actions.1153 Since it has been concluded earlier 
that the competence of the United Nations to prevent genocide may derive from the Charter of 
the UN, the competence of the General Assembly is to be looked in that Charter.  
The Charter of the United Nations gives to the General Assembly the power to discuss any 
questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers of any organs 
provided for in the Charter and except some limits, it can make recommendations to members of 
the UN or to the Security Council or to both.1154  Bruno Simma did not comment article 10 in 
light of the prevention of genocide, but he recognized the fundamental importance of the General 
Assembly as a central organ of the UN because of the very position of article 10 and the pride of 
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place it has been given in chapter IV of the Charter of the UN.1155 He added that article 10 vests 
the General Assembly with a general power of discussion and recommendation regarding any 
question which comes within the scope of the Charter.1156 According to him, this power includes 
the right to investigate which derives from the Charter because in order to discuss any matter 
thoroughly, the General Assembly must be in a position to carry out the necessary 
investigations.1157 Likewise, Nehemiah Robinson has argued that this article is so broad that no 
limitations whatsoever can be placed on the discussions and recommendations by the General 
Assembly.1158 He added that on the basis of the principle of promoting universal respect for and 
observance of human rights, the General Assembly can discuss violations of its resolutions on 
genocide and of the principles enshrined in the Genocide Convention by the virtue of the same 
authority.1159 This article makes it indeed possible for the General Assembly to discuss a matter 
related to the prevention of genocide since, as it has been interpreted and argued earlier in this 
work, this is within the scope of the Charter.  
Furthermore, under article 7(2), the GA can create subsidiary organs that it deems necessary for 
the performance of its functions.1160 It reads: “Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary 
may be established in accordance with the present Charter.” And Article 22 reads: “The General 
Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions.” In the next subsection, this general competence of the General Assembly will be 
discussed in concrete way to see when this competence can be exercised and what actions may 
be taken in order to prevent genocide.  
3.2.2. When and how can the General Assembly act to prevent genocide? 
3.2.2.1. Prevention at the primary level  
At this level of the prevention of genocide, the General Assembly may, based on article 10 of the 
Charter, for instance discuss a situation where some states do no put in place necessary 
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legislation to give effect to the Genocide Convention. And since the General Assembly is not 
subjected to any limitation on its power to discuss,1161 it can discuss that matter at that level and 
it can make recommendations to urge those states to comply with their obligation. Moreover, in 
exercising its power to make recommendations in this regard, the General Assembly can only be 
restricted to do so when the Security Council is exercising its powers on that matter.  The 
General Assembly has exercised its power to discuss and make recommendations on the 
prevention of genocide in the past. For instance it has repeatedly adopted resolutions urging 
member states to ratify the Genocide Convention.1162 At several other occasions, the General 
Assembly has held discussions that referred to the word genocide as shown by Schabas,1163 but it 
did not adopt resolutions that contain specific measures to prevent genocide. For instance, the 
General Assembly has not adopted resolutions that demanded states parties to the Genocide 
Convention to adopt legislation that gives effect to the Genocide Convention. Yet, adopting such 
resolutions would presumably contribute to the prevention of genocide at this level. 
Other measures at this level may be taken under articles 7(2) and 22 of the Charter of the UN 
under which the General Assembly can create subsidiary organs that it deems necessary for the 
performance of its functions.1164 Its practice shows that it has created many subsidiary organs on 
various matters.1165 One of many examples of subsidiary organs created by the General 
Assembly is the Human Rights Council (replacing the Commission of Human Rights which had 
been under the authority of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)) created in 2006.1166 
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The Council was given the overall mandate to promote universal respect for the protection of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.1167 That means that among its functions, this 
Council has been tasked inter alia to promote the full implementation of human rights 
obligations undertaken by States and to contribute, through dialogue and cooperation, towards 
the prevention of human rights violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies.1168 
No doubt, matters related to genocide fall within this mandate and it might therefore be said that 
this is an available means through which the General Assembly can prevent genocide because 
this mandate includes promoting “the full implementation of human rights obligations 
undertaken by States and follow-up to the goals and commitments related to the promotion and 
protection of human rights...”1169 In 2008, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 7/25 
which addresses the prevention of genocide.1170 In that resolution, it called upon states that have 
not yet ratified (or acceded to) the Genocide Convention to consider doing so as a matter of high 
priority and to enact national legislation in conformity with the provisions of the Genocide 
Convention.1171 After this resolution, a number of states have ratified (or acceded to) the 
Genocide Convention,1172 and some regional forums on the prevention of genocide have been 
established.1173 This could be an outcome from the resolution 7/25 even though there is no 
conclusive evidence on that. 
The mandate of the HRC is so broad and arguably vague when it comes to what it can do to 
prevent. Given that fact, it is possible to argue that there is no legal reason that would preclude 
the General Assembly from creating a subsidiary organ (permanent or not) which can be vested 
with an express power to investigate and report on the implementation of the rules on the 
prevention of genocide by states. This can be useful in the sense that it can exercise pressure on 
those states and it can presumably contribute to the prevention of genocide at the primary level. 
The fact that the Genocide Convention did not establish its own treaty organ does not preclude 
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the General Assembly from creating a subsidiary organ that can help in the implementation of 
that convention. That subsidiary organ is not the same as the robust monitoring body of the 
Genocide Convention suggested earlier in this work, but in the absence of the latter, this can be a 
viable alternative.  
Finally, though it can be concluded that the powers of the General Assembly to discuss various 
matters and to make recommendations accordingly are sufficiently broad to include matters that 
are related to the prevention of genocide, the problem is not only that in practice the General 
Assembly has not played that role effectively, but also that its decisions have no binding force. 
Even if the General Assembly would adopt resolutions aiming at preventing genocide at the 
primary level, their effect might be weak and there is no easy solution to that problem unless the 
Charter of the UN is amended in a way that addresses this weakness. Another problem is that in 
general there is no mechanism to check the actions of the General Assembly and this may 
weaken the prevention of genocide at this level. 
3.2.2.2. Prevention of genocide at the secondary level  
One of the means of the General Assembly to prevent genocide at the secondary level is through 
the Human Rights Council which is one of its subsidiary organs. Indeed, this Council has been 
given the mandate inter alia to address situations of violations of human rights, including gross 
and systematic violations, and to make recommendations thereon.1174 The governments 
concerned are among those to whom these recommendations are to be addressed, but of course, 
the General Assembly as well.1175 In its resolution 7/25 of 2008, the HRC called upon all states 
to cooperate in order to prevent (including to halt) gross human rights violations that could lead 
to genocide.1176 Five years after this resolution, the HRC appreciated the outcome of that 
resolution. However, most of the outcomes may concern the primary level more than the 
secondary one. It is therefore still too early to assess if and how the HRC can contribute to the 
prevention of genocide at this level. It suffices to say however that if there are reports of this 
Council, the General Assembly is competent to reinforce its recommendations by recommending 
any appropriate measure to be taken by states concerned or any other person concerned.  
Furthermore, under the UN Charter, the General Assembly can address matters related to the 
                                                          
1174
 Idem, para. 3. 
1175
 Idem, para. 5. 
1176
 See para. 6 of the HRC Resolution 7/25. 




maintenance of international peace and security and make appropriate recommendations to the 
state(s) concerned and to the Security Council or to both.1177 Since acts leading to genocide may 
be threatening the international peace and security, the General Assembly has the power to 
address matters related to genocide and make recommendations that aim at averting the 
occurrence of genocide. However, in exercising this power to address matters, the practice of the 
General Assembly does not suggest much on how it dealt with the prevention of genocide since 
the adoption of the Genocide Convention. For instance, despite claims that China’s acts were 
leading to genocide in Tibet, the General Assembly did not use the word genocide in resolutions 
related to that situation.1178 Yet, it had put in its agenda the charges that China was committing 
genocide in Tibet.1179 In its resolutions, the General Assembly did discuss the issue on a broader 
human rights perspective,1180 but it failed to explicitly deal with that situation as likely to lead to 
genocide.  
Apart from the power to discuss matters (which may include those related to the prevention of 
genocide), the Charter of the UN gave to the General Assembly the possibility to call the 
attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace 
and security.1181  This is another possibility for the General Assembly to address a situation that 
is likely to lead to genocide. The big difficulty arises when the Security Council fails to 
discharge its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security in a situation 
likely to lead to genocide, due to either the lack of unanimity of the permanent members or any 
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other reason whatsoever. And the question is whether the Security Council’s failure to take 
action relieves the General Assembly of its responsibility to take action under the Charter in 
regard to the prevention of genocide. 
3.2.2.3. Prevention of genocide at the tertiary level 
The General Assembly has adopted the Resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950 entitled 
“Uniting for peace” 1182 which can be useful to the prevention of genocide at the tertiary level 
when the Security Council fails to discharge its responsibility. In this resolution, while 
recognizing that the maintenance of international peace and security is one of the purposes of the 
United Nations and that it entails taking “effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace”, it resolved that in such situation “the General Assembly shall 
consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to 
members for collective measures, including in the case of breach of the peace or the act of 
aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security”.1183 The adoption of this resolution came through a suggestion by Dean Acheson then 
US Minister of foreign affairs persuading the General Assembly to claim for itself a subsidiary 
responsibility with regard to international peace and security as enunciated by Article 14 of the 
Charter.1184 He suggested this because of the strategy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) to block any determination by the Security Council on measures to be taken in order to 
protect the Republic of Korea against the aggression launched against it by military forces from 
North Korea and this resolution came as a response to this strategy.1185  
The General Assembly has exercised this competence in a number of situations. For instance, 
following the failure of the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility to maintain 
international peace and security during the time when the Central People’s Government of the 
People’s Republic of China was intervening in Korea, the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 19511186 calling upon all States and authorities to continue to 
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lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea1187 which of course meant military 
assistance. This was after the General Assembly had found that the People’s Republic of China 
had engaged in aggression in Korea. In this resolution 498(V), the General Assembly did not 
explicitly refer to its previous resolution 377 “Uniting for Peace”, but in the preamble it 
expressly mentioned that the Security Council had failed to exercise its primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security because of the lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members which is the same as what is stated in the resolution 377 (V) “Uniting for 
Peace”. 
Similarly, after another failure of the Security Council to adopt a resolution on the conflict 
between Israel and Egypt on 30 October 1956 due to the British and French vetoes, the matter 
was then transferred to the General Assembly, in accordance with the procedure provided by 
Assembly resolution 377 (V).1188 In its first emergency special session, the General Assembly 
adopted resolution 997 (ES-I),1189 calling for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces 
behind the armistice lines and the reopening of the Canal.1190 To enable this resolution, on 4 
November 1956 the General Assembly adopted another resolution 998((ES-I)1191 which 
requested the Secretary-General to submit within 48 hours a plan for the setting up, with the 
consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure 
and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned 
resolution 997 (ES-I).1192 Pursuant to the requested plan in the report of the Secretary-General, 
the General Assembly adopted a resolution 1000 (ES-I) adopted on 5 November 1956,1193 by 
which the Assembly established a United Nations Command for an emergency international 
Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of 
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General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956.1194 No reference was made to the 
resolution 377 (V) “the Uniting for Peace”, but as said above, the matter had been transferred to 
the General Assembly by the Security Council in accordance with the procedure provided by 
Assembly resolution 377 (V) and after it had failed to reach a resolution.  
To my knowledge, even though the resolution 377 (V) perfectly fits within the means available 
to the General Assembly in the prevention of genocide, the latter has not used it so far, to that 
purpose. Even in the situation it was more explicit in using the word genocide in 1982 where it 
adopted a resolution in which it condemned Israel for the large-scale massacre of the Palestinian 
civilians in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps situated in Beirut and resolved that this massacre 
qualified as act of genocide,1195 it failed to refer to its resolution 377 (V) and take action 
accordingly. Yet, it was after the Security Council had failed to adopt a resolution under chapter 
VII on “appropriate measures” against Israel.1196 The General Assembly did not do more than 
just deploring “the negative vote by a permanent member of the Security Council which 
prevented the Council” from adopting such a resolution.1197 Here too, the General Assembly did 
not refer to the prevention of genocide and hence it did not make any recommendation to the 
Security Council to take action thereof. Yet, given the content of the resolution 377(V) it can be 
argued that together with other provisions of the Charter evoked above, albeit they do not use the 
concept of prevention of genocide per se, it can serve as the basis under which actions to prevent 
genocide by the General Assembly can be taken at the tertiary level.  
In fact, given the content of the resolution 377 as well as the circumstances under which 
measures may be taken, it is possible to say that it may contribute to serve as a basis to take other 
measures aiming at preventing genocide such as sanctions against a state or any other person 
committing or assisting in committing genocide. Under this very resolution, it can arguably be 
said that the GA could take measures that would include the use of force to end genocide when 
the Security Council is unable to do that. This has not be done in practice but given the purposes 
of the United Nations and the rationale of resolution 377 which was to save the purposes of the 
UN in time of paralysis of the SC, taking measures that include the use of force to put an end to 
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an on-going genocide would be complying with the aims and purposes for which the UN has 
been established. It would also be of course to abide with the rule and competence to prevent 
genocide.  
The General Assembly appears to be entitled to do something related to the prevention of 
genocide. However, though the Charter has given this power to the GA, the same Charter has 
limited the binding character of its actions. Another problem may be the absence of a mechanism 
to check the actions of the General Assembly at this level. These problems make it difficult to 
conclude that the General Assembly can prevent genocide effectively. Though it is recognized 
that the General Assembly can do a lot in preventing genocide using the existing rules of 
international law as shown above, unless it is given more concrete powers in this regard, there 
are convincing reasons to say that the actions of the General Assembly to prevent genocide are 
still limited by the Charter itself.  
3.3. The Secretariat 
3.3.1. Does the Secretariat have the competence to prevent genocide? 
At first sight, it would appear from the discussion earlier (about the drafting history of article 
VIII of the Genocide Convention) that the Secretariat of the UN was not among the competent 
organs of the UN to be called upon by contracting parties to take such action under the Charter of 
the United Nations. This can especially be seen from the fact that in the debate of the drafters of 
the Genocide Convention there was an attempt to give to the Secretary-General the duty to 
inform the competent organs of the UN about a situation of genocide but this suggestion was not 
followed. In fact, during the drafting process, V. Pella Vespasian and Raphael Lemkin consulted 
by the Secretariat as experts in the field of genocide, believed the Secretary-General should have 
the duty to inform the organs of the UN on threats of genocide,1198 but this was not included in 
the convention presumably because it would have been a new power and duty not mandated by 
the Charter of the UN.1199 Those powers and duties of the Secretary-General are defined in 
articles 97 to 101 of the Charter of the UN.1200 It is worth examining those powers in order to see 
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whether or not the Secretariat of the UN can qualify as a competent organ of the UN to take 
appropriate actions for the prevention of genocide.  
According to article 97, the Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of the 
Organization.1201 Among other things, article 98 adds that the Secretary-General shall act in that 
capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and 
Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are 
entrusted to him by these organs.1202 The same article 98 obligates the Secretary-General to make 
an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization. Furthermore, like any 
other chief administrative officer of an Organisation, the Secretary-General is in charge of the 
management of daily operations in every aspect of the UN. In this capacity, he is well placed to 
know about the entire “life” and “health” of the Organisation.  
In addition to the administrative tasks, article 99 of the Charter of the UN gives him the power to 
take initiative in bringing to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion 
may threaten the international peace and security. That is why the General Assembly declaration 
on fact-finding by the United Nations in the field of the maintenance of international peace and 
security has treated the Secretariat (through the Secretary-General) as a competent organ of the 
UN in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.1203 It has been 
argued before that genocide is a threat to the peace. In that way, the Secretary-General would 
have the competence to bring to the attention of the SC a matter related to genocide. 
It may be therefore argued that as the person to deal with daily operations in every aspect of the 
UN, the Secretary-General may have the competence to address issues related to the prevention 
of genocide which is within the scope of his powers as described in the articles mentioned above. 
This nature of the position of the Secretary-General in the Organisation makes it hardly 
imaginable to think that other competent organs of the UN can prevent genocide without his/her 
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involvement. This position in the Organisation does not make him only a competent organ in the 
matters related to the prevention of genocide, but also vital because it enables him to access 
necessary information that would trigger his action. The argument that the Secretariat is among 
the competent organs of the UN to prevent genocide is highly supported by what the Secretary-
General said in his action plan of 2004 on the prevention of genocide. In this action plan, while 
acknowledging his failure in the past, the Secretary-General explicitly recognised that the 
prevention of genocide was his duty and pledged to do it better in the future by implementing his 
five points of his action plan which included to address the root causes of genocide, the 
protection of civilians in the conflict and the halting of genocide when it has started.1204 The 
possible actions of the Secretary-General in the prevention of genocide will be concretely 
discussed at the three levels of prevention. 
3.3.2. When and how the Secretariat can act to prevent genocide?  
3.3.2.1. Prevention at the primary level 
Article 98 of the Charter gives an indication on actions that the Secretary-General may take. For 
instance, s/he may include in his/her annual report problems related to potential genocide in any 
place of the world due to the fact that the states concerned have not adopted legislation that may 
give effect to the Genocide Convention. And s/he may make recommendations to the General 
Assembly and the Security Council. Furthermore, under the same article, s/he may use the right 
s/he has to participate in the meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly, to give 
his/her ideas on how to prevent genocide in some specific places and from the primary level. 
Bruno Simma has commented that the duty of the Secretary-General to draw up provisional 
agendas for those meetings has in practice gained considerable political significance.1205 Though 
the degree of significance of his/her influence is difficult to verify, it is possible to say that no 
matter how it can be, it can play a role in the prevention of genocide if the Secretary-General 
puts such questions on the agendas of the meetings. There is an example where Secretary-
General Waldheim has successfully suggested the item “measures to prevent terrorism”, and it 
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was included in the agenda of the General Assembly session in 1972.1206 The result was that after 
the discussion on this item, the General Assembly adopted the resolution 3034 (XXVII)1207 in 
which it invited states to  take all appropriate measures for the prevention of terrorism1208 by 
inter alia finding just and peaceful solutions to the underlying causes which give rise to 
terrorism.1209 The resolution also created an ad hoc Committee on that.1210  If it was possible for 
the prevention of terrorism, there is no legal reason that would preclude it from being possible 
for the prevention of genocide as well. 
Another basis for action by the Secretary-General may be article 99 of the Charter. Under this 
article, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter 
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. At first 
glance, this may appear to be already at the secondary level of prevention, but from a more deep 
analysis, article 99 may also serve at the primary level of prevention of genocide. Some 
instruments that followed the adoption of the Charter can support this assertion.  For instance, 
while acknowledging that the ability of the United Nations to maintain international peace and 
security depends to a large extent on its acquiring detailed knowledge about the factual 
circumstances of any dispute or situation, the continuance of which might threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and security,1211 the General Assembly has adopted a 
declaration that explains how the Secretary-General should act in acquiring that knowledge. 
Indeed, under this declaration, “the Secretary-General should pay special attention to using the 
United Nations fact-finding capabilities at an early stage in order to contribute to the prevention 
of disputes and situations.”1212 This early stage has been explained by Kofi Annan in his report 
(as the Secretary-General of the UN) on the prevention of conflict. He wrote that preventing 
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conflict implies the obligation to strive to “address tensions, grievances, inequalities, injustice, 
intolerance and hostilities at the earliest stage possible before peace and security are 
endangered.1213  With regard to the prevention of genocide as such, he later said that “one of the 
best ways to reduce the chances of genocide is to address the causes of conflict.”1214 On the 
recommendations of the Secretary-General of the UN in his report on the prevention of armed 
conflict, the Security Council has adopted resolution 1366.1215 In this resolution, while stressing 
the necessity of addressing the root-causes of conflict in preventing genocide and other core 
crimes of international law, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to refer to it, 
information, inter alia “on potential conflict situations arising, inter alia, from ethnic, religious 
and territorial disputes, poverty and lack of development…”1216 This resolution encouraged him 
to bring to its attention early warnings or prevention cases and to convey to the Security Council 
his assessment of potential threats to international peace and security.1217 The resolution also 
reiterated the importance of the fact-finding missions and supported the enhancement of the role 
of the Secretary-General in this regard.1218  
Pursuant to resolution 1366, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed in 2004 Juan Mendez 
as special adviser on the prevention of genocide.1219 Likewise, in 2007, Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon appointed Francis M. Deng on a full-time basis at the level of Under-Secretary-General 
in charge of the prevention of genocide.1220 The mission and mandate of this office include 
acting as a catalyst to raise awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, to alert relevant 
actors where there is a risk of genocide, and to advocate and mobilize for appropriate action.1221 
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Indeed, this Office acts as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, by bringing to 
his attention situations that could potentially result in genocide.1222 Since this does include 
tackling the causes and dynamics of genocide, the Office of the Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide would be entitled to alert the Secretary-General on situations that may 
lead to genocide even at the primary level. With this, the Secretary-General should be able to 
significantly contribute to the prevention of genocide at this primary level if that alert is followed 
by appropriate and timely actions. Actions could include creating a working network with 
regional and sub-regional arrangements in the monitoring of the situations on the ground and 
suggesting guidance to states concerned.  
Another means available within the Secretariat is through the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) created by the General Assembly in 1993 as “the 
United Nations official with principal responsibility for United Nations human rights activities 
under the direction and authority of the Secretary-General.”1223 Its mandate is to promote and 
protect the enjoyment and full realization, by all people, of all rights established in the Charter of 
the United Nations and in international human rights laws and treaties.1224 This includes 
preventing human rights violations, securing respect for all human rights, promoting 
international cooperation to protect human rights, coordinating related activities throughout the 
United Nations, and strengthening and streamlining the United Nations system in the field of 
human rights.1225 Given that mandate as well as the resources available to it, it arguably has the 
potential to prevent genocide.”1226 If it may be difficult to find where it has done so at the 
primary level so far, it is not because of the lack of competence but perhaps because of other 
various reasons. 
All these available means contained in the instruments shown above are in accordance with the 
Charter.  They constitute the legal basis under which the Secretary-General can take action that 
can have effect on the prevention of genocide from the primary level. Bruno Simma has 
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commented that under article 99 of the Charter the Secretary-General has been given the right of 
initiative in any matter and has left to the Secretary-General the discretion to evaluate whether 
the matter is capable of threatening peace and security. 1227 If that is true, the role of  the 
Secretary-General can be significant in the prevention of genocide at the primary level if he uses 
this power well. However, despite these means available to the Secretariat and the possibilities to 
invoke article 99 of the Charter in taking action related to the prevention of genocide, the past 
experience shows that no Secretary-General has ever invoked this article 99 before the outbreak 
of conflict.1228 This can be regarded as a weakness of the Secretary-Generals who have failed to 
use that article in order to prevent genocidal conflicts before they started. Yet, as the idea is that 
the situation be addressed before the conflict erupts and with the broad power he has, he can 
investigate on any matter that in his opinion is capable of endangering peace and security. It does 
not have to be endangering it at that moment. What is needed is the potential to endanger it. 
Given his position in the UN, nobody else would be better placed to get information from any 
place of the world than him/her. And if s/he fails to do what s/he should do to prevent genocide, 
it would be due to other reasons than the lack of information. This is definitely not to say that he 
for sure has all necessary resources he may need to do so, but s/he is in a position to know what 
is lacking and needed for him/her to discharge his/her responsibilities.  
3.3.2.2. Prevention at the secondary and tertiary levels 
Since the legal basis for action by the Secretary-General at both secondary and tertiary levels has 
the same source and the actions to be taken are not that different, it is not necessary to discuss 
these levels separately. 
Article 99 of the Charter is the main basis for actions that may give effect to the prevention of 
genocide at these levels. This article gives to the Secretary-General the possibility to include a 
situation of genocide whenever signs of potential genocide exist which can qualify as being 
threatening the international peace and security. The General Assembly has put much more light 
to article 99 in its declaration on fact-finding in the field of maintenance of peace and 
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security,1229 by noting that the Secretary-General, on his own initiative or at the request of the 
States concerned, may bring relevant information on a situation that is threatening peace and 
security to the attention of the Security Council. In his comment on article 99, Bruno Simma 
observed that it can be seen as the authorizing clause for declarations, proposals and draft 
resolutions which the Secretary-General submits to the Security Council.1230 Since a potential 
genocide can indeed threaten peace and security, the Secretary-General’s action may include the 
drafting and submission to the Security Council of resolutions that aim at preventing genocide at 
the secondary and tertiary levels. Without purporting to be exhaustive, those suggested actions 
may be a preventive diplomacy or preventive deployment to ensure that the conflict does not 
escalate to genocide (secondary level) or an authorization of a force under chapter VII of the 
Charter to use all necessary means to put an end to an on-going genocide (tertiary level).1231 
The role of the Secretary-General at these two levels has even been more enhanced by Security 
Council resolution 1366 in which the Secretary-General was invited by the Security Council to 
refer to it information and analyses from within the UN system on cases of serious violations of 
international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law and on 
potential conflict situations, inter alia, from ethnic, religious and territorial disputes.1232 In this 
resolution, the Security Council acknowledged the failure by all concerned actors of preventive 
efforts that preceded the tragedies in Rwanda and Srebrenica,1233  and it was apparently 
enhancing the UN system in order for it to play its role more effectively.   
The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (created by the Secretary-
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General pursuant to that resolution) was given the mandate that is indeed applicable to the 
prevention of genocide at these levels.1234 This includes to: 
“(a) collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on 
massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of 
ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; … 
(c) make recommendations to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on 
actions to prevent or halt genocide;…”1235 
Obviously, and as it has been noted in literature, since the mandate of the Special Adviser is 
prevention of genocide, it cannot be limited to situations that already constitute genocide under 
the definition of that term in international law but need to focus on situations that may lead to 
it.1236 In fact, it is even expressly stipulated in his mandate that he “would not make a 
determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the 1948 Genocide Convention had 
occurred.”1237 
Since its creation, this office has collected information in a number of situations and has reported 
about the likelihood of genocide. For instance, after his mission in 2008 in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, the Special Adviser on the prevention of genocide issued a report that the 
Secretary-General brought to the Security Council.1238 Among other things, the Special Advisor 
concluded in this report that: 
““…hatred and stigmatization based on ethnicity are widespread in North Kivu. The 
likelihood of ethnically motivated killings by armed groups and the escalation of 
genocidal hysteria among the civilian populations are factors that must be taken seriously 
and addressed in earnest. The risk of genocide in the region is significant, thus immediate 
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 Letter dated 18 March 2009 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 




action by States in the region and the international community is imperative.”“1239 
Likewise, in 2010 the Special Advisor on the prevention of genocide undertook a mission to 
Guinnea to collect information on risks of genocide in that country. In his report, he concluded 
that inter-ethnic tensions existed, especially in the Guinée Forestière region, and between 
Forestiers ethnic groups and the Malinké and Peuhl.1240  He warned that if these tensions and the 
causes behind them were not addressed in the period during and after the elections, there was a 
real risk that the tensions could escalate into violent conflict with genocidal implications.”1241 
The Secretary- General reacted and issued a statement in which he called on national and local 
leaders, as well as on the population as a whole, to refrain from any act or statement that may 
incite violence or human rights abuses.1242 It might be difficult (and it is beyond the scope of this 
work) to affirm with certainty that it is because of these actions that genocide did not happen (so 
far) in those places, but it cannot be denied that these actions have played a big preventive role. 
As Akhavan has put it, sometimes the success of the prevention can only be “measured in terms 
of what does not happen.” 1243 
The initiatives and actions by the Secretary-General himself or through his Special Advisor on 
the prevention of genocide may however face some serious challenges and result in a lack of 
preventive effect. With regard to the Secretary-General for instance, after receiving the 
information from the Special Advisor, the Secretariat may either not inform the Security Council 
in time or may do so but the Security Council fails to take action in time or ever. For example, 
though it was before the creation of this Office, the Secretary-General has flagrantly failed to 
take action even where the risk of genocide was clear in Rwanda and after the clear information 
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by the head of the UN mission in Rwanda which was about a possible genocide. Indeed, four 
months before the actual start of genocide in Rwanda, General Dallaire who was the Commander 
of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) sent to the Secretariat of the UN the 
information on a plan to wipe out the Tutsi ethnic group with the arms which were in different 
stocks in Kigali. He sought the permission to seize those weapons caches. No action followed 
this,1244 and as a result, these arms were the ones that were used in genocide four months later. It 
cannot be said with certainty that this can still happen today, but given the procedure in the UN 
system, nothing guarantees that this cannot be repeated today. 
As for the challenges related to the actions by the Office of the Special Advisor on the 
Prevention of Genocide it must be said that the fact that the Security Council does not receive 
regular notes or reports from the Special Adviser himself but through the Secretary-General is a 
problem.1245 Akhavan suggested that having a direct channel between the Special Advisor and 
the Security Council would make the mandate become “a permanent feature of Council 
deliberations, and thus more easily insulate the Special Adviser’s Office from unwarranted 
impediments or political vicissitudes at some point in the future.”1246  
It can be safe to say from this discussion that even though it was not clear whether the drafters of 
the Genocide Convention referred to the Secretariat of the UN among the competent organs of 
the UN entitled to take action under the Charter of the United Nations for the prevention of 
genocide, the Charter, the subsequent practice as well as the reality on the ground have proven 
that the Secretary-General may have the competence to suggest and take actions which may even 
be indispensable for the prevention of genocide. The actions that the Secretary-General can take 
fall within his competence under the Charter of the UN, especially its articles 98 and 99 as 
explained above. His actions are highly important because not only they may themselves have 
preventive effect but also may trigger more concrete actions by the organs with enforcement 
authority, especially when it comes to putting an end to an on-going genocide. This being said, it 
is also important to add that, although his role is vital in that, the SG may access information 
within the UN system, the complementarily with other organs of the UN is determinant in the 
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prevention of genocide.  
3.4. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
3.4.1. Does the Economic and Social Council have the competence to prevent genocide? 
On this question, it has been observed that prima facie, it would seem that ECOSOC has no 
competence in such cases, unless the General Assembly delegates such powers to it”.1247 Yet, 
this position may not be entirely correct if one interprets the Charter in line with what has been 
discussed in this work.  
It must first of all be recalled that article 1(3) of the Charter makes achieving international 
cooperation in inter alia encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental rights for all, one 
of the purposes of the United Nations. In this international cooperation, article 55 obligates the 
UN to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Article 7(1) of the Charter makes 
the ECOSOC one of the principal organs of the UN and article 60 gives the powers to ECOSOC 
to discharge the functions provided in chapter X related inter alia to the international cooperation 
in the promotion of human rights.  These provisions are to be read together with article 62 of the 
Charter. Among its functions and powers as provided for by article 62 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Economic and Social Council “may make recommendations for the purpose 
of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all”.1248 
This provision is broad enough that it would house recommendations that are related or may 
have effect on the prevention of genocide. Under this article, nothing would preclude the 
ECOSOC from making recommendations for the purpose of respecting the right to life by 
denouncing acts preparing or executing genocide. And this would perfectly fall under article 62. 
According to the same article, the Economic and Social Council “may also prepare draft 
conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its 
competence”. 1249 Here also, nothing would exclude any proposal of legal instruments related to 
the prevention of genocide since the prohibition of genocide is among the international human 
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rights norms.  
Furthermore, according to article 68 of the UN Charter, the Economic and Social Council shall 
set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and 
such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.1250 It appears 
from article 62 and 68 read together with articles 1(3), 55, 60 and 7(1) of the Charter, and its 
ECOSOC’s practice that the prevention of genocide falls within its competence. The question 
about when it may act and what it can do concretely to prevent genocide will be examined next. 
3.4.2. When and how the ECOSOC can act to prevent genocide? 
3.4.2.1. Prevention of genocide at the primary level 
Under article 62 of the Charter, the ECOSOC responsibilities include economic, social and 
human rights matters. In addressing them, the ECOSOC may initiate studies, discuss them, and 
give recommendations to the General Assembly, member states concerned and specialized 
agencies. These activities may deal with root causes of genocide. This has been discussed before 
and there is no need to dwell on that at length here. This competence conferred to ECOSOC by 
the Charter appears to be broad enough to make ECOSOC arguably be well placed to address 
many root causes of genocide at the primary level. In his action plan on the prevention of 
genocide, Kofi Annan emphasized on the prevention at the primary level, which, as a UN organ, 
concerns the ECOSOC as well. He noted: 
“We must work together with the international financial institutions, with civil society, 
and with the private sector, to ensure that young people get the chance to better 
themselves through education and peaceful employment, so that they are less easily 
recruited into predatory gangs and militias. We must protect the rights of minorities, 
since they are genocide’s most frequent targets. By all these means, and more, we must 
attack the roots of violence and genocide: hatred, intolerance, racism, tyranny, and the 
dehumanizing public discourse that denies whole groups of people their dignity and their 
rights.”1251 
The Charter has provided for some ways through which the ECOSOC can address this. For 
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instance, under article 68 of the Charter, the ECOSOC shall set up commissions in economic and 
social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be 
required for the performance of its functions. Under this article, the ECOSOC has set up the 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) at its first meeting of 10 December 1946 as its subsidiary 
body to examine, monitor and report on human rights situations.1252 From 1993, this commission 
was assisted by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in its work.1253 The CHR has 
been replaced in 2006 with the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC).1254 Though the 
Commission has not been very effective in its work, it is nonetheless important to say that it 
launched a first study on genocide. In late 1960s, the Economic and Social Council approved in 
resolution 1420 (XLVI) of 6 June 1969 the decision adopted by its Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to undertake a study of the question of 
the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.1255 Nicodeme Ruhashyankiko was 
designated as a Special Rapporteur to carry out that study that he released some years later.1256 
This study came up with suggestions and recommendations on the prevention of genocide.1257 In 
1980s, the ECOSOC adopted the resolution 1983/33 requesting the Sub-Commission to appoint 
one of its members as Special Rapporteur with the mandate to revise, as a whole, and update the 
previous study on the question of the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.1258 
Benjamin Whitaker who was appointed also made suggestions and recommendations on the 
prevention of genocide. In the 1980s and 2000s, the commission has adopted some other 
resolutions which mainly called upon states to ratify (or to accede to) the Genocide Convention 
and continue to give considerations to the prevention of genocide.1259 
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Furthermore, pursuant to ECOSOC’s competence, one year after the UN Secretary-General 
Action plan on the prevention of genocide was launched in 2004, ECOSOC made a follow-up 
with regard to the prevention of genocide as contained in that Secretary-General Action plan. For 
instance, it endorsed the Commission on Human Rights” request to the Secretary-General to 
make available a report on the implementation of his five point action plan and on the activities 
of the Special Adviser on the prevention of genocide.”1260 The point here is not to discuss the 
content of these studies and reports. The point in giving these examples is to give an indication 
on the kinds of action that the ECOSOC is competent to take to prevent genocide at the primary 
level. Indeed, such studies on that matter may be relevant for the prevention of genocide because 
they may suggest means to prevent genocide at the primary level. The examples related to the 
Human Rights Commission show how the ECOSOC could discharge its responsibility with 
regard to the prevention of genocide at the time the Commission on Human Rights was still 
under its authority, but also that nothing would preclude it from creating a human right body to 
deal with the prevention of genocide at this level. Indeed, it remains the competence  of the 
ECOSOC to set up commissions as well as ad hoc mechanisms in order to address matters falling 
within its competences.1261  
Whether the ways available to the ECOSOC may contribute to the prevention of genocide may 
depend on how it does it and on who the addressees of its recommendations are. Arguably, if 
ECOSOC creates mechanisms with concrete mandate to prevent genocide, it could have a 
significant effect to the prevention of genocide.1262  Regarding the addressee of its 
recommendations, article 62(2) on recommendations related to human rights does not mention 
the addressee of these recommendations and it has been interpreted as giving to ECOSOC the 
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discretion to decide the addressee(s) of its recommendations.1263 If that is true, ECOSOC may 
also address its recommendations to all states, or to any appropriate body whatsoever in order to 
promote respect for and observance of human rights for all throughout the world.1264  
3.4.2.2. Prevention of genocide at the secondary and tertiary levels 
Since the legal basis for action by the ECOSOC at both secondary and tertiary levels has the 
same source and the means of action are the same, the two levels are discussed together. 
To start with, it must be said that in dealing with human rights matter (related to genocide or 
not), ECOSOC actions have not been (and are not) subjected to the prior existence of threat to 
international peace and security.  In addition to the provisions of the Charter mentioned above, 
its resolutions 1235(XLII) of 19671265 and 1503(XLVIII) of 27 May 19701266 are evidence to 
this. Both resolutions gave the authorisation to the Commission on Human Rights to examine 
information relevant to gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms 1267 without 
requiring that those violations constitute threat to international peace and security. This is also 
applicable with regard to the violations of human rights that may lead to genocide.  
In the past, ECOSOC has got to deal with matters related to the prevention of genocide through 
its Commission and through its own actions. For instance, in 1992 as the war raged in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Commission met in special session on two occasions, sessions that led to 
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the appointment of a special rapporteur and an urgent mission on the ground.1268 This also 
happened in the conflict in Rwanda which serves as a good example of the work of the special 
rapporteur on situations of genocide.1269 Indeed, pursuant to the Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1992/72, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions 
reported some violations of human rights that could lead to genocide.1270 For instance, after the 
mission he conducted to Rwanda in April 1993, the Special Rapporteur Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye 
reported that:  
“The cases of intercommunal violence brought to the Special Rapporteur’s attention 
indicate very clearly that the victims of the attacks, Tutsis in the overwhelming majority 
of cases, have been targeted solely because of their membership of a certain ethnic group, 
and for no other objective reason. Article II, paragraphs (a) and (b) (of the Genocide 
Convention), might therefore be considered to apply to these cases.”1271   
Although not much has been done to prevent the escalation of that conflict, the Commission on 
Human Rights had done something on what it was supposed to do. The Secretary-General of the 
UN has acknowledged that the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings described many 
warning signs in Rwanda the year before the genocide happened but that no one paid attention to 
them.1272 
In a similar situation, after the visit to Darfur in 2004 as the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Asma Jahangir warned that there were strong indications of 
grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.1273 This might have 
contributed to triggering subsequent Security Council resolution 1564 on the establishment of an 
international commission of inquiry to investigate reports of violations of international 
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humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties and to determine also whether or 
not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a 
view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.1274   
The possible role of the ECOSOC in the prevention of genocide has not been and is not limited 
to the Human Rights Commission.1275 Indeed, its role in the prevention of conflicts (which may 
lead to genocide) was taken into account by the General Assembly in its resolution 55/217 of 6 
March 2001 on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable 
development in Africa.1276 In that resolution, the General Assembly requested the ECOSOC to 
create an ad hoc advisory group on countries emerging from conflict, with a view to assessing 
their humanitarian and economic needs and elaborating a long-term programme of support for 
implementation that begins with the integration of relief into development.1277 The ECOSOC 
responded to this request of the General Assembly by adopting the resolution 2002/1 which 
created a framework for (an) advisory group(s) on African countries emerging from conflict.1278 
In this framework, the Economic and Social Council has set-up two ad hoc advisory groups on 
Guinea-Bissau1279 and Burundi.1280  
Strictly speaking, nowhere these resolutions and decisions talked about the prevention of 
genocide, but the actions thereof are susceptible of preventing genocide. The reason to mention 
these examples here is not only because the prevention of conflicts is itself a prevention of 
genocide (in a way) since it is hard to imagine a genocide that happens where there is no conflict, 
but also because it is important to show that existing instruments and practice through which the 
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ECOSOC can operate also may play an important role in the prevention of genocide.  
Furthermore, either on basis of reports of its subsidiary organs and ad hoc mechanisms or by 
itself, the ECOSOC has the power under the Charter not only to address its recommendations to 
the General Assembly, all states and specialised agencies,1281 but also to furnish information to 
the Security Council and to assist the Security Council upon its request as stated in article 65 of 
the Charter,1282 including information related to a situation of a potential genocide or an on-going 
genocide. 
However, like for some other organs of the UN, it must be said that the decisions of the 
ECOSOC at all these levels of prevention (as well as at the primary level) face some challenges 
to the prevention of genocide. Among them, two examples will be mentioned here. First, the fact 
that ECOSOC decisions/resolutions are not binding to its addressees may limit the effect of its 
actions on the prevention of genocide because the implementation of its decisions depends on the 
will of the addressees.1283 A second challenge is that the prevention of genocide has not been 
expressly included in the Charter of the UN which may make the ECOSOC not give it top 
priority. Also, there is no mechanism to check the actions of the ECOSOC. These challenges 
make the prevention of genocide by the ECOSOC relatively ineffective. 
3.5. The International Court of Justice 
3.5.1. The basis of the competence of the ICJ to address the prevention of genocide 
Like other organs of the United Nations, the ICJ was not mentioned in article VIII of the 
Genocide Convention as one of the competent organs of the United Nations that can play a role 
in the prevention of genocide. However, unlike other organs of the United Nations which were 
not expressly mentioned, in its next article, the Genocide Convention specifically refers to the 
ICJ: “Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or 
fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for 
genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”1284 
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Article IX makes the ICJ competent with regard to the “application or fulfilment” of the present 
Genocide Convention.1285 Moreover, article VIII of the Genocide Convention is also relevant for 
the competence of the ICJ. Under that article, other organs may seek advisory opinions related to 
the prevention of genocide. Also, states may base on it to ask the court to order provisional 
measures to prevent genocide. The discussion in this subsection will be limited to examining the 
competence of the ICJ and the action it can take in the prevention of genocide at the three levels 
of prevention.   
3.5.2. When and how can the ICJ act to prevent genocide? 
3.5.2.1. Prevention at the primary level 
The question here is whether the ICJ has jurisdiction to rule in a dispute involving state failure to 
adopt preventive measures to give effect to the rules on the prevention of genocide at the primary 
level. Given the nature of the obligation as discussed above, the answer is in principle 
affirmative because the obligation to prevent genocide starts from the time there is a need to take 
preventive measures and not from the time genocide starts. The court may rule that the state 
concerned is breaching its obligation to prevent genocide and may order it to adopt preventive 
measures to give effect to the provisions of the Genocide Convention. Being binding on the 
parties concerned, such decisions may play a preventive role.1286 To date, there has been no such 
a decision by the ICJ because no such a claim has been brought before it. A detailed analysis on 
the extent to which states concerned may be held responsible at the primary level and who may 
bring such a claim  are questions whose answers require a prior discussion on some rules on 
international responsibility.  This is beyond what is aimed at here. 
The ICJ can also be asked to give advisory opinions related to the prevention of genocide. For 
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instance, in its advisory opinion on the reservation to the Genocide Convention, the ICJ 
confirmed that reservations were only permissible if they were not incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Genocide Convention and also said that the principles underlying this 
convention were binding on all states.1287 It might be difficult to evaluate the exact effect this 
opinion as well as its other pronouncements on genocide1288 have had on the prevention of 
genocide. However, they certainly are important in the understanding of the nature of the 
obligation to prevent genocide which is essential for its implementation.  
3.5.2.2. Prevention at the secondary level 
The ICJ exercised the power vested in it by article IX of the Genocide Convention to rule on 
cases in which signs of genocide exist. At the request by Bosnia in the case against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, the International Court of Justice held in 1993 that it possessed 
jurisdiction to order provisional measures requiring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to "take 
all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide."1289 Also, 
invoking article VIII of the Genocide Convention, Bosnia-Herzegovina had asked the Court to 
“act immediately and effectively to do whatever it can to prevent and suppress” the acts of 
genocide.1290  
Though the court had not yet determined that the Genocide Convention actually applied to that 
case, it ordered that “the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) should in particular ensure that any military, paramilitary or irregular armed units 
which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be 
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subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any acts of genocide, of conspiracy to 
commit genocide, of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, or of complicity in 
genocide, whether directed against the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina or against 
any other national, ethnical, racial or religious group”.1291  
3.5.2.3. Prevention at the tertiary level 
The role of the ICJ at the tertiary level is to decide on disputes related to the breach of the 
obligation to prevent genocide when genocide has started. In theory, depending on the period the 
court reaches such a decision, this can have a preventive effect because it can dissuade the state 
concerned and other states from being responsible for that breach in the future. In the judgment 
on merits in the case Bosnia-Serbia, the ICJ confirmed again its role and authority in dealing 
with cases of genocide and found Serbia and Montenegro responsible for the breach of the 
obligation to prevent genocide that occurred in Bosnia.1292 However, this decision came too late 
to prevent what happened in Bosnia. 
In other cases on genocide, the ICJ has either lacked jurisdiction, or the case is pending for a 
long period. For instance, in the case instituted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo against 
Rwanda,1293 the DRC contended that Rwanda had violated inter alia the Genocide 
Convention.1294 But the ICJ lacked jurisdiction because Rwanda had made a reservation on 
article IX of that convention.1295 Also, in 1999, Croatia instituted proceedings before the Court 
against Serbia and Montenegro that it had breached its legal obligations to Croatia under the 
Genocide Convention for genocide committed between 1991 and 1995 and requested the Court 
to hold Serbia and Montenegro responsible.1296 At the moment of the writing, the case is still 
pending before the Court.  
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Though the prevention of genocide by the ICJ at all levels is not negligible, it should be noted 
that in addition  to the challenge related to the length of the procedure which might be difficult 
for the ICJ to reach a decision that would have an effect on the suppression of an on-going 
genocide, some other challenges are worth considering.  For instance, like for other organs of the 
UN, for the action (decisions) by the ICJ to be effective, they need to be enforced by actions of 
the Security Council1297 (unless states concerned are willing enough to implement the Court’s 
decisions). Also, neither all states are parties to the ICJ nor have they all accepted the jurisdiction 
of the ICJ. It has been argued in this work that there is a customary rule on the prevention of 
genocide, but the fact that there is no equivalent customary rule that gives compulsory 
jurisdiction to the ICJ in case of the breach of the obligation to prevent genocide, the court may 
happen to lack jurisdiction in cases related to the breach of the obligation to prevent genocide.1298  
This constitutes a challenge to the prevention of genocide by the ICJ.  
Another challenge is that, given the nature of the ICJ, there is no way it can intervene in 
situations where states lack interest and/or standing to bring a claim before it on a violation of 
the obligation to prevent genocide by a given state. Neither individuals nor organisations have 
locus standi before the ICJ, although international organisations can request advisory opinions. 
3.6. Preliminary conclusions 
In this section, it is concluded that the competence of organs of the UN to take action in 
preventing genocide derives from the Charter of the UN and that each of the principal organs of 
the UN discussed in this chapter is competent to take actions. The actions by those organs are 
capable to have effect on the prevention of genocide (if they are taken at the right time). Like for 
states, the theory on the prevention of genocide through the primary, secondary and tertiary 
levels is applicable to the UN. However, the challenge is that the complementarity between these 
organs at each level is highly essential for the prevention to be effective. In fact, not only are 
there some overlaps between the functions of these organs which can have negative effect on the 
prevention of genocide, but also the fact that the obligation owed to everybody in this way 
(without any hierarchical coordination between them) may easily be breached by everybody. 
Each of the mentioned organs takes action (or should take it) in its way without any 
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coordination. This lack of coordination in the prevention of genocide within the UN system may 
weaken the prevention of genocide (among other many challenges shown in this section). And 
though the coordination is not the only change that is needed for the prevention of genocide, it is 
highly desirable for the prevention of genocide by the UN to be effective. 
Conclusion  
The first and foremost question that this chapter has had to answer was whether the United 
Nations has a legal obligation to prevent genocide. It was answered in the affirmative. Indeed, 
this chapter demonstrated why and how the United Nations is bound by the obligation to prevent 
genocide. While it was argued that the obligation of the UN to prevent genocide derives from 
general international law, the competence to take action in preventing genocide derives from the 
Charter of the UN.  The Charter does not refer to genocide as such and this has been explained as 
being due inter alia to the uncertainty on the legal existence of the crime of genocide at the time 
the Charter was adopted.1299 Yet, as interpreted in this chapter, the Charter contains provisions 
that prohibit the use of force but also creates an organization and organs vested with powers to 
put in place preventive measures that may be susceptible of contributing to the prevention of 
genocide. That is why, at the time of adoption of the Genocide Convention (3 years after the 
Charter), the Charter was referred to in article VIII. That article expressly made a reference to the 
competent organs of the United Nations and on appropriate measures to be taken under its 
Charter in order to make prevention of genocide possible. There would have been no need to 
refer to the Charter of the UN if the latter did not have provisions under which genocide could be 
prevented. Accordingly, article VIII of the Genocide Convention has referred to all provisions of 
the Charter that can be useful in preventing genocide.  
The reference to the competent organs of the UN in the Genocide Convention was not by 
coincidence. It was drafted by the UN itself and adopted under its auspices. By referring to the 
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Charter, a bridge between the two texts was created, because the UN was regarded as an 
important entity for the operationalization of that convention. Bridging was indispensable 
because the Charter has not used the word genocide. Bridging was easier than amending the 
Charter.1300 Moreover, it was clear that one of the mechanisms to implement the convention was 
to use competent organs of the UN. That is why it is argued that to discharge the UN from this 
obligation would make the rules on the prohibition of genocide redundant, because without the 
action or involvement of the UN, the chances of those rules being successfully implemented may 
be low in many cases. This view is consistent with some of the arguments on the retention of 
article VIII that; (a) since the convention was a concrete application of the Charter, it was 
desirable to include an article which made clear the relation between the Charter and the 
Convention; (b) since there was no international tribunal to enforce universal repression of the 
crime of genocide, the competent organs of the United Nations were best fitted to see to the 
application of the Convention.1301 This is a relatively clear alternative because as shown before, 
there are many difficulties in the implementation of this obligation by States themselves. It can 
therefore be maintained that the prevention of genocide may not be effectively done without the 
involvement of the UN. 
The action by the UN is not conditioned to a prior report by any state. If the action to be 
performed by the organs of the UN falls within the competence of the UN, it logically follows 
that it must not wait until it is informed by whomever, because the Charter from which its 
competence derives does not require that. Furthermore, under both the Charter and customary 
international law, action to prevent genocide by the United Nations is not territorially limited. 
It has been shown that each of the principal organs of the UN discussed in this chapter is vested 
with the power to take actions that are capable to have effect on the prevention of genocide. 
However, the overlap between the functions of UN organs and the lack of coordination has been 
identified as a big challenge that needs to be addressed. Arguably, the proposed Organisation for 
the Prevention of Genocide (OPG) and related fund suggested in the previous chapter would 
provide a solution to this challenge because it would coordinate the works of all the actors 
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involved in the prevention of genocide. The existing office of the Special Adviser for the 
prevention of genocide is a good sign toward the same result, but there is a need of a stronger 
body. In addition to what was suggested in relation to states, that  body should have 
independence from the UN organs and the capacity and authority to investigate from early stages 
and recommend measures to the relevant actors (including organs of the UN) to take appropriate 
action before the escalation of the conflict. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
discussed in chapter two can serve as one of the examples of how such a body can work with the 
UN organs. If despite this, the conflict has escalated, it should also (if given means to do so) 
determine that genocide is imminent or is being committed and recommend that the Security 
Council takes rapid and decisive action that may include the use of force where necessary.  
Without being too ambitious, it must be said that, for a timely use of force to be possible, a 
permanent force under UN command would be needed to stop killings at their very start. The 
creation of such force is possible even without the amendment of the Charter. If the world has 
found genocide an odious scourge and has committed itself to prevent it1302 in order to liberate 
mankind from it,1303 it should follow that it be serious about its prevention by putting in place 
serious mechanisms to effectively prevent it from happening.  
The challenges with regard to prevention of genocide by the UN raise the question of whether or 
not the UN can be legally held responsible for the breach of the obligation to prevent genocide 
when its organs have failed to do so. However, this is not answered in this work.1304 Instead, it is 
now opportune to examine in the next chapter whether the concept of Responsibility to Protect 
has addressed the challenges mentioned in this chapter as well as in the previous ones and how it 
may contribute to the obligation to prevent genocide by different actors. 
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Chapter VIII. Prevention of genocide and the concept of the 
responsibility to protect 
Introduction 
Many challenges have been identified in the three previous chapters with regard to the 
prevention of genocide by territorial states, non-territorial states and the UN. This chapter 
addresses the question whether and to what extent this relatively new concept is a (new) means 
to the prevention of genocide. It does not look at this concept from all perspectives nor does it 
enter in the whole debate that has surrounded its legality, legitimacy and implementation.  
It proceeds in four sections. The first section gives a brief summary of the background and 
evolution of the concept of the responsibility to protect. While the second section considers the 
responsibility to protect by territorial states in comparison with the obligation to prevent 
genocide by territorial states at the three levels of prevention, the third section discusses the 
responsibility to protect by non-territorial states and by the UN, in comparison with the 
obligation to prevent genocide by them at the three levels. The fourth and final section discusses 
the challenges of the R2P vis-à-vis the prevention of genocide. 
1. Background and evolution of the concept of the R2P 
Given the manifest failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda and in Bosnia, the international 
community sought to build a new international consensus on how to respond in the face of 
massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law.1305 The Canadian Prime Minister Jean 
Pierre Chrétien announced in the 2000 UN General Assembly the establishment of an 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).1306 Launched in 
September 2000, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
was expected to come up with new ways of reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable notions of 
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intervention and state sovereignty.1307  
This commission came up with a new concept: the responsibility to protect (R2P). In explaining 
this concept, the commission noted that “the responsibility to protect means the “responsibility to 
prevent”, the “responsibility to react,” and the “responsibility to rebuild”.1308 This concept was 
later referred to by the UN High-Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in its report of 2004: 
A more Secure world: Our Shared Responsibility which emphasized that: 
“sovereign governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens 
from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility 
should be taken up by the wider international community.” 1309 
Endorsing this High Panel report, the UN Secretary-General noted in his 2005 report: “In Larger 
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for all”:1310  
“I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we 
must act on it.  This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individual State, 
whose primary raison d”être and duty is to protect its population. But if national 
authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts 
to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help 
protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. When such methods 
appear insufficient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under 
the Charter of the United Nations, including enforcement action, if so required”.1311 
The concept has evolved since then. After some changes of the initial concept by the ICISS,1312 
the R2P was unanimously accepted by governments in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome.1313 
This concept was endorsed in two paragraphs (138, 139) and it is worth mentioning them here.  
The paragraph 138 states that:  
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““Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.   
And paragraph 139 states that: 
“The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to 
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the 
need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. 
We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build 
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and 
conflicts break out. 
In paragraph 140 states added that they fully supported “the mission of the Special Adviser of the 
Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide”. 
One year after the endorsement of the R2P by the General Assembly, the Security Council 
adopted the Resolution 1674 in which it reaffirmed the provisions of the paragraphs 138 and 139 
regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity.1314 The Security Council referred to the concept of responsibility to 
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protect in some of its subsequent resolutions such as the resolution 1706 of 2006 in which it was 
requiring Sudan to protect its population under threat of violence1315 and in resolution 1894 of 
2009 in which it endorsed again the concept of responsibility to protect.1316 This latter resolution 
was adopted ten months after the first report of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation 
of the Responsibility to protect.1317  
In this report, the Secretary-General noted that the R2P has three components or “pillars”: the 
protection responsibilities of individual States; the international community’s role in assisting 
States to fulfil their responsibilities (capacity-building); and the international community’s 
residual responsibility for timely and decisive response.1318 In other words, while pillar one is 
confirmation of the responsibility of each state to protect its populations against genocide, crimes 
against humanity, ethnic cleansing  and war crimes, pillar two is the commitment of the 
international community to assist States in meeting those obligations. Pillar three is the 
responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a 
State is manifestly failing to provide such protection.1319 
After this report was presented by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly in July 2009, 
the latter held for the first time, a debate on the responsibility to protect in the same month.1320 
Despite some concerns about this concept, in their statements, the vast majority of member states 
was positive about this concept and showed the will to commit themselves to the prevention and 
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halting of atrocity crimes.1321 Thus, the call by a few states to renegotiate the concept was not 
successful and the concept was kept the way it was adopted in the 2005 World Summit because 
the vast majority believed that the challenge was to implement the R2P not to renegotiate it.1322  
The vast majority also supported the three pillars of the R2P as suggested by the Secretary-
General.1323 The edifice of the R2P was maintained on those three pillars. The result of this 
debate was the General Assembly resolution which at the same time recalled the 2005 world 
summit outcome on the R2P and took note of the Secretary-General report and decided that the 
issues on the implementation of the R2P was to continue to be under its consideration.1324  
In 2011, the General Assembly did have indeed another thematic debate on “The role of regional 
and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect.”1325 This was 
following two reports of the Secretary-General on the same topic.1326 The objectives of the 
debate “were to reconfirm that the responsibility to protect was an evolving principle, to serve as 
an opportunity for cross-regional exchanges on lessons learned and best practices, and to offer a 
forum for considering new ideas and approaches to enhancing global, regional, and sub-regional 
cooperation on the responsibility to protect.”1327 Like the previous debate, this one was rather 
about the implementation of the R2P. Likewise, the Secretary-General report of 2012 on R2P 
continued with measures related to its implementation which concerns the timely and decisive 
response with a focus on the Charter-based tools available to respond to situations of concern 
and the partnerships that could be utilized.1328 Finally, the Report of 2013 assessed the causes 
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and dynamics of atrocity crimes and violations and provided examples of initiatives that States 
can take to prevent them.1329 In all these reports and debate thereof, there has been no proposal 
that resulted in changing the edifice of the R2P as endorsed in 2005. The question about how this 
concept constitutes a mechanism to prevent genocide will be examined in the next sections. 
2. Prevention of genocide by territorial states under the R2P 
This section examines how prevention of genocide by territorial states is dealt with under the 
R2P. This is done through the three levels of prevention.  
2.1. Prevention of genocide at the primary level under the R2P  
In the concept of R2P the notion of prevention at the primary level was not used as such. Yet, in 
the explanation of its scope, there are reasons to think that it may aim at measures that can have 
effect on the prevention of genocide in the form developed in chapter five of this work on the 
measures of territorial states to prevent genocide. This relation and contribution of the R2P to the 
prevention of genocide at the primary level is what is examined here. 
The responsibility of a state to protect its own population is expressly set out in paragraph 138 of 
the UN Summit Outcome Document which noted inter alia that each individual State has the 
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide (among other international crimes) which 
entails the responsibility to prevent it through appropriate and necessary means. 1330 However, 
this paragraph did not provide guidance on which measures may be taken by states.  
In his subsequent report on the implementation of the R2P, the Secretary-General observed that 
since genocide (and the other atrocity crimes) requires permissive conditions; measures to be 
taken must address those conditions.1331 Those conditions include seeds of intolerance, bigotry 
and exclusion which can be root likely to grow into something horrific like genocide (or other 
atrocity crimes).1332 They also include social, economic and political systems that have no self-
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correcting mechanisms in place to discourage and derail such impulses.1333  
Furthermore, it has been suggested in literature on the R2P that, before crises emerge, states must 
reflect on their own institutions and governance approaches by proactively self-structure their 
security, justice, political, and economic sectors to provide a solid buffer between the people and 
the interests of potential perpetrators.1334 Some more or less concrete measures were later 
suggested in order to prevent genocide (and other atrocity crimes) by addressing their root 
causes. These include legislative measures as well as various other measures.  
About the legislative ones, the Secretary-General noted in the said report on the implementation 
of the R2P that states should become parties to and embody in national legislation, relevant 
international instruments on human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law so 
that the four specified crimes and violations and their incitement are criminalized under domestic 
law.”1335 Also, there should be criminal laws, rules and procedures that are designed to protect 
the vulnerable and the disenfranchised, while ensuring that impunity is not accepted either 
nationally or globally. 1336 Furthermore, these laws are designed in a way that ensures that all 
segments in the society affords equal access to justice and to judicial redress for violations of 
their fundamental rights, as part of an overall effort to strengthen the rule of law.1337  
In addition to these laws (legislation), some other measures may contribute to promoting human 
rights. The report of the Secretary-General did not enumerate all measures that could be taken in 
that regard but did not exclude any, as long as they can contribute to keeping an environment that 
may not lead to genocide. Moreover, the ICISS had suggested some earlier. It had for instance 
noted that preventive strategies must work “to promote human rights, to protect minority rights 
and to institute political arrangements in which all groups are represented.”1338  According to the 
ICISS, efforts include for every state, a firm national commitment to ensuring fair treatment and 
fair opportunities for all citizens which provides a solid basis for conflict prevention. It added 
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that the sovereign state needs to undertake efforts to ensure accountability and good governance, 
protect human rights, promote social and economic development and ensure a fair distribution of 
resources.1339 Likewise Francis Deng said that since conflicts resulted not from difference but 
from how those differences are managed: gross inequalities, a denial of fundamental rights and 
civil liberties, and exclusion structural prevention should mean that issues of diversity are 
addressed through a constructive management of diversity.1340 This supposes measures to be 
taken before the conflict with the potential to lead to genocide emerges. In the report on 
implementing the R2P mentioned above, the Secretary-General was of almost the same view that 
“it is evident that states that handle their diversity well, foster respect among disparate groups, 
and have effective mechanisms for handling domestic disputes and protecting the rights of 
women, youth and minorities are unlikely to follow such a destructive path”,1341(referring to 
mass violence).  
The Secretary-General added that states can seek technical assistance from the UN, their 
neighbours and regional agencies to help oversee the implementation of the relevant international 
human rights and humanitarian standards1342 mentioned above. This technical assistance may be 
useful in enhancing another key preventive measure by states to train the police, soldiers, the 
judiciary and legislators since they are critical actors in every society.1343 Moreover, the 
population needs to be educated on the prevention of genocide (and other atrocity crimes) as 
well.1344 During the 2009 General Assembly debate on implementing the R2P, some states spoke 
of the importance of increasing education and public awareness to prevent mass atrocity 
crimes.1345 Some argued that training programs on human rights, mediation, conflict prevention, 
crisis management and good governance would be beneficial in the long term.1346 As the 
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Secretary-General has noted, if principles related to the R2P are to take full effect and be 
sustainable, they must be integrated into each culture and society without hesitation or 
conditions.1347 
There have been critiques that R2P may be everything and nothing because of its 
comprehensiveness.1348 However, though the prevention of genocide (and other atrocity crimes) 
can be an imprecise science,1349 especially at this primary level, this level is at the same time 
recognised as a priority in avoiding the occurrence of genocide.1350 My view would therefore be 
that a much more precise framework of prevention is necessary at this level. This requires a 
robust and in-depth multidisciplinary and coordinated research. 
My main observation here is however that the concept of the responsibility to protect addresses 
the conditions which may lead to genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes without either making it clear what are the causes of each of them, or precising that they 
may have the same causes and therefore be prevented by the same means. In the current form, it 
appears as if it has been assumed that they have the same causes and that they develop in the 
same manner. This may result in seeing R2P as everything and nothing as mentioned above. 
Another observation is that the R2P did not pay much attention to the measures at this level 
probably because from its inception it was designed to find a solution to mass atrocities which 
made it be rather oriented on further levels of prevention where signs are clear or when those 
crimes are being committed. 
Despite these challenges in the implementation of the R2P at this level, it can nonetheless still be 
said that the R2P at this level may correspond well with what has been discussed supra about the 
obligation of territorial states to prevent genocide at the primary level. Indeed, states have the 
obligation/responsibility to create conditions that do not give chance to the emergence of risks of 
genocide. As explained, the means may include legislation as well as other kinds of measures 
(political, administrative, educational, economic…). If they are adopted and implemented, they 
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can surely contribute to the prevention of genocide from the very primary level. This is not to say 
however that the concept of the responsibility to protect has added something to what the 
substantial obligation to prevent genocide entails to states as explained in chapter five of this 
work. Many people have lauded this concept for its potential contribution to the prevention of 
genocide, but this was because the prevention of genocide had not been explained or understood 
correctly and substantially at least with regard to the territorial states.  
Effective preventive actions at the primary level may make actions at further levels unnecessary 
and as supporters of the R2P at the earlier phase argue, there is no point in waiting to halt a 
massacre if early engagement might avert it entirely.1351 However, when measures at this level 
have failed or have not been taken, territorial states need to take further actions to avert or stop 
genocide. 
2.2. Prevention of genocide at the secondary and tertiary levels under the R2P  
The reason to treat these two levels together lies in the fact that the concept paid not much 
attention to them and gave so little but similar  indication on what should be done that can 
prevent genocide at  both secondary and tertiary levels.  
Some measures have been proposed by the Secretary-General in his report on the 
implementation of the responsibility to protect that can have effect on the prevention of genocide 
at the secondary level. For instance, the R2P suggests that states punish individuals who commit 
or incite to commit genocide (among other crimes).1352 In fact, the UN World Summit Outcome 
Document expressly mentioned the incitement of the R2P crimes as one of the crimes to be 
prevented.1353 When a state is unable to prosecute those individuals who are accused of inciting 
crimes, it has been suggested that it should refer them to the International Criminal Court or 
other international tribunals and assists them in locating and apprehending them.1354 Apparently, 
these same measures can be also used at the tertiary level because not only the measures are not 
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used in sequences but also the concept of R2P referred to the commission of the crimes as well 
as to the R2P as a ground of action to end them. 
There has been not much elaboration on what more can be done by territorial states to implement 
the R2P to prevent genocide at the secondary and tertiary levels. However, by recognising that 
states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, it is implied 
that they should do it at each level to ensure that it does not happen or that when it starts it gets 
stopped. In fact, saying in paragraph 138 of the Outcome Document that states prevent those 
crimes by all necessary and appropriate means may be understood as including measures at each 
level.  
Not elaborating on further measures that may be susceptible of preventing genocide at the 
secondary and tertiary levels may have been due to the context in which the concept was 
conceived. Indeed, it seems that the authors of this concept were driven by the assumption that 
genocide is always committed by states or condoned by them. Though it has been argued that the 
structure of the responsibility to protect lies on the equal size, strength and viability of each of its 
supporting pillars,1355 those who created the concept put much focus in explaining what the 
international community should do in preventing genocide (and other atrocity crimes) in other 
states which have failed to prevent those crimes. This can be explained by the fact that the 
commission that created this concept was itself indeed created to find ways on how to respond in 
the face of massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law where states have failed to 
prevent them. For the purpose of this work, there is not much interest in dwelling at length on the 
reasons why it has not been made clear in the concept of R2P about all the measures of territorial 
states which can have effect to the prevention of genocide at the secondary and tertiary levels. It 
is instead important to notice that for the little contained in it, there is no substantial difference 
between what the concept of responsibility to protect demands territorial states to do  and what I 
have discussed in chapter five of this work on what the obligation to prevent genocide demands 
states to do at these levels. 
This is not to say however that the insufficiency of clear measures of territorial states that can 
prevent genocide at these levels makes the R2P irrelevant for the prevention of genocide at those 
levels. The fact that it demands territorial states to take necessary and appropriate measures 
encompasses all measures at all levels. And again, as said above, the fact that the prevention of 
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genocide has been undeveloped for long time, if the responsibility to protect is respected the way 
it is, it can have some significant effect on the prevention of genocide. So, its contribution on the 
prevention of genocide is possible when its implementation is possible. In the next section, I 
examine what the R2P entails to non-territorial states and the UN with regard to the prevention 
of genocide.  
2.3. Preliminary conclusions 
In this section it is concluded that though in the concept of R2P not much focus has been put on 
the role of territorial states, this role has nonetheless been recognised in it for the prevention of 
genocide and other atrocity crimes. Under the R2P, territorial states are required to put in place 
measures that may contribute to the prevention of genocide. At the primary level, the measures 
include legislation as well as other kinds of measures (political, administrative, educational, 
economic…). It is noticed that there is no elaboration on measures that could be taken at the 
secondary and tertiary levels. However, the fact that territorial states are required to take 
necessary and appropriate measures, the R2P encompasses all measures at all levels. This being 
said, it has been observed that the concept did not add anything to what the substantial obligation 
to prevent genocide entails to states as explained in chapter five of this work.  
3. Prevention of genocide by non-territorial states and by (or through) 
the United Nations under the R2P 
The reason to treat non-territorial states and the UN together is simply that the concept of the 
R2P has put them together.1356 This section investigates the measures that may be taken by non-
territorial states on the prevention of genocide and by or through the UN at the three levels of 
prevention. 
3.1. Prevention of genocide at the primary level under the R2P 
In part of paragraph 138 of the UN World Summit Outcome document it is noted that the 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise their 
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responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.1357 Part 
of paragraph 139 added this: “we also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, 
to helping states build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assist those which are under stress before crises 
and conflict break out.”1358 The R2P demands states as members of the international community 
to take action in helping to prevent genocide and other mass atrocities when the host state is 
unable to prevent them alone.1359 It is maintained within the framework of this concept that the 
prevention cannot be a national affair, and other states are required to assist in the prevention.1360  
Under the R2P, States take actions mainly through the UN. 
Those actions may come in the form of development assistance and other efforts to help address 
the root causes of potential conflict; or efforts to provide support for local initiatives to advance 
good governance, human rights, or the rule of law.1361 This is what was the spirit of the 
conceivers of the R2P who observed that to prevent the four crimes required to tackle  what they 
called their root causes (i.e: poverty, political repression and uneven distribution of 
resources).1362 According to them, this means to address political needs and deficiencies (e.g: 
democratic institution and capacity building; constitutional power sharing, power-alternating and 
redistribution arrangements..) and to tackle economic deprivation and the lack of economic 
opportunities (e.g: development assistance and cooperation to address inequities in the 
distribution of resources or opportunities).1363 On the measures that aim at economic 
development, the Secretary-General for instance recognised later in his report on the 
implementation of the R2P that economic development is an important tool to reduce risk of 
violence because it gives the capacity to resolve domestic tensions peacefully and fully and 
suggested an increase of general development assistance.1364  
Preventing by tackling the root causes also means strengthening legal protections and institutions 
(e.g: efforts to strengthen the rule of law, enhancing protections for vulnerable groups, especially 
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minorities) and embarking upon needed sectoral reforms to the military and other state security 
services (enhanced education and training for military forces).1365  
More specifically, the Secretary-General has suggested some measures1366 that can help to 
prevent genocide at the primary level. I will mention three. The first is to encourage States to 
meet their responsibilities under pillar one. This can entail confidential or public suasion, 
education, training and assistance.1367 The second is to help states to build their capacity to 
protect. This includes assistance to give the poor and minority groups a stronger voice in their 
societies, enhancing equality and social justice, raising their education levels and increasing their 
opportunities for meaningful political participation. The Secretary-General maintained that this 
would have a net positive effect on preventing crimes related to R2P unless it is distributed in a 
way that exacerbates differences.1368 States and the UN also have the responsibilities to refrain 
from taking actions that would fuel tensions among racial, religious or ethnic groups rather than 
they prevent them. The third kind of action is to help states to exercise their responsibilities. This 
includes strengthening the capacity of the security sector in order to help weak states to have 
security forces capable of implementing their responsibility to protect.  
With regard to how actors of the R2P implement their responsibility at this level, the concept of 
R2P asserts that it is the responsibility of states and the UN without clearly separating who does 
what as if they always act together. But since the report of the Secretary-General does not 
exclude actions performed separately, it may not be definitely said that they have to act together 
all the time.  Indeed, with regard to encouraging states to meet their obligations relating to the 
R2P, the report gave examples of the UN bodies that are well placed to do that but added that 
when this is reinforced by parallel and consistent member states diplomacy, it will be more 
persuasive.1369 This does not solve the problem of the approach of the R2P related to the lack of 
precision on who does what and how. There is no clear channel and coordination whatsoever 
through which this assistance is to be done. The need of precision in this regard has been also 
suggested in literature. For instance, Gareth Evans has noted that there is a need to “sort out who 
should do what and when: immediately, over a medium transitional period and in the longer 
                                                          
1365
 ICISS Report, paras 3.21- 22. 
1366
 See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, 12 January 2009, A/63/677,  
para. 28. 
1367
 Idem, para. 30. 
1368
 Idem, para. 43. 
1369
 Ibidem. 




term” and then allocating the roles and coordinate them effectively both in relevant capitals and 
the ground.”1370  
All in all, the idea in what is explained above about the current form of the R2P is to prevent 
genocide before the conflicts and crisis starts and that corresponds to what has been discussed in 
chapters six and seven of this work related to the prevention of genocide by non-territorial states 
and by the UN at the primary level. Indeed, like for the prevention of genocide in the two said 
chapters, the concept of responsibility to protect also includes that the prevention of genocide by 
non-territorial states and by the UN involves measures that tackle the root causes of genocide. 
Also, though to a different extent, the two chapters and the present one recognise the obligation 
(responsibility in the concept of R2P) of states and the UN to prevent genocide by tackling its 
causes.  
Thus, the concept of the responsibility to protect was not a novelty. Indeed, as it is recognised at 
the creation of the concept, the foundations of it lie in legal obligations already existing in 
international law.1371 What has been affirmed in chapter six and seven is not a suggestion of new 
rules on the prevention of genocide at the primary level either. It is an interpretation of rules that 
exist since long.  Nothing in the R2P suggests any new means to prevent genocide by non-
territorial states and by the UN that is not explained in chapter six and seven of this work. 
However, this is not to say that the R2P means nothing to the prevention of genocide at the 
primary level. Again, given the still existing need to prevent genocide (and other atrocity crimes) 
at the time of the birth of the R2P, coupled with the inexistence of a clear framework of the 
obligation to prevent genocide under international law, the R2P has got the attention that the 
obligation to prevent genocide has lacked for many years.  
It can nonetheless be said that, since the R2P corresponds with what has been explained in the 
prevention of genocide at the primary level, if the R2P is respected, it can have some positive 
effects to the prevention of genocide. However, the challenges at this level need more thought 
and more research for future better protection. Among the areas to focus on in future thoughts 
and research is the need of a strong early-warning system that has the capacity to collect 
information, from the earliest phase, to understand the context of each situation and foresee 
where some factors on the ground may lead to in the future, to understand what is needed as 
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assistance, the priorities compared to the needs and to know what suits where.  
3.2. Prevention of genocide at the secondary level under the R2P  
The concept of R2P requires states and the UN (or through the UN) not only to provide 
assistance to states in need of it in order to implement their responsibilities to protect before the 
crisis or conflicts break out, but also to continue and take actions when there is a conflict that 
may lead to the four crimes that include genocide. This is what the Secretary-General called 
pillar three.1372 
Part of paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document asserts that “The international 
community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with chapters VI and VIII of 
the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide…”1373 This document did not go in 
details to give all measures that may be taken. However, some of these measures have been 
pointed out by the ICISS before and by using a broad notion of “peaceful means”, this document 
did not exclude any measure as long as it is in accordance with chapters VI and VIII. The 
measures provided for by these chapters include negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means.1374 The ICISS was more specific with regard to measures that may have effect on the 
prevention of genocide (and other atrocity crimes) by saying that some cases of international 
support for prevention efforts may take the form of inducements; in others, it may involve a 
willingness to apply tough and perhaps even punitive measures.1375 The ICISS used the form of 
direct prevention which is interesting at the secondary level.1376  The instruments in direct 
prevention may take the form of positive inducements or, in more difficult cases, the negative 
form of threatened “punishments”.1377 According to the ICISS, these positive and negative 
measures may be political and diplomatic, economic or threat to apply international legal 
sanctions.  
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While the political and diplomatic direct prevention may include positive inducements such as 
international appeals, dialogue and mediation, they may also constitute negative measures such 
as the threat or application of political sanctions, diplomatic isolation, suspension of organization 
membership, travel and asset restrictions on targeted persons, “naming and shaming,” and other 
such actions.1378 In his report on the implementation of the R2P, the Secretary-General also 
confirmed the need to use diplomatic positive actions by persuading leaders to protect their 
populations and negative actions (diplomatic sanctions) such as isolation from their peers and the 
non-eligibility for election to leadership posts in sub-regional, regional or global bodies.1379 This 
report also noted the need to take targeted sanctions such as travel bans and others related to 
financial transfers, luxury goods and arms in order to prevent genocide (and other atrocity 
crimes).1380 
For economic direct prevention, the ICISS has suggested measures that may include promises of 
new funding or investment, or the promise of more favourable trade terms as well as other 
measures of coercive nature such as threats of trade and financial sanctions; withdrawal of 
investment; threats to withdraw International Monetary Fund or World Bank support; and the 
curtailment of aid and other assistance.1381  
The threat to seek or apply international legal sanctions was also suggested in the concept of 
R2P. These may include the threat and actual use of the International Criminal Court and the 
apprehension of suspects of the crimes that may lead to genocide. During the 2009 General 
Assembly debate on implementing R2P, it has rightly been emphasized that “there is no R2P 
with impunity”.1382 These crimes may be the direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide.1383 They may also include persecution on racial, ethnic, national or religious 
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ground.1384 The Kenya situation has been overwhelmingly referred to as an example of where 
some of these measures have been used successfully.1385 Indeed, the UN diplomatic efforts that 
led to the agreement between the parties in conflict contributed in stopping it from escalating to a 
tragedy. The appeals by various personalities in the UN1386 for the indictment of individuals 
involved in crimes committed in Kenya presumably led to the decision of the prosecutor of the 
ICC to request to open an investigation proprio motu.1387 
All the above examples of measures that may be taken at the secondary level correspond well 
with article 41 of the Charter of the UN.1388 This article includes complete or partial interruption 
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.1389 The actions explained are not the 
only ones at this level under the R2P; they have been given as illustrative.  
It is also worth to consider whether the R2P provides for new obligations to prevent genocide at 
the secondary level. What the concept of the responsibility to protect suggests with regard to the 
prevention of genocide as summarised above is part of what I have discussed in Chapters six and 
seven of this work. The main idea common to this section and chapters six and seven was to see 
whether non-territorial states and the UN have the obligation to prevent genocide and it is found 
that for both, the obligation/responsibility to prevent genocide exists. The difference is however 
that, unlike the R2P, the general obligation to prevent genocide discussed in earlier chapters have 
tried to get out of the abstraction of the broad obligation by showing more or less clearly the 
legal framework of preventive actions by non-territorial states and the organs of the UN at the 
secondary level. More specifically, the R2P framework does not suggest solutions that would be 
addressing the challenges involved but it also does not clearly show to what extent states are 
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legally permitted and required to prevent genocide at the secondary level. 
This leads to the conclusion that the R2P has not added much to what is the content of the 
obligation to prevent genocide by non-territorial states and the UN at the secondary level in the 
form shown in chapters six and seven of this work.  However, as said in the previous section, 
given the attention given to the R2P worldwide compared to the prevention of genocide per se, it 
is prudent to say that if it is implemented the way it is, it can have some significant positive 
effect to the prevention of genocide.  
3.3. Prevention of genocide at the tertiary level under the R2P  
In previous chapters of this work, the discussion of the prevention of genocide at the tertiary 
level has focused on the use of force as a measure of the last resort when other measures have 
been taken at earlier levels but have failed or have not been taken at all and the genocide has 
started to be committed. This approach will be used here as well. However, since measures are 
not taken in sequences, measures taken by actors of the prevention of genocide /R2P at earlier 
levels (primary and/or secondary) may continue to apply at the tertiary level. 
The concept of the R2P demands states and the UN as members of the international community 
to take action in order to prevent genocide (and other mass atrocities) when the host state is 
unwilling, unable to prevent it or is the perpetrator itself.1390 From its inception, the first issue the 
ICISS thought to consider was “to turn the whole weary debate about the “right to intervene” on 
its head, and to recharacterise it not as an argument about any “right” at all, but rather about a 
“responsibility”.1391 It observed that: 
“the expression “humanitarian intervention” did not help to carry the debate forward, so 
too do we believe that the language of past debates arguing for or against a “right to 
intervene” by one state on the territory of another state is outdated and unhelpful. We 
prefer to talk not of a “right to intervene” but of a “responsibility to protect”.1392 
Indeed, according to the Commission, “the emerging principle in question is that intervention for 
human protection purposes, including military intervention in extreme cases, is supportable when 
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major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in question is 
unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the perpetrator”.1393 The Commission mentioned 
some instruments which in the view of its members would support the notion that there is an 
emerging guiding principle in favour of military intervention for human protection. Those are the 
wide variety of legal sources including sources that exist independently of any duties, 
responsibilities or authority that may be derived from Chapter VII of the UN Charter as well as 
fundamental natural law principles; the human rights provisions of the UN Charter; the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights together with the Genocide Convention…1394 In this respect, the 
Commission suggested six criteria for military intervention for human protection purposes to be 
legally justified.1395 Those are the just cause,1396 right intention,1397 right authority,1398 last 
resort,1399 proportional means,1400 and reasonable prospects”.1401  
Though without the same details as the ICISS document, it is noted in the 2005 WSOD that the 
heads of states and governments took the commitment to be “prepared to take collective action, 
in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
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organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide….”. Measures under chapter VII 
include those in article 42 which involve the use of force in case the actions in article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proven to be inadequate.1402 In his report on the implementation of the 
R2P, the Secretary-General noted that the collective measures may indeed be authorised by the 
Security-Council under article 42, the General-Assembly under the “Uniting for peace” 
procedure, or by regional or sub-regional arrangements under article 53 of the Charter of the UN, 
with the prior authorisation of the Security Council.1403 This alternative of an action by the 
General Assembly and regional organisations had also been pointed out earlier by the ICISS.1404 
Neither the WSOD nor the report of the Secretary-General made explicit reference to the six 
criteria suggested by the ICISS for the use of force to be justified.  However some of them may 
be implied in what is said in these documents. For instance, under the WSOD, there may be 
recourse to actions authorised by the Security Council under chapter VII when peaceful 
measures are inadequate and the national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide (and other atrocity crimes). This may imply the just cause and right 
intention criteria (protect the population from genocide…), last resort (peaceful measures are 
inadequate and the national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from 
genocide), the right authority (authorisation of the SC).  
The threshold of manifestly failing to protect the population from genocide may be subject of 
criticism for being a vague threshold and therefore susceptible of manifestly delaying the action. 
While this threshold may indeed be interpreted so narrowly and therefore delay action, I 
recognise the difficulty in making it clear. For the purpose of this work however, this threshold 
does not pose much difficulty because it can be understood as the same threshold for action at 
the tertiary level, i.e when genocide has started to be committed and the territorial state is either 
manifestly unable, unwilling to prevent it, is about to commit it or is already committing it itself. 
Moreover, this is not the most difficult issue here. The biggest issue is the question of how the 
concept of the R2P deals with the problem when the Security Council fails to take action and 
genocide is being committed in a given state. 
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Some commentators have argued that the 2005 WSOD did not exclude unilateral use of force in 
case the Security Council fails to authorise it to save people. For instance, Stephen Stedman has 
maintained that the WSOD has succeeded Kofi Annan’s agenda which had included a new norm, 
the R2P to legalise humanitarian intervention.1405 Alicia L. Bannon has gone even further to 
argue that the World Summit Outcome Document “strengthens the case for unilateral action in 
the absence of UN action.”1406  She based her argument on two things:  First, that “if nations 
have no sovereign right to commit or passively permit atrocities against their own populations, 
then they cannot object on sovereignty grounds to coercive actions halting the commission of 
those atrocities”. And second, the agreement asserts a “responsibility” for the international 
community, acting through the United Nations, to protect populations from genocide and 
declares that the United Nations is “prepared” to take “timely and decisive” coercive action if 
peaceful means prove inadequate. She added that the pledge to prevent another Rwandan 
genocide must be looked at as overriding purposes of the WSOD. She noted that “it would be 
perverse to argue that members of the international community cannot respond individually to 
vindicate the purpose of the agreement, particularly in light of the Charter’s commitment to 
human rights.”1407 She observed therefore that “rather than acting illegally, states would be 
acting in a legal void opened by U.N inaction and with the purpose of addressing an institutional 
failure”.1408 Carsten Stahn also observed that “the text of the World Summit Outcome Document 
does not firmly state that the UN collective security action constitutes the only option for 
responding to mass atrocities through the use of force.”1409 
This interpretation has however been overwhelmingly rejected by others who have argued in the 
contrary. In the report of the Secretary-General of the UN on the implementation of the 
responsibility to protect, the three options were recalled viz the action authorized either by the 
Security Council, under the regional arrangements and by the General Assembly.1410 The 
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Secretary-General recognized in that report that the United Nations is still far from developing 
the rapid response military capacity needed to handle the unfolding atrocity crimes referred to in 
paragraph 139,1411 but he did not suggest a unilateral military action as an alternative to handle 
this issue in case the UN cannot. Instead, he gave the alternatives of actions by the General 
Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” and Regional arrangements under Chapter VIII.1412  
Commentators have been clearer than the Secretary-General on this by affirming that “R2P as 
agreed in the WSOD is very clear in its confinement of military measures to those authorized by 
the Security Council”.1413 For instance, analysing the conformity of the Russian claim that its 
military action in Georgia was to stop it from perpetrating the crime of genocide (among other 
crimes) in South Ossetia, Evans Gareth who co-chaired the ICISS noted that  ”in the absence of 
UN Security Council approval, there is no legal authority for an R2P-based military 
intervention”.1414 Unlike those who found the basis as to a unilateral military action in the 2005 
WSOD, Evans Gareth based his argument on the same document  but by interpreting it as 
making it “clear beyond argument that any country or group of countries seeking to apply 
forceful means to address an R2P situation … must take that action through the Security 
Council.”1415 Likewise, Schabas noted that it is clear that the endorsement of the concept of a 
“responsibility to protect” in the WSOD is in no way a confirmation of the use of force to protect 
human security in the absence of Security Council authorization.1416 By contrast, Schabas 
observed that it is only an important reminder to the Security Council to work much better than it 
has by carrying out its responsibility to intervene in appropriate cases, where minorities are at 
great risk and human dignity is in jeopardy.1417  
As said above, there seems to be an overwhelming majority which supports the interpretation 
that the WSOD excluded any unilateral military action. As noted by Edward C. Luck, former 
Secretary-General Special Advisor on the R2P, some leading diplomats even described the 
WSOD as having “killed” or “buried” the R2P, meaning that “they had once again resisted the 
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adoption of the humanitarian intervention as a unilateral, coercive and largely military 
doctrine.”1418  
This interpretation does not resolve the problem of the endangered human beings since in some 
cases the Security Council does not authorize the military intervention even when genocide is 
being committed. It is in cases where the Security Council is not willing or is unable to reach a 
decision under Chapter VII to authorize a military action or when it cannot do it promptly that a 
unilateral military action may be needed. The argument that the R2P came to remind the Security 
Council to do its job better does not add anything to the concept. In fact, if the Security Council 
has failed to discharge its responsibility it is not because it has forgotten its responsibilities. It is 
due to other reasons as already shown earlier. Reminding only without providing solutions to the 
obstacles that cause it not to do its job well is marching on the same place without making a step 
forward. The desirable way could have been to explicitly propose rules or criteria that should 
guide the Security Council in how it deals with situations of genocide (and other crimes related 
to the R2P). During the 2009 debate on the Secretary-General report on implementing the 
responsibility to protect, there were some suggestions to reform the SC which would not only be 
about a composition that takes into consideration the contemporary realities but also remove the 
veto or at least prohibit its use on decisions that concern the prevention of atrocity crimes.1419 
However, no consensus was reached on these suggestions.  
The already existing alternatives suggested is to seek support for military action from the 
General Assembly meeting in an Emergency Special Session under the established “Uniting for 
Peace”1420 procedure and through the regional arrangements do not solve the problem either. For 
instance, the ICISS which suggested this first was itself not optimistic about the likelihood of a 
decision by the General Assembly which requires the two-thirds majority especially there has 
been either no majority in the Security Council or a veto imposed or threatened by one or more 
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permanent members.1421 The Secretary-General was also not optimistic because “the decisions of 
the General Assembly are not legally binding on the parties.”1422  
For the alternative of collective intervention to be pursued by a regional or sub-regional 
organization acting within its boundaries, 1423 the ICISS found a difficulty which is still valid 
today. This is the fact that the Charter requires enforcement action by regional organizations 
always to be subject to prior authorization from the Security Council.1424 This is a challenge 
because even if there have been cases where approval has been sought ex post facto, like in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone which have been interpreted by some commentators as a precedent and 
basis for future legal justification of military action by regional arrangements without the express 
authorization of the Security Council,1425 this has not been supported by subsequent practice.1426 
Apparently, none of these alternatives is ensuring an effective prevention of genocide. No one 
disagreed however on the fact that in most cases where the human beings are at high risk of 
genocide, there is a need of a prompt military action to halt that. Yet, the concept of the R2P 
does not go further than to suggest an intermediary solution in order to release human beings 
from those sufferings. Arguably, given the ICISS view that the military intervention would occur 
only in extreme cases, in respecting the listed conditions, it would have probably been a good 
opportunity to suggest that in those extreme cases of human sufferings, where the UN fails to 
take any action to avert them (due to any reason whatsoever), a military action to save the lives 
of endangered human beings could be justified. This was avoided but the continuing concern 
about these extreme situations and the human sufferings cannot be avoided. Gareth Evans has 
rightly observed that: “Hard as it may be for many to instinctively accept, if there is one thing as 
bad as using military force when we should not, it is not using force when we should”.1427 He 
said this urging the UN to take action when the need to do it arises, in order to halt the crimes 
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related to the R2P. This need does not disappear when the will of the UN to take action is 
lacking. The need to save people being engulfed by ruthless regimes which decide to wipe them 
out completely will always be urgent. That is why the R2P could have gone further to give more 
revolutionary alternatives.  
Though these challenges may unsurprisingly hinder the effect of the R2P on the prevention of 
genocide at the tertiary level, its potential contribution to it cannot be denied, especially because 
of the level of awareness it has strengthened among actors. Where the level of awareness is high, 
it might be expected that the level of will may also follow (though not always). And where the 
level of will is high, the chances of prompt and robust action are high. Though the Libya case is 
not about genocide as such, it can serve as a successful example of the R2P with regard to a 
prompt and robust action. It can be hoped that, since the concept is still under consideration, it 
can presumably be so in the right direction in addressing challenges that limit its effectiveness in 
the future.  
3.4. Preliminary conclusions 
Various measures by non-territorial states and (through) the UN to prevent genocide under the 
R2P have been identified. They fit the three levels of prevention. With regard to the two actors 
(non-territorial states and the UN), it has been argued in this section that the fact that they have 
been put together should not be construed as requiring them to always act together. They may 
also take actions separately. However, it is argued that this concept should have separated them 
in order to show more clearly the responsibility of each of them (i.e who does what, when, where 
and how). The future development should address this. Other serious challenges are related to the 
measures to prevent genocide under the R2P. Among them, the R2P did not provide a new 
alternative to address the issue of use of force by non-territorial states in case the Security 
Council (and the General Assembly to some extent) are unable to authorise it in order to put an 
end to an on-going genocide. Be it as it may, it has been noticed that the R2P has got an attention 
that the obligation to prevent genocide has lacked for many years. Whether this attention may be 
exploited in a way that may contribute to the effective prevention of genocide may depend on 
how its challenges are addressed. The next section will discuss those challenges further and will 
show why (and how) addressing them would contribute to the prevention of genocide. 




4. R2P and prevention of genocide: challenges ahead 
Since the adoption of R2P by the General Assembly in its 2005 resolution, academic and policy 
debates have continued over whether the R2P has a legal status, whether it should have that 
status and whether identifying that legal status matters.1428 For the reasons mentioned in the 
previous section, these questions are relevant here as well but only in as far as the prevention of 
genocide is concerned. In other words, the question here is whether the R2P has acquired a legal 
status and if so whether  this would add anything to the prevention of genocide and if not 
whether it should be acquired in order to give effect to the prevention of genocide. In either 
affirmative or negative answer, the question whether the current form of the R2P has contributed 
to the prevention of genocide is attached to the main question and is therefore briefly addressed 
as well. 
On the question whether the R2P has acquired legal status in international law, Alex Bellamy 
and Ruben Reike1429 have argued that the responsibility of a state to protect is best understood as 
a political commitment to implement and act in accordance with the already existing legal 
obligations.1430 Likewise, Banda and Welsh argued that this concept helps in establishing a 
political and moral imperative rather than creating a new legal obligation upon states.1431 Other 
authors have come to the conclusion that the general concept of R2P, at least when it comes to 
individual states, has not yet ripened into a norm of customary international law.1432 Arbour’s 
argument is that the heart of the R2P doctrine already rests upon an undisputed obligation of 
international law: the prevention and punishment of genocide.1433  
Others have recognised that the concept is evolving and may become legal in the future. For 
instance, Gareth Evans has described the R2P as an international norm with potential to evolve 
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further into a rule of customary international law.1434 This has been shared by Thomas G. Weiss 
who has also noted that the R2P has certainly the potential to evolve further in customary 
international law.1435  
It appears therefore that despite the efforts by the ICISS and the subsequent resolution by the UN 
General Assembly that adopted the 2005 Outcome document,1436 as well as further 
considerations/debates in order to explain and develop this concept,1437  there is not enough 
indication that this concept has acquired its own independent legal status in international law. 
Moreover, it should be said that this concept neither constitutes a new law nor creates a new 
legal obligation on the prevention of genocide and arguing otherwise would be somehow too 
pretentious. It could be an emerging concept though and considering its progress as shown 
earlier, maybe it could become a legal principle in the future. If it does, that will be a positive 
development in the prevention of genocide but not the ideal because as shown above, in its form, 
it faces and will face difficulties in its implementation.  
But why would it matter much for the prevention of genocide that the R2P acquires a legal 
status? Carsten Sahn noted that there are doubts whether the R2P was meant to be an emerging 
hard norm of international law at all.1438  He based his reasoning on the fact that if it were meant 
so, it should equally be possible to attach it with legal consequences in case of non-
compliance.1439 This would give it a legal authority to make it legally enforceable and therefore 
have more effect to the prevention of genocide. In the current form of the R2P however, this 
exercise would seem to be impossible because of the uncertainties surrounding its legal status. 
These uncertainties include the vagueness on who should do what, when, where and how. For 
instance, it appears to be a responsibility for everybody including international and national civil 
societies as well as individuals.1440 That means that even where the R2P would be a legal 
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principle, it would need to first be clearly defined in order to determine the responsibilities of 
each actor and the circumstances under which each actor exercises it.  Hence, in the process to 
develop this concept into a legal principle, it would be desirable that it first be defined in a way 
that makes it clear who has that responsibility to do what task and within what territorial limits 
and with which means in a way that would make it possible to make the actor responsible in case 
of its breach.  
Does the current status of the responsibility to protect make it devoid of any possible 
contribution to the obligation to prevent genocide? It was said in the WSOD that each individual 
state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. However, this was just reiterating rules that existed before. 
Furthermore, it was said in the same document that the R2P entails the prevention of such 
crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means, but for genocide, 
this also existed before as it has been demonstrated earlier in this work. 
The concept of R2P places the responsibility on the international community as a whole to 
protect people from genocide and other atrocity crimes. Yet, not only this international 
community is not a legal person per se, and even if it were so, still the problem would be to 
determine how their task is either divided or shared among states and the UN in implementing 
the R2P. For instance, non-territorial states may not always act through the UN, but it has not 
been clearly shown what they can do to prevent genocide in other states and under which 
circumstances. Moreover, even where these two things would be determined, the temporal issue 
and territorial competence and limitation would still be a problem which is not answered by the 
R2P. For instance the concept of R2P did emphasize the role of the Security Council in the 
prevention of the core crimes of international law but it did not put in place guiding principles in 
that exercise and it provided for no alternative in case the Security Council fails to prevent them 
from happening. This makes the high expectations that many people have got from this concept 
be highly far from being reached.  
However, though this concept is not a new legal principle as already explained above and though 
measures suggested in the R2P already existed within the existing rules of international law, the 
relevance of the R2P as far as the obligation to prevent genocide is concerned is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           





insignificant.  Indeed, the concept of the R2P came during the period in which there were so 
many uncertainties on what the obligation to prevent genocide entails. The fact that it has been 
put to a larger public debate, it might have contributed and may still do so in the future in raising 
the awareness of a large public (especially the political world as well as the academic one) on the 
necessity to prevent genocide and other international grave crimes using the existing (but either 
misunderstood or neglected) rules of international law. It is however extremely difficult to 
scientifically demonstrate its exact contribution especially because of its lack of independence. 
In fact, even where the international community has referred to it in the decisions to act,1441 
nothing proves that it would not have still acted the same way even without it because the rules 
of international law on the basis of which it has acted existed before its existence. 
Conclusion 
One of the questions that this chapter has had to examine is related to what the concept of the 
R2P entails. This question implies another question whether this concept could have effect on the 
prevention of genocide. The chapter also had to look at the challenges of the R2P vis-à-vis the 
prevention of genocide.  
After the background and evolution of that concept were explained in the first section, the 
responsibility of territorial states to protect its population from genocide and other atrocity 
crimes was examined in the second. This was done in comparison with the obligation to prevent 
genocide as discussed earlier in this work. In that way, the R2P was discussed within the three 
levels of prevention theory to see how it can have effect on the prevention of genocide at the 
three levels. At the primary level, the R2P has been interpreted to include the responsibility to 
create conditions that do not give chance to the emergence of risks of genocide using such means 
like legislation as well as other kinds of measures which may include political, administrative, 
educational and economic measures.  At the secondary and tertiary levels, except the suggestion 
that territorial states punish individuals who commit or incite to commit genocide, the R2P does 
not go far in suggesting other measures at these levels. It was assumed however that the 
recognition in the R2P that territorial states have the primary responsibility to protect their 
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populations from genocide implies that they take every appropriate measure to prevent genocide 
at every level. 
The concept of R2P asserts in addition to territorial states that it is the responsibility of non-
territorial states and the UN to protect the populations from genocide. This was treated in section 
three. R2P does not however clearly show what the tasks of each are. Yet, there is no evidence 
that it was meant in R2P that they would have to act together all the time in which case there 
would still be need to know how that could be operationalized. In whatever case, the measures 
that may be taken by non-territorial states and/or through the UN at the primary level include to 
encourage territorial states to meet their responsibilities, to help them to build their capacity to 
protect as well as to help them exercise their responsibilities. At the secondary level, measures 
include positive and negative political and diplomatic ones which involve various possible 
measures. Though the idea that the obligation of states to prevent genocide is not limited by 
territory shown in chapter six of this work is almost reiterated also by the R2P, the difference is 
that, unlike the R2P, chapter six and seven have tried to show the legal framework of preventive 
actions by non-territorial states and the organs of the UN in a separate way. At the tertiary level, 
the R2P requires collective action through the Security Council and under chapter VII of the 
Charter of the UN in order to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity where territorial states have manifestly failed to protect them. The 
use of force authorized by the SC is among possible measures under the R2P. This concept failed 
however to reach a consensus on criteria that would not only guide the SC in deciding to 
authorize the use of force in order to put an end to those crimes but also bind it to do so in case 
those crimes occur. The concept also failed to provide for alternatives in case of the absolute 
failure of the SC to take action. 
On the issue related to the challenges of the R2P vis-à-vis the prevention of genocide, it has been 
noticed that the responsibility to protect has not acquired an independent legal status. This could 
not be established under the current status of international law. So, the R2P is yet to be seen as a 
legal obligation. However, on the question whether in its current form it may be a new means to 
prevent genocide, it can be agreed with Schabas that in its substance, the R2P is the same with 
the duty to prevent genocide and therefore, for the purpose of this work, the duty to prevent 




again, it is “subject to application and sanction by the courts.”1442  The obligation to prevent 
genocide carries with it the legal weight that it can be enforced. However, for the advocates of 
the R2P and those who would like to find the R2P as legal principle and would act accordingly to 
prevent genocide; that is well and good. After all, it does not matter if the prevention of genocide 
is achieved in the name (or under the umbrella) of the R2P. But whenever the obligation is 
breached, the breach will be of the obligation to prevent genocide. In fact, relying only on the 
R2P may render the obligation to prevent genocide weak. I argue that had the obligation to 
prevent genocide been clear enough before the conception and development of this concept, 
there would have been little need to develop the R2P at least as far as the prevention of genocide 
is concerned. This is not the same as saying that R2P is not relevant. Since in the prevention of 
genocide all means that would contribute to the prevention of genocide are relevant, R2P may be 
one of those means despite the challenges it faces. It must be recognised that, given the fact that 
this concept came during the period in which there were so many uncertainties on what the 
obligation to prevent genocide entailed, this concept and its explanation helped in raising the 
awareness on the necessity to prevent genocide, and to some extent, it reaffirms how the 
international community acknowledges its existing but dormant duty to prevent genocide.
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Chapter IX. Summary and General Conclusions 
1. Summary 
The main question that this work has treated is what the obligation to prevent genocide in 
international law entails to its bearers. This implied also the question about who those bearers 
are. The aim was to examine whether and to what extent international law should be 
understood/interpreted/developed in a way that it allows or enables a more effective prevention 
of genocide in order to achieve the goal for which the laws on the prohibition of genocide have 
been put in place. It thus provided an assessment of the international legal regime on the 
prevention of genocide and on what that obligation requires its bearers to do, when, where, and 
how, while at the same time identifying where there are shortcomings and suggesting how things 
can be improved. The context, research question, objective, sources and structure of the work 
have been given in chapter I on the general introduction. 
Before going far in those legal questions, a primary question related to the main one needed an 
answer. This is the question what prevention itself means. Being a word used in different fields, 
prevention is elaborated on in chapter II in order to explain its meaning and structure in some of 
those fields, namely public health, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, criminology, 
environmental law and torture. For all those fields, prevention means to avert harm from 
occurring. It requires taking appropriate preventive measures at the right moment. For some 
fields like public health and criminology, the structure of prevention is explicitly divided in 
different temporal divisions which are the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. The primary 
level consists of the period before the existence of signs of harm. While the secondary level is 
the period when there are symptoms/signs of harm, the tertiary level is when the harm is 
occurring. For each level, there are preventive measures tailored to it in order to avoid that the 
situation becomes worse. For those other fields which do not use this temporal division as such, 
it has been shown from the nature of the preventive measures needed that these levels are also 
implied. In Chapter III, the question becomes to know what that meaning of prevention and 
structure means to the prevention of genocide (i.e whether it can apply to genocide as well). This 
required first to show how genocide comes to occur. In other words, there was a need to show 




those factors lead to genocide were also shown. It was found that genocide does not happen 
spontaneously. It passes through tangible factors in different phases. It was thus shown how the 
prevention structure through temporal divisions can be applied to these factors and phases in 
order to prevent genocide from happening. It was found that that structure is applicable to the 
prevention of genocide. 
This led to the question whether that structure is what was envisaged in the rules on the 
prevention of genocide and what should be the preventive measures by each bearer of that 
obligation in international law within that structure. This was treated in a series of chapters that 
followed. They treated the obligation to prevent genocide in international law. Indeed, chapter IV 
looked at the prevention of genocide in international law. This involved examining the origin and 
adoption of the Genocide Convention. After showing the origin and adoption of the Genocide 
Convention from a prevention perspective, this chapter also examined the meaning of prevention 
in international law. It was found that neither the Genocide Convention nor any other source of 
international law gave a particular meaning to that word. It was therefore found that the ordinary 
meaning of that word as explained in previous chapters is the one to be used in international law 
as well.  
This chapter also examined what the obligation to prevent genocide means. It was found that that 
obligation means to obligate its bearers to take all necessary preventive actions in order to avert 
genocide from occurring. The nature of that obligation to prevent genocide dictates that it has 
two faces: positive and negative. While the positive face requires the bearers to take necessary 
actions to prevent genocide from occurring, the negative one requires bearers to refrain from 
taking actions that would lead to genocide or acts of genocide per se.  It was also shown how the 
obligation to prevent genocide is an independent one, not absorbed by the obligation to punish as 
it has been considered quite often. The chapter also elaborated on who the bearers of the 
obligation to prevent genocide are under both the Genocide Convention and customary 
international law and when this obligation is due. It was found that all territorial states and non-
territorial states are bearers of the obligation to prevent genocide and that the three temporal 
divisions fits the prevention of genocide in international law. 
A next question arose to know what preventive measures should be required to each bearer. In 
other words, the question was to know what the obligation to prevent genocide entails to each 
bearer and what is owed to them at each level in the structure of prevention. Chapter V treated 




what that obligation entails to territorial states at the different levels. A number of measures have 
been invoked and tested to see whether they may be applicable in international law and whether 
and the extent to which they can contribute to the prevention of genocide. Those measures vary 
depending on the level in the process. At the primary level, a number of measures which include 
legislative ones have been given and explained to show their potential to prevent genocide and 
how they fit in the international law scheme. If the measures suggested are taken and 
implemented at the primary level, there may not be need of a secondary level. If not, measures 
that include judicial ones need be taken at the secondary level. They also include other different 
measures such as political, economic and educational ones. It was argued that if those measures 
are taken and implemented at the right time, it may prevent those symptoms from getting worse 
to lead to genocide; thus making the third level unnecessary. Moreover, when genocide has 
started, a number of available preventive measures at the tertiary level have been elaborated on 
to show their potential to put an end to genocide before it gets worse. However, for all the 
measures at each level, some challenges have been identified. These include the fact that there 
exist no national preventive mechanisms for the prevention of genocide that can coordinate and 
monitor the implementation of the available preventive measures at each phase. Another serious 
challenge is the fact that in many cases, territorial states may be either unable to take measures to 
prevent genocide, unwilling to do so or may themselves be planners of the commission of 
genocide.  
Those challenges led to another chapter on what non-territorial states may do to prevent 
genocide. This was treated in chapter VI in which it was argued that non-territorial states are 
obligated to prevent genocide as long as they have means to do so and it is in accordance with 
international law. It was elaborated on various preventive measures available to non-territorial 
states. Some of those measures are not dependent on the lack of will or ability of territorial states 
to take action. They may be taken regardless of whether or not territorial states are willing or 
able to take action to prevent genocide. These include the legislation that creates a mechanism 
that can prevent their own organs from engaging in activities that may fuel tensions among the 
populations of territorial states. That legislation should also create mechanisms that do not allow 
harbouring people who engage in criminal activities related to genocide within any territorial 
state. That legislation is necessary at the primary level. At the secondary level, other measures 




in territorial states. Some of those measures available to non-territorial states include the 
implementation of universal jurisdiction in order to punish suspects of international crimes that 
may lead to genocide wherever they are committed and regardless of the nationality of the 
suspects.  
When these measures have not been successful, measures that are needed at the tertiary level 
have been explained and tested to see whether and to what extent they can contribute to the 
prevention of genocide. Since at this level genocide is on-going, the focus has been put on the 
use of force to put an end to it. Under some conditions, it has been found that non-territorial 
states may use force to stop genocide from continuing.  
Many challenges have been identified at each level of prevention by non-territorial states. They 
include the fact that the obligation to prevent genocide is owed to everybody without any 
coordination in the determination of who has the capacity to take action and the portion of action 
each non-territorial state concerned should take. This led to another chapter on what the 
obligation to prevent genocide entails to the UN in order also to see whether the role of the UN 
can solve the challenges in previous chapters. It was found that the UN has the obligation to 
prevent genocide under general international law. It was also found that the Charter gives the 
competence to the organs of the UN to enable them to take actions to prevent genocide at each 
level of prevention. However, like for states, there is no coordination on how those organs act to 
prevent genocide. This has negative effects on the prevention especially at early phases where 
most organs have been found to have similar competences and it is difficult to divide the tasks 
among them. Another challenge is that at early phases there is a problem that the 
recommendations of the organs of the UN may not be binding upon states and other actors 
concerned. At a late phase, the challenge is that the UN depends on the will and means of states 
in implementing the actions taken by the UN organs. For instance, the fact that the UN does not 
have its own army which can be ready at any time to intervene to stop genocide when it starts 
weakens the UN capacity to prevent genocide. 
The development and challenges in the previous chapters led to another chapter on the relatively 
new concept of the Responsibility to Protect in order to address the question whether and to what 
extent this relatively new concept is a (new) means to the prevention of genocide. It has been 
shown that this concept came into existence due to the many failures of the international 
community to prevent genocide and other massive atrocities that have been committed. It was 




found that this concept and its explanation helped in raising the awareness on the necessity to 
prevent genocide and to some extent it reaffirms how the international community acknowledges 
its existing but dormant duty to prevent genocide. It was shown that it has the potential to 
contribute to the prevention of genocide but at the same time it was warned that if the debate is 
exclusively oriented to making it an independent legal obligation, it will neither be possible nor 
will it be necessary in its current form. It was instead said that the content of that concept is in a 
way part of the content of the legal obligation to prevent genocide. 
2. Conclusions and recommendations: Towards a world without 
genocide? 
This work has come to a number of conclusions. One of the main ones is that the ordinary 
meaning of prevention and its scope dictate that it be carried out in a structured way: primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels. This structure is not only applicable to the prevention of genocide 
in international law but also indispensable. Therefore, the prevention of genocide in international 
law is not limited to the phase when genocide is being committed as it has been considered in the 
past. That tendency to deal with late phases of the process to genocide is wrong and presumably 
explains the failure to prevent genocide in a number of examples. To prevent genocide requires 
dealing with factors that may contribute to leading to genocidal conflicts, i.e to tackle and 
address the root causes before the symptoms of genocide appear, in order to create an 
environment that does not give chance to the emergence of the symptoms that may lead to 
genocide. In all fields where prevention is paramount, the earliest phase (primary) has been 
found to be the most important one because if it is successful, it may serve the purpose of 
prevention to the maximum. In the case of genocide also, prevention at that phase is indeed the 
most important part since it precludes even the symptoms of genocide from occurring. Given the 
fact that this phase is very important in the prevention of genocide, international law should be 
understood to include it. Other phases are important as well. In fact, prevention being a 
continuous process, it requires not only to stop the harm from starting but also to halt it when it 
has started. Prevention of genocide is therefore a process not limited to what must be done before 
the symptoms. It continues to address those symptoms (after they appear) and to address the 
perpetration of genocide. This being said, this work has come to the conclusion that prevention 




process to genocide. Where international law is not clear enough, this work has shown in details 
how it should be improved from the earliest phases to the latest ones. It concludes that 
preventing genocide requires that international law be applied through the primary-secondary-
tertiary-based approach. This means that the bearers of obligation to prevent genocide need to 
take concrete measures at each level without the need to first amend the Genocide Convention. 
This conclusion can solve the problem of emptiness that has characterized the concept of 
prevention in international law for many years. The model in this work can contribute to filling 
this concept with clear and tangible measures all along the whole process to genocide. 
This conclusion cannot be relevant if the obligation to prevent genocide is not an independent 
legal obligation. Indeed it has been concluded that, contrary to how it has been considered in the 
past, this obligation has its own legal status. It is not and could not be absorbed by the obligation 
to punish genocide.  
With regard to the bearers of this obligation, this work has concluded that states parties to the 
Genocide Convention are not the only bearers of the obligation to prevent genocide because this 
obligation has acquired a customary law status. That is why it was also concluded that states 
non-parties to the Genocide Convention and the UN are also bearers of the obligation to prevent 
genocide. The findings highlighted in the chapters related to what each of those bearers of the 
obligation to prevent genocide should do to prevent genocide are significant. The work 
concluded however that prevention of genocide cannot be effective if the task for each bearer is 
not clearly shown and if the challenges involved are not addressed. That is why the conclusions 
of this work are accompanied by recommendations of how some serious challenges should be 
addressed.  
Firstly, all territorial states should put in place legislation that addresses the prevention of 
genocide at the primary level. Such legislation should inter alia penalise genocide and crimes 
that may lead to it. It should also provide for universal jurisdiction in order not only to dissuade 
potential perpetrators anywhere in the world, but also to enable them to prosecute them in case 
they actually commit those crimes. At the secondary level all territorial states should enforce 
those laws wherever they are breached. This is the same at the tertiary level. Since the lack of 
monitoring and coordination mechanism in the actions by territorial states is a challenge to the 
prevention of genocide as identified in this work, the legislation should include the creation of 
national preventive mechanisms to prevent genocide by territorial states. Pursuant to existing 




rules on the prevention of genocide, there is nothing that can preclude territorial states from 
creating such mechanisms since they are necessary for the prevention of genocide. Therefore, 
this work does not recommend that there be an amendment of the Genocide Convention (or an 
adoption of an additional protocol) in order to solely require such mechanisms. However, if an 
amendment of the Genocide Convention (or an adoption of an additional protocol to it) is ever 
initiated for other challenges, it is desirable that it includes those national preventive mechanisms 
to make the point clear for territorial states. The powers that such an amendment (or additional 
protocol) should require for independent national mechanisms include to initiate, undertake and 
monitor educational programs that educate to accommodate difference on each category of 
people with the focus to children and the youth (but of course without excluding adults who, in 
most cases are the ones who inject the virus in the minds of their children). 
Secondly, the work of these national mechanisms needs to be reported to a relevant body in the 
prevention of genocide. This body does not exist. There is therefore a need for states and the UN 
to create an organisation for the prevention of genocide (OPG) not only in order to monitor and 
coordinate the actions of territorial states (directly or through the channel of national preventive 
mechanisms) but also to monitor and coordinate the actions of non-territorial states and the UN. 
In order for this organisation to be capable of doing its work in an effective way, a fund for the 
prevention of genocide (FPG) should be created and it should be administered by the 
organisation for the prevention of genocide. This will contribute to the enforcement of the rules 
on the prevention of genocide if it is an independent body and should be equipped with 
appropriate means to enable it to work from the very early phases of the prevention. It should 
therefore be composed of independent persons from different disciplines in order to be able to 
deal with the different factors of genocide. It would develop guidelines on how bearers of the 
obligation to prevent genocide should deal with those factors and phases of genocide and the 
modes of intervention at each level of prevention. This Organisation for the Prevention of 
Genocide should be created without necessarily involving an amendment of the Charter (even 
though the amendment of the Charter would make it much clearer and presumably much more 
efficient). It can be done by either amending the Genocide Convention or adopting an additional 
protocol to the Genocide Convention. This amendment (or protocol) is possible, and the bearers 
of the obligation to prevent genocide should not wait long before they understand its dire 




an international organisation. But today the world has evolved and time has come for the world 
to learn from experience and precedents. The example of Jean Jacques Gautier dovetails nicely 
with this area and can serve as a ground for a hope that such an amendment or adoption of an 
additional protocol can be possible in the future. In 1977 Jean Jacques Gautier founded the Swiss 
committee for the prevention of torture which later became Association for the prevention of 
torture with the idea to have a universal mechanism for the prevention of torture by regularly 
inspecting places of detention.1443 This idea was espoused by the Council of Europe which 
adopted the convention on the prevention of torture. This convention created the Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture with the mandate to visit places of detention. The idea was also 
espoused by the UN which adopted the optional protocol to the CAT which also created 
international and national preventive mechanisms to visit the places of detention.1444 Learning 
from this experience does not only bring the hope that such an amendment or protocol is possible 
but also serves as a good example on what such an amendment or protocol should include.  
Thirdly, there is a need to put in place a permanent military force for the prevention of genocide 
to solve problems related to the challenges of delays in getting military troops to stop genocide 
(when the UN has authorised it). This can be possible even without necessarily involving the 
amendment of the Charter. The ideal is to have such a force together all the time. However, this 
suggestion may be criticized for being unrealistic because of the huge costs that it can involve. 
Yet, those who would criticize it might have the difficulty to prove that it would be more 
expensive than how it is now where billions of dollars are spent to deal with the consequences of 
genocidal conflicts. In case this idea to have such force together paid by the UN would be 
opposed, an alternative suggestion is to require each state to have a stand-by military unit or 
brigade kept at home (under the responsibility of that state) but ready to serve for the purpose of 
prevention of genocide immediately when the decision to do so has been reached. This does not 
require extra money for the UN until the force starts to be used by the UN. It can even be 
believed that such readiness itself can play a big deterrent role in the prevention of genocide and 
would be an economic way to do things. 
Fourthly, where no decision to end an on-going genocide can be reached by the UN for whatever 
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reasons, depending on their military capacity, and under the conditions set in this work, non-
territorial states should use force to end genocide which is a grave breach of international law. 
This can be done without the need to amend the Charter but where the amendment could be 
possible and initiated, it is desirable that it be explicitly included in it in order to end the almost 
interminable debate on that. 
Fifthly, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect with regard to the prevention of genocide in 
the three major phases as said above is not a new or an emerging principle. The prevention of 
genocide within that structure is what was there before this concept was developed but has been 
neglected, misused or simply violated in practice. What is needed is to adjust it by clarifying 
some obscure provisions and by adding what is missing in order to make it effective in the future 
and this concept has helped in that regard, despite its challenges. The Responsibility to Protect 
should therefore be used to serve the obligation to prevent genocide instead of absorbing or 
suffocating it. It should be developed in a direction that enhances the obligation to prevent 
genocide instead of weakening it. There is a risk that trying to make it an independent legal 
principle may distract the attention that should be given to the obligation to prevent genocide. 
Sixthly, there is a need to educate and raise the awareness of the people of the world on the 
necessity to prevent genocide. States and the UN should do this by initiating, promoting and 
encouraging researches by intellectuals concerned with the prevention of genocide. Education 
could help in addressing the issue of lack of political will that has characterized this area as 
shown through some instances in this work. Indeed, for too long, too many of those who were 
able to do something to prevent genocide have not been willing to do so. Yet, the political will is 
the engine to make the proposed model for the prevention of genocide work. Education will 
contribute to progressively establish a culture of prevention among the people and it may 
presumably have a positive impact because if the sensitivity of the public on the necessity to 
prevent genocide is developed, the latter could influence the political leaders to act, where 
necessary, in order to prevent genocide. The challenge is that those capable states as well as 
intellectuals from the most capable parts of the world may be not very much concerned with the 
prevention of genocide because they may not be pressed by its imminence at their doors as it is 
in those other parts of the world where genocide is much more likely. Yet, intellectuals from the 
latter areas are a few and in many cases, they are silenced by the regimes in place or they lack 




undertake such research despite those challenges, may have an insignificant audience and this 
may make their voices lack significant outcome. 
Seventhly, since another way to address the political will would presumably be to hold the 
bearers of that obligation responsible if they breach it, with the legal consequences pertaining to 
that; the bearers of that obligation should work on the clarification of that area and on making it 
possible. That will allow law to play its role. Law does not make people become angels, but it 
limits them from doing evil things or abstaining from what they ought to do, the violation of 
which results in legal consequences against the violators. This area on the responsibility for the 
breach of the obligation to prevent genocide was not treated in depth in this work but there is a 
need to treat that question in order to see whether and to what extent holding the bearers of the 
obligation to prevent genocide responsible could contribute to making the prevention of genocide 
effective. Genocide is the crime of crimes because of the unspeakable damages and pains it 
causes. The bearers of the obligation to prevent genocide need to be more serious in applying the 
existing rules of international law on the prevention of genocide  and finding new solutions to the 
challenges surrounding that area in order to avoid that this odious crime  happens again. 
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Dit proefschrift behandelt de vraag wat de verplichting om genocide te voorkomen meebrengt 
voor zijn dragers volgens het internationaal recht. Dit impliceerde ook de vraag wie die dragers 
zijn. De hoofdvraag van dit onderzoek werd opgeworpen vanwege langdurige stilstand van het 
Genocideverdrag met betrekking tot het antwoord op de preventie van genocide. De inhoud van 
de verplichting om genocide te voorkomen is grotendeels verwaarloosd. Dit houdt verband met 
het feit dat het concept van preventie zelf niet wordt verduidelijkt in het Genocideverdrag. Niet 
alleen wordt de betekenis van dit concept preventie niet verduidelijkt in het Genocideverdrag, 
ook bevat het internationaal recht in zijn algemeenheid niet veel aanwijzingen over de inhoud 
van dit concept. Bovendien is het meeste academische onderzoek naar de preventie van genocide 
verricht door historici, filosofen en sociale wetenschappers en niet door juristen. Het doel van dit 
proefschrift is dan ook geweest dat gat te vullen door de internationaalrechtelijke regeling van de 
preventie van genocide te evalueren, door te evalueren wat, wanneer en hoe deze regeling de 
dragers van internationaal recht verplicht op te treden, door te identificeren wat de 
tekortkomingen van die regeling zijn en door suggesties te doen ter verbetering ervan. Daarmee 
is onderzocht of en in hoeverre het internationaal recht zodanig moet worden 
begrepen/geïnterpreteerd/ontwikkeld dat het een effectievere preventie van genocide toestaat of 
mogelijk maakt, teneinde het doel te bereiken waarvoor regels met betrekking tot het verbod van 
genocide zijn vastgesteld. Het is beperkt tot de verplichtingen van staten en de VN om genocide 
te voorkomen en er is niet (uitgebreid) ingegaan op vragen naar hun verantwoordelijkheid in 
geval van het niet-nakomen van die verplichtingen. 
Dit onderzoek is niet beperkt tot specifieke landen als case study. In het onderzoek zijn enkele 
voorbeelden gegeven van staten waarin genocide voorgekomen is, zonder overigens een 
specifieke regio of staat in het achterhoofd te hebben, teneinde de theoretische argumentaties te 
verifiëren. Aangezien genocide een mondiaal probleem is, was het onderzoek ook mondiaal. 
Een groot deel van het werk bestaat uit de uitwerking van de betekenis en de reikwijdte van het 
concept preventie en van de middelen, instrumenten en methoden die beschikbaar zijn voor 
staten en de VN om genocide te voorkomen tijdens het gehele genocideproces, dat wil zeggen 




De juiste methode in dit onderzoek was de analyse van de algemene literatuur en juridische 
materialen. Algemene literatuur over het concept preventie is gebruikt om de betekenis en 
strekking van dat begrip in het algemeen te verduidelijken. Wetenschappelijk onderzoek op 
diverse gebieden, zoals volksgezondheid, criminologie, economie, milieu en sociologie is 
gebruikt. Aangezien de gewone betekenis van de termen bovendien relevant is bij de interpretatie 
van internationaal recht, is het gebruik van deze algemene literatuur nuttig geweest omdat het 
heeft bijgedragen aan het ophelderen van de betekenis en de reikwijdte van het begrip preventie 
en de verplichting onder internationaal recht tijdens de verschillende fasen in de processen die 
leiden tot genocide om genocide te voorkomen. Wat betreft de juridische materialen zijn 
internationale verdragen en gewoonterecht gebruikt om de “ratio legis” van het 
Genocideverdrag, de inhoud van de verplichting om genocide te voorkomen en zijn structuur en 
grenzen te laten zien. Als bijkomende wijze van het bepalen van de rechtsregels is ook 
rechtspraak gebruikt, om te laten zien hoe instrumenten van internationaal recht zijn 
geïnterpreteerd en toegepast door gerechten met betrekking tot de preventie van genocide. Ook is 
juridische doctrine gebruikt om regels en beginselen van het internationaal recht met betrekking 
tot de preventie van genocide die niet voldoende zijn gedefinieerd in internationale verdragen te 
verduidelijken. Andere juridisch relevante bronnen zoals resoluties van bevoegde organen van de 
VN zijn gebruikt en geanalyseerd om de mate te laten zien waarin zij kan hebben bijgedragen 
aan de ontwikkeling van internationaal recht op het gebied van de preventie van genocide en om 
de statenpraktijk en die van de VN bij het nemen van maatregelen om genocide te voorkomen te 
laten zien en te bespreken. 
Om de vragen te beantwoorden die in dit boek gesteld zijn, is het verdeeld in negen 
hoofdstukken. De context, vraagstelling, doelstelling, bronnen en structuur van het werk zijn 
behandeld in hoofdstuk I over de algemene inleiding. Alvorens zo ver in te gaan op de juridische 
vragen, behoeft een primaire vraag die gerelateerd is aan de hoofdvraag beantwoording. Dat is de 
vraag wat preventie zelf betekent. Omdat het woord gebruikt wordt op verschillende terreinen is 
preventie uitgewerkt in hoofdstuk II, teneinde de betekenis en de structuur ervan uit te leggen op 
een aantal van deze terreinen, namelijk volksgezondheid, non-proliferatie van kernwapens, 
criminologie, milieurecht en marteling. Op al deze terreinen betekent preventie het voorkomen 
dat kwaad plaatsvindt. Het vereist het nemen van passende preventieve maatregelen op het juiste 





preventie expliciet opgedeeld in verschillende temporele onderverdelingen, die de primaire, 
secundaire en tertiaire niveaus zijn. Het primaire niveau bestaat uit de periode vóór het bestaan 
van tekenen van schade. Terwijl het secundaire niveau de periode is waarin er 
symptomen/tekenen van schade voorkomen, is het tertiaire niveau de periode waarin de schade 
zich voordoet. Voor elk niveau bestaan er preventieve maatregelen die zijn afgestemd om te 
voorkomen dat de situatie verslechtert. Voor andere terreinen, die geen gebruik maken van deze 
tijdsonderscheidingen als zodanig, is uit de aard van de vereiste preventieve maatregelen 
gebleken dat deze niveaus ook worden geïmpliceerd. In hoofdstuk III wordt de vraag beantwoord 
wat die betekenis van preventie en structuur betekent voor het voorkomen van genocide (dat wil 
zeggen of ook kan worden toegepast op genocide). Daarvoor is eerst vereist te laten zien hoe het 
komt dat genocide voorkomt. Het was, met andere woorden, nodig het proces tot genocide te 
laten zien. De factoren van genocide werden toegelicht. En de fasen waardoor deze factoren 
leiden tot genocide werden ook getoond. Geconcludeerd werd dat genocide spontaan voorkomt. 
Het gebeurt door tastbare factoren in verschillende fasen. Daarmee werd getoond hoe de 
preventiestructuur door middel van tijdsonderscheidingen toegepast kan worden op deze factoren 
en fasen zodat voorkomen kan worden dat genocide voorkomt. Er werd vastgesteld dat deze 
structuur toepasselijk is op genocidepreventie. 
Dit leidde tot de vraag of die structuur is wat voorzien was in de regels ter voorkoming van 
genocide en wat de preventieve maatregelen binnen die structuur moeten zijn, die genomen 
moeten worden door iedere drager van die verplichting naar internationaal recht. Dit werd 
behandeld in een reeks hoofdstukken die volgde. Deze hoofdstukken behandelden de 
verplichting tot voorkoming van genocide naar het internationaal recht. Hoofdstuk IV bekeek de 
voorkoming van genocide in het internationaal recht. Dit hield onderzoek in naar de oorsprong 
en adoptie van het Genocideverdrag. Na de oorsprong en adoptie van het genocideverdrag te 
hebben laten zien vanuit een preventieperspectief bestudeerde dit hoofdstuk ook de betekenis van 
preventie in het internationale recht. Geconcludeerd werd dat noch het Genocideverdrag, noch 
enige andere bron van internationaal recht een specifieke betekenis geeft aan het woord. Daarom 
werd geconcludeerd dat de gewone betekenis van het woord, zoals uitgelegd in de voorafgaande 
hoofdstukken, de betekenis is die ook in het internationaal recht moet worden gebruikt. 
Dit hoofdstuk onderzocht ook wat de verplichting tot genocidepreventie betekent. Het bleek dat 




maatregelen ter voorkoming van genocide. De aard van die verplichting tot genocidepreventie 
schrijft voor dat die twee ‘gezichten’ heeft: positief en negatief. Terwijl het positieve gezicht van 
de dragers eist dat ze allen noodzakelijke maatregelen nemen om te voorkomen dat genocide 
voorkomt, eist het negatieve gezicht van de dragers dat ze zich onthouden van acties die zouden 
leiden tot genocide of van genocideacties per se. Getoond werd ook hoe de verplichting tot 
genocidepreventie een onafhankelijke verplichting is, die niet is opgenomen in de verplichting 
om te straffen, zoals vaak wel wordt aangenomen. Het hoofdstuk werkte ook uit wie de dragers 
van de verplichting tot genocidepreventie volgens zowel het Genocideverdrag als het 
internationaal gewoonterecht zijn en wanneer deze verplichting geëffectueerd moet worden. 
Gevonden werd dat alle territoriale en niet-territoriale staten drager van de verplichting tot 
genocidepreventie zijn en dat de drie temporele onderscheidingen passend zijn voor de 
verplichting tot genocidepreventie in het internationaal recht. 
De volgende vraag die opkwam was welke preventieve maatregelen voor iedere drager vereist 
zouden zijn. Met andere woorden, de vraag was wat de verplichting tot voorkoming van 
genocide meebrengt voor iedere drager en waartoe zij verplicht zijn op ieder niveau in de 
preventiestructuur. Een aantal maatregelen is ingeroepen en getest om erachter te komen in 
hoeverre ze van toepassing kunnen zijn in het internationale recht en in hoeverre ze kunnen 
bijdragen aan de voorkoming van genocide. Deze maatregelen variëren afhankelijk van het 
niveau in het proces. Op het eerste niveau is een aantal maatregelen, inclusief wetgevende 
maatregelen, genoemd en uitgewerkt om hun potentieel tot het voorkomen van genocide te tonen 
en om te laten zien hoe ze in het internationaal recht passen. Als de genoemde maatregelen 
geïmplementeerd worden op het primaire niveau kan het zijn dat het tweede niveau niet nodig is. 
Zo niet, dan is het nodig maatregelen, inclusief rechterlijke, te nemen op het tweede niveau. 
Deze houden ook andere maatregelen in, zoals politieke, economische en onderwijsmaatregelen. 
Betoogd werd dat als deze maatregelen genomen worden en op het juiste moment worden 
geïmplementeerd, zij kunnen voorkomen dat de symptomen zodanig erger worden dat ze tot 
genocide leiden, daarmee het derde niveau overbodig makend. Voor het geval genocide gestart 
is, is bovendien een aantal beschikbare preventieve maatregelen op het derde niveau uitgewerkt 
om hun potentieel tot het stoppen van de genocide te tonen voordat die erger wordt. Van alle 
maatregelen op ieder niveau zijn evenwel ook enkele uitdagingen geïdentificeerd. Deze omvatten 





implementatie van de beschikbare preventieve maatregelen in iedere fase kan coördineren en 
monitoren. Een andere serieuze uitdaging is het feit dat in veel gevallen territoriale staten ofwel 
niet in staat zijn maatregelen te nemen om genocide te voorkomen, ofwel niet bereid zijn om dat 
te doen of zelf plannen genocide te plegen. 
Die uitdagingen leidden tot een hoofdstuk over wat niet-territoriale staten kunnen doen om 
genocide te voorkomen. Dit werd behandeld in hoofdstuk VI, waarin betoogd werd dat niet-
territoriale staten verplicht zijn genocide te voorkomen voor zover zij de middelen hebben om 
dat te doen en dat in overeenstemming is met internationaal recht. Verschillende preventieve 
maatregelen die beschikbaar zijn voor niet-territoriale staten werden uitgewerkt. Enkele van die 
maatregelen zijn niet afhankelijk van de wil of het vermogen van territoriale staten om actie te 
ondernemen. Ze kunnen onafhankelijk van de wil van territoriale staten om actie te ondernemen 
worden genomen ter voorkoming van genocide. Ze houden onder meer wetgeving in die een 
mechanisme creëert dat kan voorkomen dat hun eigen organen deelnemen in activiteiten die 
spanningen vergroten tussen de bevolkingsgroepen van territoriale staten. Die wetgeving zou ook 
mechanismen moeten creëren die het niet toestaat onderdak te bieden aan mensen die betrokken 
zijn bij criminele activiteiten die gerelateerd zijn aan genocide in een territoriale staat. Deze 
wetgeving is nodig op het eerste niveau. Op het tweede niveau zijn andere maatregelen 
uitgewerkt en getest om te zien in hoeverre ze genocide kunnen voorkomen in territoriale staten. 
Sommige van de maatregelen die beschikbaar zijn voor niet-territoriale staten omvatten de 
implementatie van universele jurisdictie, teneinde verdachten van internationale misdrijven die 
kunnen leiden tot genocide te straffen, ongeacht waar ze zijn gepleegd en ongeacht de 
nationaliteit van de verdachten. 
Voor wanneer deze maatregelen niet succesvol zijn geweest, zijn maatregelen die nodig zijn op 
het derde niveau uitgelegd en getest, om te zien in hoeverre zij kunnen bijdragen aan de 
preventie van genocide. Aangezien genocide op dat niveau reeds gaande is, is de focus gelegd op 
het gebruik van geweld om genocide te stoppen. De uitkomst was hier dat niet-territoriale staten 
onder enkele voorwaarden geweld mogen gebruiken om genocide te stoppen. 
Vele uitdagingen zijn geïdentificeerd op elk niveau van preventie door niet- territoriale staten. 
Zij omvatten het feit dat de verplichting om genocide te voorkomen tot eenieder gericht is, 
zonder coördinatie van de vaststelling wie de capaciteit heeft om actie te ondernemen en van het 




over wat de verplichting tot voorkoming van genocide meebrengt voor de VN, om te zien of de 
rol van de VN de in de vorige hoofdstukken geschetste uitdagingen kan oplossen. Naar voren 
kwam in dit hoofdstuk dat de VN volgens het algemeen internationaal recht verplicht is genocide 
te voorkomen. Ook kwam naar voren dat het Handvest bevoegdheden aan de organen van de VN 
geeft om hen op ieder niveau van de voorkoming van genocide in staat te stellen. Evenals voor 
de staten is er evenwel geen coördinatie van de handelingen van deze organen tot het voorkomen 
van genocide. Dit heeft negatieve effecten voor de preventie, in het bijzonder in de vroege stadia, 
in welke de meeste organen vergelijkbare bevoegdheden blijken te hebben en het moeilijk is de 
taken tussen hen te verdelen. Een andere uitdaging in de vroege stadia is het probleem dat 
aanbevelingen van de organen van de VN niet bindend voor staten en andere betrokken actoren 
kunnen zijn. In een laat stadium is de uitdaging dat de VN afhankelijk is van de wil en de 
middelen van de staten om maatregelen van de VN te implementeren. Een voorbeeld is dat de 
capaciteit van de VN om genocide te voorkomen verzwakt wordt doordat het geen eigen leger 
heeft dat op ieder moment klaarstaat om in te grijpen teneinde genocide te stoppen. 
De ontwikkeling en de uitdagingen in de vorige hoofdstukken leidden tot hoofdstuk (VIII) over 
het relatief nieuwe concept ‘the Responsibility to Protect’, om de vraag te behandelen of en in 
hoeverre dit relatief nieuwe concept een (nieuwe) mogelijkheid biedt voor het voorkomen van 
genocide. Getoond werd dat dit concept ontwikkeld is als reactie op de vele mislukkingen van de 
internationale gemeenschap om genocide en andere massale wreedheden die gepleegd zijn te 
voorkomen. Naar voren kwam dat dit concept en de uitleg ervan geholpen heeft bij het verhogen 
van het bewustzijn van de noodzaak om genocide te voorkomen en dat het tot op zekere hoogte 
herbevestigd hoe de internationale gemeenschap zijn bestaande maar ‘slapende’ plicht om 
genocide te voorkomen erkent. Gebleken is dat het potentieel heeft om bij te dragen aan de 
preventie van genocide, hoewel tegelijkertijd gewaarschuwd werd dat als het debat exclusief gaat 
over het tot onafhankelijke rechtsplicht maken ervan, het noch mogelijk, noch noodzakelijk zal 
zijn in zijn huidige vorm. In plaats daarvan werd betoogd dat de inhoud van het concept op een 
bepaalde manier de inhoud is van de verplichting tot voorkoming van genocide. 
Dit proefschrift vat een aantal conclusies samen in hoofdstuk IX. Een van de belangrijkste is dat 
de gewone betekenis van preventie en het bereik daarvan voorschrijft dat het uitgevoerd wordt 
op een bepaalde manier: het eerste, tweede en derde niveau. Deze structuur is niet alleen van 





Daarom is de preventie van genocide in het internationaal recht niet beperkt tot de fase waarin 
genocide plaatsvindt, zoals in het verleden wel werd aangenomen. Die neiging om te handelen in 
de late fasen van het genocideproces is verkeerd en verklaart vermoedelijk het mislukken van het 
voorkomen van genocide in een aantal gevallen. Genocide voorkomen vereist het aanpakken van 
factoren die kunnen bijdragen aan genocideconflicten, dat wil zeggen het aanpakken en 
behandelen van de onderliggende oorzaken voordat de symptomen van genocide naar voren 
komen, teneinde een milieu te creëren het opduiken van de symptomen die tot genocide kunnen 
leiden geen kans geeft. Gebleken is dat op alle terreinen waarop preventie van het grootste 
belang is de vroegste (eerste) fase is, omdat succes dan het doel van preventie maximaal dient. In 
het geval van genocide is preventie in die fase ook van het grootste belang omdat dat voorkomt 
dat zelfs de symptomen van genocide voorkomen. Omdat deze fase zeer belangrijk is bij het 
voorkomen van genocide moet internationaal recht zo begrepen worden dat het deze fase omvat. 
Andere fasen zijn ook belangrijk. Sterker nog, omdat preventie een continu proces is vereist het 
niet alleen dat voorkomen wordt dat dit kwaad een begin heeft, maar ook dat het gestopt wordt 
wanneer er wel een begin van is. Genocidepreventie is daarom niet een proces dat beperkt is tot 
datgene wat moet gebeuren voor er symptomen zijn. Het omvat ook de behandeling van die 
symptomen (nadat ze zich hebben voorgedaan) en het aanpakken van het plegen van genocide. 
Dit gezegd zijnde komt dit boek tot de conclusie dat genocidepreventie begrepen moet worden 
als een continu proces dat ingrijpt op ieder niveau van het genocideproces. Waar het 
internationaal recht niet duidelijk genoeg is, heeft dit boek gedetailleerd laten zien hoe het 
verbeterd kan worden, vanaf de vroegste fase tot de laatste. Het concludeert dat 
genocidepreventie vereist dat internationaal recht toegepast wordt door middel van de eerste-
tweede-derde-gebaseerde aanpak. Dit betekent dat de dragers van de verplichting tot voorkoming 
van genocide op ieder niveau concrete maatregelen moeten nemen zonder dat aanpassing van het 
Genocideverdrag nodig is. Deze conclusie kan het probleem van de leegte die het 
preventieconcept in het internationaal recht vele jaren gekenmerkt heeft oplossen. Het model in 
dit werk kan bijdragen aan het vullen van dit concept met duidelijke en tastbare maatregelen 
voor het gehele genocideproces. 
Deze conclusie kan niet relevant zijn als de verplichting tot voorkoming van genocide niet een 




dat in het verleden overwogen is, de verplichting zijn eigen juridische status heeft. Zij is niet en 
kan niet opgenomen zijn in de verplichting genocide te bestraffen. 
Wat betreft de dragers van de verplichting heeft dit werk geconcludeerd dat de staten die partij 
zijn bij het Genocideverdrag niet de enige dragers zijn van de verplichting tot voorkoming van 
genocide, omdat de verplichting de status heeft verworven van internationaal gewoonterecht. Dat 
is de reden dat geconcludeerd werd dat ook staten die geen partij zijn bij het Genocideverdrag en 
de VN drager van de verplichting tot voorkoming van genocide zijn. De bevindingen waarop de 
nadruk is gelegd in de hoofdstukken die gaan over wat elk van de dragers van de verplichting om 
genocide te voorkomen moet doen zijn significant. Het boek heeft evenwel geconcludeerd dat 
genocidepreventie niet effectief kan zijn als de taak van elke drager niet duidelijk wordt gemaakt 
en als de uitdagingen niet het hoofd wordt geboden. Om die reden bevat dit werk aanbevelingen 
over hoe sommige serieuze uitdagingen het hoofd zouden moeten worden geboden. 
Ten eerste moeten alle territoriale staten wetgeving aannemen die over de genocidepreventie op 
het eerste niveau gaat. Dergelijke wetgeving moet onder andere genocide en misdrijven die 
daartoe kunnen leiden strafbaar stellen. Ze moet ook universele jurisdictie inhouden; niet alleen 
om potentiële plegers van genocide waar dan ook ter wereld te ontmoedigen, maar ook om het 
mogelijk te maken dat ze vervolgd worden als ze deze misdrijven daadwerkelijk plegen. Op het 
tweede niveau moeten alle territoriale staten die wetten handhaven wanneer ze overtreden 
worden. Dit geldt ook voor het derde niveau. Omdat een uitdaging voor genocidepreventie die in 
dit werk geïdentificeerd is een gebrek aan een toezichts- en coördinatiemechanisme voor de 
acties van territoriale staten is, zou die wetgeving ook het in het leven roepen van nationale 
preventiemechanismen ter voorkoming van genocide door territoriale staten moeten inhouden. 
Op grond van de bestaande regels over genocidepreventie is er niets dat het territoriale staten kan 
beletten zulke mechanismen in het leven te roepen, aangezien ze noodzakelijk zijn voor de 
voorkoming van genocide. Om die reden beveelt dit boek niet aan het Genocideverdrag aan te 
passen (of om een aanvullend protocol aan te nemen) met het enkele doel zulke mechanismen te 
verplichten. Als evenwel ooit het initiatief genomen wordt tot het aanpassen van het 
Genocideverdrag (of tot het aannemen van een aanvullend protocol) teneinde andere uitdagingen 
het hoofd te bieden, dan is het wel wenselijk dat het die nationale preventieve maatregelen bevat, 
teneinde dat punt duidelijk te maken voor territoriale staten. De bevoegdheden die een dergelijke 





mechanismen omvatten het initiëren van, uitvoeren van en toezicht houden op educatieve 
programma’s die het accommoderen van verschil tussen verschillende categorieën van mensen 
onderwijst, met een focus op kinderen en jeugd (zonder natuurlijk volwassenen uit te sluiten die 
in de meeste gevallen het virus in de geesten van hun kinderen injecteren). 
Ten tweede moet het werk van deze nationale mechanismen gerapporteerd worden aan een 
relevant lichaam ter preventie van genocide. Een dergelijk lichaam bestaat niet. Daarom moeten 
staten en de VN een organisatie voor de preventie van genocide (OPG) oprichten, niet alleen om 
de acties van territoriale staten (direct of door middel van nationale preventiemechanismen) te 
monitoren en te coördineren, maar ook de acties van niet-territoriale staten en de VU te 
monitoren en te coördineren. Om deze organisatie in staat te stellen zijn werk effectief te doen 
moet een fonds voor de preventie van genocide (FPG) in het leven geroepen worden, welk 
beheerd zou moeten worden door de organisatie voor de preventie van genocide. Dit zal 
bijdragen aan de handhaving van de regels ter voorkoming van genocide als het een 
onafhankelijk lichaam is terwijl het uitgerust moet worden met passende middelen om het in 
staat te stellen zijn werk vanaf de zeer vroege fasen van preventie te doen. Het zou daarom 
samengesteld moeten worden van afhankelijke personen van verschillende disciplines, opdat het 
in staat is om te gaan met de verschillende factoren van genocide. Het zou richtlijnen 
ontwikkelen over hoe dragers van de verplichting tot genocidepreventie om moeten gaan met die 
factoren, met de fasen van genocide en met de modellen van interventie op ieder niveau van 
preventie. Deze Organisatie voor de Preventie van Genocide zou in het leven geroepen moeten 
worden zonder dat aanpassing van het Handvest nodig is (ook al is aanpassing van het Handvest 
duidelijker en zou het vermoedelijk efficiënter zijn). Dit kan worden gedaan door ofwel het 
Genocideverdrag aan te passen, ofwel een aanvullend protocol bij dit verdrag aan te nemen. 
Deze aanpassing (of dit protocol) is mogelijk en de dragers van de verplichting tot 
genocidepreventie zouden niet te lang moeten wachten voordat ze de bittere noodzaak ervan 
begrijpen. In de tijd dat het Genocideverdrag werd aangenomen dacht niemand aan een 
internationale organisatie. Maar vandaag is de wereld geëvolueerd en is de tijd gekomen voor de 
wereld om van ervaring en precedenten te leren. Het voorbeeld van Jean Jacques Gautier dat in 
dit werk wordt gegeven sluit goed aan bij dit terrein en kan dienen als een basis voor de hoop dat 
een dergelijke aanpassing of aanname van een aanvullend protocol mogelijk is in de nabije 




marteling op, die later de Vereniging ter voorkoming van foltering werd, met het idee een 
universeel mechanisme ter voorkoming van foltering te hebben door regelmatig detentiecentra te 
controleren. Dit idee werd omarmd door de Raad van Europa, die het Verdrag ter voorkoming 
van foltering aannam. Dit verdrag riep het Comité voor de Preventie van Foltering in het leven, 
dat een mandaat heeft om detentiecentra te bezoeken. Het idee werd ook omarmd door de VN, 
die een aanvullend protocol bij het verdrag tegen foltering aannam, welk ook internationale en 
nationale preventieve mechanismen in het leven riep tot het bezoek van detentiecentra. Het leren 
van deze ervaring doet niet alleen de hoop rijzen dat een dergelijke aanpassing of dergelijk 
protocol mogelijk is, het dient ook als een goed voorbeeld voor wat een dergelijke aanpassing of 
in een dergelijk protocol moet omvatten. 
Ten derde is het nodig een permanente militaire eenheid in het leven te roepen ter voorkoming 
van genocide om problemen op te lossen die gerelateerd zijn aan de uitdaging van vertraging bij 
het stoppen van genocide door militaire eenheden (wanneer de VN dat geautoriseerd heeft). Dit 
is zelfs mogelijk zonder aanpassing van het Handvest. Het ideaal is deze eenheid altijd te 
hebben. Deze suggestie kan evenwel als onrealistisch bekritiseerd worden wegens de enorme 
kosten die ze zou kunnen meebrengen. Degenen die de suggestie zouden bekritiseren zouden 
echter wel eens moeilijkheden kunnen ondervinden bij het bewijzen dat die duurder zou zijn dan 
dat het is om miljarden dollars te besteden aan de consequenties van genocideconflicten. Als het 
idee een dergelijke eenheid te hebben die betaald wordt door de VN wordt tegengehouden, is een 
alternatieve suggestie iedere staat te verplichten een militaire eenheid of brigade thuis stand-by te 
hebben (onder de verantwoordelijkheid van die staat), die klaarstaat om het doel van 
genocidepreventie onmiddellijk te dienen wanneer de beslissing wordt genomen dat te doen. Dit 
vereist geen extra middelen voor de VN totdat deze eenheid door de VN wordt ingezet. Zelfs kan 
worden aangenomen dat een dergelijke paraatheid zelf een grote afschrikwekkende rol kan 
spelen bij de voorkoming van genocide, terwijl die een voordelige manier kan zijn om de zaken 
aan te pakken. 
Ten vierde zouden niet-territoriale staten, wanneer door de VN om welke reden dan ook geen 
beslissing kan worden  genomen om een in gang zijnde genocide te stoppen, afhankelijk van hun 
militaire capaciteit en onder de voorwaarden die in dit werk uiteen zijn gezet, geweld moeten 
gebruiken om de genocide, die een zware schending van het internationaal recht is, te 





mogelijk zou zijn, zou het wenselijk zijn het expliciet op te nemen teneinde het zo’n beetje 
oneindige debat erover te beëindigen. 
Ten vijfde is het concept van de Responsibility to Protect met betrekking tot genocidepreventie 
in de drie hoofdfasen, zoals hiervoor werd uitgelegd, niet een nieuw of opkomend principe. De 
preventie van genocide binnen die structuur bestond al voordat dit concept werd ontwikkeld, 
maar deze is genegeerd, misbruikt of simpelweg geschonden. Wat nodig is, is dat het wordt 
aangepast door onduidelijke bepalingen te verduidelijken en door toe te voegen wat ontbreekt 
om het in de toekomst effectief te maken. Dit concept heeft in dat opzicht geholpen, ondanks zijn 
uitdagingen. De Responsibility to Protect moet derhalve worden gebruikt om de verplichting tot 
genocidepreventie te dienen in plaats van die te absorberen of te verstikken. Zij zou in een 
richting moeten worden ontwikkeld die de preventieverplichting versterkt in plaats van verzwakt. 
Er bestaat een risico dat wanneer gepoogd wordt het een onafhankelijk rechtsbeginsel te maken, 
dat mogelijk afleidt van de aandacht die gegeven zou moeten worden aan de verplichting tot 
voorkoming van genocide. 
Ten zesde is er een noodzaak de bevolking van de wereld te onderwijzen in de noodzaak van 
genocidepreventie en hun bewustzijn daarvan te vergroten. Staten en de VN zouden dit moeten 
doen door onderzoek van intellectuelen die begaan zijn met genocidepreventie te starten, te 
promoten en aan te moedigen. Onderwijs zou kunnen helpen bij het aanpakken van het punt van 
het gebrek aan politieke wil, die dit terrein gekenmerkt heeft, zoals dit werk in een aantal 
gevallen heeft laten zien. Te lang zijn te velen die iets konden doen ter voorkoming van 
preventie niet bereid geweest datgene te doen. Politieke wil is evenwel de motor die het 
voorgestelde model voor genocidepreventie zou moeten laten draaien. Onderwijs zal bijdragen 
aan de geleidelijke totstandbrenging van een cultuur van preventie onder de mensen en het kan 
vermoedelijk een positief effect hebben, want als de gevoeligheid van het publiek ten aanzien 
van de noodzaak om genocide te voorkomen wordt ontwikkeld, kan het politieke leiders 
beïnvloeden om waar nodig te handelen om genocide te voorkomen. De uitdaging is dat de 
capabele staten, evenals intellectuelen uit de meest capabele delen van de wereld zich wel eens 
niet vreselijk bezig zouden kunnen houden met genocide, omdat ze niet de druk voelen van haar 
onmiddellijke aanwezigheid, zoals dat het geval is in de andere delen van de wereld waar 
genocide veel waarschijnlijker is. Maar er zijn niet veel intellectuelen uit die andere delen en in 




middelen om onderzoek te doen dat het verschil zou kunnen maken. Zelfs de weinigen, die 
dergelijk onderzoek zouden kunnen starten ondanks de die moeilijkheden, zouden wel eens een 
gering publiek kunnen hebben, hetgeen ervoor zou zorgen dat hun stem geen significante 
betekenis heeft. 
Ten zevende zouden de dragers van die verplichting, omdat een andere manier om de politieke 
wil aan te pakken vermoedelijk zou zijn om hen verantwoordelijk te houden als ze die 
verplichting schenden, met de juridische gevolgen van dien, moeten werken aan de 
verduidelijking van dat terrein en aan het mogelijk maken ervan. Daarmee zou het recht zijn rol 
kunnen vervullen. Het recht zorgt er niet voor dat mensen engelen worden, maar het beperkt hen 
in het doen van kwaad of het zich onthouden van wat ze zouden moeten doen. De schending 
daarvan leidt tot juridische gevolgen voor de schenders. Dit onderdeel van de 
verantwoordelijkheid voor de schending van verplichting tot genocidepreventie werd niet 
diepgaand behandeld in dit werk, maar het is wel nodig die vraag te behandelen, om te zien of en 
in hoeverre het verantwoordelijk houden van de dragers van de verplichting tot 
genocidepreventie zou kunnen bijdragen aan het effectief maken van genocidepreventie. 
Genocide is de misdaad der misdaden vanwege de onuitsprekelijke schade en pijn die het 
veroorzaakt. De dragers van de verplichting tot voorkoming van genocide moeten de bestaande 
internationaalrechtelijke regels serieuzer toepassen en nieuwe oplossingen vinden voor de 
uitdagingen die aan het terrein verbonden zijn, opdat voorkomen wordt dat deze afschuwelijke 
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